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Abstract 
The first company from the People’s Republic of China listed outside Mainland 
China was an H-share enterprise listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange on July 
15, 1993. In the twenty years since then, the rapid development of the Mainland’s 
economy has created a climate in which China’s companies can internationalise, and 
some of China’s heavyweight State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) even tried to 
accelerate their overseas investment by means of transnational acquisitions and 
mergers. This thesis undertakes a detailed theoretical and empirical study exploring 
the corporate governance practices of Chinese companies that have listed on foreign 
stock exchanges; of particular interest has been the influence that foreign listing has 
exerted on the corporate governance practices of these Chinese companies. Several 
experts and scholars have provided valuable criticisms and remarks as part of the 
fieldwork for this thesis. A number of major propositions concerning the corporate 
governance of overseas listed Chinese companies are discussed and fieldwork data 
has been collected to test these propositions. 
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1 
CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW OF KEY ISSUES 
Tsingtao Brewery Corporation was the first Chinese company to list outside 
Mainland China on July 15, 1993; this was as an H-share enterprise company listed 
on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. In the wake of this listing, there has been a 
dramatic and growing trend towards overseas listing and cross-listing on the 
Mainland. Therefore, it is arguable that the corporate governance standards and 
practices of most off-shore-listed China’s enterprises have moved forward over the 
past two decades. Nevertheless, the general impression is that most 
Mainland-incorporated
1
 corporations still face a turbulent future in the light of 
blockholder control and poor performance of management, together with the legacy 
of political reform, despite their shares having been traded on highly developed 
foreign stock exchanges. Several major issues have been highlighted in the literature.  
 
Theoretically speaking, the shareholders’ general meeting is the key means of 
exercising shareholder rights, playing a part in corporate decision making both for 
the controlling and minority shareholders. However, there is no real incentive for 
minority shareholders and public shareholders in Mainland companies to participate 
in such corporate meetings due to the large proportion of non-circulating State 
Shares and Legal Person (LP) Shares, let alone an incentive to exercise their own 
rights. In recent years, more stringent measures have been introduced to give 
                                                             
1
 China, Mainland China and Mainland in this thesis refer to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), excluding 
Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan; the term “Chinese” and “China’s” will be used interchangeably.  
  
 
2 
minority and public shareholders the opportunity of referring to company records, 
and even questioning directors or supervisors, so as to encourage them to become 
more actively involved in corporate management.
2
 From a practical point of view, 
such vague provisions are still unable to realistically protect the interests of minority 
shareholders.  
 
In most Mainland corporations, ordinary shareholders cannot receive desirable 
compensation through civil remedies when directors and senior officers behave 
inappropriately or breach their duties as prescribed by the Company Law and by the 
corporation’s articles of association. Thus, shareholder representative legal 
proceedings were introduced by the 2006 Company Law of China as a vehicle for 
ordinary shareholders to be able to file lawsuits in their own name when the interests 
of the corporation are being infringed.
3
 Moreover, shareholders can also institute 
direct lawsuits so as to recover their own losses.
4
 Unfortunately, such remedies are 
still quite vague and hence cannot provide wholly satisfactory solutions for ordinary 
                                                             
2
 People’s Republic of China, Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (2005 Order No.42 of the President 
of the People’s Republic of China), Article 98 and Article 151, amended and adopted at the 18
th
 session of the 
Standing Committee of the 10
th
 National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on October 27, 
2005, and effective as of January 1, 2006, available at: 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=4685&lib=law&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=%D6%D0%B
B%AA%C8%CB%C3%F1%B9%B2%BA%CD%B9%FA%B9%AB%CB%BE%B7%A8, accessed September 22, 2012.  
3
 People’s Republic of China, Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (2005 Order No.42 of the President 
of the People’s Republic of China), Article 152, amended and adopted at the 18
th
 session of the Standing 
Committee of the 10
th
 National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on October 27, 2005, and 
effective as of January 1, 2006, available at: 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=4685&lib=law&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=%D6%D0%B
B%AA%C8%CB%C3%F1%B9%B2%BA%CD%B9%FA%B9%AB%CB%BE%B7%A8, accessed September 22, 2012.  
4
 People’s Republic of China, Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (2005 Order No.42 of the President 
of the People’s Republic of China), Article 153, amended and adopted at the 18
th
 session of the Standing 
Committee of the 10
th
 National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on October 27, 2005, and 
effective as of January 1, 2006, available at: 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=4685&lib=law&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=%D6%D0%B
B%AA%C8%CB%C3%F1%B9%B2%BA%CD%B9%FA%B9%AB%CB%BE%B7%A8, accessed September 22, 2012.  
  
 
3 
shareholders.  
 
The board of directors in most Chinese listed corporations lack real independence, 
while there is insufficient supervision over directors, supervisors and other senior 
officers. Furthermore, some recent research appears to suggest that the mandatory 
presence of independent directors in Chinese companies does not have the intended 
effect upon corporate performance.
5
 In fact, most of China’s major listed enterprises 
have been controlled by a “key man”, i.e., by the controlling shareholder, by the 
representative of the controlling shareholder or by another senior officer such as the 
company chairman. As expected, this kind of insider control model found in Chinese 
companies has been criticised by western scholars. Although China’s regulatory 
institutions have issued several circulars requiring the mandatory introduction of 
independent directors onto the board,
6
 it is virtually impossible for independent 
directors or representatives of employees to play a substantial role in corporate 
governance matters in China.  
 
The 2006 Company Law of China provides that a supervisory board, comprising a 
minimum of three supervisors, must be established in every listed enterprise.
7
 In 
                                                             
5
 Clarke, Donald C., “The Independent Director In Chinese Corporate Governance”, Delaware Journal of 
Corporate Law, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2006, p. 217.  
6
 People’s Republic of China, Establishment of Independent Director Systems by Listed Companies Guiding 
Opinion (2001 Order No.102 of China Securities Regulatory Commission of the People’s Republic of China), 
Article 3, promulgated by China Securities Regulatory Commission of the People’s Republic of China on, and 
effective as of August 16, 2001, available at: 
http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/Article/1880871/Channel/9950/Establishment-of-Independent-Director-
Systems-by-Listed-Companies-Guiding-Opinion.html, accessed January 10, 2011.  
7
 People’s Republic of China, Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (2005 Order No.42 of the President 
of the People’s Republic of China), Article 118, amended and adopted at the 18
th
 session of the Standing 
Committee of the 10
th
 National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on October 27, 2005, and 
  
 
4 
theory, the supervisory board should play a role paralleling that of the board of 
directors. In reality, the power of the supervisory board is quite weak. According to a 
recent investigation using grounded theory methodology, it was found that the roles 
of supervisory boards in the Chinese corporate environment could roughly be 
classified into four categories: (1) as an honoured guest, (2) as a friendly advisor, (3) 
as a censored watchdog or (4) as an independent watchdog;
8
 with the supervisory 
board actually only being able to perform its role of supervision in very limited cases. 
Therefore, it could be said that the supervisory boards in most of China’s listed 
corporations are dysfunctional. Through the inheritance of traditional ideas in 
China’s company law, Chinese corporations are in theory always concerned with the 
shareholders’ interests. The board of directors is generally seen as an organ for 
maximising the interests for shareholders, but the role of the supervisory board has 
largely been neglected. To a certain degree, the supervisory board in most Chinese 
companies is just an affiliated arm of the board of directors, and is controlled 
through the shareholders’ meetings.  
 
I. THE MAJOR INCENTIVES FOR OFF-SHORE LISTING BY PRC CORPORATIONS 
 
Fundamentally, companies in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) see off-shore 
                                                                                                                                                                            
effective as of January 1, 2006, available at: 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=4685&lib=law&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=%D6%D0%B
B%AA%C8%CB%C3%F1%B9%B2%BA%CD%B9%FA%B9%AB%CB%BE%B7%A8, accessed September 22, 2012.  
8
 Xiao, Zezhong; Jay, Dahya and Lin, Z. Jun, “A Grounded Theory Exposition of the Role of the Supervisory Board 
in China”, British Journal of Management, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2004, p. 39.  
  
 
5 
listing as a desirable avenue for seeking financing so as to maximise their own 
interests. Paradoxically, due to certain deficiencies in the Mainland’s capital markets, 
off-shore listing could also be seen as a realistic financing option for most of the 
PRC’s small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). And to some degree, western 
investors have always had a strong desire to take up investment opportunities in 
emerging markets, despite the recent recession. To a certain degree, the IPO and 
back-door listing of PRC corporations on foreign stock exchanges caters for this 
kind of appetite.  
 
Generally, China’s major State-Owned Enterprises (SOE)9 have good opportunities 
to obtain domestic bank loans. It is also likely that large mainland SOEs will list 
A-shares and B-shares in domestic stock exchanges like the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). When taking such 
factors into account, it is arguable that the drivers of overseas listing for major SOEs 
in the PRC are more complex than the need to raise new funds.  
 
Generally, listing on foreign stock exchanges can bring mainland SOEs larger 
amounts of capital. The current Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) traces its history 
back to November 26, 1990, while the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) was 
opened slightly earlier, on July 3 of the same year. In 2009, the combined market 
                                                             
9
 “China’s SOE” in this thesis refers to China’s state sole funded companies and enterprises, with the state as 
the biggest shareholder. 
  
 
6 
capitalisation of the SSE and SZSE was approximately RMB
10
 14,607,500,727,746 
(US$ 2,137,474,499,231).
11
 In actual fact, this is an exaggerated figure since it 
includes the supposed market value of non-circulating Legal Person (LP) shares and 
state shares. Moreover, LP and state shares are generally traded at heavy discounts 
on the price of tradable shares in real transactions. In March 2009, the tradable 
market capitalisation of the SSE and SZSE were only RMB 4,238,400,000,000 
(US$ 620,193,151,887),
12
 and RMB 1,692,627,658,722 (US$ 247,677,444,940),
13
 
respectively. Hence the total tradable market capitalisation of the SSE and SZSE 
(US$ 867,870,596,827) was only one-thirtieth of the size of the NYSE Euronext 
(US$ 25,000,000,000,000) in 2009.
14
 By the end of 2004, the total market 
capitalisation of all off-shore listed PRC corporations amounted to 
US$ 349,200,000,000.
15
 In terms of market capitalisation, listing on foreign stock 
exchanges is still a good option for most Mainland SOEs in spite of the significant 
developments in the domestic capital market in recent years. 
 
                                                             
10
 The Renminbi (RMB, also “yuan”, sign: ¥) is the official currency of Mainland China, its exchange rate against 
the US dollar stood at 6.3 yuan per US dollar in 2012. 
11
 Figures taken from “Trading Summary” Section of Shanghai Stock Exchange website (Updated to February 27, 
2009), available at: 
http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/webapp/datapresent/TradingSummariesMonthlyAct?reportName=BizCompTr
adingSummariesMonthlyRpt, accessed March 14, 2009; “Market Statistics” Section of Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
website (updated to March 13, 2009), available at: 
http://www.szse.cn/main/en/MarketStatistics/MarketOverview/, accessed March 14, 2009. 
12
 Figures taken from “Trading Summary” Section of Shanghai Stock Exchange website (Updated to February 27, 
2009), available at: 
http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/webapp/datapresent/TradingSummariesMonthlyAct?reportName=BizCompTr
adingSummariesMonthlyRpt, accessed March 14, 2009.  
13
 Figures taken from “Market Statistics” Section of Shenzhen Stock Exchange website (updated to March 13, 
2009), available at: http://www.szse.cn/main/en/MarketStatistics/MarketOverview/, accessed March 14, 2009.  
14
 Figures taken from “Market Capitalization of NYSE Companies” Section of New York Stock Exchange Euronext 
website, available at: http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/default.aspx?tabid=115, accessed March 14, 2009.  
15
 Figures taken from State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of Shanghai Municipal 
Government website, available at: http://www.shgzw.gov.cn/gb/gzw/gzjg/gzsd/userobject1ai39256.html, 
accessed March 14, 2009.  
  
 
7 
The off-shore listing of China’s major SOEs can also introduce foreign experienced 
investors to China’s companies, providing considerable business expertise in 
corporate management for the day-to-day administration of SOEs. Since the daily 
management and corporate governance of China’s listed SOEs are bound up with the 
interests of foreign investors, such investors are likely to introduce valuable practical 
experience, modernised management structures and transparent financial controls to 
China’s SOEs, so as to maximise their own share of the SOE's profits. Such 
measures can facilitate reform of China’s SOEs and enhance their corporate 
governance, since there is a widespread lack of desirable business management 
practices in most of China’s SOEs. In the Mainland’s increasingly open markets, 
SOEs have to be more competitive to outmanoeuvre their fast-moving private 
counterparts, and therefore advanced western business processes will be very helpful 
for them. Such improvements in their market-orientation may also provide a solid 
foundation for China’s SOEs to allow them to compete in the global markets. In 
some sense, this parallels and supplements China’s central government’s16 overall 
strategies for SOE reform.  
 
On the other hand, accessing domestic bank loans is quite challenging for most 
Chinese medium-sized state-owned enterprises, and privately owned companies. The 
credit obtained by the private sector accounted for only one per cent of the loans 
                                                             
16
 While Mainland China is still a totalitarian statist state under the control of the Communist Party, 
“Communist Party” will be used as an interchangeable term for “China’s government” or “China’s central 
government” in most cases in this thesis.  
  
 
8 
from the national banking system by the end of 2000.
17
 This reality could also 
provide a plausible explanation for the recent rise of informal finance on the 
Mainland; this is sometimes described as the shadow banking system. Destabilising 
financing practices of government controlled domestic banks were a political 
product arising under financially repressive circumstances.
18
 Thus, foreign public 
markets and overseas private placements have become good mechanisms for raising 
funds for those enterprises that cannot gain sought after capital from the domestic 
markets.  
 
In reality, the shortage of funding is gradually becoming a constraint on the growth 
or the further development of most Chinese companies, especially in a period of 
rapid economic expansion. By June 2007, the number of Chinese SMEs had risen to 
42,000,000, accounting for 99 per cent of the totality of PRC companies.
19
 The total 
value of all goods and services produced by the PRC’s SMEs amounted to 60 per 
cent of the Mainland’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).20 In addition, the tax 
contributions of Chinese SMEs equalled around 50 per cent of the total taxation paid 
by Mainland companies in almost every tax year up to 2007.
21
 Currently, the 
Chinese government is aiming to achieve full employment; however, a large 
                                                             
17
 Figures taken from Statistical Yearbook of China 2000, China Statistical Press, Beijing.  
18
 Tsai, Kellee S., Back-Alley Banking: Private Entrepreneurs in China, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2002, p. 6.  
19
 Figures taken from The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China’s website, “The Figure 
of Small and Medium-Sized Chinese Enterprises Accounts for 99% of the Totality of PRC Companies” (updated to 
June 7, 2007), available at: http://www.gov.cn/wszb/zhibo78/content_639715.htm#, accessed March 11, 2009.  
20
 Figures taken from The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China’s website, “The Figure 
of Small and Medium-Sized Chinese Enterprises Accounts for 99% of the Totality of PRC Companies” (updated to 
June 7, 2007), available at: http://www.gov.cn/wszb/zhibo78/content_639715.htm#, accessed March 11, 2009.  
21
 Figures taken from The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China’s website, “The Figure 
of Small and Medium-Sized Chinese Enterprises Accounts for 99% of the Totality of PRC Companies” (updated to 
June 7, 2007), available at: http://www.gov.cn/wszb/zhibo78/content_639715.htm#, accessed March 11, 2009.  
  
 
9 
proportion of unemployed workers have actually obtained their employment in 
SMEs.
22
  
 
Overall, China has maintained a high level of urban economic growth over the last 
two decades. Since the pioneering days of economic reform in 1978, China’s average 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rates increased from some 4 per cent to 9.6 per cent 
by the end of 2005.
23
 In particular, China even achieved a high average annual GDP 
growth of over 10 per cent from 1990 to 2001;
24
 while from 2002 to 2006, China’s 
average GDP growth was 10.3 per cent, which was much higher than the average 
level in most developed countries.
25
 In 2005, China was ranked fourth in economic 
size in the world, just falling behind the U.S., Japan, and Germany.
26
 In such an 
economic climate, most small and medium-sized mainland companies are in real 
need of considerable amounts of funding so as to enable them to invest in the latest 
technologies, enlarge the scale of their production and increase their market share.  
 
Theoretically, commercial banks should be the first source of funding for most small 
and medium-sized companies. However, this is not the reality for Mainland 
                                                             
22
 Figures taken from The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China’s website, “The Figure 
of Small and Medium-Sized Chinese Enterprises Accounts for 99% of the Totality of PRC Companies” (updated to 
June 7, 2007), available at: http://www.gov.cn/wszb/zhibo78/content_639715.htm#, accessed March 11, 2009.  
23
 Brandt, Loren and Rawski, Thomas G., China's Great Economic Transformation, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2008, Chapter 1; Holz, Carsten A., “China’s Economic Growth 1978-2025: What We Know Today 
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companies, and the opposite is often true. With the banking sector in the Mainland 
dominated by the four State-Owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs),
27
 these SOCBs 
actually have quite poor risk control capabilities. It has been observed that most of 
China’s commercial banks still lack a mature methodology for credit risk 
management, whereas independent and professional risk management functions are 
also scarce.
28
 Hence, an extremely complicated process for bank loan applications 
has been formulated for SMEs, while there is no desirable solution to the issue of 
growing non-performing loans (NPLs) to SMEs, as the legal and credit systems of 
the Mainland are relatively underdeveloped. On an optimistic note, according to one 
of the bank’s officials, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), China’s central bank, is 
considering constructing a credit-rating system for SMEs.
29
 However, there is still a 
rather long process to be followed before this new idea can be implemented, 
although the PBOC has been moving in the right direction. In actual fact, almost 
every one of China’s commercial banks is very cautious about granting loans to 
SMEs, and only very few SMEs can successfully obtain the bank loans they require.  
 
II. KEY ISSUES OR PROPOSITIONS IN THIS THESIS 
Generally, patterns of corporate governance of listed companies in the world is 
                                                             
27
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divided into two major categories: outsider control systems (as found in 
Anglo-American systems) and insider control systems, (as in Germany and Japan). 
Outsider systems, typified by companies in the United Kingdom and the United 
States in general, have a heavy reliance on the securities market for capital raising, 
as the shareholdings of most major corporations are widely-dispersed and control of 
companies is largely in the hands of their managers and not shareholders. In contrast, 
shareholdings in countries with insider control systems are more concentrated, and 
significant blockholders (such as large banks) often engage in the control and 
funding of these corporations. Besides, the relationship between management and 
blockholders is noticeably stronger in insider systems. Japan and Germany are 
usually regarded as representative of insider systems.
30
  
 
By a broadly similar method, Mark Roe also categorised selected nations into two 
broad groups,
31
 while some scholars have reviewed the theory developed by Roe as 
implying that a socialist political system should produce an insider system of 
corporate ownership and control.
32
 Several features of China’s securities markets 
that can support Roe’s theory have been enumerated in a recent study.33 Mainland 
China had been described by Mark Roe as a totalitarian regime, and hence it was 
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excluded from his analysis as it was contended that there was a lack of the necessary 
institutions to support an advanced economy in such centrally controlled countries.
34
 
Moreover, it was said that an extreme statist regime would not facilitate or even 
impede the normal functioning of such basic institutions.
35
  
 
Arguably, the system of corporate governance in Mainland China can be 
characterised as an “insider system”, as most publicly held corporations on the 
Mainland have very concentrated ownership and control systems. Admittedly, the 
Chinese regulatory authority benefited from the experience of continental Europe 
during the process of designing China’s current legal system. In broad terms, the 
supervisory board in China’s corporate law system was arguably a transplantation of 
a model derived from the German insider system. Nevertheless, it was suggested by 
some scholars that Anglo-American governance structures had been predominantly 
imposed in developing China’s modern corporate system.36  
 
To a certain extent, the ideological differences between the Mainland and developed 
democratic nations can also be ignored in terms of the issue of corporate governance, 
since hundreds of Mainland enterprises have now listed on overseas stock exchanges 
(see Appendix I-IV). Henceforth, such Mainland enterprises were governed by the 
same strict codes of conduct found in foreign stock exchanges, which must be 
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observed by domestic and foreign corporations listed in the country in which the 
foreign stock exchange is based. Thus, it is possible for almost every Mainland listed 
corporation to be able to derive substantial benefits from foreign listing on advanced 
stock exchanges, as marketplace rules in such exchanges are more independent and 
enforceable than those on the Mainland.  
 
Considerable improvement has therefore occurred in the overall quality of corporate 
governance of Mainland companies after their foreign listing. This is due to stock 
exchanges such as the NYSE, NASDAQ and the London Stock Exchange, etc., all 
having sophisticated “binding” rules in place, such as the comply or explain 
corporate governance guidelines, that are aimed at maintaining high standards of 
corporate responsibility, integrity and accountability to shareholders. In fact, most 
Mainland corporations have undergone a restructuring in the process of their foreign 
listing applications, and their corporate governance has been subsequently improved. 
However, the other reality is that the corporate governance of listed Mainland 
corporations has probably never radically changed, since their shareholdings are still 
firmly concentrated in the hands of a small number of blockholders (who are often 
state-controlled). Thus, corporate democracy and disclosure are still quite weak in 
these companies as most members of their senior management are appointed by the 
blockholders. Moreover, their independent directors are unable to play a major role. 
On the boards of these companies, there is a strong connection between management 
and the blockholders; this most distinctive feature of state-owned enterprises has 
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hardly changed, as the management was still accountable to the state as blockholder.  
 
The U.S. and U.K. stock exchanges are the first choice for overseas listing for most 
Mainland Chinese enterprises, as their corporate governance rules have a reputation 
for strictness and transparency. Listing on such exchanges will certainly raise the 
enterprises’ international profile, in view of the considerable funds that can be raised 
thereby. Nevertheless, improvements in the corporate governance practices of 
Mainland enterprises are arguably to some degree a reflection of their ostensible or 
superficial compliance with foreign regulatory requirements that has been necessary 
in order to adapt to the higher standards of corporate governance in foreign 
exchanges, which aim to enhance market efficiency and to protect shareholders of 
listed companies. Most overseas listed Mainland corporations arguably still operate 
in fundamentally the same way as they did prior to seeking foreign listing.  
 
Fortunately, it seems that the introduction of strategic partnerships with foreign 
well-regarded enterprises has also played a positive role in the improvement of the 
corporate governance of the Mainland’s corporations during the last decade. The 
Measures for the Administration of Strategic Investments in Listed Companies by 
Foreign Investors were promulgated on 31 December, 2005,
37
 and foreign investors 
can accordingly make medium and long-term strategic investments in the Mainland’s 
listed companies which have completed their reform regarding the separation of 
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equity ownership and trading rights. This means that foreign investors can also own 
a minority strategic stake in large PRC state-owned companies. Nevertheless, this 
raises another problem concerning the distribution of profits, as some observers are 
concerned that foreign investors had benefited greatly on an annual basis from their 
strategic investments, but that their expertise and experience had contributed little to 
the actual improvement of corporate governance in PRC corporations when 
contrasted with the substantial profits that they had realised. This then provides the 
backdrop to the key propositions that this thesis will explore. 
 
KEY PROPOSITIONS IN THIS THESIS: 
(1) China’s stock exchanges largely reflect an insider control system.  
(2) China’s corporate governance patterns reflect insider control system patterns. 
(3) Political factors determine the nature of corporate governance in China’s listed 
companies. 
(4) Foreign listing of China’s companies will improve some aspects of their 
corporate governance.  
(5) Traditional Chinese corporate governance ideas will be likely to remain strong in 
foreign listed Mainland companies.  
 
III. SUMMARY 
The rapid development of the Mainland’s economy has created a climate in which 
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China’s companies can internationalise, while some very large Chinese SOEs are 
also trying to accelerate overseas investment by means of transnational acquisitions 
and mergers.
38
 Overseas listing is undoubtedly one of the major approaches used by 
China’s companies to implement their globalisation strategies. Thus, more and more 
of China’s companies, especially China’s major SOEs, have endeavoured to float on 
foreign stock exchanges in recent years.  
 
However, most of China’s companies are still trailing poorly in corporate governance, 
which is partly due to the unsatisfactory legal and regulatory framework in China. As 
some Chinese companies have been listed on foreign stock exchanges for many 
years, the corporate governance implications of overseas listing and cross-listing of 
China’s companies may well be worthy of further exploration.  
 
Given that the development of corporate governance closely parallels advances in 
stock markets, the history of stock markets will be explored in the next chapter. 
Furthermore, the next chapter will also explore the function and role of stock 
markets, as well as the corporate governance implications of the history of stock 
markets. Despite the fact that the history of the Mainland’s stock markets is 
relatively short, there is still a need for it to be carefully studied, as it deepens our 
understanding of the pathways that have shaped the current system of corporate 
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governance in foreign-listed Chinese companies.
39
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CHAPTER 2. THE ROLE OF STOCK MARKETS AND CORPORATE 
ACTIONS 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF STOCK MARKETS 
Essentially, equity or stock markets generally refer to places where tradable 
securities, foreign exchange, futures, and options can be bought and sold. According 
to the historian Fernand Braudel, almost every form of trade association had been 
built by Muslim and Jewish merchants in Cairo by the eleventh-century, while the 
modern securities market could be traced back to medieval Italy, as transferrable 
securities already existed in the city states of Venice, Genoa and Florence at that 
time.
40
 Venice compelled its residents to lend funds to the authorities in 1171, but 
the creditors could obtain certain interest at 5 per cent per annum by virtue of the 
bonds issued by the authorities. This event is generally regarded as the origin of the 
global securities market.
41
 In this era, there were few transferrable securities on the 
market as most enterprises were small-scale and closely-related. Hence, actual 
sophisticated stock exchanges did not come into being until several hundred years 
later.  
 
In the late 13th century, Bruges commodity traders often gathered in a building 
named Place de la Bourse in Antwerp, which was owned by the Van der Beurse 
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family. Through the influence of this innovative idea, a number of “Bourse” soon 
opened in Ghent, and Amsterdam very soon after, and “Bourse” became a term 
interchangeable with that of “stock exchange”. However, investors mainly traded 
money and bills on Bruges’ Bourse, while there were no specialist intermediaries 
within Bourse either.
42
 The first stock exchange was established in Antwerp in 1460. 
Later, more stock exchanges were built in European cities, such as Cologne in 1553, 
Paris in 1563, in Seville in 1583, and in Frankfurt in 1585.
43
 Bruges thrived under 
its financial leadership of Northern Europe until its principal position was eventually 
replaced by Antwerp. Nevertheless, there were still no adequate liquidating 
transferrable securities for investors on the emerging market in Antwerp in the 
sixteenth-century,
44
 and the system in this era was still vulnerable as short-term 
government debts were the main form of securities. Furthermore, governments were 
frequently unable to honour their commitments by virtue of compulsorily reducing 
the interest rate of bonds issued by them. In 1570, Antwerp also reneged on its own 
borrowings; later, its rival Amsterdam gradually became the new centre of commerce 
and finance in Europe.
45
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In 1602, exciting possibilities were opening up for securities markets by the 
establishment of the Dutch East India Company or the Vereenigde Oost-Indische 
Compagnie (VOC). VOC was granted a 21-year monopoly to carry out colonial and 
trading activities in the Far East and Asia by the States-General of the Netherlands. 
Since VOC mainly engaged in long-distance and high-risk trade, it could not be 
capitalised by small groups of merchants in the traditional manner, as the great costs 
and high risks could only be shared by many investors. Consequently, VOC became 
the first joint-stock company which issued a large number of shares to the public. 
Hence, VOC had the dubious honour of exemplifying the global securities market as 
it “began to take on its modern form”.46  
 
In the 17th century, continuous trade was reputedly introduced by the Amsterdam 
Stock Exchange (or Amsterdam Bourse) for the first time. Although the securities 
market was still dominated by the shares of the Dutch East India Company, more 
sophisticated technologies had been gradually employed by investors. In 1688, 
Joseph de la Vega noted the techniques of short selling, margin trading, future 
contracts, option trading, debt-equity swaps, hedging, merchant banking, unit trusts 
and other speculative instruments that had already been pioneered by the Dutch.
47
 It 
seems that such trading techniques have not changed substantially since.
48
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However, the securities market in the Netherlands at this stage could not be 
considered as a modern organised market as it was little more than 
experimentation,
49
 while the equity market established in Paris in 1724 was 
generally termed as the first organised stock market, as a market conduct code had 
been drawn up and executed to regulate securities dealing, despite its membership 
being limited to 60 Agents de change.
50
  
 
In Great Britain, an Act of Parliament named “Commune Concilium Tentum in 
Camera Guildhall Civitas London” was enacted in 1673; this concerned the 
regulation of brokers, but did not mention stock and share transactions.
51
 However, 
it seems that the amount of stock in the market was already enough to require the 
emergence of specialist dealing intermediaries.
52
 Initially, stock-jobbers gathered in 
the Royal Exchange, which had frequently been mistaken for the Stock Exchange.
53
 
This episode had been recorded in many documents, and it was noted in one account 
that “the younger Rothschilds occupy a pillar on the south side of the Exchange, 
much in the same place as their sire stood before them”.54  
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Jonathan Miles founded Jonathan's Coffee House in Change Alley in the City of 
London around 1680. In 1698, stock-dealers moved to Exchange Alley, which was 
actually a spacious courtyard.
55
 John Castaing had posted the prices of stocks and 
commodities in Jonathan's Coffee House since that time, and other merchants began 
to meet there so as to buy and sell shares. John Houghton made a detailed record of 
this in his weekly journal entitled “Joint-Stocks and the various dealings therein, 
commonly called Stock-Jobbing”. According to Houghton’s record, the trade was 
chiefly conducted at Jonathans’ Coffee House, and sometimes at Garraways or some 
other Coffee Houses.
56
 Houghton noted “Monied Man goes among the Brokers” and 
then “upon information bids the Broker buy or sell so many Shares of such and such 
Stocks if he can at such and such Prices”.57 At the very beginning, transactions were 
generally carried out by means of private negotiation between seller and buyer. By a 
later time, auctions were regularly held at Garraways, since it could meet the 
requirements of both owner and purchaser simultaneously, owing to the significant 
growth of these types of securities as well as in the number of investors.
58
 
Nevertheless, the auction procedure also had a drawback, as the potential buyer 
could not have their own requirement heard.
59
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In reality, the U.K. government had widely employed the short-term redeemable 
borrowings so as to raise needed funds in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. A 
permanent transferable debt was finally created by William III in 1693, but it was not 
welcomed warmly among investors. Several defaults on the former government’s 
bonds accounted in no small measure for the new no-win long-term loan. 
Nevertheless, this unsuccessful loan indirectly constituted the real foundation of the 
British securities market. Scotsman William Paterson founded the Bank of England 
at the suggestion of William III in 1694 with the sum of £1.2 million, so as to lend 
the full capital to the British government.
60
 Many investors had been attracted by 
the terms of the loan since it had an 8 per cent interest rate per annum. Moreover, the 
banking privileges monopolised by the Bank of England, such as the issuance of 
notes, also restored subscribers’ confidences. Since the quantity of investors had 
increased dramatically, turnover in the London securities markets rose 
consequentially. Hence, the formation of the Bank of England actually provided the 
foundations for the London Stock Exchange, as the government’s permanent debt 
investors had an urgent need to make its investments marketable.
61
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Nevertheless, the London securities market was still relatively small in the early 
eighteenth century. There were only some 50 active traders on the market, and the 
Dutch bond was the only available international equity.
62
 Several years later, 
Jonathan's Coffee House was destroyed by fire in 1748, and then rebuilt. An 
organised club to trade stocks, consisting of 150 brokers and jobbers, was created in 
1760. In 1773, the Coffee House was finally renamed as the Stock Exchange.
63
  
 
The development of European securities markets from the sixteenth century to the 
early seventeenth century was remarkable due to the positive role played by 
governments. However, it seems that most European governments were not poised 
for the rapid growth of the securities markets, and the consequential burgeoning of 
the money supply. By degrees, the unformed monetary policies were strangling the 
Western European economy adversely, leading to a speculative boom in the 1720s 
which centred on Paris and London. Most chief financial centres in Western Europe, 
including Amsterdam, Geneva, Vienna, Lisbon and Hamburg were all engulfed by 
this speculation. The consequence of this speculative boom was disastrous as it 
affected investor confidence in regard to governments’ debt, with confidence that 
had taken many years to build up being destroyed overnight. Fortunately, the British 
                                                                                                                                                                            
in The Bank of England: Money, Power and Influence 1694-1994, Richard, Roberts and Kynaston, David edited, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, p. 9.  
62
 Banner, Stuart, Anglo-American Securities Regulation: Cultural and Political Roots 1690-1860, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1998, p. 22 and p. 28; Scott, William Robert, The Constitution and Finance Of 
English, Scottish And Irish Joint-Stock Companies to 1720, Vol. I, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1912, p. 
155 and p. 161.  
63
 Blair QC, Michael and Walker, George, Financial Markets and Exchanges Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2007, p. 7.  
  
 
25 
government did not renege on its obligations to the South Sea Company, whose 
securities were one of the main stocks on the European market. Hence, the London 
securities market narrowly avoided collapse amid the wave of speculation, and the 
Bank of England remained in operation.
64
  
 
On the whole, the early development of European securities markets was due in 
large part to the strong desire of governments to raise funds which would finance 
their military campaigns and colonial rule. Short-term borrowings were gradually 
replaced by long-term government debts and corresponding interest payments, since 
governments could provide steady income for relatively long periods of time. Such 
transferable long-term debt was also comparatively attractive to most investors when 
compared with traditional loans to individuals, as merchants could employ their own 
idle funds more safely, and with a moderate rate of return on their capital. 
Nevertheless, the fickleness of governments had been corroborated by their 
continued reneging on debts; hence, there was widespread lack of confidence in 
government debts among investors over a fairly long time frame. This condition had 
depressed the whole European securities market and a sophisticated securities 
market could not be created thereon as there were insufficient liquid securities. Later, 
the foundation of the Bank of England actually privatised government debt,
65
 and 
investors’ confidence was restored dramatically. Thus, the establishment of an 
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organised securities market could cater for the needs of investors that wanted to buy 
and sell securities in a risk free environment with low trading costs.  
 
Turning to North America, which is another major example of an outsider system. 
The United States federal government was heavily in debt when the Revolutionary 
War ended in the 1780s. Hence, the federal government issued bonds valued at some 
US$ 80 million in 1790 so as to reduce the debt burden. These bonds formed the 
origins of the United States investment markets. Initially, brokers traded generally in 
the market. On May 17, 1792, twenty-four New England businessmen signed a 
contract in New York, known as the Buttonwood Agreement, outside 68 Wall Street 
in Lower Manhattan. Regulations, fee ceilings and general rules concerning the 
operation of the stock market had been designated by this agreement. They then met 
at 22 Wall Street at noon each day, with the highest bidder able to buy the stocks and 
bonds. Later, they moved to the Tontine Coffee House to trade, with the New York 
Stock Exchange and Board finally created in 1817. Then, in 1863, its name was 
shortened to the New York Stock Exchange and its location finalised on the corner of 
Wall Street and Broad Street.
66
  
 
Around 250 stock exchanges had existed in the United States over the nineteenth 
century, but only a few of these had survived.
67
 The New York Stock Exchange 
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(NYSE) was generally termed as the most successful exchange in the U.S., as it had 
a “mighty influence over the price of the vast volume of securities dealt within its 
walls.”68 Moreover, it had contributed significantly to the U.S. economy by issuing 
bonds and stocks, channelling necessary funds to many capital-intensive projects 
ranging from railroads to infrastructure construction.
69
 Significantly, it seems that 
the functional role of the New York Stock Exchange as an important signalling 
instrument for the market had been overlooked by some scholars. Since laissez-faire 
policy was dominant in United States at that time, and a central bank did not exist, 
an institution like the New York Stock Exchange was inevitable in order to achieve 
equilibrium in the economy.
70
  
 
In 1971, the NASDAQ (National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotations) was created as a bulletin board which provided information of listings 
and prices for buyers and sellers. In 1987, an efficient electronic system was adopted 
in the NASDAQ, so as to balance the October crash; this measure actually 
transformed the NASDAQ into a competitive electronic stock exchange as the 
telephone trades had been eliminated. In reality, most traders had dealt via the 
telephone prior to that point, and the NASDAQ was also still termed as an 
Over-The-Counter trading system by Standard & Poor's Corporation until 1987.
71
 
The NASDAQ almost collapsed when the dot-com bubble burst at the close of last 
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century, but fortunately it survived that crisis. The NASDAQ recovered gradually as 
several giant high-technology corporations, such as Microsoft and Google, still listed 
their securities on the Exchange and it now even has the ability to compete with the 
NYSE.  
 
The history of the global securities market allows us to infer that the trust and 
confidence of investors, and the stability of the financial system, are essential 
ingredients for the prosperity of the stock market. It would be very difficult to 
achieve or maintain equilibrium in the economy simply by relying on administrative 
direction from government; the global securities market is also important in 
maintaining this equilibrium. Thanks to the flexibility endowed by its very nature, 
the securities market plays a vital role in capital mobilisation and funds channelling. 
Moreover, the function of the stock market should be complementary to that of the 
banking system since they are both integral components of a well-balanced financial 
system.
72
  
 
China’s stock markets can only be regarded as emergent when compared with these 
highly developed western counterparts, but the former have been developing at a 
rapid rate, and contributing considerably to Mainland China’s economic growth. 
Therefore, the history of China’s stock markets will be reviewed next. 
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a) Early History of China’s Stock Markets 
By the nineteenth century, several well-regarded trading centres had emerged along 
the south coast of Mainland China due to the earlier commercial revolution. Initially, 
the trade between China and the West was limited in terms of both trading scale and 
scope. Especially, foreign merchants were confined to conducting business in Canton 
with the consent of the Ch’ing government.73 European traders such as the East 
India Company and American merchants obtained a large volume of tea and silk 
from Canton and exported large amounts of opium to China as a substitute for 
silver.
74
  
 
In August 1842, the Treaty of Nanking was signed when the Ch’ing government 
suffered a shock defeat in the Opium Wars, and four more ports were opened for 
foreign merchants, including Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai.
75
 After the 
conclusion of the Treaty of Nanking, the Sino-foreign trade expanded rapidly and the 
volume of imports had tripled by the end of the nineteenth century.
76
 Gradually, 
Shanghai became the major centre of foreign trade among all Treaty ports in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century due to its geographical advantages, it was even 
once noted that foreigners could derive incalculable advantages from this place due 
                                                             
73
 Thomas, William Arthur, Western Capitalism in China: A History of the Shanghai Stock Exchange, Ashgate, 
Farnham, 2001, p. 3.  
74
 Hao, Yen-p'ing, The Commercial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century China: The Rise of Sino-Western Mercantile 
Capitalism, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1986, p. 32.  
75
 Wakeman, Frederic E., Jr., The Fall of Imperial China, The Free Press, New York, 1975, p. 136; Johnson, Linda 
Cooke, Shanghai: From Market Town to Treaty Port 1074-1858, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, 1995, p. 
178.  
76
 Feuerwerker, Albert, “Economic Trends in the Late Ch'ing Empire, 1870–1911”, in The Cambridge History of 
China, Vol. 11, Part 2, Fairbank, Jonh K. and Liu, Kwang-Ching edited, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1980, p. 48.  
  
 
30 
to the liberty of trade.
77
 With the turnover of Maritime Customs revenue, the 
institution established by foreign consuls to collect maritime trade taxes in Shanghai 
in 1854 had increased by 500 per cent by 1900.
78
  
 
In reality, many joint stock companies had already been established in Shanghai by 
the 1860s and their shares were also being traded publicly. The North China Herald, 
one of the most influential foreign newspapers in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, had a column for the collection of local share list.
79
 Share trading was 
accomplished in Shanghai's International Settlement in most instances, since the 
financial and legal frameworks were well developed there. Then, the first share list 
appeared in 1866.
80
  
 
Soon, more and more investors were eager to speculate on the shares of local 
enterprises and took greater risks accordingly, as the commercial activity in the 
Yangtze basin was prospering after the defeat of the Taiping Rebellion in the 1870s. 
It has been said that there was a boon in mining shares in the early 1890s, and that 
the Shanghai Sharebrokers' Association was founded by foreign investors so as to 
meet the demand for organised securities trading. However, members had to pay five 
US dollars per annum as a subscription, plus an entrance fee of twenty-five US 
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dollars.
81
  
 
China signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki with Japan in 1895, and the number of 
listed companies was gradually expanded as more foreign enterprises were formed in 
the Treaty Ports due to the privileges endowed by this Treaty. The introduction of the 
manufacturing industry greatly contributed to the prosperity of local share markets, 
and more people rushed into the International Settlement and French Concession to 
seek their fortunes. The Association filed an application for registration in Hong 
Kong in accordance with the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, and its official title 
was finally changed in 1904 to the “Shanghai Stock Exchange”.82  
 
Revolution and the flames of war almost overwhelmed the entirety of China from 
the early twentieth century, until this disruption ceased in October 1949 with the 
founding of the People's Republic of China. Consequentially, the stock markets 
experienced challenging times during this turbulent pre-1949 era. Following 
proposals by Sun Yat-sen and his associates, the now dissolved Peking Stock 
Exchange was established in 1917 with a capital of 1,000,000 US dollars, while the 
notes of the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications were the major 
securities traded on this exchange.
83
 Several years later, the China Merchants’ Stock 
& Commodity Exchange and the Shanghai Chartered Stock & Produce Exchange 
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came into operation in succession with the consent of the Republican Government’s 
Ministry of Commerce.
84
 Generally, securities traded in these markets in this era 
should be termed as speculative rather that real investment. Legal provisions were 
ambiguous and most disputes were decided at the discretion of the Ministry of 
Commerce.
85
  
 
In December 1940, the Shanghai Chinese Stock Exchange was established at 270 
Peking Road, so as to “promote the flow of capital into large scale Chinese 
enterprises”.86 After a brief success, the Exchange was riddled with speculation and 
once again was affected by the strains of war and inflation. In May 1949, all equity 
trading activities was terminated as the Communist regime and the People’s 
Liberation Army took control of Shanghai. The previous legal system and its laws 
were abrogated by the new PRC government, and the widespread nationalisation of 
registered companies began.
87
  
 
b) Recent History of China’s Stock Market from the 1980s to 2011 
Having been taken over by the Communist regime in 1949, the Shanghai Securities 
Exchange was closed down for over 40 years, until December 1990. During this 
period, the class struggle dominated the country. The economy did not improve 
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substantially until Deng Xiaoping was in the position of authority and a plan for 
modernisation was put in place.
88
 When the economy went into large-scale 
modernisation, an enormous quantity of capital was urgently needed for the 
transformation of State-Owned Enterprises (SOE). During the early and mid-1980s, 
every year the central PRC government still had to pay huge subsidies to 
loss-making SOEs, and this gradually became a heavy burden on government 
revenues.
89
 Consequently, private corporate structures were adopted by many SOEs 
by the end of the 1980s, and staff members could even purchase a small fraction of 
the SOEs capital. Nevertheless, the state still took de facto control of the vast 
majority of SOEs, since all such stocks and shares were non-circulating.
90
  
 
The first public share issuance occurred in 1985 in Shanghai, originating from a 
subsidiary of Yanzhong Photocopy Co.
91
 However, there was tension between the 
central government and local authorities in Shanghai and Shenzhen on the issue of 
opening stock markets, since Beijing officials had major concerns about the 
consequential speculation and feared the loss of their own control over enterprises. 
The first experimental market opened in Shenyang around one year later under the 
management of the Shenyang Trust and Investment Corporation, but bonds were the 
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major form of equity issued.
92
 A branch of the People’s Bank of China tactfully 
approved the share offering of Yanzhong Industrial Corporation and Feile Acoustics 
Corporation in September 1986, and such trading was undertaken by the Jingan 
district branch of the Shanghai Trust and Investment Trust Company.
93
 This 
development was given a rapturous welcome by investors.  
 
Inspired by the success of the Jingan district branch, fifteen more broking houses 
were put into operation in Shanghai by the end of 1989, while the number of listed 
corporations was also increasing. However, the situation in Shanghai was quite 
similar to that of Shenyang, as the trading of treasury bonds and short-term 
enterprise bonds dominated the market due to the high rates of interest.
94
 The plan 
to list more corporations was halted by the cataclysm of Tiananmen Square in 
Beijing, 1989, but the repercussions of this political disruption were limited since 
there was an urgent need for market reform. As time passed, Shanghai and Shenzhen 
evolved into major centres of shares and stock trading, and did so with official 
support. To a certain degree, Shanghai had the advantage over Shenzhen as the city 
had a long history of share dealing prior to 1949. In light of these developments, in 
the mid-1990s the People’s Bank of China imposed a limit on share price rises and 
falls following a policy of containment; this was because speculation had intensified 
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dramatically after more corporations had listed on the Shenzhen market.
95
 The 
conditions in the Shanghai market were slightly different from those of Shenzhen, as 
listed corporations paid a reasonable dividend to shareholders every year, which was 
even higher than the bank deposit rates. Nevertheless, most of the capital of the 
listed corporations was still controlled by state institutions and the market could not 
on the whole have been termed as active.
96
  
 
In December 1990, the Shanghai Securities Exchange was formally put into 
operation and all existing over-the-counter and curb markets were outlawed. 
Following soon after, the Shenzhen market was also fully operational around six 
months later. Next, the new computer systems of the Securities Trading Automated 
Quotation System (STAQS) and the National Electronic Trading System (NETS) 
came on stream so as to facilitate the day-to-day running of the new securities 
exchanges.
97
 More and more listed corporations, especially giant state-owned 
enterprises, appeared on the market as time went by. With the support of the central 
authorities, Shanghai gradually established its status as China’s financial centre, and 
though the growth of the Shenzhen stock market was also fairly rapid, it was 
eclipsed by its counterpart in Shanghai to a considerable degree.  
 
The shares issued in China’s stock markets were generally divided into two major 
categories: A shares and B shares. A shares were intended mainly for the domestic 
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market, whilst B shares were created in December 1991 for foreign investors and 
aimed at encouraging overseas securities firms and financial institutions to invest in 
China’s markets. Moreover, B shares were traded in foreign currencies rather than 
RMB: in the US dollar in Shanghai and in the Hong Kong dollar in Shenzhen.
98
 
Apart from A and B shares, two other classes of shares were created as part of the 
corporatisation of SOEs; they were non-tradable legal person shares (LPs) and state 
shares (or state-owned shares). State shares and LPs each made up about one-third of 
the listed SOE’s whole equity. State shares were under the management of affiliates 
of the Ministry of Finance, and LPs were allocated to institutions such as SOEs and 
government bureaus before their Initial Public Offerings (IPO).
99
  
 
These listing activities soon spread widely and Tsingtao Brewery became the first of 
the nine Chinese SOEs to list on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in July 1993, when 
it issued 317.6 million H shares at the price of HK$ 2.80 per share and raised 
HK$ 900 million.
100
 Moreover, several other Chinese SOEs took the approach of 
“backdoor listing” in Hong Kong since they could not meet the requirements for 
direct listing for a variety of reasons; these SOEs were generally known as “Red 
Chips”. The backdoor listing was achieved by several means, including setting up a 
Listing Vehicle and then asset swapping, and acquiring or merging with an existing 
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listed corporation.
101
 One year later, the Shandong Huaneng Power Development 
and Huaneng Power International listed on the New York Stock Exchange through 
the issue of American Depositary Receipts and became the first listed Chinese SOE 
to have what are now labelled as N shares.
102
  
 
The quota system once dominated the share issuance process in the primary 
securities market on the Mainland. Upon the approval of the State Planning 
Commission (the predecessor of the National Development and Reform Commission) 
and the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), it was possible for almost 
every province to be allocated some quota each year. Since the central authorities 
were not free from the influence of instrumentalism, the quota system had been 
employed as a major policy means to maintain the balance between the different 
industrial sectors and regions. In most cases, only preferred SOEs could obtain the 
essential quota for making issues, while the number of issues had already been fixed 
in advance. Furthermore, the government’s main concern with price manipulation 
and the rapidity of development could be alleviated by such measures. With the 
enactment of the first Securities Law in 1999,
103
 these curbs on primary issuance 
were gradually relaxed.
104
 On the other hand, B shares were immune to the quota 
system, but the adequacy of foreign exchange income of such companies was a 
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crucial factor for IPO approval as foreign exchange would be used to pay dividends. 
The quota did not apply to H shares either, but obtaining the seal of IPO approval 
was not a simple matter since the application would be considered in all its features. 
Generally, only large and major SOEs had the potential to list H shares within a 
reasonable time frame.
105
  
 
In the early stages of the stock market’s development, there was strong demand for 
subscribing to new shares when an IPO was launched in the Mainland; this demand 
was difficult to satisfy since the number of shares allocated to individuals was fairly 
limited. There was the real likelihood that the share price would double in value or 
even more on the first day of trading, and this condition was the driver of the 
unprecedented boom of stock markets. Moreover, the comparatively low Chinese 
personal savings rate was another objective condition that contributed to the great 
enthusiasm for securities investment.
106
 Later the approach of choosing subscribers 
by lottery was introduced in the IPO of Yanzhong in August 1992, and 
approximately 10 per cent of those subscribers who had obtained scarce application 
forms were expected to be entitled to subscribe for shares in the IPO. Unfortunately, 
this experimental practice soon resulted in chaos as there were circulating rumours 
that some application forms had been sold or stolen by government officials and 
bank staff. The Shenzhen stock market was closed temporarily as a direct 
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consequence of such rumours.
107
  
 
Once the deficiencies of imposing limits on the supply of IPO application forms 
were fully realised, the application forms were made available in sufficient quantity 
in the issuance of the Tsingtao Brewery shares in July 1993. After several modified 
methods were further trialled by the relevant authorities, a compromise mechanism 
was finally accepted by most investors.
108
 Firstly, the subscribers for new IPO 
shares had to place a sufficient deposit into a designated bank account as a necessary 
step for application, then the shares would be allotted by the approach of a lottery on 
a pro rata basis.
109
 Fortunate investors would be selected to subscribe to new shares, 
whereas deposits were repaid to unsuccessful applicants within a certain period. 
Over time, the turnaround in deposit repayment was shortened considerably.
110
 
However, the strict quota on the subscription of new shares was not introduced for 
the issuance of B shares, as only foreign investors were qualified to purchase these.  
 
Mainland China was a late entrant into the establishment of securities markets; 
therefore, its early regulations and legislation were far from satisfactory. From the 
mid-1980s to the early 1990s, the local branch of the People’s Bank of China took a 
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major role in approving new listings, and the local municipal government also 
tended to exercise undue influence upon market regulation.
111
 Since local 
protectionism generally had an adverse effect on the development of stock markets, 
local authorities were forced to gradually devolve most of their regulatory powers to 
the central government. In October 1992, the State Council Securities Commission 
(SCSC) was created as an affiliated policy-making institution for drafting the laws 
and regulations related to the equity market; the first chairman of SCSC was Zhu 
Rongji, the Vice-Premier.
112
 Following the formation of the SCSC, the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) came into existence shortly afterwards. 
Originally, the CSRC was authorised to supervise the securities and futures markets 
as an executive branch of the SCSC. Despite these awkward arrangements, the 
CSRC gradually obtained a greater say in the regulation of securities markets in the 
ensuing years. Pursuant to the State Council Reform Plan, the SCSC and the CSRC 
were finally merged into one ministerial level agency under the umbrella of the State 
Council in April 1998.
113
 With the CSRC’s investigative and disciplinary powers 
enhanced considerably, the centralisation of regulatory powers actually facilitated 
the structured regulation of equity markets.
114
   
 
The regulation of A shares has matured considerably over the last two decades, and 
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the A shares markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen flourished despite a fairly high rate 
of volatility. In contrast to A shares, the B shares market had a relatively small 
capitalisation (see Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4),
115
 and non-resident investors soon 
became disillusioned with B shares, as their performance had not improved 
acceptably over a long period. In such a climate, persistent heavy discounting had 
been employed in the sales of B shares to make them more attractive. In the early 
1990s, some Mainland corporations even offered their B shares at a surprising 
discount of 60 per cent, although a 20 per cent discount was more commonplace 
throughout the markets.
116
 After 1994, some domestic investors stealthily opened 
accounts for B shares under the acquiescence of the Mainland government, as the 
authority intended to give fresh impetus to the market. By 1997, more than half of 
the annual turnover of B shares was attributed to domestic investors,
117
 but the 
Mainland authority was still reluctant to define its position towards the widely 
documented problems of B shares. On the other hand, the latent political risks and 
opaque listing requirements added complications to the indefinite prospects of B 
shares, which also made it more difficult to inflame the investment interests of 
foreign investors. Some years later, limitations on capital accounts were finally 
relieved. Resident investors were entitled to open trading accounts for B shares from 
February 19, 2001, but a deposit of US$ 1,000 had to be paid as a minimum 
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requirement.
118
 China’s Premier, Zhu Rongji, defined this move as an integral part 
of the ongoing reform of the stock markets.
119
 As the savings of foreign currency in 
the personal sector had accumulated around US$ 80 billion, there was an incentive 
for resident investors to invest in B shares.
120
 The trading volume of B shares soon 
soared after the opening of the B share market. Nevertheless, the boom only lasted 
for several months and the index of B shares then slid to a 52-week low in July 
2001.
121
 Some analysts blamed the central government for this collapse in prices, 
since there had been no consistent action to build investor confidence.
122
  
 
As Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 below show, there were only 6 companies listed on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in 1991. Then, the number of companies listing 
began to accelerate, and there was a steep rise in the number of companies listed on 
the SZSE after 1995, especially as over 100 companies were listed annually in 1996 
and 1997. From 1998 to 2000, the number of companies listing increased steadily. 
However, this number decreased from 514 to 508 in 2001; then it remained almost 
unchanged until 2003. After 2003, the quantity of companies listed on the SZSE was 
again on the increase. Dozens of companies were listed on the SZSE on average 
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between 2003 and 2009, and the total number of listed companies on the exchange 
reached 830 in 2009. In 2010 and 2011, 339 and 242 companies were listed on SZSE, 
respectively. The surge of companies listing in these two years owed a great deal to 
the initial prosperity of the ChiNext board, which was a new market tier of the SZSE 
inaugurated in late 2009 for high-growth start-ups. On the whole, the SZSE has 
experienced rapid and steady growth since the 1990s in terms of the number of listed 
companies, despite China’s government deciding to execute a plan to reduce certain 
state shares listed on the stock markets from 2000 to 2003, the principal aim of 
which was to raise funds for China’s social security.123 Moreover, the Small and 
Medium Enterprises Board (SME Board) and the ChiNext board of the SZSE have 
given a fair account of themselves since they were launched.  
 
Issued capital refers to the value of the shares issued to shareholders, which also 
means the nominal value of the shares. By comparison, market capitalisation is 
calculated by multiplying the number of shares outstanding by the current market 
price of one share.
124
 The issued capital and market capitalisation of A shares and B 
shares listed on the SZSE are illustrated in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 below. As B shares 
were not introduced into the SZSE by China’s government until after 1992, the total 
issued capital of A shares was only RMB 357 million in 1991, and the total market 
capitalisation was RMB 7,976 million in the same year. Moreover, only about 68 per 
                                                             
123
 See Wang, Zhipeng, “Reducing State Shares Listed on the Stock Market on a Selective Basis”, China Today, 
May 2002, available at: http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/English/e20025/basis.htm, accessed June 12, 2012.  
124
 Damodaran, Aswath, Damodaran on Valuation: Security Analysis for Investment and Corporate Finance, 
John Wiley, Hoboken, New Jersey, 2006, p. 255.  
  
 
44 
cent of such issued capital and 47 per cent of the market capitalisation was 
negotiable, because of the role of state-owned shares and legal person shares that 
exist in Mainland China. The issued capital of the SZSE had continued to accelerate 
since 1992, when its market capitalisation had endured continued volatility. Table 2.1 
shows that the total market capitalisation of the SZSE increased steadily by and large 
from 1991 to 2000, although there was a modest devaluation in 1994 and 1995. 
Nevertheless, the market capitalisation of the SZSE continued to decrease sharply 
from 2001, from a peak of RMB 2,116,008 million in 2000 to merely RMB 933,414 
million in 2005, which was only marginally higher than what it was in 1998. From 
2006 the situation began to improve, and the market capitalisation of the SZSE hit a 
record high of RMB 5,730,201 million in 2007. Unfortunately, this figure soon 
plunged by almost 50 per cent towards the end of 2008. Unexpectedly, the market 
capitalisation of the SZSE again increased exponentially in 2009 and 2010 and it 
reached new heights in late 2010, of RMB 8,641,535 million. Nevertheless, the 
market capitalisation of the SZSE declined rapidly in 2011, which served to confirm 
the high volatility of China’s stock markets.  
 
Significantly, these official statistics on market capitalisation were somewhat 
exaggerated, since the figures included the non-tradable state shares and legal person 
shares. In 1991, the market capitalisation of tradable A and B shares traded on the 
SZSE was RMB 3,767 million, which accounted for only 47 per cent of the official 
capitalisation. In the following year, this value was down further to 34 per cent. 
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Technically, the ratio of negotiable capitalisation to total market capitalisation of the 
SZSE hovered around 35 per cent throughout the whole of the 1990s, and it did not 
change measurably until 2005, in which year this value finally passed the 40 per cent 
mark. This figure continued to increase for the next three years, and the SZSE’s 
negotiable capitalisation overtook the non-tradable capitalisation for the first time in 
2008, although the lead was not significant.
125
 In broad terms, the underlying trend 
of negotiable capitalisation of the SZSE was increasing after 2005, and this was due 
in large part to the fact that the split share structure reform had commenced without 
incident. As more “original shares” were gradually released from trading restrictions 
after 2008, the value of all tradable shares formed about 61 per cent of the market 
capitalisation of the SZSE by the end of 2009.
126
 Although this figure dropped by 3 
percentage points in the following year, it soon began to rise again, finally reaching 
new heights at 63 per cent towards the end of 2011.  
 
Although the originally non-tradable shares are still subject to certain trade 
restrictions after the expiration of their lockup period,
127
 the ratio of the SZSE’s 
negotiable capitalisation to its total market capitalisation is not expected to alter 
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significantly in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, there had been some major 
changes in the proportion of B shares’ negotiable capital to its total issued capital 
after the split share structure reform came into effect. Table 2.2 illustrates that the 
ratio of B shares’ negotiable capital to its total issued capital was 89.5 per cent in 
2004. Then, this figure continued to rise and its total increase was in excess of 9.7 
per cent by 2011, which topped out at 99.2 per cent. These changes could suggest 
that almost all issued capital of B shares has been negotiable. Hopefully, this will 
help to improve liquidity in the stock market, as well as the corporate governance of 
companies that are listed on the SZSE.  
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Table 2.1 Shenzhen Stock Exchange Statistics 1991-2000 (RMB￥ Million) 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Number of Listed Companies 6 24 77 120 135 237 362 413 463 514 
Number of Listed Stocks* 6 33 95 142 161 270 399 454 504 557 
A Shares 6 24 76 118 127 227 348 400 450 499 
B Shares / 9 19 24 34 43 51 54 54 58 
Total Issued Capital** (Million Shares) 357.34 2,656.51 12,205.97 22,059.11 26,738.89 43,954.28 79,585.70 106,500.58 132,870.12 158,096.84 
A Shares 357.34 2,211.91 11,151.57 20,500.18 24,048.10 39,947.94 73,837.13 99,785.60 125,920.28 149,225.31 
B Shares / 416.00 1,054.40 1,558.93 2,690.79 4,006.34 5,748.57 6,714.99 6,949.84 8,871.53 
Negotiable Capital (Million Shares) 243.51 854.71 3,618.96 7,757.21 10,513.15 15,875.85 27,506.31 36,121.44 45,793.17 58,432.53 
A Shares 243.51 681.21 2,998.85 6,759.96 8,378.31 12,576.94 22,529.83 30,152.98 39,751.63 51,440.87 
B Shares / 173.50 620.12 997.26 2,134.85 3,298.91 4,976.47 5,968.46 6,041.54 6,991.65 
Market Capitalisation*** 7,976.25 48,974.54 133,532.45 109,048.70 94,862.11 436,457.35 831,117.06 887,973.11 1,189,070.42 2,116,008.44 
A Shares 7,976.25 45,753.72 125,101.30 103,249.72 87,686.52 413,242.65 812,174.04 877,391.40 1,172,690.97 2,085,943.42 
B Shares / 3,220.82 8,431.15 5,798.98 7,175.59 23,214.70 18,943.02 10,581.71 16,379.44 30,065.02 
Negotiable Capitalisation 3,767.34 17,064.07 43,768.98 38,193.87 35,122.49 145,829.24 269,095.41 279,814.52 396,427.59 760,618.89 
A Shares 3,767.34 15,725.82 38,863.15 34,350.95 29,589.05 126,695.49 252,822.58 270,310.00 382,752.70 737,742.13 
B Shares / 1,338.25 4,905.83 3,842.92 5,533.44 19,133.76 16,272.82 9,504.52 13,674.88 22,876.76 
Source: Shenzhen Stock Exchange Fact Book 1991-2000128 
* The Number of Listed Stocks refers to the total number of the securities listed or traded on the Exchange. 
** The Issued Capital refers to the outstanding capital of A and B shares, excluding that of H shares. 
*** The Market Capitalisation = total issued capital stock x closing price. 
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Table 2.2 Shenzhen Stock Exchange Statistics 2001-2011 (RMB￥ Million) 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Number of Listed Companies 508 508 505 536 544 579 670 740 830 1169 1411 
Number of Listed Stocks* 550 551 548 578** 586 621 712 782 872*** 1211 1453 
A Shares 494 494 491 484 481 464 455 454 455 473 472 
B Shares 56 57 57 56 55 55 55 55 54 54 54 
Total Issued Capital* (Million Shares) 167,391.49 173,514.77 182,753.84 200,446.79 213,364.81 237,583.29 278,171.79 344,185.80 390,756.18 504,497.52 627,846.31 
A Shares 157,669.19 164,815.35 173,276.68 186,349.31 195,354.63 210,445.39 230,362.08 270,109.63 292,888.21 335,003.95 377,318.71 
B Shares 9,722.31 8,699.41 9,477.15 10,874.12 12,395.77 12,817.16 13,845.56 14,915.74 14,994.90 15,313.04 16,223.96 
Negotiable Capital (Million Shares) 64,335.18 68,740.56 74,022.26 82,280.97 93,429.75 117,690.06 151,121.79 202,375.36 260,107.82 341,085.17 450,605.56 
A Shares 56,835.84 60,824.83 65,568.42 71,588.90 79,755.09 100,343.08 124,906.68 161,651.91 206,616.45 250,347.34 307,815.07 
B Shares 7,499.33 7,915.73 8,453.84 9,733.39 11,454.34 11,879.04 13,549.30 14,701.51 14,794.34 15,184.79 16,103.88 
Market Capitalisation* 1,593,163.91 1,296,540.62 1,265,279.40 1,104,122.72 933,414.96 1,779,151.76 5,730,201.98 2,411,453.09 5,928,389.28 8,641,535.43 6,638,187.21 
A Shares 1,531,104.92 1,260,513.64 1,211,983.20 1,018,184.37 847,292.71 1,498,071.46 4,544,363.26 1,742,155.79 3,984,450.48 4,249,069.11 3,075,396.86 
B Shares 62,058.99 36,026.98 53,296.21 44,595.21 37,967.10 79,550.70 121,155.07 42,328.94 95,675.36 119,483.07 76,479.00 
Negotiable Capitalisation 608,105.63 501,725.78 497,737.65 433,776.26 387,590.57 857,530.88 2,853,217.82 1,290,799.08 3,645,365.39 5,077,296.81 4,206,994.10 
A Shares 561,883.58 469,375.13 450,904.78 382,789.74 332,859.38 707,373.16 2,351,228.98 981,711.08 2,770,378.78 3,143,091.20 2,446,357.03 
B Shares 46,222.05 32,350.65 46,832.87 38,990.43 36,201.85 77,795.06 119,623.23 41,820.48 94,733.09 118,609.26 75,877.04 
Source: Shenzhen Stock Exchange Fact Book 2001-2011129 
* Please refer to the explanatory notes of Table 2.1 for the definition of these terms. 
** Small and Medium Enterprises Board (SME Board) was inaugurated by SZSE in May 2004.130 
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*** SZSE launched the ChiNext board, a market for high-growth, high-tech start-ups in October 2009.131 
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The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) was in operation by late 1990, a little earlier 
than the SZSE. Table 2.3 below shows that although there were only 8 companies 
listed on the SSE in 1990 and 1991, this figure increased steadily throughout the 
1990s. The number of companies listing on the SSE had increased to 572 towards 
the end of 2000, which was slightly more than that of the SZSE in the same year. 
With this number continuing to rise rapidly until 2004, the SSE had outstripped the 
SZSE in terms of the number of companies listing by this time, as 837 Chinese 
companies had listed on the SSE. When the SSE experienced a major market slump 
from 2001 to 2005, a ban was imposed on new Initial Public Offering (IPO) in April 
2005, and this ban was not lifted until one year later.
132
 Due to the IPO ban, only 3 
new companies were listed on the SSE in 2005, while the total number of companies 
listed on the SSE had even decreased to 834, as several companies had been delisted. 
The SSE continued to raise capital for China’s companies after 2005, but the number 
of companies listing had slowed considerably. There were only thirty or so new 
companies listed on the SSE in 2006 and 2007; this number shrank further to single 
figures in the following two years. Nevertheless, improvements have been seen since 
2010, as more than 30 companies a year (on average) were newly listed on the SSE 
during 2010 and 2011, but this figure still trails behind that of the SZSE for the same 
period.  
 
The number of companies listing on the SSE had started to level out from 2004, in 
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contrast to the SZSE for the same period. The SZSE had attracted many different 
types of companies to float on it since 2004, particularly after the Small and Medium 
Enterprises Board (SME Board) and ChiNext Board were inaugurated in 2004 and 
2009, respectively. According to data published by the World Federation of 
Exchanges, the SZSE enjoyed the fastest growth among the world’s 52 stock 
exchanges in terms of trading volume in 2011.
133
 It seems that the SZSE had 
encouraged more innovation in recent years in comparison with the SSE, and this 
had allowed the SZSE to gain a competitive advantage over rival stock exchanges. 
The Greater China IPO statistics of Ernst & Young show that the SME board and 
ChiNext board of the SZSE had accomplished 205 and 116 IPO deals, respectively, 
in 2010, when the capital that had been raised came to US$ 44.3 billion in total.
134
 
By contrast, the SSE concluded only 26 IPO deals in 2010, which had raised 
US$ 27.9 billion for Chinese companies. It is noticeable that the SSE was trailing far 
behind the SZSE by 2010, in both the number of IPO deals and the amount of capital 
raised. Moreover, the SZSE outperformed the SSE again in 2011 with 243 IPO deals 
and US$ 27.8 billion US of fund raising, while the SSE raised only US$ 15.1 billion 
through 37 IPO deals in the same year. It is notable that the amount of funds raised 
by the SZSE even surpassed that of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) in 2011, 
which singled it out as the outstanding performer among all stock exchanges in the 
Greater China region.  
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According to Tables 2.3 and 2.4, the SSE issued only 261 million shares in 1990 
while its capitalisation was RMB 1,234 million. There was a rapid rise in the issued 
share volume of the SSE after 1992, and its market capitalisation had accelerated 
simultaneously. Technically, the whole period of the 1990s saw a continuation in the 
rise in these two barometers of the SSE. The Exchange continued to issue more 
shares after 2000, but its capitalisation was not as stable as it had previously been, as 
fluctuations were rather erratic in some years. Between 2000 and 2005, there had 
been peaks and troughs in the capitalisation of the SSE, but generally things were 
looking settled, while the bear market that began in early 2006 pushed the 
capitalisation of the SSE up to RMB 7,161,238 million. The year 2007 was another 
successful year for the SSE as its capitalisation reached new heights, which at RMB 
26,983,887 million, had nearly quadrupled the amount in 2006. Nevertheless, this 
figure quickly fell to RMB 9,725,191 million in the following year, down by almost 
two-thirds on 2007. The capitalisation of the SSE rallied considerably in 2008, but 
volatility destroyed trillions of RMB of its market value in the subsequent two years.  
 
Basically, the cause of the high volatility of China’s stock market was the 
conjunction of many factors, which included high rates of inflation, the rise and fall 
in interest rates, the enactment of new tax rules, unfavourable global economic 
conditions, as well as the notorious speculation and rampant illegal trading.
135
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Although the SZSE had grown rapidly in the recent years, its market value was still 
notably lower than that of the SSE in almost every year. This is largely due to the 
fact that the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), which is the main 
securities regulator of China, lent significant weight to the SSE during the earlier 
stages of the development of China’s stock market, when its aim was to mould the 
SSE into China’s main board market. This policy would also enhance the financial 
centre status of Shanghai.
136
 Thus, many major Chinese SOEs had been listed on the 
SSE at the instigation of the CSRC. Technically, only those Chinese companies with 
some degree of state ownership could launch an IPO before the ChiNext board of the 
SZSE was inaugurated. Despite the fact that the SZSE had attracted hundreds of 
companies to float on it in recent years, the vast majority of these companies were 
smaller, mainly private companies.  
 
However, the size of the SSE does not really stand up to scrutiny, nor does that of the 
SZSE, since the SSE also included a disproportionately large amount of non-tradable 
state shares and legal person shares. Table 2.4 shows that the negotiable market 
capitalisation formed about 31 per cent of the SSE’s total market value by the end of 
2000. From 2001 to 2005, this ratio did not alter significantly, generally standing at 
28 per cent. The Split Share Structure Reform sought to make an increasing 
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proportion of state owned shares tradable on securities markets. Although the SSE 
took the first tentative steps to introduce the Split Share Structure Reform in 2005, 
the ratio of the SSE’s negotiable market value to its total market capitalisation 
initially showed little sign of improving. Instead, it dipped to 23 per cent during 
2006 and 2007. In 2008, there was a slight increase in this figure and it returned to 
the usual level, which was typically over 30 per cent. The Split Share Structure 
Reform began to show results from 2009, and the negotiable market capitalisation 
had accounted for 62 per cent of the total market value of the SSE by this year. 
During 2010 and 2011, the Split Share Structure Reform sent this said ratio into a 
dramatic increase, reaching 82 per cent towards the end of 2011. According to 
official statistics, the Split Share Structure Reform in China seems to have proved 
highly successful.  
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Table 2.3 Shanghai Stock Exchange Statistics 1990-1998 (RMB￥ Million) 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Number of Listed Companies 8 8 29 106 171 188 293 383 438 
Number of Listed Stocks* 8 8 38 123 203 220 329 422 477 
Issued Volume (Million Shares) 261.00 272.00 4,694.00 23,554.00 41,888.00 56,066.00 74,986.00 97,537.00 128,035.00 
Market Capitalisation* 1,234.00 2,943.00 55,840.00 220,620.00 260,013.00 252,566.00 547,781.00 921,806.00 1,062,592.00 
Source: Shanghai Stock Exchange Fact Book 2011 and Historical Data of Shanghai Stock Exchange official website137 
* Please refer to the explanatory notes of Table 2.1 for the definition of these terms.  
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Table 2.4 Shanghai Stock Exchange Statistics 1999-2011 (RMB￥ Million)* 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Number of Listed Companies 484 572 646 715 780 837 834 842 860 864 870 894 931 
Number of New Listed Companies 46 88 75 70 67 61 3 13 25 6 9 28 39 
Number of Listed Stock** 525 614 690 759 824 881 878 886 904 908 914 938 975 
A Shares   636 705 770 827 824 832 850 854 860 884 921 
B Shares   54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 
Issued Volume (Million Shares) 158,015.00 203,242.00 316,444.00 372,784.00 417,039.00 470,055.00 502,305.00 1,027,954.00 1,417,310.00 1,541,039.00 1,665,996.00 2,193,951.00 2,346,665.00 
Negotiable Shares Volume (Million Shares) 49,441.00 64,899.00 83,753.00 99,253.00 115,710.00 136,658.00 156,121.00 225,448.00 339,930.00 491,604.00 1,157,856.00 1,603,130.00 1,799,380.00 
Market Capitalisation** 1,458,047.00 2,693,086.00 2,759,056.00 2,536,372.00 2,980,492.00 2,601,434.00 2,309,613.00 7,161,238.00 26,983,887.00 9,725,191.00 18,465,523.00 17,900,724.00 14,837,622.00 
Negotiable Market Capitalisation 424,969.00 848,133.00 838,211.00 746,730.00 820,114.00 735,088.00 675,461.00 1,642,833.00 6,453,217.00 3,230,591.00 11,480,500.00 14,233,744.00 12,285,136.00 
Capital raised by A shares 48,287.00 91,068.00 95,749.00 61,430.00 55,741.20 45,690.10 30,875.00 171,351.00 670,133.00 223,685.00 334,315.00 553,214.00 319,969.00 
Capital raised by B shares (US$) 42.80 44.00 0.00 0.00 42.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Source: Shanghai Stock Exchange Fact Book 1999-2011138 
* It seems that the historical statistics of Shanghai Stock Exchange Fact Book are not strictly accurate, as some of the information appears to be in conflict with other data. These conflicts have been 
reviewed, and only the relatively credible data has been chosen for this research.  
** Please refer to the explanatory notes of Table 2.1 for the definition of these terms.  
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By comparison, H shares
139
 could be defined as a more attractive proposition for 
overseas investors, since strict listing rules must be continuously complied with 
when Mainland corporations launch a public offer of H shares on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange (HKEx). The first IPO of H shares resulting from the Tsingtao 
Brewery in July 1993 was judged to have been a resounding success as there was an 
oversubscription of 110 times the available shares .
140
 Further issuances such as the 
Guangzhou Shipyard International and Beiren Printing followed swiftly and the 
capital raised by H shares amounted to HK$ 8,224 million by the end of 1993.
141
 In 
the prehistory of H shares, the central government tended to select former giant 
state-own enterprises for listing from a parochial view of responsibilities. However, 
the majority of these enterprises had a universal problem in that they could not avoid 
the heavy burden of their traditional welfare and excessive labour commitments.
142
 
Moreover, most loss-making Mainland SOEs lost their advantage after their 
considerable state subsidies had been severely curtailed; this was because China’s 
authorities aimed to alleviate the protracted pressure on government budgets.
143
 This 
was also one of China’s major commitments in its negotiations with the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).
144
 In addition, it was surprising to discover that a certain 
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proportion of the subscription obtained from H share listing had been diverted to 
risky businesses such as property deals, shares and futures.
145
 A multiplicity of these 
disadvantages, together with underlying political uncertainties, detracted from the 
ephemeral success of H shares when the enthusiasm of foreign investors subsided.  
 
Given the fiasco that had occurred with the issue of B shares and H shares, foreign 
investors took a more optimistic view of “Red Chips” enterprises.146 Although most 
Red Chips were owned by the Chinese government, either directly or indirectly, 
almost all Red Chips were headquartered in Hong Kong.
147
 With most Red Chips 
listed on the HKEx through a subsidiary or Listing Vehicle incorporated offshore, 
they were also largely run by foreign quality management techniques, which made 
them less vulnerable to the fluctuations of excessive Mainland bureaucracy. The Red 
Chip index had already increased by 41 per cent by late 1996,
148
 and the total 
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market capitalisation of Red Chips amounted to HK$ 473 billion at the end of 1997, 
which exceeded that of H shares by nearly ten to one (see Table 2.5 below).
149
 As 
most Red Chip enterprises could obtain full backing from municipal governments, 
there was a general expectation that high quality assets would be injected into the 
listing vehicle corporation. As the Mainland governmental entities could not export 
good assets within a reasonable time, the Red Chip boom was devastated by the 
advent of the Asian financial crisis in 1998.
150
 In recent years, there have been 
widespread rumours that the Red Chip stocks would return to China’s Mainland’s 
A-share market, and a report by Hong Kong’s Wen Wei Po also confirmed the 
further progress of relevant preparatory work.
151
  
 
Table 2.5 shows that the market value of H shares listed on the HKEx was increasing 
faster than ever after 2005, and that this figure had increased fourfold during 2006 
and 2007. When the Hong Kong stock market became badly affected by the global 
financial crisis in 2008, the market capitalisation of both Red Chips and H shares 
was down by almost 50 per cent in that year.
152
 Notwithstanding, the market value 
of H shares made a remarkable recovery after the recession, and it finally overtook 
that of Red Chips in 2009, maintaining its lead in the following two years.  
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The Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) is an alternative market tier of the HKEx that 
was established in 1999 for growth companies, and it provides extra fund raising 
opportunities for those companies that cannot fulfil the listing requirements of the 
main board of the HKEx.
153
 Unfortunately, it seems that the GEM gave a poor 
account of itself since its market value could not be compared to that of the main 
board. Technically, the market capitalisation of all Red Chips listed on the GEM was 
only approximately HK$ 1 billion before 2006. In 2007, there was a steep rise in this 
figure, but it quickly fell back to HK$ 1 billion in the following year. Although the 
said number was again on the rise in 2009, it experienced another downturn in 2010 
and 2011. By comparison, those H shares listed on the GEM of HKEx conducted 
themselves far better than the Red Chips. The market value of H shares listed on the 
GEM kept rising at a reasonable rate from 2000 to 2007, as Table 2.5 shows. In spite 
of the dramatic drop caused by the global economic slowdown that began in 2008, 
the market capitalisation of H shares listed on the GEM totalled some HK$ 27.1 
billion in 2009, making them over one quarter of the size of all shares that were 
listed on the GEM. Unfortunately, the weak Hong Kong stock market had sent those 
H shares listed on the GEM into an abrupt decline in the two years that followed, 
and their value shrunk to only HK$ 4.6 billion at the end of 2011, which was worth 
only 5.4 per cent of the total market capitalisation of the GEM.  
 
As Hong Kong has a free market economy that is closely linked to international 
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finance and trade, these H share and Red Chip companies listed on HKEx became 
more exposed to global economic conditions in comparison with the Mainland 
companies listed on the SZSE or SSE. On the other hand, the HKEx was also 
increasingly influenced by the rapid developments of Mainland China.
154
 The 
market value of H shares and Red Chips that listed on the main board of the HKEx 
added up to HK$ 8,095 billion towards the end of 2011, which had already 
accounted for more than 46 per cent of the total market capitalisation of the HKEx’s 
main board. In fact, the main board of the HKEx hosted only 143 H share companies 
and 103 Red Chip companies,
155
 and the sum total of such H shares and Red Chips 
accounted for only 18.5 per cent of the total number of companies listed.
156
 These 
statistics suggest that H share and Red Chip companies listed on the main board of 
the HKEx could expect to raise more funds than other HKEx main board listed local 
or foreign companies. In contrast, these H shares and Red Chips listed on the GEM 
of the HKEx could not attain a considerable size, and their market capitalisation 
showed unusual volatility periodically, reflecting that these small-caps companies 
were especially vulnerable in cases of a volatile economic and financial market 
environment.  
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Table 2.5 Market Capitalisation by Stock Type of Hong Kong Stock Exchange 1997-2011 (HK$ billion) 
Year 
Main Board Growth Enterprise Market 
Total 
Of which 
Total 
Of which 
Hang Seng Indexes Constituents* Red Chips H Shares Red Chips H shares 
1997 3,202.3 2,132.0 473.0 48.6 n/a** n/a n/a 
1998 2,661.7 2,106.0 335.0 33.5 n/a** n/a n/a 
1999 4,727.5 3,744.0 956.9 41.9 7.2 1.3 0.0 
2000 4,795.2 3,866.1 1,203.6 85.1 67.3 0.8 1.0 
2001 3,885.3 3,136.8 908.9 99.8 61.0 1.0 1.9 
2002 3,559.1 2,684.6 806.4 129.2 52.2 0.8 2.4 
2003 5,477.7 3,859.6 1,197.8 403.1 70.2 n/a 5.1 
2004 6,629.2 4,429.1 1,409.4 455.2 66.7 0.7 6.4 
2005 8,113.3 4,685.9 1,710.0 1,280.5 66.6 0.8 6.4 
2006 13,248.8 8,191.3 2,951.6 3,363.8 88.9 0.8 15.0 
2007 20,536.5 13,284.5 5,514.1 5,056.8 161.1 10.4 23.7 
2008 10,253.6 7,208.8 2,874.9 2,720.2 45.2 1.0 11.6 
2009 17,769.3 10,812.3 3,862.1 4,686.4 105.0 6.6 27.1 
2010 20,942.3 12,056.5 4,380.7 5,210.3 134.7 5.3 20.2 
2011 17,452.7 10,481.3 3,999.1 4,096.7 84.6 3.4 4.6 
Source: Market & Industry Statistics data from The Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) of Hong Kong157 
                                                             
157
 The Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong, Market & Industry Statistics, B: Hong Kong Markets, Table B5 Market Capitalization by Stock Type, available at: 
  
 
63 
* As some red chips and H-shares are also Hang Seng Indexes constituents, figures reported in this table are not exclusive. 
** The Growth Enterprise Market was launched by HKEx in November 1999.158 
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II. THE FUNCTION OF STOCK MARKETS 
Traditionally, the stock market has been considered one of the most important 
vehicles for corporations to raise funds. As the shares of corporations are publicly 
traded on an organised market, all kinds of corporations can obtain the equity capital 
they need for their expansion and development. Some scholars have termed this as 
an “important economic purpose” since business enterprises can acquire “long-term 
debt” from the public.159 Nevertheless, it seems there is a noticeable difference on 
this issue between those firms coming from developed markets and those from 
emerging markets, although they all raise substantial funds from the capital markets. 
For instance, a significantly higher proportion of U.K. corporations expend 
considerable proportions of their profits on new net investment than is the case on 
China’s Mainland. It is generally believed that more than half of the net investment 
of U.K. companies is funded by these kinds of “internal funds”.160 In addition, 
ordinary U.K. corporations can also obtain substantial borrowings from banks. In 
reality, only slightly more than 20 per cent of investments by UK corporations are 
funded by means of the issue of new securities.
161
  
 
Stock markets generally consist of two parts: a primary market to issue new shares 
and a secondary market to trade shares that have already been issued previously. 
With the help of experienced underwriters (sometimes in the form of syndicates), 
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companies issue their equity to the public on the new-issuance markets. Then, 
investors can buy and sell such securities on the trading floor (where there is one). 
As a result, liquidity is an outstanding and attractive feature of stock markets, when 
compared to other less liquid investments such as real estate, since investors can 
purchase securities freely, and such securities can be quickly and easily disposed of 
at a later time and at a reasonable price. Trading markets are also a “price setting 
mechanism”, as “the use of securities as collateral for loans” can be facilitated and a 
company can also get an assurance of the price of issuing additional securities.
162
  
 
Essentially, stock markets are also a mechanism for capital allocation as supply and 
demand can be generally reflected in prices in the long-term. Thus, it is arguable that 
an enterprise with good prospects can raise finance from stock markets as it can 
return a high rate of earnings annually for investors. This key characteristic is 
essential for most developing countries, such as China, since it is quite difficult for 
most small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to obtain sufficient funds from 
commercial banks in developing countries. In addition, most SMEs in developing 
countries cannot retain enough of their profits for further investment and 
development as they are still in their infancy. In the face of stiff competition from 
stock markets, commercial banks would probably prefer to furnish enterprises with 
more funds on better conditions so as to gain a competitive advantage.  
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The costs and risks of financing structures are a major concern for most modern 
corporations, and listing on public stock markets can be a potential solution for them 
as the stock market can protect them from “higher interest rates and a credit 
crunch”. 163  Moreover, stock markets can also be employed as instruments of 
long-term assets management for the governments of developing countries. For 
instance, China's national pension fund (National Social Security Fund), which had a 
goal of amassing around RNB 1 trillion (US$ 203 billion) in assets by the end of 
2010, is planning to explore additional investment opportunities and the stock 
market is probably a desirable choice for managing such assets effectively. This is 
also very helpful for those governments that are in transition from a traditional 
planned economy to a market-oriented economy.  
 
On the other hand, stock markets can also have a negative effect on the economy if 
adequate regulation and strict discipline are absent, especially for those developing 
countries that are still in the early stages of economic development. Corporations 
will have incentives to behave unfairly if there is no adequate supervision and law 
enforcement. In an immature stock market such as China’s, which is imbued with 
insider dealing and price manipulation, investors cannot rely upon the integrity of 
corporate disclosure, as much information that is provided by companies is 
unreliable. In such circumstances, investing in stock markets gradually turns into 
speculation, and small investors all seek to gain short-term advantages since they 
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cannot obtain real long-term protection. Thus, the basic economic benefit of stock 
markets as capital channels has been abandoned as high-quality corporations having 
bright growth prospects cannot actually obtain funds from such markets. If 
governments invest public funds, such as China's national pension fund, in such a 
“lottery”, it would be likely to cause immeasurable harm to the economy of the 
country as a whole. This can also explain why most developing countries place a 
priority on developing their banking system rather than their stock markets, as the 
usage of loan capital can be monitored more easily and effectively by a commercial 
bank.  
 
III. SUMMARY 
The historical data and statistics reviewed in this chapter help to clarify the factors 
affecting the governance mechanisms of China’s listed companies, as well as the 
economic and legal circumstances that China’s companies are situated in. Most 
major Chinese companies, especially giant SOEs, began to make sincere attempts to 
access foreign capital markets in response to the kinds of defects and inadequacies 
that existed within China’s corporate governance system.  
 
There is a necessity to review the traditional western corporate governance theories, 
as well as the corporate governance practices of China’s major companies before we 
explore the overseas listing activities of Chinese companies. Furthermore, a detailed 
  
 
68 
analysis of the Spilt Share Structure Reform will also be provided in the next chapter, 
since this reform would potentially have a considerable effect on the ownership 
structure of most leading listed Chinese companies.  
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CHAPTER 3. THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF CHINESE 
COMPANIES 
The Chinese government had given top priority to reforming the enterprise system, 
inter alia the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), since the very beginning of China’s 
economic reforms. The establishment of modern enterprise systems as a major 
objective in the economic reforms originally emanated from the Third Plenary 
Session of the Fourteenth Central Committee held by the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) in 1993.
164
 In reality, the notion of “modern enterprise systems” was a de 
facto transplantation of the arrangement of corporate governance and company 
management from the industrialised countries, and this transplantation was 
dysfunctional to a certain degree. In addition, the process of listing SOEs on China’s 
stock exchanges and on foreign stock exchanges had also been employed as a major 
instrument to improve the productivity and profitability in the transformation of 
SOEs. Arguably, the vast majority of China’s corporations would benefit from the 
corporate governance models and corporate organisational forms imported from the 
West regardless of their ownership structures. As these imported corporate 
mechanisms had been refined over many years in industrialised countries, they 
naturally possessed some desirable characteristics. However, a more global approach 
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should be taken in developing the system of corporate governance for both SOEs 
and private enterprises, as the multifaceted attributes of China’s economy and 
complex social environment demanded comprehensive survey.  
 
In a broad sense, there was a relationship between the reasonableness of corporate 
governance and management structure with the performance of enterprises, as along 
with the market-oriented economy that had been gradually introduced into China, 
some indebted SOEs with chronic financial difficulties had become a heavy burden 
for the fiscal budget. Furthermore, despite favourable fiscal subsidies to SOEs, they 
operating at a loss,
165
 and had also strangled the growth of emerging private-sector 
enterprises. The establishment of a corporate sector with due competition would 
therefore be beneficial to the development of China, but the true extent of the 
problem regarding corporate governance should be investigated thoroughly when the 
financial interests of the state in SOEs deserved effective protection and 
promotion.
166
 When the transformation of ownership structure was of primary 
importance in the reform of China’s SOEs, some further steps were taken so as to 
tackle the fossilised problem of corporate governance in state-owned conglomerates.  
 
Traditionally, China’s SOEs employed the majority of the workforce in urban areas 
and had accordingly become the de facto “patron” of social welfare for workers. 
Although China’s central government aimed to reduce the SOE sector, a 20 
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million-strong workforce was still engaged in the SOE sector by 2002.
167
 This 
figure had elevated to over 42 million with a total wage bill of more than RNB 1,313 
billion by the end of 2008,
168
 since some SOEs had acquired shares in private-sector 
enterprises by the approach of merger and takeover. There was a sense in which the 
family network of employees was also caught up in the extension of this 
comprehensive welfare provision.
169
 This situation was said to be the typical origin 
of the problems of overstaffing and poor productivity in most SOEs.  
 
After being transformed into the corporate form through the economic reforms, the 
operation of most Chinese SOEs had been subsumed under the umbrella of 
Company Law. On the other hand, private-sector listed corporations were emerging 
as significant players in the Mainland market as they gradually acquired the 
capability to compete with SOEs in selected fields. While the institutional 
significance of SOEs and giant corporations compelled the attention of China’s 
policymakers, Chinese corporate governance discourse in practice focused almost 
exclusively within SOEs and listed companies following a rational approach.
170
 
Since China’s economic and social contexts were substantially different from those 
of industrialised countries, China’s policymakers stumbled over the selection of 
corporate governance models, as no idealised models could perfectly serve the 
economic transitional process of China in principle.  
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With the term of “corporate governance” referring to the structures and management 
of corporations, the Principles of Corporate Governance drawn up by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) identified its 
key aspects as: “the rights and equitable treatment of shareholders, the role of 
stakeholders, disclosure and transparency, and the responsibilities of the Board of 
Directors.” 171  This definition had gained acceptance throughout much of the 
Chinese academic world. While the definition and importance of corporate 
governance filled considerable column inches in Chinese broadsheets, most Chinese 
scholars had largely ignored the noteworthy interactive relationship between the 
system of corporate governance and other social systems, such as the legal 
framework and political system. Just as it was noted in Ronald Coase’s classic 
discourses, transaction costs depended to a certain degree on the functioning of the 
legal system and the educational system,
172
 with the company actually representing 
a complex nexus of contractual relationships.
173
 Moreover, as we learnt from the 
New Institutional Economics, the working of the economic system could also be 
confined by other social systems in some way since the transaction costs were 
non-zero in the real world.
174
 Furthermore, the reform of corporate governance 
regarding SOEs in China was largely about trying to deviate from the chronic 
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dilemma of administrative intervention by the bureaucratic apparatus.
175
 It seemed 
that the major concerns of Chinese scholars diverged greatly from the established 
criteria in traditional theories of corporate governance in the West, such as the ideas 
of accountability, allocative efficiency and the minimisation of agency costs.
176
  
 
It seems that scholars coming from different European jurisdictions had mixed 
interpretations of the term “corporate governance”. 177  In China, “corporate 
governance” was a relatively new notion which was generally defined by reference 
to the financial subjugation to the establishment of a “socialist market economy” for 
China.
178
 Even the notion of a “company” was perceived from different perspectives 
by Chinese scholars. Conventional perceptions among Chinese academia held that 
the Anglo-American model of corporate governance had an inbuilt advantage over 
other models, since minority shareholders and stakeholders could gain extra 
protection by the vintage mechanisms of accountability and fiduciary duties. 
Nevertheless, few Chinese SOEs or other economic organisations had the structural 
similarities in ownership to American listed corporations, as dispersed ownership 
was widespread among most major enterprises in North America.
179
 As envisaged 
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by the Path Dependency Theory in corporate governance,
180
 the evolution of 
economic organisations was heavily constrained by the pre-existing conditions and 
relevant history. As a result, the examination of corporate governance arrangements 
in China proceeded against a background in which the relevant factors of economic, 
legal and other major social systems had been critically taken into account. 
Moreover, the scrutiny of corporate governance systems and the corporate sector 
should be placed in the context of China’s entire economic development, when the 
transitional nature of China’s economy claimed particular attention.  
 
I. THE CONCEPT AND NATURE OF THE COMPANY 
To understand corporate governance in China, it is useful to first review aspects of 
the conceptual underpinnings of the corporate governance debate and theoretical 
models of the corporation that it has produced.  
 
As early as 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means had envisaged that the separation 
of control and management together with dispersed ownership would give more 
discretion to professional managers, and the power of shareholders would 
accordingly be eroded to a certain degree.
181
 By inference, the likelihood was that 
the management would deviate from their original objective, which was to maximise 
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profits for the company. It was further surmised that a modern company would play 
a more significant role in the entire society rather than merely being a private 
business entity, and that the rapid evolution of the company had wider implications 
for the economic, political and social circumstances in modern society.
182
 Moreover, 
the accumulation of social wealth would gradually exist through the form of 
ownership of stock shares, while the traditional emphasis on physical property was 
disintegrating to some extent. Company stock was distinct from the property of a 
business as it represented a claim on a proportional share of the company’s assets 
and profits in the event of a winding up.  
 
In fact, the issue associated with the separation of ownership from control had 
already been mentioned in the work of Adam Smith in the nineteenth-century, and its 
importance was highlighted after the Great Depression of the late 1920s and early 
1930s in the U.S. The agency theory advanced by Berle and Means was premised on 
the assumption that the vast majority of public companies had a diffused ownership, 
and hence the individual shareholder (the principal) did not have enough incentive to 
control the management (the agent). When power shifted towards management, 
some of that power would probably be abused. When the managers were not 
accountable to shareholders, the interests of the whole company would be harmed. 
Furthermore, it would also represent a serious hazard to the wider public when the 
scale of an enterprise was considerable, since management lacked accountability to 
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society in general.
183
  
 
Actually, there was an on-going corporate governance debate between Merrick Dodd 
and Adolf Berle from the early 1930s to the late 1960s. According to the corporate 
realist model advocated by Dodd, the company was a real person having a separate 
personality from its shareholders.
184
 Inasmuch as the company was considered as an 
independent corporate person as well as an organ of the state, it should shoulder 
corresponding social responsibilities. Essentially, Dodd’s model was emphasising the 
responsibilities of a company to societal stakeholders, and hence required directors 
to accommodate the interests of employees, consumers, creditors and even the 
aggregate community wherever possible. On the other hand, Berle argued that 
Dodd’s formulation was quite vague and would probably spark the centralisation of 
power into the hands of a small number of corporate administrators.
185
 By 
advocating the shareholder primacy position, Berle proposed that managers should 
only be accountable to shareholders, and that wealth maximisation for shareholders 
was the sole object of a company. Berle’s theory had been seen as a form of political 
economy by some critics, as it integrated a theory of corporate law within a theory of 
social welfare maximisation.
186
 Significantly, these historical arguments should not 
be interpreted outside of their original context, as they were largely policy responses 
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to the crisis of the Great Depression. Similarly, the scrutiny of the debates of that 
time surrounding corporate governance and responsibility also needed to be set in 
the new context, which was substantially different from that of several decades ago.  
 
Much criticism has been levelled at agency theory since its origination. When 
agency theory placed its locus on those companies having dispersed ownership, its 
theoretical scope was also quite limited. It was arguable that the issue of 
accountability could not always be termed as the major focus in corporate 
governance outside of the U.K. and U.S. When the state and banks took the position 
of blockholder in some companies, they could then intervene in the management 
actively. Moreover, the management policy was not independent of shareholders’ 
supervision either, in most companies that were established by families. Even in the 
U.K. and U.S., the classic agency model had been complicated by the fact that 
institutional investors, such as pension funds, hedge funds and insurance companies, 
began to emerge as dominant players in capital markets from the 1980s.
187
 While 
the short-term outlook of institutional investors largely diverged from the interests of 
the long-term traditional shareholders, directors had to determine which interests 
should be higher on the list of priorities. It seems that the traditional role of 
management underwent a transformation during this process.  
 
The focus of agency theory was the correlation between the corporate governance 
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structure and the performance of a company, and much scholarship had been 
accomplished to test whether there was a causal linkage between these two ideas.
188
 
It was ordinarily believed that the generality of conclusions obtained from 
contemporary research was not quite compelling, since different scholars could draw 
substantially varied outcomes from the very same data. Besides, it was widely 
perceived that measures of the quality of corporate governance employed by practice 
and scholarship were inconclusive and inconsistent. As corporate governance was an 
intricate network of loyalties and relationships, the most effective governance 
institutions actually depended on context, and on a company’s specific 
circumstances.
189
 Some scholars argued that the attributes of corporate governance 
could not be examined only by reference to quantitative measures, as board level 
activities were under the influence of various factors, such as inter-personal relations 
between directors as well as political factors.
190
 Conversely, some critics gradually 
began to harbour doubts about the philosophical underpinnings of agency theory. As 
the theory assumed that all individuals were self-interested with bounded 
rationality,
191
 agents would use their decision-making authority to maximise their 
personal welfare by satisfying their personal desires, in conflict with the goals of 
their principal. Nevertheless, it was argued that self-interested behaviour was not the 
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essence of organisations, and asymmetric distribution of power in bureaucracies 
would structurally encourage exploitation.
192
 When agency theory was attempting to 
define relationships in governance by means of simplistic abstract contracts between 
parties, it was only natural to highlight the issue of moral hazard.  
 
One of the major positive contributions made by agency theory was the treatment of 
information as a purchasable commodity bearing a cost.
193
 As the top executive of a 
company generally knew more about the operation of that company than the 
shareholders, shareholders were compelled to effectively ensure that the executive 
was taking actions in a well-conceived manner, so as to align the interests of the 
executive with those of shareholders. When the strategic role of the information 
system had been highlighted, the underlying implication was that shareholders could 
make a reasonable investment in the information system so as to acquire sufficient 
knowledge concerning the operation of the company. Thereby organisations incurred 
“agency costs” when treating the difficulties that arose under conditions of 
information asymmetry between principals and agents. An inevitable extension of 
the issues arising from asymmetric information was executive compensation policy. 
A considerable number of scholars held that the link between top executive 
compensation and organisational performance was quite weak,
194
 and some 
statistical analyses even suggested that performance-contingent pay might be an 
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inappropriate means of improving organisational performance.
195
 With the board of 
directors arguably an effective monitoring device for the interests of shareholders,
196
 
executive pay arrangements were more likely based on the behaviour of executives 
since shareholders could obtain substantial information from their boards. In fact, 
organisations would devise different strategies of executive compensation when 
facing similar conditions, as the eligibility of the same long-term incentive 
arrangement was questionable in changed environments. According to recent 
empirical research, it seemed that executive compensation practices in a certain 
number of major public companies were still seriously flawed where the executives’ 
incentives had been distorted by inflated and concealed pay that was unrelated to 
performance.
197
 Moreover, the value of the retirement packages given to executives 
was also not definite.  
 
Although agency theory was still open to dispute, it, together with these theories 
dealing with it has remained in the mainstream of published literature surrounding 
corporate governance over recent decades. As agency theory was a branch of 
financial economics and political science that directed at ubiquitous conflicts of 
interest between people with different interests in the same assets, its application to 
the legal circumstances of the company had made positive contributions to 
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organisational thinking. It had actually imposed far-reaching implications over 
research on corporate governance since its origination.  
 
Being a major counterbalance to agency theory, stewardship theory was developed 
by Lex Donaldson and James H. Davis in the early 1990s.
198
 In essence, the key 
assumption of stewardship theory was a radical departure from the philosophical 
foundation of agency theory, since the inherent concept of the former believed that 
shareholders should put their trust in management. Interestingly, stewardship theory 
had an unintended overlap with stakeholder theory concerning the wider 
responsibility of directors, as both theories held that the interests of creditors, 
employees and other stakeholders should be considered by the management. 
Nevertheless, stewardship theorists did not recognise the capital structure as the 
driver of management.
199
 It was argued that managerial behaviour was determined 
largely by the characteristics of the very job and position that managers were 
holding.
200
 Hence, an idealised view of managerial behaviour had been adopted by 
stewardship theory, in which the strong desire for achievement and relevant 
responsibility was deemed a major motivator of managerial performance.
201
 Some 
scholars even commented that the sense of common humanity played a positive role 
in influencing managerial behaviour, since some desirable characteristics such as 
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loyalty and honour were intrinsic to the nature of the human being.
202
 This spilt 
between stewardship theory and agency theory had been defined as the difference 
between the economic and socio-psychological models of man.
203
 By the 
implications of stewardship theory, corporate governance structures should grant 
enough discretion to top management so as to facilitate their organisational functions, 
while they would be regarded as stewards. It was further argued that the widespread 
practice of separating the roles of chair and CEO would lower industrial 
performance.
204
  
 
While stewardship theory was actually reflecting the basic legal perspective of the 
corporation’s legislation, it seemed that it should have had an inbuilt advantage over 
other corporate governance counterparts. However, some critics had also challenged 
the validity of stewardship theory. It was pointed out that such normative models 
rooted in the social setting of the nineteenth-century would not function effectively 
in modern companies. Moreover, the principals had to assume more risks under the 
stewardship governance mechanism when obtaining the given advantages. From this 
perspective, the agency relationship could be considered as a necessary sacrifice for 
aligning the behaviour of the executive with the interests of the principal.
205
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Scholars had also carried out extensive empirical research in order to confirm the 
association between the executive-chaired board structure and higher industrial 
performance, but no conclusive evidence had been procured.
206
 Being an alternative 
agency theory, stewardship theory essentially relied on the philosophy of 
involvement-oriented management and the trust between the principal and 
executive.
207
 In fact, it was doubtful that either the stewardship theory or agency 
model would be the most desirable option to corporate governance, as the principal 
could regularly weigh the benefits of the governance structure against the risks 
involved, and alter accordingly the management strategy.  
 
Inspired by the theoretical insights of agency theory, Ronald Coase further probed 
the nature of the company and reached some tentative perceptions, which considered 
minimising transaction costs as the foundation for the existence of the company.
208
 
Furthermore, it was argued that the transaction costs could be saved by undertaking 
activities within the organisation, as the major function of a company was obtaining 
merchandise and services at a competitive price independently, rather than resolving 
it externally. According to the further account of Williamson, the efficacy of 
governance forms chosen by large corporate groups could be assessed by an 
examination of the relevant decision-making processes and associated costs.
209
 As 
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economic efficiency was the first consideration in transaction cost economics, these 
“comparative institutional exercises” would help to overcome the disadvantages of 
scale.
210
 When governance structures and mechanisms together with the cost of 
enforcement were the main focus of transaction cost theory, the primacy of markets 
had also been underlined. It seems that managerial discretion was a common concern 
of transaction cost economics and agency theories, as both believed that directors 
were given to opportunism and moral hazard, and that the management always 
operated under bounded rationality.
211
 Arguably, the resources in a free-market 
economy should be allocated efficiently without the intervention of any authority, 
and the major contribution of Coase was in identifying the costs of using market 
equilibrium forces. When firms could alleviate such transaction costs by substituting 
the price mechanism with the exercise of authority, corporate governance was 
merely research into how this authority was allocated and exercised.
212
  
 
Some critics attempted to further elaborate on the basis of Coase’s transaction cost 
theory, and the nexus of contracts theory advanced by Alchian and Demsetz 
describing the firm as a set of contracts with no hierarchy.
213
 By this argument, 
almost every party in the firm had equal power to renegotiate over the contract, and 
equilibrium outcome could be achieved at last. The theory of the firm as a nexus of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
4, No. 1, 1988, p. 88.  
210
 Williamson, Oliver E., “Transaction Cost Economics: How it Works; Where it is Headed”, De Economist, Vol. 
146, No. 1, 1998, p. 53. 
211
 Stiles, Philip and Taylor, Bernard, Boards at Work: How Directors View Their Roles and Responsibilities, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p. 4.  
212
 Zingales, Luigi, “In Search of New Foundations”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, Issue 4, 2000, p. 1623.  
213
 Alchian, Armen A. and Demsetz, Harold, “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization”, The 
American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5, 1972, p. 777.  
  
 
85 
contracts was further developed by several other scholars, most of whom generally 
strived to provide a theoretical model of the firm through a variety of contractual and 
economic perspectives. For instance, Jensen and Meckling argued that specialised 
factors of production generated transaction costs, and that these transaction costs 
could be minimised by the contractual designs.
214
  
 
This literature proposed all manner of hypotheses and theories to explain why the 
firm could exist as an independent entity. Moreover, the divergence of interests 
between the firm’s participants and resultant social efficiency issues was another 
major concern. As economic theories tried to deal with corporate governance from a 
different perspective, they exerted some influence on corporate legal scholarship in 
certain respects.  
 
A big growth area in corporate governance debates of recent years has been in 
relation to stakeholder theory. The stakeholder model attempted to solve the issue of 
corporate governance from a societal perspective while advancing the significance of 
corporate social responsibility and sustainability. By the supposition of stakeholder 
philosophies, the company could be deemed as a set of multilateral arrangements 
between internal stakeholders (employees, managers, owners) and external 
constituencies (customers, suppliers and the community).
215
 As there was a growing 
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belief that the behaviour of large economic entities would affect the interests of a 
wide range of stakeholders, stakeholder advocates envisaged that the executive 
should be held accountable to all those affected by their decisions. It was further 
argued that equity, efficiency and self-governance in the private sector could be 
improved to a great extent when the broader cybernetic stakeholder governance was 
adopted. Meanwhile, stakeholder participation could also provide competitive 
advantages for companies.
216
 On the other hand, some critics had expressed concern 
about the potential conflicts and incompatibility occasioned by the misguided usage 
of stakeholder theory. It was believed that government intervention could be 
rationalised by the stakeholding governance architecture, when private property and 
executive accountability were undermined.
217
 The stakeholder approach could not 
necessarily provide better corporate governance or industrial performance, but its 
usage would involve uncertain risk.  
 
In fact, the divergence between agency theory and stakeholders philosophy was not a 
new issue, and had been widely discussed as early as the 1930s. What was at issue 
was whether the corporation should serve a wider social purpose and be managed in 
the broader public interest, rather than being solely for the purpose of maximising 
shareholder returns. When a vast company or conglomerate occupied considerable 
valuable social resources, it was arguable that they should shoulder corresponding 
                                                             
216
 Turnbull, Shann, “Stakeholder Governance: A Cybernetic and Property Rights Analysis”, Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, Vol. 5, Issue 1, 1997, p. 11.  
217
 Sternberg, Elaine, “The Stakeholder Concept: A Mistaken Doctrine”, Foundation for Business Responsibilities, 
Issue Paper No. 4, 1999, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=263144, accessed January 10, 2011.  
  
 
87 
social obligations. Therefore, some proponents of the stakeholding model described 
the ideal corporate goal as maximising the wealth producing capacity of the 
enterprise.
218
 With the emergence of sophisticated equity markets and dispersed 
share-ownership, professional executives tried to find a better route to satisfying the 
interests of the entire corporate constituency. Hence, no single stakeholder’s interest 
should be significantly overwhelmed by any other when the company is broadly 
viewed as a social institution in common business practice.
219
 This could also be 
dubbed as a distinction between the myopia of profits maximisation and the 
long-term profit maximisation view. When shareholder wealth and corporate 
resources were diverted to some activities for enhancing the well-being of the 
community, the shareholder could also be widely cross-fertilised by the continual 
improvement of general business circumstances.  
 
To a certain degree, another major facet of the stakeholder model had been neglected 
by a considerable number of scholars as it was rather difficult to determine a 
reasonable scheme for executives to enforce the company’s wider social 
responsibilities. If the executive were accountable to no one, it would be almost 
impossible to have the company function efficiently. However, publicly traded 
companies had increasingly employed the stakeholder approach so as to facilitate 
their long-term profitability. Moreover, stakeholding could be interpreted in several 
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different ways in various countries, as the social context and political conditions 
were substantially dissimilar.  
 
It is now appropriate to turn to examine how these corporate governance ideas have 
been applied or developed in China.  
 
II. THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF CHINESE COMPANIES 
In Mainland China, there was no apparent consensus on the concept of the “company” 
until the early 1980s. Following a long period of confusion and disorder, the 
definition of a “legal person” was formally incorporated into The General Principles 
of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China in 1987 (Article 36).220 
According to Article 41 of the Civil Law, “an enterprise under ownership by the 
whole people” (SOEs) or enterprises with collective-ownership can be qualified as a 
legal person when they have sufficient funds, articles of association and premises. 
This stipulation provided a preliminary framework for the corporatisation of SOEs. 
By 1993, the government was determined to accelerate corporatisation for SOEs 
after a long period of reflection. One year later, the long overdue Company Law of 
China
221
 officially brought the foundation of limited liability companies and joint 
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stock companies as legal persons onto the statute book. In the years 2004 and 2005, 
China’s legislative body successively promulgated two revisions of the Company 
Law in the light of steady progress of economic development.  
 
With the rigidity of the old Company Law having seriously impeded economic 
growth, a certain amount of flexibility was incorporated into the new system by the 
2005 revision, while some other significant changes were also introduced to 
corporate practice.  
 
As the minimum capital requirements for establishing new companies had been 
largely reduced,
222
 more investors could operate their businesses by means of an 
independent legal entity with limited liabilities. In fact, the legal limits on capital had 
never imposed an obstruction on the process of corporatisation for SOEs, since 
essential subsidies would be provided for the reformation in which the government 
predominated.  
 
With the availability of a single shareholder limited liability company in the new 
2005 Company Law, investors could form an entity with the simplified corporate 
structure of only one shareholder. However, it seems that SOEs and wealthy 
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investors would not engage with this facilitation, as it posed risks for the shareholder 
to shoulder the joint liability of the firm’s debts.223  
 
Besides, the transparency issue of company information was clarified in the new law 
and hence the creditors or even the public had the right to obtain certain essential 
information about the company. Moreover, further protection was also provided for 
shareholders by making the information regarding financial records and tax reports 
accessible, while maintaining that the request for information disclosure should not 
impair the firm’s interests.224 These mandatory provisions for information release 
would place directors and management under necessary supervision, as there was 
always an incentive for senior management to operate the firm for their own 
interests.  
 
Moreover, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil had been introduced by the new 
Company Law so as to protect the interests of the entire company as well as third 
parties. When obtaining the protection of limited liability through the independent 
legal person character of the company, it was not beyond the realms of possibility 
that shareholders would abuse the advantages of the limited liability company. Now, 
                                                             
223
 People’s Republic of China, Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (2005 Order No.42 of the 
President of the People’s Republic of China), Article 64, amended and adopted at the 18
th
 session of the 
Standing Committee of the 10
th
 National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on October 27, 
2005, and effective as of January 1, 2006, available at: 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=4685&lib=law&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=%D6%D0%B
B%AA%C8%CB%C3%F1%B9%B2%BA%CD%B9%FA%B9%AB%CB%BE%B7%A8, accessed September 22, 2012.  
224
 People’s Republic of China, Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (2005 Order No.42 of the 
President of the People’s Republic of China), Article 34, amended and adopted at the 18
th
 session of the 
Standing Committee of the 10
th
 National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on October 27, 
2005, and effective as of January 1, 2006, available at: 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=4685&lib=law&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=%D6%D0%B
B%AA%C8%CB%C3%F1%B9%B2%BA%CD%B9%FA%B9%AB%CB%BE%B7%A8, accessed September 22, 2012.  
  
 
91 
the shareholder had to take personal liability to the injured party if the corporate 
formality was not observed.
225
 In China, this rule would be useful to prevent 
shareholders from escaping their own liability in most cases.  
 
Apart from these improvements, the new Company Law also placed further 
limitation on loans and security arrangements to third parties, as these corporate 
practices were often abused by senior management and blockholders for their own 
benefit. The new Company Law also placed much emphasis on the legal remedies of 
the shareholder’s legitimate interests, since these interests were always jeopardised 
by the self-interested misconduct of directors and senior management.  
 
Significantly, China’s government suggested several major reforms during the 
revision of the old Company Law, and a number of important changes were 
introduced via the new Company Law with the intention of improving China’s 
lamentable corporate governance regime.  
 
Article 104 of the new Company Law
226
 prescribed that each share held by the 
shareholders vested them one vote in the general shareholders’ meetings. In addition, 
Article 4 ensured that the shareholders enjoyed the right to share in the benefits of 
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the company’s assets. Article 38 held that shareholders should exercise their right to 
vote on fundamental corporate changes. Besides, Chapter 5 (Section 2) of the new 
law offered a clear definition for the transfer of shares from joint stock companies, 
with these provisions asserting that the shareholders of a listed company had the 
statutory right to transfer their shares through the automatic bidding system and 
block-trading provided by the stock exchanges. These provisions ensured that the 
stronger legal safeguards for basic shareholder rights were placed centre stage as a 
result of the revision of the Company Law.  
 
There was a lack of adequate protection for minority shareholders in the old 
Company Law, and the new law aspired to provide greater means of legal remedy for 
such shareholders. Article 102 of the new law stipulated that if the board of directors 
or supervisory board could not convene a shareholders’ general meeting, the 
shareholders who individually or aggregately had held 10 per cent of the company’s 
shares for more than 90 consecutive days had the right to convene such a 
shareholders’ general meeting. Moreover, the new law attempted to offer an 
additional tier of protection for minority shareholders by introducing a cumulative 
voting method. Unfortunately, very few Chinese listed companies adopted this 
cumulative voting system, as its provision was not mandatory.  
 
Strict regulations governing related-party transactions were also laid down in the 
new Company Law. With Article 116 providing that a joint-stock company should 
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not directly or indirectly lend money to its directors, supervisors or senior executives, 
the directors and executives of such a joint-stock company were debarred from 
sealing a contract with the company itself by Article 149, unless such a contract had 
been approved by the general shareholders’ meeting. Furthermore, Article 117 of the 
new law stipulated that the remuneration of the directors, supervisors and executives 
of a joint-stock company should be periodically disclosed, and that such 
remuneration should be determined by the general shareholders’ meeting.227 These 
provisions provided a framework for treating all shareholders equitably, with 
safeguarding the interests of minority shareholders being considered of primary 
importance.  
 
As accurate and timely information disclosure of listed companies correlates with 
investor confidence, the new Company Law introduced new regulations (Article 146) 
which clearly specified that listed companies were subject to certain reporting 
requirements. The onus was on China’s listed companies to communicate relevant 
information to their shareholders and investors through annual, half yearly and 
quarterly reports, while Article 165 of the new Company Law provided that listed 
companies should formulate financial reports at the end of each fiscal year, with a 
requirement for these financial reports to be audited by a chartered auditor. 
Technically, Article 124 stated officially that the main burden of handling 
                                                             
227
 People’s Republic of China, Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (2005 Order No.42 of the 
President of the People’s Republic of China), Article 100, amended and adopted at the 18
th
 session of the 
Standing Committee of the 10
th
 National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on October 27, 
2005, and effective as of January 1, 2006, available at: 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=4685&lib=law&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=%D6%D0%B
B%AA%C8%CB%C3%F1%B9%B2%BA%CD%B9%FA%B9%AB%CB%BE%B7%A8, accessed October 23, 2013.  
  
 
94 
information disclosure fell to the secretariat of the board of directors.  
 
The board of directors and supervisory board were the primary bodies responsible 
for the corporate governance of joint-stock companies in China’s two-tier board 
system. Article 109 of the new Company Law stipulated that each joint-stock 
company must have a board of directors composed of five to nineteen members. In 
addition, Article 100 provided that the general shareholder’s meeting of a joint-stock 
company was entitled to elect or remove members from the board of directors and 
supervisory board. However, the new Company Law did not contain clear 
specifications regarding the procedures for appointment and election of directors and 
supervisors, as only those shareholders who held more than 3 per cent of the total 
share volume (either individually or jointly) could exercise the authority to propose 
nominees for vacant director and supervisor positions. Besides, the employees’ 
representative might sit on the board of directors, to which the former could be 
democratically elected by the employee representative congress or employee 
congress.  
 
Hiring and dismissing managers was one of the major statutory duties carried out by 
the board of directors in a joint-stock company, according to Article 114, while 
deciding on manager remuneration and the employment of other senior managerial 
staffers were also within the remit of the board of directors. Significantly, Article 147 
gave a clear definition of the qualification requirements for directors, supervisors 
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and executives by clarifying which types of individuals were prohibited from 
appointment to such positions in joint-stock companies. Furthermore, Article 149 
stipulated that directors of joint-stock companies were under obligation to remain 
loyal to the company, and therefore should not commit any wrongdoing while 
fulfilling their duties. Compared with the old Company Law, the duties and functions 
of the supervisory board had been considerably strengthened in the new law, as it 
was afforded a more positive monitoring role. According to Article 118 of the new 
law, the supervisory board of a joint-stock company should be comprised of no less 
than three members, with employee representatives filling at least one-third of these 
seats.  
 
With stakeholder interest and corporate social responsibility gaining increasing 
importance in China, its government decided to phase in new regulations to protect 
stakeholder interest whilst requesting that large companies undertake certain forms 
of corporate social responsibility. To support this, Article 18 of the new law 
sustained that employees could organise labour unions to facilitate collective 
bargaining over their welfare. Article 20 introduced the doctrine of piercing the 
corporate veil, with one major intention of this article being to safeguard the interests 
of creditors. Unfortunately, Mr J (Interviewee No.10) attached little importance to 
these provisions regarding stakeholders and corporate social responsibility, as he 
argued that the ambiguities of such provisions inexorably led to the reality that they 
rarely seems to be applied in practice.  
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It is arguable that the new Company Law injected new changes into the practice and 
management of China’s companies, as more affairs were left to the discretion of the 
company itself, while the importance of the articles of association had also been 
highlighted by some legislative provisions.
228
 Indeed, the new Company Law 
improved corporate governance in China to a certain degree. Nevertheless, these 
tangible improvements did not meet expectations since enforceability was always a 
concern in China’s judicial system. Moreover, the new law may also have provided 
grounds for judicial officials to interfere in a company’s internal affairs, since 
judicial remedies would play a more important role under the new law.
229
  
 
According to the classic theory of capital markets, stock markets could be classified 
into two general types: the Anglo-American style and the continental Europe style.
230
 
As the structures of ownership of Anglo-American listed companies were 
substantially different from those of their continental model counterparts, to a certain 
extent the Anglo-American style stock market also performed a dissimilar function 
compared with continental model stock markets. Traditionally, the typical 
Anglo-American publicly quoted company had widely dispersed share ownership, 
and the substantial equity of most major listed companies resided with institutional 
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investors.
231
 In contrast, the property rights of the vast majority of quoted 
companies in continental countries were mostly concentrated in a handful of 
investors, including families, companies and other institutions. As the directors in the 
Anglo-American corporate governance system were seen to have an obligation to 
maximize shareholder value, profit-oriented behaviour was generally considered as 
an essential means to enhance corporate efficiency.
232
 In contrast, the interest of 
shareholders was arguably subordinated to the collective interest of the whole 
company in continental countries. Besides, a one-tier board structure had been 
widely adopted in Anglo-American companies, where executive directors as well as 
non-executive directors formed one board. Apparently, the two-tier board system 
was a strong preference for continental countries, in which the management board 
and supervisory responsibility were clearly separated.
233
  
 
Stock exchanges played an important role in corporate finance in Anglo-American 
countries, while their capacity was largely reduced in the continental mechanism. 
While the policy of dividend payment highly valued in the Anglo-American 
governance system, this was less prioritised on the Continent since the ownership of 
cross-shareholdings was common practice there. Under the continental governance 
mechanism, publicly held companies often owned a significant percentage of each 
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other’s equity, and financial institutions such as banks were also major shareholders. 
As a general rule, non-bank financial institutions, such as pension funds and life 
insurance firms, could exert more substantial control over corporate activities in the 
Anglo-American system, when large corporate groupings created by complex 
inter-linkages of equity ownership were generally represented on each other’s boards 
on the Continent.
234
  
 
Some scholars have organised the variables of corporate governance mechanism into 
two main types: capital-related and labour-related,
235
 with the capital-related aspects 
comprising variables such as ownership structure, corporate voting and the role of 
institutional owners. It was generally believed that the capital-related attributes of 
Anglo-American countries were desirable when their capital markets were well 
developed. It was further argued that the presence of large investors was not the only 
variable that generated concentration of control in continental companies, since the 
smaller shareholdings were not “appreciably” smaller than the largest ones in the 
U.K. and U.S. Furthermore, the presence of significant shareholdings by smaller 
investors had actually enabled the effective control by coalitions rather than by 
individual shareholders.
236
 As the share ownership structure of the Anglo-American 
corporate governance system was widely dispersed, it was felt that small individual 
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shareholders should be placed under extra protection, since they could exert little 
control or influence over the management. To a certain degree, the strict regulation 
of the stock market and harsh penalty measures against corporate activities in the 
Anglo-American system were well suited to its ownership structure when balancing 
the interests of majority shareholders and those of the minority shareholders. Hence 
small shareholders could trade their shares freely since their rights were safeguarded 
by the stringent rules of information disclosure, insider trading and takeovers.  
 
With the bank playing a major role both in corporate finance and control in the 
continental system, its importance had been minimised in the corporate ownership 
structure in Anglo-American countries. In contrast, some non-bank financial 
institutions, such as pension funds and life insurance companies, gradually gained 
substantial control over the corporate sector in the U.K. and U.S. Takeover 
mechanisms, meanwhile, had been employed as a main correctional measure for 
managerial failure, as well as an inducement to corporate efficiency in the 
Anglo-American system, when its role was restricted to a certain degree on the 
Continent.
237
 While large shareholders had due incentives to be involved in the 
monitoring of the corporate activities of publicly listed companies, dispersed 
outsiders had little incentive for this. As dispersed investors did not exert direct 
control over corporate activities, takeovers could help these outsiders to substitute 
conservative or ineffectual management so as to achieve the maximisation of 
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benefits.  
 
According to some earlier observations, quoted companies outperformed their 
unquoted matched counterparts in terms of capital return rates, growth rates, 
productivity and profitability.
238
 Arguably, this could imply that companies achieved 
better performance with the benefits of stock markets. Enabling outside individual 
investors and companies to purchase the ownership of quoted companies, stock 
markets also offered a much greater degree of flexibility for existing shareholders to 
trade in their property rights. In essence, the introduction of publicly-traded equity 
claims together with external markets allowed corporate control through mergers and 
takeovers. Meanwhile, this outsider-based corporate financial structure also 
facilitated hostile takeovers. Moreover, companies also had to bear the high cost of 
these outside equity financing activities since signalling to outside investors was 
expensive.
239
  
 
It is generally believed that there was a close relationship between corporate 
governance arrangements and corporate performance. With the rapidly growing 
economy, the development of a viable corporate governance system was becoming 
of primary importance to China’s corporate sector reforms. Particularly, improving 
the performance of SOEs and other major public companies through institutional 
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changes would have certain political and social significance in Mainland China, as it 
could enhance the country’s economic growth.  
 
As argued in Proposition 1, there was a reasonable prospect that China’s corporate 
governance patterns would reflect insider control system patterns, generally. In fact, 
some observers had already looked with favour upon this proposition.
240
 Ironically, 
it seems that some of China’s guiding policies on corporate governance actually 
mirrored the principles of the stylised Anglo-American model based on external 
markets. However, the quintessence of the Anglo-American model was largely 
ignored by this prescriptive approach to corporate sector reform as it was only a 
replication of the Anglo-American stylised corporate governance structure, whereas 
the related conditions and institutions that made such a governance model functional 
had been disregarded to the utmost degree.
241
  
 
After the Great Depression of the 1930s, the Anglo-American corporate governance 
model was gradually shaped during the development of the capital markets. 
Furthermore, it was widely believed that the paramount component for the effective 
functioning of this model was a competitive external market for corporate control, 
which had also been termed as the “takeover market”.242 The takeover mechanism 
was generally considered as an effective means of having inefficient management 
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replaced, which also tended to encourage a convergence of interests between the top 
executives and the shareholders.
243
 However, such an external market for corporate 
control did not actually exist in Mainland China.  
 
The traditional Chinese ethical and philosophical doctrines typified by Confucianism 
were still considered by many commentators as a significant philosophical 
foundation of modern Chinese society. Particularly, those core virtues promoted by 
Confucianism were vital components in the corporate governance of Chinese 
companies.
244
 Some scholars argued that guanxi
245
 played a decisive role in the 
Confucian-oriented corporate governance, as its decision-making mechanism was 
highly unitary.
246
 The prevailing view appears to be that traditional Confucian 
virtues and doctrines would help to enhance the voluntary regulation of directors and 
executives, and then further improve the corporate governance of Chinese and Asian 
companies.
247
 By comparison, the significance of a rational mechanism such as the 
legal approach was better appreciated by the western corporate governance systems, 
which were exemplified by the continental European and Anglo-American models. It 
was held that western culture was pluralistic, and that the moral obligations of 
business had already been incorporated in the law.
248
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It seems that the role of traditional Confucian values in the management of Chinese 
companies diverged to a certain extent from the obligations imposed by overseas 
listing. With western corporate governance models prioritising the accountability, 
effectiveness and transparency of the board, they often adopted a myriad of 
sophisticated mechanisms to ensure that the directors’ interests were being aligned 
with those of the shareholders. As the legal and regulatory environments of western 
countries were generally well developed, these sophisticated mechanisms could 
effectively enable a supervisory role of the companies’ management in most 
instances. Compared with their western counterparts, China’s Confucian-oriented 
governance structures underscored the importance of paternalism, collectivism and 
social relationships. The Confucian-style directors and executives had a natural 
inclination to follow the autocratic management style in the face of consequential 
matters, as this could help to achieve greater fluency and efficiency. Significantly, 
the Confucian-oriented governance structure had convergent views with western 
governance models on certain issues. For instance Benevolence (Ren), which is a 
core virtue advocated by Confucianism, emphasises that there is a necessity for one 
to be mindful of the welfare of others. Therefore, virtue of Benevolence actually 
required people to deliberate on the impact of their conduct on those around them. 
The concept of Benevolence (Ren) naturally coincided with the modern stakeholder 
theory, and could support companies in shouldering more corporate social 
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responsibility.
249
 
 
III. THE SPLIT SHARE STRUCTURE REFORM OF CHINA’S LISTED COMPANIES  
By the beginning of 2000, the shares of most of China’s publicly listed companies 
were still segmented into several different classes. Whereas the tradable A and B 
shares accounted for only one third of the capitalisation of all China’s companies 
listed on the Mainland’s two stock exchanges, large amount of non-tradable shares, 
including State Shares and Legal Person Shares, were retained by various 
state-controlled entities and organs.
250
 According to the official document, the term 
“State Shares (or State-owned Shares)” referred to shares that were retained by 
authorised departments or official bureaus. When these authorised organisations 
represented the state to invest with state funds, all State Shares were fully owned by 
the State Council of Mainland China. Although State Shares could not be traded 
openly, they could be transferred to some domestic investors with the special 
permission of the CSRC. Similarly, “Legal Person Shares” also ultimately belonged 
to the state. However, for the sake of facilitating economic growth, these Legal 
Person shares had been transferred to various institutions including securities 
companies, non-bank financial institutions and SOEs that enjoyed operational 
autonomy to a greater degree.
251
 The Legal Person shares were originally created in 
                                                             
249
 Zhu, Wenzhong and Yao, Yucheng, “On the Value of Traditional Confucian Culture And the Value of Modern 
Corporate Social Responsibility”, International Journal of Business and Management, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2008, p. 61. 
250
 Liu, Guy and Sun, Pei, “China’s Public Firms: How Much Privatization?”, in Exit the Dragon? Privatization and 
State Control in China, Green, Stephen and Liu, Guy S. edited, Wiley-Blackwell, Malden, Massachusetts, 2005, p. 
114.  
251
 People’s Republic of China, Opinions on Standards for the Companies Limited by Shares (1992 Order No.31 
  
 
105 
the 1980s so as to promote the corporatisation process of SOEs.  
 
As the split share structure gradually became the major obstacle of China’s capital 
market, the Chinese government committed to institute a number of radical changes 
to the existing system. After two pilot projects involving several listed companies, 
two important pieces of legislation concerning non-tradable share reform were 
promulgated by the CSRC, together with other authorities, in late 2005.
252
 This 
marked the beginning of an overdue structural reform aiming at addressing the 
inveterate problems of China’s domestic capital market. If the distorted price 
mechanism of the domestic capital market could be eliminated by the new measures, 
there would be some optimism that the corporate governance of China’s major 
companies would be improved to a certain degree. Meanwhile, the prospect of a 
competitive market for corporate control would also be reasonable since liquidity 
would be enhanced.
253
  
 
Through the mentioned legislation, reform was gradually extended to the vast 
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majority of Mainland listed companies after the pilot projects. Since most of China’s 
companies listed on domestic stock exchanges were state-owned, the essential 
transformation of state-owned assets management was one of the major concerns of 
the reform’s proposals. On the other hand, the government still aimed to retain 
control of most major SOEs, even after the spilt-share reform. For the sake of 
implementing the reform scheme in a reliable manner, some vital restrictive rules 
had been applied to the non-tradable shares. As all non-tradable shares were subject 
to a certain lock-up period in the reform, the shareholders were prohibiting from 
trading in such shares within the first 12 months, commencing from the date of the 
reform’s implementation.254 Besides, it was noteworthy that the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) still had 
de facto authority over the transactions of non-tradable shares in the split share 
reform.  
 
As the split share capital structure of China’s stock exchanges had been regarded by 
many commentators as a major cause of the poor corporate governance of China’s 
listed companies, there was a necessity to scrutinise the latest situation of split share 
structure reform. Technically, the kernel of the split share structure reform was the 
conversion of non-tradable shares into fully tradable shares. As a matter of fact, 
non-tradable share reform was also a restructuring process for most SOEs, with the 
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intention of maximising the interests of all shareholders.
255
 In addition, balancing 
the interests of tradable shares’ shareholders and those of non-tradable shares’ 
shareholders was also one of the major concerns.  
 
At the initial stage, there was a deep ideological division over the merits and flaws of 
the proposed spilt share reform. The key issue was whether the conversion of 
non-tradable state shares and legal person shares would undermine the traditional 
state ownership system, or even set the scene for large-scale privatisation of 
SOEs.
256
 Moreover, the flotation of non-tradable shares also exerted pressure on 
political stability and stock market stability, as the state shares and legal person 
shares accounted for around 64 per cent of the total equity capital of all listed 
companies in Mainland China.
257
  
 
In the summer of 2001, the Chinese government made an attempt to float a range of 
state shares so as to raise funds for social security; however, this was the point at 
which the initial reform was to meet its nemesis since the security markets in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen soon slumped by over 45 per cent.
258
 As these experiences 
provided a cautionary tale for the Chinese government, a much restrained gradualist 
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approach was taken when the Split Share Structure Reform was being put into effect 
in mid-2005. Thus, the reform was distributed into several stages and four 
companies were selected for Phase One on a trial basis. Around two months later, the 
Chinese government was swift to take steps so as to implement the second round of 
the pilot scheme which involved another 42 companies.
259
 When the results of these 
two phases of the pilot scheme were deemed effective, the reform moved into full 
operation from September 2005. 
 
There is no certainty whether the Split Share Structure Reform will transfer China’s 
stock market into a fully open market, since the Chinese government presumably 
would not loosen its control over most leading SOEs post-reform. The negotiable 
shares volume and the negotiable market capitalisation of A shares and B shares that 
listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) 
have been superficially analysed in percentage terms in Section I (b) of Chapter 2. 
As Table 3.1 shows, the original shares released from trading restrictions in the SSE 
had multiplied from 2005 to 2011. The SSE released 1,043,366 million original 
shares from trading restrictions in 2010, which accounted for more than 47 per cent 
of all issued shares. By 2011, over 76 per cent of all issued shares in the SSE were 
negotiable. By comparison with the SSE, the SZSE released many fewer original 
shares from trading restrictions during this period. According to the data represented 
in Table 3.1, the SZSE began to lift the trading restrictions on original shares from 
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2006. In 2011, the volume of original shares released by the SZSE from trading 
restrictions at its height reached 43,815 million shares. Nonetheless, this figure 
formed only approximately 7 per cent of all the shares issued by the SZSE in the 
same year. These statistics may indicate that the Spilt Share Structure Reform was 
not far reaching enough in the case of the SZSE.  
 
It would appear that the Spilt Share Structure Reform could further perfect the 
corporatisation process of China’s SOEs, since their non-tradable shares would 
obtain the property of full tradability. However, most strategically valuable assets 
owned or controlled by leading Chinese SOEs were actually contributed by the 
central or local government. There is a sense in which the conversion of non-tradable 
shares into tradable shares will obscure the “state-owned” attributes of the SOEs’ 
assets, since it would be impossible to determine whether central or local 
government already have the proprietary rights to these assets when any investors 
can purchase the shares of such SOEs on the open market.
260
 Moreover, whether this 
reform will lead to a massive wave of privatisation of China’s SOEs is also a matter 
for debate.  
 
These comments could be acceptable in theory, but they are likely to be in conflict 
with the prevailing attitude in Mainland China. Mr K (Informant No. 11), who 
studied at PhD level at China University of Science and Law, is an expert on China’s 
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economics. As mentioned in Section III (d) of Chapter 1, Mr K had been serving 
under Professor LIU Jipeng for many years. The special social connections of 
Professor LIU enabled Mr K to make the acquaintance of several senior officials of 
the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). 
With 117 centrally-administered state-owned enterprises (or Central-owned SOEs) in 
China,
261
 around 35 of these SOEs had been categorised as strategically important 
by the SASAC. The vast majority of these SOEs operated in industrial sectors that 
were critical to China’s national security, which included aviation, defence, oil, 
petrochemicals, power generation, shipping and telecommunications.
262
 A senior 
official of the SASAC reported to Mr K that China’s government would definitely 
retain majority shareholding in these strategically important SOEs after the Spilt 
Share Structure Reform, and that they would not adjust this policy in the foreseeable 
future. 
 
The comments of this SASAC official could be confirmed by the data derived from 
Table 3.1. With the SSE beginning to release original shares from trading restrictions 
from 2006, the first lock-up period of these original shares did not expire until 2007. 
When 68,816 million locked-up shares became eligible to be traded on the SSE in 
2007, only 19,059 million shares were redeemed, which indicated that only 27 per 
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cent of the expired locked-up shares had been redeemed by the shareholders. From 
2008 to 2010, more shares came on to the SSE market as various lock-in periods 
ended. Nevertheless, only a very small faction of these expired locked-up shares 
were redeemed. In 2008, the proportion of redeemed expired locked-in shares in 
comparison to the total amount redeemable was 24 per cent in the SSE. In 2009 and 
2010, this percentage decreased further down into single figures, of 4 per cent and 6 
per cent, respectively.  
 
Unfortunately, the SZSE did not provide any statistics about the volume of expired 
locked-up shares as well as the redemption percentage of expired locked-up shares. 
As mentioned earlier, the SZSE released very few original shares from trading 
restrictions from 2005 to 2011. Thus, the number of expired locked-up shares that 
had been redeemed on the SZSE were likely to be fewer, with a tendency to be a 
much lower amount than that of the SSE. The said senior official of the SASAC 
indicated to Mr K that the SASAC would actually keep an indefinite tight restraint 
on the redemption of these expired locked-up original shares. Indeed, it would not be 
difficult for the SASAC to regulate the redemption of expired locked-up shares, 
since the majority of shareholders of these leading Chinese SOEs were government 
ministries or government-linked agencies. It has been suggested by some scholars 
that the Split Share Structure Reform could possibly improve the market liquidity of 
China’s stock market, as the non-tradable share would be removed.263 Furthermore, 
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it appears clear from the reports from the mentioned official of SASAC that such an 
objective of the reform seems unlikely, at least in the short-term.  
 
Moreover, Mr K added that setting strict limits on the redemption of expired 
locked-up original shares could also help to prevent non-tradable shareholders from 
flooding the market with shares in a short space of time. It is widely known that the 
non-tradable shareholders of Chinese companies obtained the original shares at an 
unreasonably low price. Although these non-tradable shareholders were requested to 
compensate the tradable shareholders before floating their shares on the stock 
markets,
264
 the non-tradable shareholders still possessed the largest shareholding 
after the reform.  
 
Technically, this approach for maintaining state control had already been 
consolidated as early as 1994, when the pilot scheme known as “grasp the large and 
release the small” was proposed by China’s State Council.265 To a certain degree, 
one of the major objectives of the creation of the SASAC was to supervise the 
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restructuring process of these strategically important SOEs.
266
 The SASAC 
reiterated the necessity of maintaining absolute government control in leading the 
SOEs of strategically important sectors at China’s Central Economic Work 
Conference held in December 2006. Furthermore, the SASAC promulgated the 
Guiding Opinions of the SASAC about Promoting the Adjustment of State-owned 
Capital and the Reorganization of State-owned Enterprises in late 2006, so as to 
pursue this policy with determination, which indicated again that China’s 
government would not give up a majority controlling stake in strategically important 
SOEs.
267
 According to the acquainted SASAC official of Mr K, it seems that 
China’s government made no attempt to change such policy of retaining state control 
in leading Chinese SOEs after the Spilt Share Structure Reform.  
 
With the Split Share Structure Reform mainly aimed at large Chinese SOEs, leading 
Chinese Central-owned SOEs are of primary importance. Almost all of these 
strategically important Central-owned SOEs are the largest companies in their own 
industries, and have also achieved dominant positions in China’s stock market. These 
facts can suggest that the corporate governance patterns of leading Chinese 
companies will still reflect insider control system patterns in the future, which was 
proposed by Proposition 2 in Chapter 1. Besides, the information provided by Mr K 
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could also sustain the argument of Proposition 1, which submitted that China’s stock 
markets largely reflect an insider control system.  
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Table 3.1 Statistics on the Split Share Structure Reform of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 2005-2011 (volume-million) 
Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Issued Shares Volume 502,305.00 1,027,954.00 1,417,310.00 1,541,039.00 1,665,996.00 2,193,951.00 2,346,665.00 
Negotiable Shares 156,121.00 225,448.00 339,930.00 491,604.00 1,157,856.00 1,603,130.00 1,799,380.00 
Original Shares Released from Trading Restrictions* n/a 6,693.00 56,451.00 137,390.00 739,044.00 1,043,366.00 ？ 
Expired Locked-up Shares** n/a n/a 68,816.00 107,813.00 629,004.00 327,067.00 ？ 
Expired Locked-up Shares Redeemed n/a n/a 19,059.00 26,874.00 27,350.00 22,744.00 ？ 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Issued Shares Volume 213,364.81 237,583.29 278,171.79 344,185.80 390,756.18 504,497.52 627,846.31 
Negotiable Shares 93,429.75 117,690.06 151,121.79 202,375.36 260,107.82 341,085.17 450,605.56 
Original Shares Released from Trading Restrictions n/a 2,653.00 15,813.00 19,440.00 41,538.00 36,246.00 43,815.00 
Expired Locked-up Shares n/a ?*** ? ? ? ? ? 
Expired Locked-up Shares Redeemed n/a ?*** ? ? ? ? ? 
Source: Shanghai Stock Exchange Fact Book 2008-2011268 
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* The “Original Shares” refers to the shares “with a prescribed no-sale period in a company which is listed on the Shenzhen or Shanghai main board, and has completed the share-trading reform and the 
issued shares in a company before its IPO and listing on the Shenzhen or Shanghai main board after the policy of ‘separating the new from the old’ has been implemented.”269 
** According to the relevant regulation, “(1) The original non-tradable shares may not be listed for trading or be transferred within twelve months as of the day when the reform scheme comes into force; 
and (2) Where the original holders of non-tradable shares holding 5 per cent or more of the shares of a listed company sell their original non-tradable shares through listing in a stock exchange beyond the 
time limit as prescribed in the preceding item, the amount of the original non-tradable shares sold may not exceed 5 per cent of the total shares of the company within twelve months and not exceed 10 per 
cent of the total shares of the company within twenty-four months.”270 
*** Unfortunately, the SZSE did not provide any statistics about these items.  
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IV. SUMMARY 
This chapter has reviewed the traditional concerns and theories of corporate 
governance, as well as the current state of Chinese companies’ corporate governance. 
Moreover, the latest developments of China’s Split Share Structure Reform have also 
been briefly surveyed. 
 
As discussed in this chapter, China’s SOEs, especially the Central-owned SOEs, 
claimed the advantage in the economic competition within Mainland China under the 
auspices of the Chinese government. Although Chinese private companies have been 
progressing rapidly in recent years, they still could not play a pivotal role in China’s 
economy. When taking these considerations into account, it was attempted to provide 
a concrete analysis of the corporate governance of the major Chinese companies, 
with an emphasis on the current situation of China’s leading SOEs.  
 
Although Chinese authorities had given effect to SOE reform as early as 1994, the 
government is still playing a significant role in the corporate governance of large 
SOEs, especially in the strategically important Central-owned SOEs. After the 
adventurous Split Share Structure Reform, all non-tradable shares that included 
State-owned Shares and Legal Person Shares were transferred into tradable shares in 
principle. Nevertheless, it seems that China’s government did not intend to 
relinquish control of the largest of China’s SOEs, especially those that operated in 
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strategically important industrial sectors.  
 
While some characteristics of the corporate governance of China’s companies have 
been discussed in this chapter, a review of the legal framework of foreign listing for 
China’s companies will be provided in the following chapter. It is hoped that this can 
illuminate some of the hidden depths of the regulatory environment in which China’s 
companies operate.  
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CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY FOR THE STUDY 
While this research explores the corporate governance of China’s overseas listed 
companies, its focus is generally upon the relationship between overseas corporate 
listings (or “cross-listings”) and the corporate governance of China’s companies. In 
particular, this research will seek to identify aspects of the corporate governance of 
China’s overseas listed companies that have been improved through the process of 
foreign listing. In addition, this study aims to document how far political factors 
determine the nature of corporate governance in Mainland China’s overseas listed 
companies.  
 
It is hoped that the outcomes of this research will contribute positively to the 
corporate governance of China’s overseas listed companies, and that the empirical 
research will illuminate key practices in selected companies so as to allow us to 
scrutinise some key aspects of their corporate governance practices.  
 
As this methodology section sets out the basic methods and rationale applied in the 
process of fieldwork for this research, our discussion will be organized by reference 
to the following key issues:  
(a) The object of study and sampling 
(b) Method of data gathering 
(c) Research coordination 
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(d) Interviews and informants 
(e) Complete interview schedule 
(f) Confidentiality 
(g) Sample characteristics and limitations 
 
I. THE OBJECT OF STUDY AND SAMPLING 
In general, the aim of qualitative research is to “elicit the contextualized nature of 
experience and action, and attempts to generate analyses … in the sense of relating 
individual events and interpretations to larger meaning systems and patterns.”271 
With the help of reliable qualitative data, researchers could “document the world 
from the point of view of the people studied … rather than presenting it from the 
perspective of the researcher.”272  
 
As has been illustrated in the text below, the focus of study is the corporate 
governance of those Mainland China companies that have been listed overseas. 
Where corporate governance consists of some essential variables, the directors and 
top management of China’s overseas listed companies should clearly understand 
such variables and their impact, since such directors and top management are the 
main executors who perform the duty of corporate governance in Chinese companies. 
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Some of the Mainland’s other professionals, such as intermediaries and scholars, are 
probably also familiar with the corporate governance practices of China’s foreign 
listed companies, as their jobs allow them to gain access to such information.  
 
It was anticipated that the individuals mentioned above would provide insights into 
the corporate governance of China’s overseas listed companies during the 
discussions regarding a series of topics in the empirical interviews. A previously 
drafted questionnaire that reflected the key issues and propositions of the current 
research would be employed to guide the empirical interviews.  
 
II. METHOD OF DATA GATHERING 
One key point to gathering data for this research was to critically evaluate official 
company documents, such as the annual and sustainability reports of these overseas 
listed Chinese companies, and then to identify their deficiencies. Foreign stock 
exchange reports could also be useful to a certain degree. In addition, a review of the 
international financial press’s literature on foreign listings was considered valuable 
as a separate analysis, when it was combined with research from analysts from 
market research bodies, such as the well-regarded US short-seller, Muddy Waters.  
 
Apart from critically evaluating listed company documents, on-site in-depth 
interviews were the key to gathering useful information for this research. The 
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qualitative empirical investigation of this study was conducted on a basis of on-site 
face-to-face interviews using a semi-structured interview-schedule approach, with 
informants from several selected overseas listed Chinese State Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs). Attempts were made to invite a number of interviewees from each company 
to participate in the face-to-face interviews, and the field-work research with the 
interviewees of these target SOEs was generally carried out in their corporate offices 
in Beijing wherever physically possible.  
 
I sought to interview informed senior officers in leading Chinese companies that had 
listed abroad (e.g. in the Company Secretary’s office).  I also sought to interview 
Corporate Counsel, who is often the Company Secretary in these 
companies.  Executives in the listing department of the company and the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange were also approached for interview; however in most instances, 
interviews with such individuals were hard to set up as they were all very powerful 
people in some particularly large China’s companies (i.e., those that list on foreign 
stock exchanges). The fieldwork for this thesis took place at the politically sensitive 
time of the period leading up to the change over from the leadership of the Hu-Wen 
era (President and Premier) to the new national leadership of President Xi and 
Premier Li; this meant that many interviews in government agencies were extremely 
cautious about talking about sensitive topics such as the foreign listing of leading 
Chinese companies.  
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As setting up these kinds of in-depth interviews with senior executives of China’s 
overseas listed companies was not always possible, empirical research was 
undertaken in a more indirect way, this was to talk to proxies for senior corporate 
executives, such as regulators and professional intermediaries, such as accountants in 
the Big Four accounting firms, lawyers in large local and international law firms 
located in Beijing, professional consultants in securities firms and experienced 
financial journalists. Eventually several other miscellaneous informants were 
approached to take part in the on-site interviews as they were directly involved in the 
corporate governance practices of either major Chinese SOEs or sizeable enterprises. 
These miscellaneous informants comprised auditors, chartered accountants, 
economic experts, foreign lawyers and legal scholars. The involvement of these 
miscellaneous respondents in the interviews ensured that more objective qualitative 
data could be obtained for the study, since these professional intermediaries were 
independent of state control to a certain degree. Such persons are sometimes called 
upon to act as directors or advisers of major Chinese companies which listed abroad.  
 
While drafting the interview schedule, the annual reports of these target companies 
were first reviewed to obtain quotable references. When a number of foreign stock 
exchanges issued their comply or explain codes of corporate governance and 
attached these to their exchange’s listing rules, these target Chinese companies listed 
on such foreign exchanges accordingly made disclosure statements. Although there 
was little elaboration about corporate governance in these annual reports and 
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disclosure statements, they could still provide some useful insights into the target 
companies. Once the interview schedule had been drafted, and then revised 
following a pre-test, interviewees were given advance notice of the broad areas to be 
covered in these interviews. The schedule of questions generally examined the extent 
to which corporate governance practices in overseas listed companies had changed 
as a result of their listings abroad, and how these practices related to corporate 
governance principles in the respective foreign stock exchanges.  
 
Each interview took between one to three hours to complete, with eleven on-site 
interviews being conducted in Beijing producing 25 interview hours of data. 
Together with two written interviews, the thirteen interviews in total resulted in more 
than 60 pages of transcripts. Interviewee comments were transcribed by hand during 
the interviews, with a digital copy of the data created at a later time. In addition, I 
tried to transcribe the interview on the same day wherever possible, since this should 
help to achieve optimum results. Where a good rapport had been established with 
some informants, a digital recorder was openly used in several interviews with the 
permission of the informants.  
 
A written summary of this empirical research and the broad findings of the project 
will be provided to each interviewee, and data obtained has been automatically 
anonymised. 
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III. RESEARCH COORDINATION 
The bulk of these empirical research practices were handled by me as the candidate, 
while my supervisor, Professor Tomasic, and I had a number of brief meetings in 
preparation for the fieldwork. As a consequence, the thesis draws upon data derived 
from fieldwork involving thirteen respondents who were interviewed in Beijing 
during November 2011.  
 
Dozens of senior managers and executives of the target companies were invited to 
participate in the fieldwork while they were being asked to make a remark on these 
issues listed in the fieldwork questionnaire. When contacting respondents, I 
endeavoured to get into the Company Secretary’s office, since it is generally 
accepted that the Secretary is sufficiently independent to be able to make such 
decisions. Technically, I did not begin in a complex manner, merely telling the 
respondents that I was interested in corporate governance issues in China and how 
these reflect international standards. As top management of these Chinese target 
companies always treat foreign empirical researchers with great caution, I did not 
dwell upon the issue of foreign listings when trying to set up the interviews, since 
that might have resulted in the whole fieldwork reaching an impasse.  
 
In addition, acquaintances and friends who could help as an intermediary were also 
engaged with, as this could open up greater opportunity for the fieldwork. However, 
interviews were not conducted over the telephone, since such respondents who 
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operate company telephones would be less likely to be educated in corporate 
governance issues.  
 
Overseas Listed Chinese Companies 
China Mobile Limited Company (China Mobile) 
When China Mobile was incorporated in Hong Kong, Several e-mails were initially 
sent to their Hong Kong corporate office.
273
 Unfortunately, no response was 
forthcoming. Subsequently, phone calls were made to China Mobile 
Communications Corporation (CMCC), which is the parent company of China 
Mobile. However, all the calls were rebuffed fiercely by those members of staff who 
answered the calls, to the point where they even denied having previously discussed 
this subject with me. It appeared from their attitude that foreign-based empirical 
research was definitely prohibited by CMCC, and that there was a conspiracy of 
silence surrounding this subject among most executives of CMCC. Later, a member 
of staff highlighted that CMCC should not be called directly as it is a 
ministry-levelled “state apparatus”.  
 
Despite a number of setbacks, I persevered in my attempts to phone China Mobile 
and CMCC. Unfortunately, the executives of China Mobile and CMCC were 
challenging to approach and their casual dismissal of this kind of empirical research 
seemed somewhat irresponsible. Such executives professed that the corporate 
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governance structure of China Mobile was well established, and that there was no 
reason for them to become involved in the fieldwork of this study. Above all, it was 
claimed that they only disclosed corporate governance information of China Mobile 
and CMCC through official company documents, such as annual reports and 
sustainability reports.  
 
By sheer good fortune I eventually successful in inviting three senior managers (Mr 
B, Miss C and Mr D) of a major Chinese telecommunications SOE to give 
interviews, having received considerable help from my mother. Fortunately, as she 
had worked in the China National Development and Reform Commission as a junior 
official, she was in some way connected with a number of other junior officials in 
some of China’s major telecommunications SOEs.  
 
While a number of factors might decide whether these kinds of academic fieldwork 
interviews could be successfully set up, it seems that having good interpersonal 
relationships with some officials of the target SOEs is still the critical factor. Mr B, 
who held a post of senior manager at one of China’s renowned telecommunications 
SOEs, indicated that there is still an inclination in Mainland China to treat these 
kinds of foreign empirical research projects as a precarious venture. This could 
explain why most executives of these target Chinese SOEs who had been contacted 
had tried to distance themselves from this study’s fieldwork.  
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PetroChina Company Limited (PetroChina) 
In the first instance, several messages were sent by electronic mail to the Investor 
Relations Office, Public Relations Office, Foreign Affairs Office and Legal Affairs 
Department of PetroChina;
274
 however as anticipated, there was no response to my 
enquiries. Then, I made every effort to phone these departments of PetroChina, but 
found no one who could answer my queries. In fact, those who answered the 
telephone were all trying to skirt around the issue, as they explained that their 
opinions seemed to carry very little weight in regards to foreign fieldwork studies in 
PetroChina. Although their excuses were starting to become somewhat implausible, 
there was undoubtedly a great deal of truth in their assertions that the senior 
executives of most major Chinese SOEs seemed to isolate themselves from foreign 
empirical research. 
 
The Secretary’s office of PetroChina was later contacted in the hope of arranging 
several interviews. Unfortunately, this was to no avail as a senior secretary advised 
me not to phone them again, since there was no real possibility of their participation 
in my fieldwork. In fact, this senior secretary regarded these kinds of foreign 
fieldwork as risky activities. Moreover, he thought it was better to maintain a 
cautious approach since the fieldwork would bring them few tangible benefits. This 
senior secretary even suspected that I was a spy from British research institutes, 
which in the circumstances was somewhat farfetched. 
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Since the situation appeared intractable, I decided to seek the aid of a college 
associate who was in a position to appeal for assistance to a senior engineer of 
PetroChina. Through the engineer’s support, a manager (Mr H) of a large Chinese 
petrochemical SOE finally agreed to give an interview. As this senior engineer had a 
long record of service in the petrochemical industry, he also managed to persuade 
another manager (Mr L) of a renowned Chinese petrochemical enterprise to be a 
party to my fieldwork. Unfortunately, there was still some reluctance on the part of 
Mr L to become involved in the empirical interview in person, and he only agreed to 
complete the interview schedule in writing.  
 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation Limited (CNOOC Ltd.) 
CNOOC Ltd. did not provide any contact email address on their website,
275
 and the 
email address of China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC Group, the 
parent company of CNOOC Ltd.) was not operational due to excessive volumes of 
unsolicited emails.
276
 Thus, several phone calls were made to the Beijing office of 
CNOOC Ltd. in an attempt to secure a number of interviews. To my surprise, the 
employees of CNOOC Ltd. were willing to discuss the empirical fieldwork with me. 
Significantly, CNOOC was the only company that did not give me an instantaneous 
negative response, among the six Chinese companies targeted.  
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CAO Yan, who was a member of staff in the Legal Department, helpfully suggested 
that I should send further details of my empirical research to his personal email 
address. As a general rule of social science empirical research, interviewees should 
be given advance notice of the broad areas to be covered in interviews. When these 
corporate executives became aware of the topics that I was pursuing, they could 
possibly have had a more compelling reason to see me.
277
 Thus, I immediately sent 
a detailed description of my fieldwork to Cao.  
 
I later received a reply from ZHANG Fan, the director of Investor Relations 
department in CNOOC Ltd., who said they were keen to help but that there was a 
necessity for them to examine in detail the complete interview schedule of my 
fieldwork in advance. Professor Tomasic, who has had considerable experience 
conducting in-depth interviews with Chinese top executives and state officials, had 
reminded me that it was advisable to provide only a simplified version of the 
interview schedule to these Chinese would-be interviewees before the on-site 
interviews, since they might give some bureaucratic or stock answers if they had 
received the complete interview schedule beforehand. Following this advice, I 
selected only fifteen questions from the interview schedule that did not appear to be 
too politically sensitive, and forwarded them to ZHANG Fan.  
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Unfortunately, I received a swift and negative response, which revealed that those in 
charge of corporate governance in CNOOC Ltd. would have a demanding schedule 
all year round, and that they would not be available for interviews. Potentially, these 
would-be interviewees of CNOOC fell back on the common excuse of having no 
time and did not show the slightest inclination to make any comment on the 
interview schedule.  
 
In fact, it is not uncommon for researchers to get into the situation of “cold calling” 
when they are trying to get access to business elites.
278
 It would be desirable, if not 
essential, to have a relative or a family friend who could help as an intermediary for 
setting up these empirical interviews, especially in a country such as Mainland China 
in which personal relationships have been placed in such high esteem. Hence, I 
asked a relative to try to contact a vice president of CNOOC so as to make enquiries 
about my proposed fieldwork. Unfortunately, this vice president responded that he 
had to handle these kinds of foreign empirical research with circumspection, or there 
would be a strong possibility that it might jeopardise his position. Furthermore, he 
asserted that I would not have any opportunity of setting up these empirical 
interviews by merely phoning junior officials of the Secretary’s Office in the target 
SOE, since such decisions were outside the remit of these junior officials.  
 
As the secretary of the board of directors could be deemed as a representative of a 
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company, my relative asked the said vice president of CNOOC to approach the 
secretary; however he rejected our request, indicating that the secretary of the board 
in CNOOC was actually a vice minister level official whose ranking was higher than 
his, and he would never ask for any favours from a higher ranking official as it 
would break the unwritten rules of Chinese bureaucracy.  
 
Ultimately, this vice president of CNOOC declined upon learning more of the details 
of my fieldwork. He suggested that his rejection was largely due to the sensitive 
nature of my research, and that it was a singularly inappropriate moment to do such a 
study since China’s leadership transition was occurring at that time.279 He further 
suggested that some information that I had requested, such as “the role of the Party’s 
committee”, could even be classified as state secrets under certain given 
circumstances.
280
  
 
As several foreign scholars have pointed out, on occasion there has been a necessity 
for survey researchers to invite officials of China’s SOEs to dinner in elegant 
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surrounding so as to establish a reciprocal relationship with them.
281
 Thus, I later 
asked my relative to invite the said vice president of CNOOC for an evening meal, 
but he turned down our invitation for reasons unexplained. This vice president told 
my relative confidentially that CNOOC had issued an internal notice some time ago, 
which required that all CNOOC executives should opt out of these kinds of foreign 
empirical interviews. Presumably, the origins of this ban on foreign empirical 
research were several controversial incidents which had occurred in 2011, such as 
the Bohai Bay oil spillage
282
 and Huizhou refinery explosion,
283
 which unleashed a 
wave of criticisms of CNOOC.  
 
China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Limited (Sinopec Limited) 
As Sinopec Limited did not provide any contact email address on their website,
284
 
the annual reports and other documents that Sinopec Limited issued on foreign stock 
exchanges were scrutinised, but no contact email address could be retrieved. Then, I 
forwarded several enquiry emails to Sinopec Group, which was the parent company 
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of Sinopec Limited.
285
 Unfortunately, the email address of Sinopec Group was not 
functioning and all my enquiry emails were returned.  
 
Under the circumstances, I called the switchboard of Sinopec Limited and asked for 
the secretary of the board’s telephone extension to enquire about my proposed 
fieldwork. Unsurprisingly, these junior secretaries who answered my phone call 
declined to participate in my interviews and rejected my enquiries on one pretext or 
another. It appalled me that a junior secretary even questioned the veracity of my 
proposed fieldwork, when he questioned whether my intention was to scour their 
company for unfavourable news and then sensationalise it. As it was proving 
consistently difficult to gain the confidence of these would-be interviewees of 
China’s largest SOEs, I later attempted to telephone the secretary of the board office 
in Sinopec Limited again so as to delineate my empirical research. However, these 
members of staff in the secretary of the board’s office terminated the call impatiently. 
Finally, I decided to try telephoning them repeatedly, but there was no response, and 
all my telephone calls were forwarded to a voicemail.  
 
As there was absolutely nothing more I could do, I turned to a distant relative for 
help. This relative used to serve under a vice mayor of Beijing municipal council, 
and she had acquired some social connections with a senior manager of Sinopec 
Limited. As some scholars suggested, the interviewers needs to gain some trust with 
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the would-be informants at first, especially if the research is sensitive or intrusive.
286
 
Moreover, establishing rapport with respondents should be high on the list of 
priorities for most survey researchers, as it could open the doors to more informed 
fieldwork.
287
 Thus, when I tried to examine the situation of my fieldwork from the 
viewpoint of these would-be interviewees of Sinopec Limited, my aim of removing 
the would-be informants’ doubts about my empirical interviews was of primary 
importance.  
 
Unfortunately, it appeared that dispelling the doubts and fears of these Chinese SOE 
officials was only half the battle. Although the said senior manager of Sinopec 
Limited expressed some initial interest in my fieldwork, he flatly refused to 
participate after reading my interview schedule. According to the explanation of this 
senior manager, his refusal of my proposed interviews was due in large part to the 
highly undesirable timing of my fieldwork, since the former chairman of Sinopec, 
CHEN Tonghai, had been sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve in a corruption 
case in mid-2009.
288
 Consequently, almost everyone in Sinopec had been very 
careful not to overstep the bounds of propriety since then, so that nobody was 
relishing the prospect of participation in these kinds of foreign empirical research. 
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This senior manager finally recommended that I should seek the seal of approval for 
my fieldwork from the top official of Sinopec Group, otherwise there was little 
prospect that I could conduct the interview. Furthermore, he was also convinced that 
the junior secretaries in the Sinopec secretaries’ office had little voice in giving 
official approval for foreign academic interviews.  
 
As we had failed to invite these would-be interviewees of Sinopec to give interviews 
in spite of all our exertions, I decided to seek the aid of a former classroom associate. 
Ultimately, Mr M, a senior manager who came from a giant Chinese state-owned 
petrochemical company, allowed himself to be persuaded into participating in the 
fieldwork. Unfortunately, Mr M declined to be present in the interview in person, 
and only provided written responses to the interview schedule.  
 
Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China Limited (Ping An) 
Ping An Company did not provide any contact email address on their Chinese 
website, but the contact details of the Investor Relations team of Ping An was 
available on their English website.
289
 Thus, the Investor Relations team was written 
to so as to enquire about the proposed empirical research. Ping An was very different 
from other target Chinese companies as they made a courteous and prompt response 
in reply to my enquiry. Unfortunately, Crystal ZHU, the senior secretary of the 
Investor Relations team, advised me that they would not be able to attend my 
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empirical interviews. They presented a high-sounding case for their refusal, which 
claimed that Ping An only disclosed corporate governance information through 
official documentation, such as interim reports and annual reports that were 
published on the Hong Kong and Shanghai Stock Exchanges. 
 
Zhu argued that some relevant policy governing information disclosure had been 
formulated by Ping An, and that such company policy had to be followed. Moreover, 
Zhu had signalled that Ping An was a cross-listed company simultaneously listed on 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and that there 
had been a necessity for Ping An to strictly adhere to the listing rules with regard to 
information disclosure of these two stock exchanges. Besides, it was also alleged 
that Ping An would never disclose any corporate governance information through 
unofficial channels, as this might give some investors an unfair advantage over 
others. Legally this is quite compelling.  
 
After the failure of the first attempt, I decided to take a chance and gave a telephone 
call to the Investor Relations team of Ping An, which was affiliated to the Shenzhen 
headquarters of Ping An. However, the response of the secretary in the Investor 
Relations team to my fieldwork proposal was unreceptive. They reiterated that no 
individual member of staff was able to offer an interview after the board of Ping An 
had laid down a strict code of corporate information disclosure, and that the 
corporate governance data of Ping An was accessible only by official documents 
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such as in its annual reports.  
 
By sheer good fortune, a junior official in the Beijing branch of Ping An was a 
business acquaintance of one of my relatives. This junior official had highlighted the 
sensitive nature of my empirical research when he was reviewing my interview 
schedule, but he had agreed to give the matter priority from the outset. Besides, he 
had been very direct in pointing out that most officials of China’s SOEs would not 
take part in this kind of empirical research since they would not stand to gain from it. 
Furthermore, this junior official confided to my relative that it had been heard that 
the board of Ping An had taken internal disciplinary action against a top executive 
some time ago, as this said top executive had disclosed some corporate information 
about Ping An to a foreign journalist without permission. Apparently, the board of 
Ping An had been reprimanded by the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) after this leaked 
corporate information of Ping An attracted foreign press coverage.  
 
Although we tried everything we possibly could to convince the said junior official 
in the Ping An Beijing branch regarding the anonymity for my empirical interviews, 
he eventually refused to help me organise any interviews. While this junior official 
regretted any inconvenience that this might have caused, he also advised us that he 
could not risk giving an interview, since that would have placed him in danger of 
losing his position.  
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Tsingtao Brewery Company Limited (Tsingtao Brewery) 
Tsingtao Brewery, which is located in Qingdao city in Shandong Province, provided 
a contact email address on their official website.
290
 Like many other of the large 
Chinese SOEs, the email address of Tsingtao Brewery was not working since it had 
been inundated with unsolicited messages, and was waiting for maintenance. A 
telephone call was thus made to the switchboard of Tsingtao Brewery, and then the 
operator put me through to the Academic Research Center, which was in charge of 
corporate governance practices. As was often true of first contacts, a female senior 
research assistant reported that they were too committed to their own work to have 
spare time for giving interviews. In addition, this senior research assistant said she 
did not think my empirical research would make a great contribution to the corporate 
governance practices of Tsingtao Brewery, as they had participated in some similar 
fieldwork projects in recent years. Thus, she thought there was no benefit in 
duplicating similar empirical research already conducted.  
 
The next week a follow-up telephone call was made to the Investor Relations office 
of Tsingtao Brewery. This time I tried to spell out as clearly as possible the rationale 
for my empirical research, its objectives and methodology, with the intention of 
discriminating my study from other fieldwork that Tsingtao Brewery had participated 
in. However, the senior secretary who answered the phone call still firmly refused to 
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participate in the research, nor would he allow access to his superiors.  
 
In reality, my supervisor, Professor Tomasic, had conducted face-to-face interviews 
in Qingdao city with some informants from Tsingtao Brewery during 2003 and 
2004.
291
 I tried to take advantage of this previous relationship so as to persuade the 
personnel of Tsingtao Brewery to provide interviews, but all my efforts appeared to 
be in vain. The senior secretary in the Investors Relations office of Tsingtao Brewery 
then said a few words to the effect that the respect they held for Professor Tomasic 
could make all the difference, as the Professor’s influence on the fieldwork trip to 
Tsingtao Brewery could be utilised as the subject matter for good publicity for 
Tsingtao Brewery.  
 
Technically, participating in the empirical research of a famous foreign professor 
could probably help Tsingtao Brewery raise its own international profile. By contrast, 
my fieldwork had been considered to be of dubious benefit to Tsingtao Brewery, 
since my position was merely that of a Chinese postgraduate student.  
 
Towards the end of my follow-up telephone call, the senior secretary in the Investors 
Relations office of Tsingtao Brewery confirmed that all the contact email addresses 
published on their official website were not functioning. In fact, they would not 
publicise any effective email address of theirs, since they always received large 
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volumes of unsolicited messages.  
 
Accounting Professionals 
With the help of an old school friend, I successfully invited Miss A, who was 
working in the Beijing branch of a giant international accounting firm as senior 
auditor, to participate in my empirical interviews. “Guanxi” is an important means of 
transacting business in China where the environment is unfriendly or uncertain. So, I 
resorted to these traditional methods in an effort to further my research. 
 
Miss F used to study economics in The Chinese University of Hong Kong, and she 
had also obtained a Master’s degree in economics from the U.K.’s Cambridge 
University. With Miss F currently holding the position of senior associate in a major 
Chinese investment firm, she was acquainted with the corporate governance 
practices of some of China’s major companies. Furthermore as she was an 
acquaintance of my family in Beijing, Miss F ensured that she found the time to 
provide an interview.  
 
In fact, I also attempted to get two other former school associates involved in these 
empirical interviews. They were both working in KPMG as qualified accountants, 
and so they had connections with a number of China’s SOEs. Unfortunately, they 
refused my request for help, informing me that the staff members of KPMG had 
been forbidden to take part in this kind of fieldwork under the regulations of KPMG.  
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Legal Professionals and Academics 
Quite a number of major international law firms have set up their representative 
offices in Beijing and Shanghai in recent years, among them many have established 
good working relationships with large Chinese companies. Thus, senior lawyers in 
such international law firms have gained much personal knowledge about the 
corporate governance practices of China’s companies.  
 
The outline of my research was sent by email to about 150 lawyers from 40 
international law firms, but the response rate was low. Three lawyers gave prompt 
but negative replies, which included: Betty Xie of Linklaters LLP (Beijing office), 
Elaine Fei of O’Melveny & Myers LLP (Shanghai office) and Paul C. Deemer of 
Vinson & Elkins LLP (Beijing office). It was said they preferred not to partake in my 
fieldwork due to relevant constraints or regulations of their law firms. 
 
Fortunately, three other foreign lawyers made timely positive responses and they 
ultimately managed to participate in the interviews. These three foreign lawyers, 
who consisted of Mr E (British partner in the Corporate & Finance Department of an 
international law firm), Mr G (American managing partner of the Asia Capital 
Markets practice in an international law firm) and Mr I (American senior lawyer of 
an international law firm), had broad experience in cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions, corporate finance and financing work in Hong Kong and in Mainland 
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China, and in relation to international IPOs, with experience in energy and resource 
transactions as well as numerous other industrial sectors. The experience of Mr E 
even extended to acting for both investment banks and issuers, and in relation to 
H-share, red-chip and A+H share transactions. These foreign lawyers provided 
valuable criticism and information for my empirical research.  
 
Professor J was the director of the Economic Law Research Center in a 
well-regarded Chinese law school. Meanwhile, he was also a Beijing-based 
academic company lawyer who acted for some large Chinese companies. As 
Professor J’s practice encompassed a broad range of corporate and securities law 
matters, he gave me useful comments and suggestions in the interview.  
 
An enquiry email regarding my empirical research was also sent to other 
well-regarded academic company lawyers, such as ZHAO Xudong, who was the 
deputy head of Civil and Economic Law College in the China University of Political 
Science and Law. However, none of my enquiries met with a response.  
 
Regulatory Officials 
One of my former school associates had worked in the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) for several years. Thus, I hoped to enlist the help of this 
individual in setting up a number of interviews with regulatory officials of the CSRC. 
However, this person could not offer me any practical assistance with my fieldwork. 
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From the account of this school associate, the director of the CSRC had reiterated 
that the CSRC’s regulatory officials and China’s SOE’s executives should not get 
involved in any foreign academic research activities in a number of internal 
off-the-record meetings during that period. My school associate had no idea why the 
CSRC had placed such strictures against staff members participating in foreign 
academic research, but it was said that these tough measures were introduced to 
prevent foreign agitators from trawling through China’s large enterprises looking for 
scandals. According to the knowledge of my school friend, the vast majority of 
regulatory officials or SOE executives did not dare to contravene this injunction of 
the CSRC, for fear of being singled out by the CSRC’s disciplinary committee.  
 
Enquiry emails were also sent to several regulatory officials of the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSEx), such as to the Director of the Research Center in the SSEx, but no 
acknowledgement of my email was received.  
 
Independent Directors 
Mr K, who was an economic expert and independent director of a Chinese 
state-owned investment company, could be numbered among one of my closest 
friends. He used to work in the Beijing Standard Financial Consultant Co., Ltd., as 
well as the Huiya Equity Investment Fund Company as an executive director for 
over seven years. Technically, the Beijing Standard Company and Huiya Investment 
Company were de facto owned by Professor LIU Jipeng. Professor LIU was 
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nominally the director of Securities Research Center in the China University of 
Political Science and Law, while his true identity was as a key protégé of LI Keqiang, 
first ranked vice-premier and deputy party secretary of the State Council of China 
and now the Premier of China.
292
 In addition, LIU Jipeng had good personal 
relationships with several other senior officials of China who served under LI 
Keqiang in charge of economics and finance, such as WANG Yong and ZHOU 
Xiaochuan.
293
  
 
Technically, Professor LIU rendered a financial counselling service for over 30 per 
cent of the centrally-owned enterprises in China,
294
 and he also had been involved in 
long-term partnerships with many leading private Chinese companies. These special 
backgrounds of Mr K placed him in a unique position to be able to attend the annual 
general meetings, board meetings and Party committee meetings of some large 
Chinese SOEs and enterprises in an external financial advisory capacity. As Mr K 
had gained valuable first-hand experience whilst working with senior executives 
coming from these large Chinese companies, he provided valuable insights into the 
corporate governance practices of some of China’s major SOEs and other large 
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private companies in the interview.  
 
IV. INTERVIEWS AND INFORMANTS 
The qualitative data for this study was collected through face-to-face interviews with 
academic lawyers, China’s SOE managers, officials, professionals and several other 
miscellaneous interviewees. The core of this empirical research was based on 
interviews with Chinese SOE managers, and other informants who had been directly 
involved in the corporate governance practices of large Chinese SOEs and 
companies in Beijing, China.  
 
Certainly, it would be desirable to include qualitative board level data in the study, 
since most important corporate governance issues of China’s SOEs and large 
companies could only be decided at board or even higher level.
295
 Thus, there was a 
necessity to interview the individuals who could gain access to such corporate 
governance information. Unfortunately, it was not possible to insist on exactly whom 
was interviewed, since this largely depended on whether the would-be interviewees 
were willing to accept the invitation to participate in the empirical interviews. This is 
an endemic problem with qualitative research, especially that which relies upon the 
“snowball” method of referrals to obtain access to further interviewees.  
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In most of China’s SOEs and large companies the upper-level managers who are in 
charge of a department, such as the finance or sales and marketing departments, 
actually have no voice in the decision-making process for major corporate 
governance issues. Such decisions generally fall within the remit of the company’s 
vice chairman, chairman, vice president, president and the secretary of the Party’s 
Committee. This means most upper-level managers in China’s SOEs actually have 
sparse knowledge of the important corporate governance information relating to their 
own company.  
 
Significantly, essential corporate governance information is accessible to the 
secretary of the board of directors in most of China’s SOEs. Nevertheless, this major 
post is generally held by a vice chairman or vice president in the vast majority of 
cases.  
 
Technically, the six target Chinese companies explored in the case study chapters of 
this dissertation
296
 are all ministry-level organisations in Mainland China. Therefore, 
these six companies’ vice chairmen, vice presidents and the secretaries of the board 
are de facto vice minister-level officials, while the chairmen, presidents and the 
secretaries of the Party’s committee are de facto minister-level officials.297  
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It is reasonable to infer that these senior executives of the six targeted companies 
who understand about the essential corporate governance practices of their own 
company are actually unavailable, as they can be deemed to be senior government 
figures rather than entrepreneurs. Basically, the only practical approach to secure the 
involvement of such senior government officials in these kinds of foreign research 
projects in Mainland China is to ask their immediate superior or some other state 
officials with superior status to arrange or even chaperone the interviews.  
 
Unfortunately, not everyone can be fortunate enough to have this kind of social 
interpersonal relationship in China. In addition, some scholars have pointed out that 
senior executives of China’s companies are not always candid in these interviews set 
up, or even chaperoned, by superior state officials.
298
 Similarly, Professor Tomasic 
has made a reference to these kinds of issues in a meeting, once asking GAO Xiqing, 
who was the deputy chairman at the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC),
299
 to assist him in arranging interviews with senior managers of some 
Chinese enterprises in Shanghai city. As GAO Xiqing was in an influential political 
position, these Chinese senior managers could not easily turn him down. 
Nevertheless, such senior managers provided either bureaucratic answers or evasive 
comments in their interviews, since they were apprehensive that Professor Tomasic 
                                                             
298
 See Walder, Andrew G., “Factory and Manager in an Era of Reform”, The China Quarterly, Vol. 118, 1989, p. 
247.  
299
 GAO Xiqing held the post of deputy chairman in CSRC from 1999 to 2003, and he currently is working in 
China Investment Corporation (CIC) as vice chairman and president; see China Investment Corporation (CIC), 
Governance, Board of Directors, available at: http://www.china-inv.cn/cicen/governance/governing_bod.html, 
accessed March 23, 2012.  
  
 
149 
would give negative feedback on their work to GAO Xiqing after the interviews.  
 
Apart from government officials and semi-officials, academic lawyers, legal scholars 
and financial professionals were also invited to participate in the interviews, since 
the involvement of such individuals who were indirectly operative in the corporate 
governance practices of China’s companies could provide a wider perspective on the 
target issues. Academic lawyers and legal scholars proved an extra dimension to the 
research, since they often had the opportunity to dissect the governance practices of 
China’s companies. In contrast, the financial professionals, especially the auditors 
and chartered accountants who worked in the major financial institutions, actually 
played an intermediary role in the daily management of China’s companies, as they 
reviewed the client company’s systems from time to time and even helped client 
companies to make decisions about allocating resources. Basically, the participation 
of these interviewees hailing from different professions could help to avoid taking a 
biased approach to examining the corporate governance of China’s companies.  
 
In this research the author is extremely grateful to all the informants who gave their 
strong support and valuable time to the study. These interviewees sat for a number of 
hours in the interview and provided valuable information without apparent reserve. 
Unfortunately, it has not been possible to mention the real names of the informants 
and make a point of directly thanking them for their great help in this thesis, since 
the confidentiality of the discussions is important to almost all informants.  
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With all informants guaranteed confidentiality and anonymity, their names were 
anonymised. A simple code was developed by taking the initials of the informants, as 
this could facilitate the identification of each individual informant. The positions of 
all the individuals interviewed have been listed below, and each number (i.e. 1-13) 
indicates one interview. A brief description of their occupation and position has been 
provided for each interviewee.  
 
The Interviewees and Informants 
1. Miss A: senior auditor of an international accounting firm, Beijing, 2011 
2. Mr B: senior manager of a Chinese SOE in the telecommunication sector, Beijing, 
2011 
3. Miss C: manager of a Chinese SOE in the telecommunication sector, Beijing, 
2011 
4. Mr D: senior manager of a Chinese SOE in the telecommunication sector, Beijing, 
2011 
5. Mr E (British): partner lawyer of an international law firm, Beijing, 2011 
6. Miss F: senior associate of a Chinese financial consulting and investment firm, 
Beijing, 2011 
7. Mr G (American): partner lawyer in an international law firm, Beijing, 2011 
8. Mr H: manager of a Chinese SOE petrochemical industry, Beijing, 2011 
9. Mr I (American): senior lawyer in an international law firm, Beijing, 2011 
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10. Mr J: lawyer and legal scholar in a Chinese educational institution, Beijing, 2011 
11. Mr K: senior manager and economic expert in a Chinese financial consulting & 
investment firm, Beijing, 2011 
12. Mr L: senior manager in a Chinese SOE in the petrochemical industry, Beijing 
2011 (who only agreed to participate in this project by providing written responses to 
the questionnaire) 
13. Mr M: senior manager in a Chinese SOE in the petrochemical industry, Beijing, 
2011 (who only agreed to participate in this project by providing written responses to 
the questionnaire) 
 
V. COMPLETE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
Organisation 
Organisation’s name: 
Organisation’s address: 
Organisation’s founded date:  
Organisation’s main activities: 
Organisation’s sector: 
Number of employees (active / retired): 
Respondent 
Respondent’s name: 
Respondent’s gender: 
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Respondent’s education (college graduate / postgraduate) (Has the respondent ever 
studied a degree course in a foreign academic institution?): 
Respondent’s field of specialisation (i.e., accountant, auditor, economist, lawyer, 
management, etc.?): 
Respondent’s position in organisation: 
Respondent’s length of employment with organisation: 
How was this respondent recruited? 
Interview 
Date of interview: 
Place of interview: 
Interview time length: 
Provided Durham Law School Ethics and Data Protection Monitoring Form? (Yes / 
No)
300
 
Interview Schedule 
1. What are the key differences between the roles of the company President and the 
CEO in your company? 
2. In so far as governance practices are concerned, what is the role of the Party’s 
Committee in your company? 
3. Can you describe the process of board appointment in your company?  
                                                             
300
 Under the regulations of Durham Law School, research that involves human participants and / or raises 
ethical issues (e.g. interviews or questionnaires) requires approval in advance. Durham Law School’s Ethics and 
Data Protection Review Group had approved the Ethics and Data Protection Monitoring Form of this PhD project 
prior to its commencement, which confirms that the methodology and reporting strategies of this project meet 
acceptable ethical standards. The said Ethics and Data Protection Monitoring Form of this study was provided to 
informants for their reference before each interview, and all informants had been informed that all collected 
data of this project would be processed in accordance with the rights of data subjects under the relevant 
regulations of Durham Law School.  
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4. What is the company President’s influence on board appointments in your 
company? 
5. What do you think of the size of the board in your company (i.e., is it too large or 
too small)? 
6. What do you think of the effectiveness of the outside directors (independent 
directors) in your company (prompt, are they suitably qualified and well enough 
informed to do the job)? 
7. What impact does the holding of multiple directorships by outside directors have 
upon governance practices in your company? 
8. How independent is the Board of Directors in your company? 
9. Are company board meetings in your company held frequently enough? 
10. Is board diversity an issue in your company (if so, how)? 
11. What do you think of the relationship between your company and its parent 
company (company group)?   
12. Do domestic institutional investors in your company have any noticeable 
influence over your company? 
13. How well are minority shareholders protected in your company? 
14. What change, if any, has the split share structure reforms had upon your 
company? 
15. Do you think the ownership structure of your company will change after the split 
share structure reforms are completed? 
16. Is it possible for the President (or board chairman) in your company to be 
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challenged? 
17. To what extent is profit-maximisation the ultimate goal of your company’s 
board? 
18. Do government policy goals affect your company? 
19. What do you think of the role of foreign institutional investors in your company? 
20. Has the overseas listing of your company’s shares been beneficial for your 
company (please give some examples)?  
21. Has overseas listing of your company had an effect on the company’s corporate 
governance practices?  
22. Have the rules of foreign stock markets upon which your company is listed 
affected the corporate governance of your company? 
23. What role do banks play in the corporate governance of your company? 
24. Who is in the best position to effectively review the performance of the board 
and management in your company? 
25. To what extent has foreign listing improved the performance of your company? 
 
VI. CONFIDENTIALITY 
It is widely known that Chinese people, especially senior official and elite 
professionals, have a strong natural tendency towards caution. In my empirical 
interviews, the informants were being asked to talk about issues concerning the 
corporate governance of large Chinese SOEs, which might be deemed as an unsafe 
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subject for discussion by many Chinese people. Particularly, some interviewees were 
requested to comment on the corporate governance practices of those Chinese 
companies that they worked for.  
 
Unexpectedly, the anonymity of the interviewees was also a primary concern for 
some foreign lawyers. By the account of Mr G, who was an American partner lawyer 
working in a Beijing-based international law firm, it would not be advantageous for 
him to be openly hostile towards China’s government, since he still had to practice 
law in Mainland China for the foreseeable future.  
 
For these reasons, all interviewees were guaranteed confidentiality and anonymity. 
All names of the informants were anonymised and a simple code developed by 
taking their initials. This could facilitate the identification of the informants, and it 
would also help to ensure continuity between statements for a particular informant.  
 
VII. SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS AND LIMITATIONS 
The selection of cases, i.e., selecting an individual company for case studies, is 
vitally important for this research. Meanwhile, the attributes of the industrial sectors 
in which these case companies belonged have been also taken into account. While 
hundreds of China’s companies, including SOEs and private companies, had been 
listed on foreign stock exchanges, the scope of this study and time constraints only 
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allowed me to sample several of them.  
 
First of all, a full list of China’s overseas listed companies was made, which included 
these Chinese SOEs and private companies listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange-Euronext, NASDAQ, Hong Kong Stock Exchange and London Stock 
Exchange.
301
 Indeed, some of China’s companies had been listed on the stock 
exchanges of Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, Korea and Singapore. However, 
these companies were not included in this list due to their comparatively small 
market capitalisation. Appendix lists provide the most up-to-date information of all 
of China’s major foreign listed companies.302  
 
According to the lists found in Appendix, there were 53 Chinese companies listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)-Euronext,
303
 there were 49 Chinese 
companies listed on the NASDAQ stock exchange,
304
 and 242 Chinese companies 
                                                             
301
 See Appendix.  
302
 The information contained in the Appendix lists was last updated in October 2008. As rapid economic 
growth and swift change was occurring in China, some smaller companies in this list may had been delisted or 
suspended by the end of 2012. The relevant information of the top 15 Chinese companies listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange and Hong Kong Stock Exchange has been complied into Table 4.2 and 4.3 (rated according 
to their market capitalisation).  
303
 This number includes 41 Chinese companies listed on New York Stock Exchange, 3 Chinese companies listed 
on NYSE Archipelago Exchange (NYSE ARCA), 1 Chinese company listed on NYSE Alternext U.S., 3 Chinese 
companies listed on NYSE Alternext Paris and another 6 Chinese companies listed on Euronext Paris-Marché 
Libre. In fact, Euronext Paris-Marché Libre is not a constituent part of NYSE Euronext French equities market. It 
is a non-regulated market administered by Euronext Paris for transactions in securities not listed on other 
markets; see New York Stock Exchange Euronext, Euronext: Organization and Procedures, Non-Regulated 
Markets, p. 11, available at: www.euronext.com/fic/000/010/706/107061.pdf, accessed March 30, 2012.  
304
 These 49 Chinese companies were listed on three different market tiers of NASDAQ stock exchange: 14 
companies listed on NASDAQ Global Select Market (with the highest initial listing standards), 30 companies 
listed on NASDAQ Global Market (formerly the NASDAQ National Market) and 5 companies listed on NASDAQ 
Capital Market (formerly the NASDAQ Small Cap Market); for more information about the NASDAQ’s new 
three-tier market classification which was created on July 1, 2006, see NASDAQ OMX Group, “NASDAQ Creates 
New Market Tier With Highest Listing Standards In the World”, February 15, 2006, available at: 
http://ir.nasdaqomx.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=187664, accessed March 31, 2012.  
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listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx),
305
 and, finally, there were 68 
Chinese companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE).
306
  
 
Largely, most of China’s long-running, traditional State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
such as China Mobile, Chalco,
307
 CNOOC, PetroChina and Sinopec, opted for the 
NYSE as their prime listing venue. Relatively speaking, the majority of these 49 
Chinese companies listed on the NASDAQ stock exchange, typified by Baidu, Inc., 
NetEase, Sina.com, Inc. and Sohu.com, Inc., which are all growing high technology 
companies involved in electronics or the Internet under private ownership. The 
proximity of Hong Kong to Mainland China, together with its high market liquidity, 
makes Hong Kong very popular with many China’s companies that are seeking to 
list overseas. Appendix lists shows that the number of Mainland Chinese companies 
listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange had surpassed that of all other markets. 
Seemingly, a large proportion of these Chinese companies listed on the LSE had 
attained only a modest size, and very few large Chinese SOEs elected to list their 
securities on the LSE. Significantly, many of China’s major SOEs decided to execute 
                                                             
305
 These 242 Chinese companies were listed on two different market tiers of HKEx: 198 companies listed on 
HKEx Main Board and 44 companies listed on HKEx Growth Enterprise Market (GEM); 6 of these companies had 
been suspended for over 1 year by October 2008; for more information about the two different market tiers of 
HKEx, see Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Our Markets, available at: 
http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/listing/listhk/our_markets.htm, accessed April 2, 2012.  
306
 6 of these 68 Chinese companies were listed on the International Main Market of London Stock Exchange 
when all such 6 companies were incorporated in China; the other 62 companies were listed on the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) of London Stock Exchange, which is London Stock Exchange’s international market for 
smaller growing companies. These 62 companies listed on AIM were incorporated in various countries including 
Australia, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Hong Kong, Republic of Ireland, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. Further, only 2 of the 62 companies were operated in Hong Kong, while the operation of 
all other 60 companies was in Mainland China. For information about the listing regime of London Stock 
Exchange, i.e. Premium (formerly Primary) Listing, Standard (formerly Secondary) Listing and AIM comparison, 
see London Stock Exchange, Main Market, Companies: Listing Regime, available at: 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/main-market/companies/primary-and-seconda
ry-listing/listing-categories.htm, accessed April 2, 2012.  
307
 Chalco stands for Aluminum Corporation of China Limited.  
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cross-listing or triple-listing, in other words floating their shares on two or even three 
stock exchanges simultaneously.
308
  
 
                                                             
308
 There are many examples, such as the cross-listing of Agricultural Bank of China on Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange (HKEx) and Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE), or the triple-listing of Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China Ltd. (ICBC) on HKEx, SSE and U.S. Over-the-Counter (OTC) Pink market; the statistics of China’s cross-listed 
and triple-listed companies is omitted in this thesis, as the emphasis of this study is NOT on the difference 
between overseas listing and cross-listing; besides, whether the overall quality of corporate governance of 
China’s cross-listed companies is better than that of non-cross-listed companies is still open to debate, see Chen, 
Shaw; Lin, Bing-Xuan; Wang, Yaping and Wu, Liansheng, “Cross-listing, Corporate Governance and Operating 
Performance - Evidence from The Chinese Market”, in Advances in Business and Management Forecasting Vol. 5, 
Lawrence, Kenneth D. and Geurts, Michael D. edited, Elsevier, Oxford, 2008, p. 19.  
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Table 4.1 Criteria Adopted by this Research for the Selection of Case-studied Samples 
Criteria Standard 
Market capitalisation of the listed company Large and mega capitalisation are preferable 
Number of employees Larger number of employees is preferable 
Date of overseas listing Earlier listing date is preferable 
State Owned Enterprise or private company State Owned Enterprise is preferable 
Attributes of the sector 
Sectors with higher state presence is preferable 
Sectors with higher asset intensity are preferable 
Cross-listing (triple-listing) Cross-listing (triple-listing) is preferable 
 
The criteria adopted by this research for the selection of empirical case-studied 
samples have been compiled into Table 4.1 above. In the first instance, market 
capitalisation has been used as a major criterion for the selection of overseas listed 
Chinese company samples. As shown in Appendix lists, the market capitalisations of 
these Chinese companies listed on the NYSE Euronext, NASDAQ, HKEx and LSE 
stock exchanges are expressed in descending numerical order.  
 
Market capitalisation represents the total value of the tradable shares of a public 
company, and it is equal to the total number of outstanding shares times the current 
share price. In general, market capitalisation can be used as an indicator for the net 
worth of the listed company, but it can only be considered as an approximate proxy 
since it is just a rough market estimate of a company’s value at the time of 
calculation. Nevertheless, market capitalisation does represent the relatively 
  
 
160 
reasonable valuation of the company in any given period as it can mostly reflect the 
listed company’s tangible assets as well as the future expected prospects.309  
 
Apart from market capitalisation, the total number of employees of the company is 
also adopted as a criterion when selecting the empirical study cases. The number of 
employees generally can serve as a useful proxy to measure the size of a company, 
although it might correlate to the specific business nature of the company as well as 
some other factors. In the main, large companies should have a large number of 
full-time employees.
310
  
 
The overseas listing date of these Chinese companies is another important 
consideration. When a Chinese company had only been listed on the foreign stock 
exchanges for five or less years, it would be difficult to assess if the corporate 
governance of such a company would have been substantially affected by the 
governance regime of these better-regulated markets. Thus, the Chinese companies 
that had been listed overseas for more than ten years became priority cases in this 
research, while those Chinese companies that had accomplished their off-shore 
listing after 2005 were all avoided.  
 
Although China’s government alleges that Mainland China has undergone the 
                                                             
309
 Windsor, Duane, “Shareholder Wealth Maximization”, in Finance Ethics: Critical Issues in Theory and Practice, 
Boatright, John R. (edited), John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, New Jersey, 2010, p. 440.  
310
 This is based on the grounds that the officially reported employees figures of these overseas listed China’s 
companies are basically accurate and that the majority of their employees are full-time employees; for more 
information about the measures of company size, see Hart, Peter E. and Oulton, Nicholas, “Growth and Size of 
Firms”, The Economic Journal, Vol. 106, No. 438, 1996, p. 1243.  
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transition from command economy to a market economy, there is no denying that 
China’s state still plays a dominant role in China’s economy. Indeed, the share of 
China’s SOEs has shrunk in some sectors such as manufacturing in recent years. 
However, the level of Chinese state control is predominant in most important 
industrial sectors, such as car manufacturing, banking, public transportation, steel 
and telecommunications.
311
 Significantly, SOEs continue to maintain total 
supremacy over their non-state-owned rivals in sectors that have been defined as 
“strategically vital” by China’s government, such as civil aviation, defence, energy 
and natural resources.  
 
Undoubtedly, the definition of private sector is ambiguous to a certain degree in 
China,
312
 as it is always controversial whether Collectively Owned Enterprises 
(COEs) and Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) can be classified as non-state. 
However, China’s state does maintain substantial equity interests in COEs and TVEs, 
and these enterprises are under the close control of China’s government in most 
instances.
313
 Furthermore, the fact that China’s state sector has been expanding 
rapidly in recent years is not insignificant either, since this is at the expense of the 
                                                             
311
 It is said that China’s SOEs held more than 30 per cent of the total assets of the secondary sector (i.e. 
construction and production) and tertiary sector (i.e. service), and over 50 per cent of total industrial assets by 
2008, see Xu, Gao, “State-Owned Enterprises in China: How Big Are They?”, World Bank Blogs, January 19, 2010, 
available at: http://blogs.worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/state-owned-enterprises-in-china-how-big-are-they, 
accessed May 1, 2012; see also Pei, Minxin, “The Dark Side of China’s Rise”, Foreign Policy, February 17, 2006, 
available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/02/17/the_dark_side_of_chinas_rise, accessed May 1, 
2012.  
312
 Haggard, Stephan and Huang, Yasheng, “The Political Economy of Private-Sector Development in China”, in 
China’s Great Economic Transformation, Brandt, Loren and Rawski, Thomas G. edited, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2008, pp. 340-341.  
313
 Bai, Chong-En; Li, David D. and Wang, Yijiang, “Thriving on A Tilted Playing Field”, in How Far Across the River? 
Chinese Policy Reform at the Millennium, Hope, Nicholas C.; Yang, Dennis Tao and Li, Mu Yang edited, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, 2003, p. 99. 
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once-flourishing private sector to some extent.
314
  
 
When taking the foregoing various variables into account, it seems that non-state 
sector
315
 can only play a subordinate role in China’s economy, and China’s 
economic policy always slants towards privileging these state-backed SOEs. Hence 
China’s overseas listed major SOEs take precedence over other private Mainland’s 
companies for the case-studied samples selection in this research, as their 
governance structure and business operation could more accurately reflect the 
economic policy and measures of China’s state. In fact, SASAC always keeps 
ascendancy in the corporate governance practices of most of China’s SOEs, since it 
holds the Chinese government’s shareholding in almost all of the Mainland’s public 
SOEs.
316
  
 
When the scope and space of this research does not permit me to gather a 
comprehensive sample that will provide a large number of overseas listed China’s 
companies across all industrial sectors, the weight of the industrial sectors’ selection 
is not to be taken lightly. The main objective of the sectors’ selection in this research 
is to allow a representative sample of overseas listed Chinese companies to be 
covered.  
                                                             
314
 See Wines, Michael, “China Fortifies State Businesses to Fuel Growth”, The New York Times, August 29, 2010, 
available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/30/world/asia/30china.html?_r=1&hp, accessed May 2, 2012.  
315
 “Non-state sector” has been used as an interchangeable term with “private sector”.  
316
 China’s Ministry of Finance holds shareholding on behalf of China’s government in Mainland’s public SOEs of 
finance sector; see Mattlin, Mikael, “Chinese Strategic State-Owned Enterprises and Ownership Control”, 
Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies Asia Paper, Vol. 4, No. 6, 2009, p. 8, available at: 
http://www.vub.ac.be/biccs/site/index.php?id=23, accessed May 4, 2012.  
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As state control is still the keynote of the China’s economy, the level of the Chinese 
state’s presence cannot be ignored in most important industrial sectors. Thus, this 
research adopts selection criteria which are more inclined to choose these industrial 
sectors with higher Chinese state presence, as the institutional environments of such 
sectors and individual overseas listed Chinese company’s level of autonomy in such 
sectors may be affected by China’s government, either directly or indirectly.317  
 
Besides, asset intensity is also one of the major parameters for the selection of 
sectors in this study. The term “asset intensity” generally refers to “the dollar amount 
of assets necessary to support a dollar of revenue”.318 Where asset intensity is a 
widely used variable in economics, it can be simply interpreted in this research as 
companies in these sectors with higher asset intensity generally which need larger 
amounts of capital to maintain production at constant levels so as to generate a profit. 
According to Williamson’s theory, the greater the amount of capital invested in the 
contractual relationship by two involved parties, the greater are the continuity 
properties of such contractual relationships.
319
 This theory has been extensively 
applied by several other scholars to institutional environments within China’s 
industries, which indicates that these asset-intensive industrial sectors of China will 
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 Guthrie, Doug, Dragon in A Three-Piece Suit: The Emergence of Capitalism in China, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1999, p. 225.  
318
 For more information about the definition of asset intensity and ways of calculating asset intensity, see 
Leach, J Chris and Melicher, Ronald W, Entrepreneurial Finance, South-Western Cengage Learning, Mason, Ohio, 
2012, p. 57; also Golis, Christopher C.; Mooney, Patrick D. and Richardson, Thomas F., Enterprise and Venture 
Capital, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2009, p. 43.  
319
 Williamson, Oliver E., Economic Organization: Firms, Markets, and Policy Control, New York University Press, 
New York, 1986, p. 142.  
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probably have more stable institutional environments than asset non-intensive 
sectors, while China’s companies in such asset intensive sectors can operate 
accordingly in a more predictable way.
320
  
 
Thus, those Chinese companies in the energy, infrastructure and telecommunications 
sectors were given priority in the selection of case study samples for this study, as 
the asset intensity of these sectors is stronger than that of industries concerned with 
garments, the internet and retailing sectors. It is theoretically possible that the 
corporate governance practices of such Chinese companies should be remarkably 
sure-footed, since the better institutional environments of these asset-intensive 
sectors could facilitate their management and operation. Efforts were made to collect 
relevant data of industrial sectors from the China Statistical Yearbook,
321
 and a 
simplified method was used to determine the level of asset intensity of these sectors. 
In addition, preliminary telephone surveys were attempted with several economic 
experts such as Mr K (Interviewee No.11), so as to verify the asset intensity of the 
industrial sectors in China.  
 
Furthermore, cross-listing (or triple-listing) was employed as a gauge during the 
selection of case-studied samples. It is generally held that companies with a 
cross-listing in the U.S. have a higher valuation than non-cross-listed 
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 Guthrie, Doug, Dragon in A Three-Piece Suit: The Emergence of Capitalism in China, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1999, p. 224.  
321
 National Bureau of Statistics of China, Annual Data, available at: 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/, accessed May 13, 2012.  
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corporations.
322
 Besides, cross-listed and triple-listed companies could arguably 
have better corporate governance practices since they are subject to the corporate 
governance standards of two or even three stock exchanges in different countries. 
Hence, preference has been given to Chinese companies with cross-listing or 
triple-listing in the empirical research of this study, considering that the corporate 
governance of such companies is most possibly influenced by foreign regulatory 
regimes.  
 
As was stated earlier, the NYSE remained the most popular choice of overseas 
listing for most of China’s major SOEs and large private companies. Furthermore, 
the international financial centre status and desirable geographical location of Hong 
Kong had a powerful magnetising effect on the Mainland’s companies. Thus, 242 of 
the Mainland’s companies had listed on the HKEx by the end of 2008 (6 of these 
companies were suspended), resulting in the HKEx ranking highly among all foreign 
stock exchanges in terms of the quantity of listed Mainland companies. By 
comparison, the majority of the Chinese companies listed on the NASDAQ were 
emergent high technology companies with comparatively short listing spans, 
generally no more than ten years. Moreover, very few large Chinese SOEs decided to 
list on the LSE, while those private companies listed on the LSE could only attain 
small market capitalisations. As a matter of fact, many of the private Chinese 
companies in the Appendix List IV had been delisted from the LSE by the middle of 
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 Doidgea, Craig; Karolyib, G. Andrew and Stulz, René M, “Why Are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S. Worth 
More?”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 71, Issue 2, 2004, p. 205.  
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2012, which reveals that the operation of these small companies is not as stable as 
that of major Chinese SOEs.
323
  
 
In light of the arguments presented above, this research shifted the emphasis towards 
those Chinese companies listed on the NYSE Euronext and HKEx. The 
comparatively larger size and longer listing span of these companies listed on the 
said two stock markets should arguably facilitate the empirical research, as it would 
be very difficult to examine the corporate governance implications of overseas 
listing on Chinese companies if the management and operation of the would-be 
company samples lacked stability and tangibility.  
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 More than a third of the Chinese companies in Appendix List IV joined LSE in or after 2006, and thus their 
overseas listing span was no more than 3 years by the time of this study. Technically, many British investors have 
expressed concern over the corporate governance and management of these Chinese companies listed on LSE 
due to the growing delisting and high-profile failures of such companies; see MacLellan, Kylie, “Governance Key 
for China’s London IPO Hopefuls”, Reuters, March 14, 2012, available at: 
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Table 4.2 Top 15 Chinese Companies Listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
(rated according to their market capitalisation) 
Ranking English Name of Company Ticker Symbol Listed Stock Exchange 
Market Capitalisation 
(descending US$)* 
Listing Date 
1 China Mobile Limited (China Mobile) CHL NYSE $4,817,311,590 22 Oct 1997 (IPO) (ADR) 
2 PetroChina Company Limited PTR NYSE $1,627,920,000 06 Apr 2000 (IPO) (ADR) 
3 New Oriental Education & Technology Group Inc. (New Oriental) EDU NYSE $1,268,276,800 07 Sep 2006 (IPO) 
4 Mindray Medical International Limited MR NYSE $1,175,235,880 26 Sep 2006 (IPO) (ADR) 
5 China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) Limited CEO NYSE $1,070,926,260 27 Feb 2001 (IPO) (ADR) 
6 China Life Insurance Company LFC NYSE $1,062,736,030 17 Dec 2003 (IPO) (ADR) 
7 Suntech Power Holdings Co., Ltd. (Suntech) STP NYSE $769,881,600 14 Dec 2005 (IPO) (ADR) 
8 Giant Interactive Group Inc. GA NYSE $741,124,670 01 Nov 2007 (IPO) 
9 China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) SNP NYSE $725,462,100 18 Oct 2000 (IPO) (ADR) 
10 LDK Solar Co., Ltd. LDK NYSE $564,536,850 01 Jun 2007 (IPO) (ADR) 
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11 Huaneng Power International, Inc. HNP NYSE $511,838,780 06 Oct 1994 (IPO) (ADR) 
12 China Unicom Limited CHU NYSE $466,087,750 21 Jun 2000 (IPO) (ADR) 
13 American Oriental Bioengineering, Inc. AOB NYSE $446,019,300 18 Dec 2006 
14 Longtop Financial Technologies Limited LFT NYSE $436,778,480 24 Oct 2007 (IPO) (ADR) 
15 Aluminum Corporation of China Limited (Chalco) ACH NYSE $314,607,930 11 Dec 2001 (ADR) 
Source: data collected from the official website of New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ in October 2008324 
* The market capitalisation of the Chinese companies showed in this table was considerably smaller than the official figures issued by China’s government, since the NYSE and NASDAQ probably adjusted 
for this by calculating on a free float basis, i.e., the market capitalisation that the NYSE and NASDAQ used is the value of the publicly tradable part of the company. 
Note: China Netcom, full name China Netcom Group Corporation (Hong Kong) Limited (former stock codes: HKEX:0906, NYSE:CN), abbreviated CNC, has been removed from this list, since it was 
merged with China United Netcom (Hong Kong) Ltd. (China Unicom) on 6 October 2008. After China Netcom became a wholly owned subsidiary of China Unicom, the listings of its shares on the HKEx 
and its American Depositary Receipt Shares on the NYSE were withdrawn.325  
 
                                                             
324
 See New York Stock Exchange Euronext, Listings Directory, available at: http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/lc_all_overview.html, accessed October 27, 2008. 
325
 See Xinhua News Agency, “China Netcom Removed from Hang Seng Index Constituent After Merger”, October 6, 2008, available at: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-10/06/content_10156603.htm, accessed March 17, 2012.  
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Appendix List I shows all the Chinese companies listed on the NYSE by October of 
2008, while the top 15 companies among them in terms of market capitalisation have 
been complied into Table 4.2 in descending order.  
 
According to Table 4.2, China Mobile Limited took the market capitalisation crown 
from the Mainland’s oil-services giant, PetroChina Company Limited, with a 
significant advantage. China Mobile Limited is a Mainland telecommunications SOE 
having over 160,000 employees,
326
 and was listed on the NYSE as early as 1997. In 
addition to the overseas listing on the NYSE, China Mobile Limited also lists its 
equity shares on the HKEx. The telecommunications industry of the Mainland is 
almost completely dominated by the state. Technically, the asset intensity of the 
telecommunications sector is naturally higher than that of other sectors, largely due 
to the considerable capital expenditure involved in building infrastructure. 
Furthermore, the investment recovery periods of the telecommunications industry 
tend to be longer than in many other industries. Hence, China Mobile Limited fulfils 
all the criteria for being selected as a case-studied sample of this research.  
 
PetroChina Company Limited, which has a market capitalisation of 
US$ 1,627,920,000, closely follows China Mobile Limited in Table 4.2. PetroChina 
Company Limited is a large oil services SOE with over 550,000 employees,
327
 
                                                             
326
 See Hoovers, Key China Mobile Limited Financials, available at: 
http://www.hoovers.com/company/China_Mobile_Limited/hcxcji-1-1njea5.html, accessed May 21, 2012.  
327
 See Financial Times, Markets Data, PetroChina Company Limited, Business Profile, available at: 
http://markets.ft.com/Research/Markets/Tearsheets/Business-profile?s=601857:SHH, accessed May 21, 2012.  
  
 
170 
which launched its Initial Public Offering (IPO) on the NYSE in 2000. Furthermore, 
the listing of PetroChina Company Limited on the HKEx and SSE has made it a 
triple-listed company. The oil and gas sector has been defined as a strategically vital 
sector by China’s government, with the state always playing a central, directive role 
in this sector. While the oil and gas sector is basically asset intensive, it involves a 
high level of fixed investment and higher degree of risk. Therefore, PetroChina 
Company Limited was selected as a sample for the case studies of this research.  
 
With New Oriental Education & Technology Group Inc. and Mindray Medical 
International Limited joining the NYSE in late 2006, they were not desirable choices 
for selection as case-studied samples, as their overseas listing span was scarcely two 
years by 2008. The market capitalisation of China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC) Limited is ranked fifth in Table 4.2. CNOOC Limited is the major 
investment holding subsidiary of China National Offshore Oil Corporation, which is 
the third-largest National Oil Company (NOC) in Mainland China. CNOOC Limited 
employs more than 5,300 employees,
328
 and was cross-listed on the NYSE and 
HKEx in 2001. With the petroleum industry of the Mainland tightly controlled by 
China’s state, CNOOC Limited is actually a Chinese SOE in an asset intensive sector. 
Hence, CNOOC Limited became the last sample that was listed on NYSE and 
included in the case studies.  
 
                                                             
328
 See Financial Times, Markets Data, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) Limited, Business 
Profile, available at: http://markets.ft.com/Research/Markets/Tearsheets/Business-profile?s=883:HKG, accessed 
May 23, 2012.  
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Table 4.3 Top 15 Chinese Companies Listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) 
(rated according to their market capitalisation) 
Ranking English Name of Company Stock Code Listed Stock Exchange 
Market Capitalisation 
(HK$ descending) 
Listing Date Type 
1 China Mobile Limited Company 00941 HKEx Main Board 1,359,476,863,733 23 Oct 1997 Red Chip Companies* 
2 China Construction Bank Corporation 00939 HKEx Main Board 831,349,610,800 27 Oct 2005 H Share Companies* 
3 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited 01398 HKEx Main Board 294,020,016,945 27 Oct 2006 H Share Companies 
4 China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) Limited 00883 HKEx Main Board 281,415,959,899 28 Feb 2001 Red Chip Companies 
5 Bank of China Limited 03988 HKEx Main Board 168,004,755,304 01 Jun 2006 H Share Companies 
6 China Life Insurance Company Limited 02628 HKEx Main Board 151,427,911,250 18 Dec 2003 H Share Companies 
7 China Unicom (Hong Kong) Limited 00762 HKEx Main Board 150,314,471,395 22 Jun 2000 Red Chip Companies 
8 PetroChina Company Limited 00857 HKEx Main Board 120,263,730,000 07 Apr 2000 H Share Companies 
9 Bank of Communications Company Limited 03328 HKEx Main Board 101,944,949,161 23 Jun 2005 H Share Companies 
10 Bank of China Hong Kong (Holdings) Limited 02388 HKEx Main Board 90,714,454,682 25 Jul 2002 Red Chip Companies 
11 China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Limited 00386 HKEx Main Board 84,405,854,640 19 Oct 2000 H Share Companies 
12 Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China Limited 02318 HKEx Main Board 81,876,598,336 24 Jun 2004 H Share Companies 
13 China Overseas Land & Investment Limited 00688 HKEx Main Board 66,567,247,103 20 Aug 1992 Red Chip Companies 
14 China Resources Power Holdings Company Limited 00836 HKEx Main Board 60,227,954,874 12 Nov 2003 Red Chip Companies 
15 China Shenhua Energy Company Limited 01088 HKEx Main Board 47,580,155,000 15 Jun 2005 H Share Companies 
Source: data collected from the official website of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in October 2008329 
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 See Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Statistics & Research, Securities Market Statistics: China Dimension, available at: http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/stat/smstat/chidimen/chidimen.htm, accessed October 
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* Note: According to the definition given by the HKEx, H-share companies are companies incorporated in Mainland China and whose listings in Hong Kong are approved by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC). Shares of H-share companies are listed in Hong Kong, subscribed for and traded in Hong Kong dollars or other currencies. The letter H stands for Hong Kong. By contrast, Red chip 
companies are enterprises that are incorporated outside of the Mainland and are controlled by Mainland governmental entities. The most important difference between a red chip company and an H-share 
company is that a red chip company is not Mainland-incorporated.330  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
27, 2008.  
330
 See Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Frequently Asked Questions, Chapter 3: 3.5, available at: http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/global/faq/hkex%20markets.htm, accessed October 27, 2008.  
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Appendix List II shows all Chinese companies listed on the HKEx by October of 
2008, while the top 15 companies among them measured by market capitalisation 
have been complied into Table 4.3 above in descending order.  
 
In these companies, the top-ranked China Mobile Limited, fourth-ranked China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) Limited and eighth-ranked PetroChina 
Company Limited were selected as the samples that listed on the NYSE for case 
studies, as they were cross-listed.  
 
The second-ranked China Construction Bank Corporation, third-ranked Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China Limited, fifth-ranked Bank of China Limited and 
ninth-ranked Bank of Communications Company Limited were excluded from the 
case studies since they all joined the HKEx after 2005, which indicated in 2008 that 
their overseas listing span was quite short. The China Life Insurance Company 
Limited ranks sixth in this list, but it was not selected as a sample since its overseas 
listing span was only 5 years in 2008. While the tenth-ranked Bank of China Hong 
Kong (Holdings) Limited was listed on HKEx in 2002, it was also removed from the 
case studies, as an overseas listing span of 6 years could not be considered as 
sufficient.  
 
It was theoretically possible for China Unicom (Hong Kong) Limited, which is 
ranked seventh in Table 4.3, to have been selected as a sample for case studies, as it 
  
 
174 
had been listed on the HKEx as early as 2000. Nonetheless, China Unicom (Hong 
Kong) Limited was ruled out of the case studies in this research since it is a red chip 
company rather than an H share company. 
 
When red chip companies
331
 are incorporated outside Mainland China, their actual 
business and assets have a strong Mainland orientation. Although almost all red chip 
companies are controlled, either directly or indirectly, by various Mainland 
governmental entities, they are not regulated by the Mainland’s law from a strictly 
legal point of view. As H share companies are incorporated in Mainland China, they 
are still regulated by the Mainland’s law. The most important difference between a 
red chip company and an H share company is that all of the shares in issue in a red 
chip company are normally tradable, since non-Mainland incorporated red chip 
companies are not subject to the segmentation of share capital as in H share 
companies.  
 
Hence, this research gave top priority to H share companies rather than red chip 
companies in the HKEx case studies, as the prime objective of this research is to 
examine whether the corporate governance of these Chinese companies governed by 
the Mainland’s regulatory system have been affected by their overseas listings.  
 
In Table 4.3, the eleventh-ranked China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Limited 
                                                             
331
 The word “red” represents the Chinese Communist Party; the term “red chip” is not an official or legal stock 
category and it was coined by Hong Kong economist Alex Tang, who is the Head of Research of Core Pacific - 
Yamaichi International (H.K.) Limited, in 1992.  
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(Sinopec Limited) is a Mainland state-owned oil and gas company based in Beijing, 
which had over 370,000 employees.
332
 Sinopec Limited was simultaneously listed 
on the HKEx, NYSE and LSE in late 2000, and was floated on the SSE in 2001. 
China Petrochemical Corporation Group (Sinopec Group), which is the parent 
company of Sinopec Limited, is one of the major petroleum companies on the 
Mainland. With the oil and gas sector an asset intensive sector with very high state 
presence in Mainland China, Sinopec Limited is a major downstream oil Chinese 
SOE.
333
 Thus, Sinopec Limited was suitably qualified for being selected as a sample 
for the HKEx case studies.  
 
Sinopec Limited is followed by the Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China 
Limited (Ping An) in Table 4.3, which was the first insurance company in China to 
have a shareholding structure. With Ping An established in Shenzhen in 1988, it has 
developed into an integrated financial services conglomerate with 175,136 
employees.
334
 Although the insurance business is the traditional core business of 
Ping An, the company has diversified into financial services including asset 
management, commercial banking, investment and securities brokerage since the 
middle 1990s. Ping An was listed on the HKEx in June 2004, and it was further 
floated on the SSE three years later. In view of the comparatively short overseas 
                                                             
332
 See Financial Times, Markets Data, China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Limited, Business Profile, 
available at: http://markets.ft.com/Research/Markets/Tearsheets/Business-profile?s=600028:SHH, accessed 
May 28, 2012.  
333
 See Arul, Arun, “Quick Facts: PetroChina vs. SNP and CEO”, Chinavestor, September 26, 2009, available at: 
http://www.chinavestor.com/index.php/knowledge-base/adr-market/70972-quick-facts-petrochina-vs-snp-and-
ceo.html, accessed May 28, 2012.  
334
 See Hoovers, Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Ltd., Overview: Financials, available at: 
http://www.hoovers.com/company/Ping_An_Insurance_%28Group%29_Company_of_China_Ltd/ryxytsi-1-1njh
t4-1njfaq.html, accessed May 31, 2012.  
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listing span, Ping An was potentially an undesirable sample for the case studies. 
Nevertheless, Ping An was the first nationwide financial holding group company in 
China, and it was also the first Chinese enterprise to introduce significant foreign 
investment into the Mainland’s finance and insurance industry. Thus, Ping An can be 
considered as a representative sample of China’s integrated financial services 
conglomerate. With both the asset intensity and state presence in the finance and 
insurance sector very high in Mainland China, the majority of the top ten 
shareholders of Ping An are actually either directly or indirectly in the control of 
China’s government. Significantly, some of China’s most influential political leaders 
and their next of kin had played a vital role in the H-share listing of Ping An, by all 
accounts.
335
 Hence, Ping An was selected as a sample for the case studies of this 
research, largely for the sake of examining the contribution of political factors to the 
corporate governance of China’s overseas listed companies.  
 
The last H-share company that was selected as a sample for the HKEx case studies 
was Tsingtao Brewery Company Limited (Tsingtao Brewery), even though its 
market capitalisation was not large enough to be ranked in the Top 15 companies of 
Table 4.3. Tsingtao Brewery was founded by German settlers in 1903, and turned 
into an SOE by nationalisation in 1949. It has now developed into China’s second 
largest brewery with over 37,000 employees.
336
 Tsingtao Brewery was listed on the 
                                                             
335
 Chan, John, “Corruption Scandal Signals Sharp Differences in Chinese Ruling Elite”, World Socialist Web Site, 
August 3, 2004, available at: http://www.wsws.org/articles/2004/aug2004/chin-a03.shtml, accessed June 6, 
2012.  
336
 See Financial Times, Markets Data, Tsingtao Brewery Company Limited, Business Profile, available at: 
http://markets.ft.com/Research/Markets/Tearsheets/Business-profile?s=600600:SHH, accessed June 6, 2012.  
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HKEx as an H-share company in July 1993, and was also floated on the SSE in the 
same year. Besides, Tsingtao Brewery is also listed on the OTC Pink market. 
Technically, Tsingtao Brewery has been regarded as the first H-share company listed 
on the HKEx. Furthermore, Tsingtao Brewery is also one of the first of China’s 
SOEs to try to conduct privatisation, as well as one of the earliest Chinese SOEs that 
entered into a strategic investment agreement with foreign investors.
337
 In early 
2009, Asahi Breweries acquired 19.9 per cent of Tsingtao Brewery’s outstanding 
capital from Anheuser-Busch InBev, making Asahi Breweries the second largest 
shareholder of Tsingtao Brewery behind only the Tsingtao Brewery Group itself, 
which is a holding company owned by the Qingdao government.
338
 The inference 
that can be drawn from these facts is that Tsingtao Brewery is still an SOE controlled 
by China’s government, but foreign investors will arguably play a functional role in 
the corporate governance and management of the brewery. Basically, the asset 
intensity and state presence of foods sector cannot be deemed as high. Nonetheless, 
Tsingtao Brewery was still selected as a sample for the case studies, since it had been 
listed on the HKEx for about 20 years. The long overseas listing span of Tsingtao 
Brewery would help to examine whether foreign listing had improved some aspects 
of the corporate governance of China’s companies or not. Moreover, it was more 
than likely that the governance practices of Tsingtao Brewery conformed to 
international standards, as it had more foreign strategic investors than other ordinary 
                                                             
337
 Nolan, Peter, Integrating China: Towards the Coordinated Market Economy, Anthem Press, London, 2008, p. 
58.  
338
 Tsingtao Brewery Group remains the largest shareholder of Tsingtao Brewery with a 30 per cent 
shareholding; see Ding, Qingfen, “Chen Eye May Prove Frothy for Tsingtao”, China Daily, May 14, 2009, available 
at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-05/14/content_7775700.htm, accessed June 7, 2012.  
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Chinese SOEs.  
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CHAPTER 5. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF OFF-SHORE LISTINGS FOR 
MAINLAND CORPORATIONS  
The overseas listing of Mainland-based companies has always been deemed as an 
important element of modern financial markets by the Chinese government, thus 
there is a necessity to examine the regulatory framework of China’s domestic 
financial markets before scrutinising China’s legal framework of off-shore listings.  
 
In the main, China’s financial markets experienced quite heavy regulation and the 
strict control of the central government. Technically, several enforcement agencies 
and organs led by the State Council, together with their local branches, exercised the 
power of administration, legislation and supervision in the securities markets, which 
included the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF), the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC).
339
  
 
Unfortunately, the powers and functions of these administrative agencies had not 
been defined clearly in the early stages of development, and they relied heavily on a 
number of overlapping guidelines issued by the State Council for the performance of 
their duties.
340
 Basically, the PBOC and its local branches played an important part 
                                                             
339
 Liu, Lisheng, “An Overview of China’s Financial Markets”, in China’s Financial Markets: An Insider’s Guide to 
How the Markets Work, Neftci, Salih N. and Menager-Xu, Michelle Yuan edited, Elsevier Academic Press, London, 
2007, p. 32.  
340
 Su, Dongwei, Chinese Stock Markets: A Research Handbook, World Scientific Publishing Company, Singapore, 
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in security management during the prehistory of China’s stock markets. Meanwhile, 
several macroeconomic management agencies under China’s State Council such as 
the State Planning Commission (SPC), which was the predecessor of the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), could also exert strong influence 
on certain complex cases.  
 
When the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges were launched in 1990 and 1991, 
respectively, no corresponding national regulatory authorities had been established. 
Thus, these stock exchanges were generally under the supervision of the local 
municipal governments at this stage.  
 
In late 1992, the State Council finally reached a decision to establish the Security 
Committee of State Council as the main securities regulator of Mainland China. 
Meanwhile, the State Council also promoted a standing executive body for the 
Security Committee, the CSRC. Technically, this movement could be considered as 
an immediate aftermath of the storm of protests which occurred in Shenzhen during 
the summer of 1992. In July of 1992, the Shenzhen municipal government issued 5 
million Initial Public Offering (IPO) application forms valued at RMB 500,000,000, 
with the investors who purchased these application forms having a 10 per cent 
chance of being approved to subscribe to the new shares.
341
 However, only a 
fraction of the investors finally managed to gain the application forms, since most 
                                                                                                                                                                            
2003, p. 33.  
341
 LeBaron, Dean, Mao, Marx, and the Market: Capitalist Adventures in Russia and China, John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., New York, 2002, p. 259.  
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had long since been appropriated by corrupt bank staff together with government 
officials.
342
 The dissatisfaction among the investors soon permeated down to the 
general public, and serious disorder broke out on August 10, which became known 
as the 8.10 Riot. In fact, the 8.10 Riot became a turning point for the central 
government and led to reflection over the regulative structure of China’s stock 
market. After several months of deliberation and self-analysis, the central 
government decided in favour of establishing a special agency that would be 
empowered to independently regulate the securities markets.  
 
Nevertheless, the PBOC actually still assumed principal responsibility for the 
supervision of the securities and insurance business until late 1997, when China’s 
central government instigated the institutional reform of the financial markets.
343
 
The supervision was fully centralised in the CSRC as part of the financial reform in 
China’s first National Financial Work Conference during November 1997.344 By 
April 1998, the Security Committee of State Council had been absorbed into the 
CSRC so as to form a new ministry-level regulatory body. The announcement of 
China’s first Securities Law in late 1998 finally granted the CSRC the authority to 
implement the centralised regulation of China’s securities and futures markets.345 
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 Green, Stephen, China’s Stock Market: A Guide to its Progress, Players and Prospects, Bloomberg Press, 
London, 2003, p. 14.  
343
 Laurenceson, James and Chai, Joseph C. H., Financial Reform and Economic Development in China, Edward 
Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2003, p. 19.  
344
 China’s National Financial Work Conference has been convened by the central authorities every five years 
since 1997, and it was widely deemed as strategically important for China’s financial reform; see Xinhua News 
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 People’s Republic of China, Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China (1998 Order No.12 of the 
President of the People’s Republic of China), Article 166, adopted at the 6
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th
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Besides, Article 238 Securities Law (2005 revision) reiterated that all PRC 
enterprises that directly or indirectly issued any securities abroad were subject to the 
approval of the securities regulatory body of the State Council, which was the 
CSRC.
346
 
 
When trying to scrutinise the legal framework of overseas listing for Mainland 
companies, there is a necessity to first review the laws and regulations of Mainland 
China that have governed overseas listing.  
 
I. THE LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF MAINLAND CHINA GOVERNING OVERSEAS 
LISTING 
The earliest official legislation of off-shore listing for the Mainland’s companies can 
be traced to Article 85 of the 1993 Company Law of China, which mandates that 
“with the approval of the securities administration of the State Council, a joint stock 
limited company may make a rally abroad. The specific method for the rally shall be 
formulated by the State Council”. 347  However, the State Council did not 
immediately formulate any regulation for off-shore listing after the announcement of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
of July 1, 1999, available at: http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=1084, accessed September 
21, 2012.  
346
 People’s Republic of China, Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China (2005 Order No.43 of the 
President of the People’s Republic of China), Article 238, amended and adopted at the 18
th
 Meeting of the 
Standing Committee of the 10
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 National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on October 27, 
2005, and effective as of January 1, 2006, available at: http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=60599&lib=law, 
accessed October 6, 2012.  
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 People’s Republic of China, Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (1993 Order No.16 of the 
President of the People’s Republic of China), Article 85, adopted at the 5
th
 Session of the Standing Committee of 
the 8
th
 National People’s Congress on December 29, 1993, and effective as of July 1, 1994, available at: 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=641&lib=law&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=%D6%D0%BB
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the 1993 Company Law, possibly because overseas listing was still uncharted 
territory for China at that time.  
 
In fact, the State Council and CSRC had issued some Circulars and Notices 
concerning the overseas listing of Chinese companies before the enactment of the 
1993 Company Law. Article 4 of the Notice of the State Council on Further 
Enhancing the Macro-control of the Securities Market
348
 stipulates that the overseas 
listing of China’s companies is subject to approval by the Security Committee of 
State Council.  
 
On April 9, 1993, the CSRC provided a report to the Security Committee of State 
Council, in which the CSRC defined its position on the issue of the overseas listing 
of China’s companies. This report can be termed as one of the most significant 
regulations issued by the Chinese government, since it enumerated the four major 
direct and indirect ways that had been adopted by China’s companies to make an 
overseas listing or share issue, which included: 
1. Chinese companies directly make a listing or share issue on foreign stock 
exchanges. 
2. Chinese companies indirectly make a listing or share issue on foreign stock 
exchanges through an offshore company that has been set up as a listing vehicle. 
3. Chinese listed companies directly make a listing or share issue on foreign stock 
                                                             
348
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exchanges. 
4. Chinese listed companies directly issue Depository Receipts (DR) or other stock 
derivatives on foreign stock exchanges.
349
  
In this report, the CSRC iterated that no Chinese company should make an overseas 
listing or share issue through any direct or indirect means without prior approval of 
the Security Committee of State Council. 
 
Shortly afterwards, the State Council enacted the Interim Provisions on the 
Management of the Issuing and Trading of Stocks, and Article 6 of this regulation 
prescribed that all Chinese enterprises must obtain approval from the Security 
Committee of State Council before issuing shares abroad, regardless of whether the 
foreign listing would be accomplished in a direct or indirect manner. However, this 
regulation did not state any detailed measures for overseas listing,
350
 merely stating 
that the detailed measures would be formulated separately.  
 
Following the announcement of the 1993 Company Law, the CSRC tried to take 
steps to tighten up the regulation of overseas listings of the Mainland’s companies. 
The CSRC issued a circular in 1994,
351
 in which the CSRC noted that several 
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companies, which were incorporated outside China
352
 but owned or controlled by 
Mainland companies, were trying to float on foreign stock exchanges. Furthermore, 
several other Chinese companies had tried to list on foreign stock exchanges through 
reverse merger or other indirect approaches. The CSRC stated categorically that all 
such overseas listing related activities were under the jurisdiction of the Security 
Committee of State Council, and that all Mainland companies should submit their 
applications for overseas listings to the CSRC beforehand.  
 
On August 4, 1994, the State Council of China enacted Special Provisions of the 
State Council Concerning the Floatation and Listing Abroad of Stocks by Limited 
Stock Companies,
353
 which could be considered as one of the earliest specific 
regulations issued by China’s authority in regard to the overseas listing of Mainland 
companies. In this regulation, the State Council gave a precise definition of “listing 
abroad” for the first time. 
 
In March 1997, the CSRC made a written response in reply to Shenzhen DaXin law 
firm on the issue concerning the indirect overseas listing of domestic companies.
354
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Outside China for China’s Domestic Companies, issued by China Securities Regulatory Commission of the 
People’s Republic of China on, and effective as of February 4, 1994.  
352
 Here, China refers to Mainland China, excluding Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.  
353
 These Special Provisions were formulated according to Article 85 and Article 155 of 1993 China’s Company 
Law; see 
People’s Republic of China, Special Provisions of the State Council Concerning the Floatation and Listing Abroad 
of Stocks by Limited Stock Companies (1994 Order No.160 of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China), 
adopted at the 22
nd
 executive meeting of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China on, and effective as 
of August 4, 1994, available at: http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=707, accessed April 26, 
2012.  
354
 People’s Republic of China, The Response of China Securities Regulatory Commission On the Issues 
Concerning the Indirect Overseas Listing of Domestic Enterprises (1997 Order No.1 of China Securities 
Regulatory Commission of the People’s Republic of China), promulgated by China Securities Regulatory 
Commission of the People’s Republic of China on, and effective as of March 17, 1997.  
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The CSRC highlighted quite positively in this document that both the direct and 
indirect overseas listing of domestic enterprises were subject to the approval of the 
Security Committee of State Council. Significantly, in this response the CSRC 
touched on the issue regarding which kind of legal responsibilities PRC law firms 
should take when they were trying to provide legal opinions for overseas listing.  
 
a) The 1997 Red-chip Guidelines 
The State Council of China finally promulgated the Circular of the State Council 
Concerning Further Strengthening the Administration of Share Issuance and Listing 
Overseas on June 20, 1997,
355
 in view of the Mainland companies’ increasing 
preference to list themselves on foreign stock exchanges. The CSRC issued a further 
Notice as to how to implement the 1997 Red-chip Guidelines in early 1998,
356
 and 
this Notice precisely delineates the normal procedures of overseas listing application 
for Mainland companies.  
 
As this Circular has been widely termed the 1997 Red-chip Guidelines, there is a 
necessity to initially clarify the definition of “Red-chip”. As was mentioned earlier, 
                                                             
355
 This Circular is widely known as “1997 Red-chip Guidelines”; see People’s Republic of China, Circular of the 
State Council Concerning Further Strengthening the Administration of Share Issuance And Listing Overseas (1997 
Order No.21 of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China), promulgated by the State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China on, and effective as of June 20, 1997, available at: 
http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/Article/1937172/Channel/9846/State-Council-Further-Strengthening-Ad
ministration-of-the-Issue-and-Listing-of-Shares-Outside-China.html, accessed April 26, 2012.  
356
 People’s Republic of China, Notice of China Securities Regulatory Commission Concerning the 
Implementation of the Circular of the State Council Concerning Further Strengthening the Administration of 
Share Issuance and Listing Overseas (1998 Order No.5 of China Securities Regulatory Commission of the 
People’s Republic of China), promulgated by China Securities Regulatory Commission of the People’s Republic of 
China on, and effective as of February 27, 1998.  
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the definition of “Red Chip companies” by the Securities and Futures Commission 
(SFC) of Hong Kong and HKEx refers to companies which,  
“1. have at least 30% shareholding held in aggregate by Mainland China entities, 
and / or indirectly through companies controlled by them, with the Mainland China 
entities being the single largest shareholders in aggregate terms. Or; 
2. if the shareholding of the company held in aggregate directly and / or indirectly 
by Mainland China entities is below 30% but is 20% or above and there is a strong 
influential presence, on a judgemental basis, of Mainland China-linked individuals 
on the company’s board of directors.”357 
These criteria gathered strength in the subsequent years, and were adopted by the 
Hang Seng Indexes Company Limited to compile the Hang Seng China Enterprises 
Index.  
 
By comparison, there was another important criterion of the Red Chip company, 
which was to establish whether the main business of the company was based in 
Mainland China. As this criterion had been used by only few financial data 
companies such as Bloomberg, the definition given by the SFC of Hong Kong and 
HKEx will be adopted in this thesis.  
 
Another important term that was employed by the 1997 Red-chip Guidelines was 
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 Mainland China entities include state-owned enterprises, and entities controlled by provincial and municipal 
authorities; see The Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) of Hong Kong, Published Resources, Market & 
Industry Statistics, Statistics by Topics: Table B2 Number of Newly Listed Companies by Stock Type, available at: 
http://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/published-resources/market-and-industry-statistics/statistics-by-topics/, accessed 
September 20, 2012.  
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“PRC-funded entities”. It seems that the State Council or CSRC had never clearly 
defined the exact meaning of “PRC-funded entities”. A number of senior lawyers 
coming from leading Chinese law firms suggested that the term “PRC-funded 
entities” might have distinct meanings in different Chinese regulations. Most 
Chinese lawyers held the view that “PRC-funded entities” referred to those 
enterprises funded by China’s government only in the 1997 Red-chip Guidelines.  
 
When the definition of these important terms is understood correctly, there remains 
another significant issue, which is to ascertain which kinds of Chinese companies 
were covered by the 1997 Red-chip Guidelines. While the Mainland’s State-owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) inevitably fell within the scope of the 1997 Red-chip Guidelines, 
these Guidelines also applied to those overseas listed companies incorporated 
outside China but in which PRC-funded entities had a controlling interest. Besides, 
Article 3 of the 1997 Red-chip Guidelines especially provided that these Mainland’s 
companies, which exploited their own domestic assets to achieve overseas listing, 
should obtain prior approval from the CSRC. Furthermore, Article 4 of the 1997 
Red-chip Guidelines actually prohibited Mainland companies from purchasing 
majority shareholdings of overseas listed companies, since some Mainland 
companies had sought to list on foreign stock exchanges by such a route.
358
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 Article 4 of 1997 Red-chip Guidelines is actually a reiteration of a previous Notice issued by the State Council 
in 1993; see People’s Republic of China, Notice of the State Council on Suspension of the Purchase of Overseas 
Enterprises and Further Strengthening the Administration of Overseas Investment (1993 Order No.69 of the 
State Council of the People’s Republic of China), promulgated by the State Council of the People’s Republic of 
China on, and effective as of November 23, 1993.  
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It would appear that two different supervisory patterns had been applied to China’s 
companies under the rules of the 1997 Red-chip Guidelines. For those offshore listed 
companies incorporated outside Mainland China, in which Chinese-funded entities 
had a controlling interest, they only had to officially report the relevant information 
to the CSRC when they engaged in activities such as spin-off listings and issues of 
additional shares. For those companies that tried to list offshore by exploiting their 
domestic assets, they had to receive advance approbation from the CSRC.  
 
The 1997 Red-chip Guidelines can be deemed as the cardinal regulation enacted by 
the Chinese authorities that regulated the off-shore listing and related activities of 
Mainland companies in the 1990s. Significantly, the scope of the 1997 Red-chip 
Guidelines was involved in ambiguity to the extent that it was unclear whether it 
regulated these Mainland companies under private ownership,
359
 or not. Such 
ambiguity presumably is due largely to the fact that the vast majority of these 
Mainland companies under private ownership seemed to be incapable of reaching the 
required listing standards of major foreign stock exchanges before 1997.  
 
b) Other Laws and Regulations Governing Overseas Listing 
In mid-1999, the Securities Law of The People’s Republic of China became 
effective.
360
 According to Article 2 of this law, Chinese companies must obtain the 
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 “Mainland’s companies under private ownership” refer to these Mainland’s companies directly or indirectly 
owned by Mainland private companies or individuals rather than China’s government.  
360
 People’s Republic of China, Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China (1998 Order No.12 of the 
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approval of the CSRC when they are seeking to directly or indirectly list their 
securities outside China. As the 1999 Securities Law accorded the CSRC 
wide-ranging powers over administrative regulations of securities,
361
 Article 29 was 
probably the highest-level legislation in the hierarchy of China’s laws regarding 
offshore listing. Unfortunately, Article 29 had rarely been referred to in practical 
administration by the CSRC, and the source of the problem resided in the fact that 
the stipulation of Article 29 was far too abstract to be applied in practice.  
 
In July 1999, the CSRC issued the Relevant Questions Concerning Enterprises’ 
Application for Overseas Listing Circular, through which the CSRC officially stated 
the compulsory minimum requirements for filing overseas listing application for the 
first time.
362
 It was made clear that this Circular applied to all Chinese companies, 
including SOEs, collectively owned enterprises and private joint-stock companies. 
Technically, Article 1 of this Circular listed the requirements that China’s companies 
must satisfy before submitting their overseas listing applications, which included:  
1. The company should have minimum net assets of RMB 400,000,000 
(US$ 63,240,106), with an amount of after-tax net profits of not less than RNB 
60,000,000 (US$ 9,486,016) in the last year.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
President of the People’s Republic of China), adopted at the 6
th
 Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 9
th
 
National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on December 29, 1998, and effective as of July 1, 
1999, available at: http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=1084, accessed September 21, 2012.  
361
 Tomasic, Roman A. and Fu, Jian, “The Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China: An Overview”, 
Australian Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 10, 1999, p. 274.  
362
 People’s Republic of China, Relevant Questions Concerning Enterprises’ Application for Overseas Listing 
Circular by China Securities Regulatory Commission (1999 Order No.83 of China Securities Regulatory 
Commission of the People’s Republic of China), promulgated by China Securities Regulatory Commission of the 
People’s Republic of China on, and effective as of July 14, 1999, available at: 
http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/Article/1886828/Channel/9952/China-Securities-Regulatory-Commission
-Relevant-Questions-Concerning-Enterprises-Application-for.html, accessed September 18, 2012.  
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2. The total amount of the funds raised by the issuer should be no less than RMB 
50,000,000 (US$ 7,905,013), on the basis of a reasonable prospective Price to 
Earnings ratio (P/E). 
3. The company should have established a normative corporate governance 
structure and relatively sound internal administrative system; the company should 
also have a stable senior management team that has desirable management capacity.  
4. The company should have steady sources of foreign exchange for the payment 
of dividends and interests after the overseas listing, which should conform to China’s 
regulations on foreign currency controls.
363
 
 
In the late 1990s, leading Chinese SOEs and major collectively owned enterprises 
possibly had no difficulty in fulfilling the foregoing requirements set by the CSRC. 
However, most private joint-stock companies probably found it difficult to meet 
these criteria. Significantly, these listing criteria set by the CSRC were much higher 
than those of the main board of the HKEx. Thus, most China’s enterprises under 
private ownership had to abandon their plans of directly listing on the main board of 
the HKEx as H shares.  
 
It would appear that most regulations issued by the CSRC at this stage were mainly 
aimed at China’s SOEs, and the CSRC did not formally specify whether private 
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 People’s Republic of China, Relevant Questions Concerning Enterprises’ Application for Overseas Listing 
Circular by China Securities Regulatory Commission (1999 Order No.83 of China Securities Regulatory 
Commission of the People’s Republic of China), Article 1, promulgated by China Securities Regulatory 
Commission of the People’s Republic of China on, and effective as of July 14, 1999, available at: 
http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/Article/1886828/Channel/9952/China-Securities-Regulatory-Commission
-Relevant-Questions-Concerning-Enterprises-Application-for.html, accessed September 18, 2012.  
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companies were falling within the scope of these regulations. Under the 
circumstances, some large Chinese private enterprises began to consider the 
possibilities of listing on foreign stock exchanges through an indirect route, such as 
back-door listing or the setting up of an offshore company as a Special Purpose 
Vehicle (SPV). A detailed analysis of these indirect overseas listings of Chinese 
companies will be provided in Section V of this chapter. 
 
The CSRC probably soon realised that most of China’s small and medium-sized 
enterprises could not meet the high criteria set by them within a short period of time, 
since the CSRC promulgated the Examination, Approval and Supervision of 
Enterprises in China Applying to List on the Hong Kong Growth Enterprise Market 
(GEM) Guidelines in November 1999.
364
 Unfortunately, Article 1 of this regulation 
stipulated that only those joint-stock companies approved by China’s 
provincial-level governments or the State Economic and Trade Commission could 
file application for a listing on the Hong Kong GEM. It seems that the target for this 
regulation was still primarily Chinese SOEs and collectively owned enterprises.  
 
Moreover, the Chinese government also tried to retain control of the offshore listing 
of Chinese companies by the simple expedient of licensing only a small proportion 
of PRC law firms to provide legal opinion for overseas listing. Theoretically, only 
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 People’s Republic of China, Examination, Approval and Supervision of Enterprises in China Applying to List on 
the Hong Kong Growth Enterprise Market Guidelines (1999 Order No.126 of China Securities Regulatory 
Commission of the People’s Republic of China), promulgated by China Securities Regulatory Commission of the 
People’s Republic of China on, and effective as of September 21, 1999, available at: 
http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/Article/1694798/Issue/8508/Examination-Approval-and-Supervision-of-E
nterprises-in-China-Applying-to-List-on-the-Hong-Kong-GEM.html, accessed September 29, 2012.  
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those domestic law firms that had been accredited by the CSRC and Ministry of 
Justice of China could take up the legal practices relative to securities before 
1998.
365
 In July 2000, the CSRC issued a notice that set out the requirements and 
procedures for China’s law firms to perform overseas listing related legal services.366 
In 2000, the CSRC and Ministry of Justice finally presented a circular, through 
which 59 select Chinese law firms were licensed to conduct business related with 
overseas listing.
367
 However, the government abolished these regulations in less 
than a year,
368
 and the CSRC published a notice towards the end of 2002 which 
declared that all PRC law firms could be in securities-related legal practices without 
restriction.
369
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 People’s Republic of China, Notice about Strengthening the Administration for the Securities Legal Practices 
of Lawyers by China Securities Regulatory Commission (1998 Order No.1 of China Securities Regulatory 
Commission of the People’s Republic of China), Article 1, promulgated by China Securities Regulatory 
Commission of the People’s Republic of China on, and effective as of July 3, 1998.  
366
 People’s Republic of China, Notice on Issues Concerning the Qualification Authorization of Practicing Law 
Offices Engaged in Securities Business for Undertaking Overseas Companies’ Business Related to Domestic Rights 
and Interests, Article 1, issued by China Securities Regulatory Commission of the People’s Republic of China on, 
and effective as of July 17, 2000, available at: 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=1672&lib=law&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=%D6%D0%B
9%FA%D6%A4%C8%AF%BC%E0%B6%BD%B9%DC%C0%ED%CE%AF%D4%B1%BB%E1%B7%A8%C2%C9%B2%BF
%B9%D8%D3%DA%D6%A4%C8%AF%B4%D3%D2%B5%C2%C9%CA%A6%CA%C2%CE%F1%CB%F9%B4%D3%CA%
C2%C9%E6%BC%B0%BE%B3%C4%DA%C8%A8%D2%E6%B5%C4%BE%B3%CD%E2%B9%AB%CB%BE%CF%E0%B9
%D8%D2%B5%CE%F1%D7%CA%B8%F1%C8%CF%BF%C9%D3%D0%B9%D8%CE%CA%CC%E2%B5%C4%CD%A8%
B8%E6, accessed October 2, 2012.  
367
 People’s Republic of China, Circular of China Securities Regulatory Commission and Ministry of Justice 
Concerning the Approval for 59 PRC Law Firms to Engage in Legal Practices for Overseas Companies that 
Involved Assets Located within the PRC, jointly issued by China Securities Regulatory Commission and Ministry 
of Justice of the People’s Republic of China on, and effective as of December 4, 2000.  
368
 People’s Republic of China, Decision of the State Council Concerning Cancelling the First Batch of 
Administrative Approval Items (2002 Order No.24 of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China), 
promulgated by the State Council of the People’s Republic of China on, and effective as of November 1, 2002.  
369
 People’s Republic of China, Notice of China Securities Regulatory Commission and Ministry of Justice 
Concerning Abolishing the Examination and Approval Requirements for the Qualifications of Lawyers and Law 
Firms to Engage in Securities Legal Business (2002 Order No.93 of China Securities Regulatory Commission of 
the People’s Republic of China), Article 1, jointly promulgated by China Securities Regulatory Commission and 
Ministry of Justice of the People’s Republic of China on, and effective as of December 23, 2002, available at: 
http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/Article/1693337/Issue/8508/China-Securities-Regulatory-Commission-an
d-Ministry-of-Justice-Abolishing-the-Examination-and.html, accessed October 2, 2012.  
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II. OTHER REGULATIONS OF MAINLAND CHINA RELATIVE TO OVERSEAS LISTING 
Apart from these mentioned laws, several other regulations also cover the overseas 
listing of Chinese companies. Inevitably, Chinese companies must comply with these 
regulations when trying to issue shares abroad.  
 
a) The Regulations Relative to Foreign Exchange 
Foreign currency transactions were always rigorously controlled in Mainland China, 
and the regulator had the authority to check all foreign currency payments and 
related bank account information. Besides, all conversion of Renminbi (RMB) into 
foreign currency and foreign currency into RMB for capital account transactions, 
such as direct investment, portfolio investment and loans, was generally subject to 
the prior approval of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). China’s 
government has approved some new rules in recent years to tighten foreign currency 
control, such as SAFE 2007 Circular 1,
370
 SAFE 2010 Circular 59
371
 and SAFE 
2011 Circular 11.
372
 When overseas listing inevitably involves the usage of foreign 
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 People’s Republic of China, Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Issuing the Detailed 
Rules for the Implementation of the Measures for the Administration of Individual Foreign Exchange (2007 Order 
No.1 of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange of the People’s Republic of China), promulgated by the 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange of the People’s Republic of China on January 5, 2007, and effective as 
of February 1, 2007, available at: http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=5762, accessed 
October 5, 2012.  
371
 People’s Republic of China, Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Relevant Issues 
Concerning Strengthening the Administration of the Foreign Exchange Business (2010 Order No.59 of the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange of the People’s Republic of China), promulgated by the State Administration 
of Foreign Exchange of the People’s Republic of China on, and effective as of November 9, 2010, available at: 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=8327, accessed October 6, 2012.  
372
 People’s Republic of China, Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Relevant Issues 
Concerning Further Strengthening the Administration of Foreign Exchange Business (2011 Order No.11 of the 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange of the People’s Republic of China), promulgated by the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange of the People’s Republic of China on March 18, 2011, and effective as of 
April 1, 2011, available at: http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=8649, accessed October 6, 
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currency, these regulations relative to foreign currency must be adhered to.  
 
b) The Regulations Relative to Foreign Exchange Spent in Certain Onshore and 
Offshore Transactions 
In early 2005, SAFE issued two circulars to strengthen the administration of foreign 
exchange related with cross-border mergers and acquisitions.
373
 In October 2005, 
SAFE issued the important Circular 75 so as to replace these two circulars.
374
 The 
announcement of SAFE Circular 75 indicated that the Chinese government had 
begun to introduce some stringent new regulations on the offshore Special Purpose 
Vehicles (SPV) created by PRC citizens. Article 2 of SAFE Circular 75 requested 
PRC residents to file an application to local SAFE branches for foreign exchange 
registration of overseas investment before establishing offshore SPVs, especially 
when these SPVs were holding domestic assets. Moreover, SAFE soon issued 
detailed operating rules (Circular 124) for Circular 75 towards the end of 2005.
375
  
                                                                                                                                                                            
2012.  
373
 People’s Republic of China, Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Issues Concerning 
Improvement in the Administration of Foreign Exchange in Connection with Mergers and Acquisitions by Foreign 
Investors (2005 Order No.11 of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange of the People’s Republic of China), 
promulgated by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange of the People’s Republic of China on, and effective 
as of January 24, 2005, available at: http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=6131, accessed 
October 3, 2012; and People’s Republic of China, Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on 
Relevant Issues of Registration of Overseas Investments Contributed by Domestic Individual Residents and 
Foreign Exchange Registration of Merger or Acquisition with Foreign Investments (2005 Order No.29 of the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange of the People’s Republic of China), promulgated by the State Administration 
of Foreign Exchange of the People’s Republic of China on, and effective as of April 8, 2005, available at: 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=4141, accessed October 3, 2012.  
374
 People’s Republic of China, Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Relevant Issues 
Concerning Foreign Exchange Administration for Domestic Residents to Engage in Financing and in Return 
Investment via Overseas Special Purpose Companies (2005 Order No.75 of the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange of the People’s Republic of China), promulgated by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange of 
the People’s Republic of China on October 21, 2005, and effective as of November 1, 2005, available at: 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=4616, accessed October 3, 2012.  
375
 People’s Republic of China, Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Issuing the Operating 
Rules for “Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Relevant Issues for Improving Foreign Debt 
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Later, SAFE issued Circular 106 in mid-2007 to further clarify the implementation 
of SAFE Circular 75.
376
 According to SAFE Circular 106, the PRC subsidiaries of 
an offshore company covered by SAFE Circular 75 were required to coordinate and 
supervise the filing of SAFE registrations in a timely manner by the offshore holding 
company’s shareholders, who were PRC residents. Besides, SAFE had also specially 
issued some directive procedures (Circular 77) for the foreign currency spent on 
capital projects in 2009.
377
 In 2011, SAFE finally promulgated the new Circular 19 
on round trip investment, which could be deemed as the revision for SAFE Circular 
124, Circular 106 and Circular 77.
378
  
 
These regulations from SAFE regarding the foreign currency spent in onshore and 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Administration” and “Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Relevant Issues Concerning 
Foreign Exchange Administration for Domestic Residents to Engage in Financing and in Return Investment via 
Overseas Special Purpose Companies” (2005 Order No.124 of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange of 
the People’s Republic of China), promulgated by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange of the People’s 
Republic of China on, and effective as of November 24, 2005.  
376
 People’s Republic of China, Notice of the General Affairs Department of the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange on Issuing the Operating Rules for the Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on the 
Relevant Issues about Foreign Exchange Control over the Financing and Return Investment of Domestic Residents 
through Overseas Special Purpose Companies (2007 Order No.106 of General Affairs Department of the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange), promulgated by State Administration of Foreign Exchange of the People’s 
Republic of China on, and effective as of May 29, 2007, available at: 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=6441&lib=law&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=%B9%D8%D
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377
 People’s Republic of China, Directive Procedures for Foreign Currency Spent on Capital Project (2009 Order 
No.77 of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange of the People’s Republic of China), promulgated by the 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange of the People’s Republic of China on, and effective as of June 9, 2009.  
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 People’s Republic of China, Circular of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Printing and 
Distributing the Operational Rules on Foreign Exchange Administration for Financing and Return Investments by 
Domestic Residents through Special-Purpose Overseas Companies (2011 Order No.19 of the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange of the People’s Republic of China), promulgated by the State Administration 
of Foreign Exchange of the People’s Republic of China on May 20, 2011, effective as of July 1, 2011, available at: 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=11320&lib=law&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=%BE%B3%C
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%F7%B9%E6%B3%CC, accessed October 4, 2012.  
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offshore transactions played an important role in governing the indirect overseas 
listing of Mainland companies, and a detailed analysis of this will be provided in a 
later section of this chapter.  
 
c) The SAFE Regulations on Employee Share Options 
In early 2007, SAFE issued a regulation relative to the employee shareholding plans 
of Chinese overseas listed companies (Share Option Rule).
379
 The purpose of the 
Share Option Rule was to regulate the foreign exchange administration of PRC 
domestic individuals who participated in the employee shareholding plans and share 
option plans of overseas listed companies.  
 
According to the Share Option Rule, when a PRC domestic individual participated in 
any employee shareholding plan, or share option plan of an overseas listed company, 
a PRC domestic agent or the PRC subsidiary of such overseas listed company should 
file an application with SAFE on behalf of such individual to obtain approval for an 
annual quota with respect to the purchase of foreign exchange in connection with the 
shareholding or share option exercises, since PRC domestic individuals might not 
directly use overseas funds to purchase shares or exercise share options.  
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 People’s Republic of China, Operating Rules on the Foreign Exchange Administration of the Participation of 
Domestic Individuals in the Employee Stock Ownership Plans, Share Option Plans, Etc. of Overseas Listed 
Companies (2007 Order No.78 of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange of the People’s Republic of 
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d) China’s Other Regulations Related to Overseas Listing 
Apart from these mentioned regulations, some other Chinese regulatory bodies, such 
as the Ministry of Information Industry
380
 and Ministry of Commerce had also 
issued laws and regulations that covered overseas listing.  
 
For instance, a circular promulgated by the Ministry of Information Industry in 2006 
specified that the overseas listing of domestic telecommunications enterprises were 
subject to the approval of the concerned departments of the State Council.
381
 
Furthermore, another circular regarding Internet audio and visual programs
382
 
requested that these companies providing such programs should submit a proposal to 
the authorities for examination if they were planning to float on foreign stock 
markets.  
 
Significantly, the Ministry of Commerce issued several catalogues for guiding 
foreign investment,
383
 and the State Council also offered its opinions about foreign 
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investment control.
384
 As several Chinese companies have begun to consider the 
possibility of indirectly listing on foreign stock markets by Variable Interest Entity 
(VIE) in recent years, one catalogue has become increasingly important. The key 
role played by the Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment in 
regulating the overseas listing of Chinese companies will be analysed in a later 
section of this chapter.  
 
It should be noted that China’s industries were classified into four categories for 
foreign investment in the 2011 Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign 
Investment: “encouraged”, “permitted”, “restricted”, and “prohibited”. The offshore 
listing applications of these companies that fell under the sector of “encouraged” and 
“permitted” would be treated sympathetically by the CSRC in the vast majority of 
cases. By contrast, the CSRC explicitly prohibited those companies belonging to the 
“prohibited” sector from listing on foreign stock exchanges. Furthermore, Chinese 
companies that fell under the scope of “restricted” category were subject to a much 
higher level of CSRC’s scrutiny. Technically, the CSRC would not sanction the 
overseas listing applications filed by these companies from a “restricted” sector, if 
such companies were to fall under the de facto control of foreigners.  
 
Arguably, these mentioned circulars and notices issued by various departments of 
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China’s government had no direct relevance to the overseas listing of Chinese 
companies. However, such subsidiary regulations actually made it possible for the 
Chinese government to retain control of those companies that belonged to 
strategically important sectors.  
 
III. THE CHINA SECURITIES REGULATORY COMMISSION (CSRC) AND STATE-OWNED 
ASSETS SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION COMMISSION (SASAC)  
As mentioned earlier, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is a 
ministry-level ranked institution directed by the State Council of China. The CSRC 
has been empowered to supervise Mainland China’s nationwide securities and 
futures markets in order to maintain their competitiveness, orderliness and 
transparency.
385
 The Commission has the power to supervise securities issuers, as 
well as to investigate and impose penalties for illegal activities related to securities 
and futures.
386
 The Commission is also granted authority to formulate policies and 
regulations for capital markets, and issue non-legally binding guidance for publicly 
listed companies. The CSRC is comprised of 18 departments, an enforcement bureau 
and a public offering review committee consisting of professionals and experts. 
Moreover, 36 regional branches of the CSRC have been set up in provinces, 
autonomous regions and municipalities throughout Mainland China. Especially, two 
                                                             
385
 Huang, Chi-Wei, “Worldwide Corporate Convergence within A Pluralistic Business Legal Order: Company Law 
and the Independent Director System in Contemporary China”, Hastings International and Comparative Law 
Review, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2008, p. 411.  
386
 Friedman, William I., “One Country, Two Systems: The Inherent Conflict Between China’s Communist Politics 
and Capitalist Securities Market”, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, Vol. 27, Issue 2, 2002, p. 484.  
  
 
201 
special supervision bodies have been established in Shanghai and Shenzhen, where 
two of the Mainland’s stock exchanges are situated. In summary, the CSRC’s role is 
quite similar to that of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the U.S., 
or the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the U.K.  
 
The special dominant role played by China’s government in the national economy 
has been reviewed by several scholars,
387
 and the CSRC actually acted as the voice 
of the Chinese government in the regulatory environment for overseas listed 
companies in China. Indisputably, overseas listed Chinese companies were still 
subject to the rules and regulations, such as company law and securities law, issued 
by the Chinese government, since their primary operations were located in Mainland 
China. Moreover, the CSRC also encouraged overseas listed companies to adopt the 
corporate governance code it had issued,
388
 although this code was theoretically 
applicable to companies publicly listed on the Mainland’s stock exchanges only.  
 
As analysed in the last section of this chapter, the State Council of China is the top 
regulatory body responsible for overseas listed Chinese companies, and the CSRC 
can be deemed as an executive body for the State Council on the regulation of 
offshore listed Chinese companies. It has been argued by some commentators that 
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the power of the CSRC is absolute when compared with its foreign counterparts, 
such as the SEC or FSA.
389
 To some extent, these commentators’ arguments are 
accurate. In terms of the overseas listing of Mainland companies, the State Council 
and CSRC can directly authorise or reject the overseas listing applications filed by 
Chinese companies without explaining their decision to the applicants. Besides, the 
CSRC has the de facto right to discipline almost all overseas listed Mainland 
companies, particularly those major offshore listed companies with Chinese SOEs 
and collectively owned enterprises as dominant shareholders.  
 
As witnessed by the promulgation of these laws and regulations governing the 
overseas listing of Chinese companies, which have been reviewed in the last two 
sections of this chapter, the CSRC held the de jure and de facto power to formulate 
regulations and policies on the offshore listing of Mainland companies. Surely the 
CSRC would not make such policies in a vacuum in the vast majority of cases. 
Without doubt, the CSRC’s operation was still under the leadership of the powerful 
State Council, as administrative powers and measures were always the most 
important approach for China’s government to regulate overseas listed Mainland 
companies.  
 
Although China’s government alleged that most overseas listed Mainland companies 
that had been transformed from former Chinese SOEs had established modern 
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corporate governance systems, these companies were actually still under the tight 
control of the Communist Party, and Mr K (Interviewee No.11) provided further 
facts surrounding this. By the account of Mr K, these Mainland companies with 
China’s SOEs or collectively owned enterprises as dominant shareholders have 
continued to occupy a prominent position among all overseas listed Chinese 
companies in recent years. Moreover, most senior executives of such overseas listed 
Mainland companies, including the chairman and chief executive officer (CEO) were 
Communist Party members. China’s government generally established control over 
these overseas listed Chinese companies by administrative measures, since most 
senior executives of these companies were politically appointed rather than 
democratically elected.  
 
Take the centrally owned enterprises of China, for instance. As explained previously, 
China’s centrally owned enterprises had been classified into three categories 
according to their importance by China’s government, which were “strategically 
important enterprises”, “basic industries enterprises” and “other industries 
enterprises”. As far as Mr K was aware, the Organization Department of the 
Communist Party of China Central Committee politically appointed the chairman 
and CEO for more than a third of China’s centrally owned enterprises, since these 
enterprises had been defined as “strategically important” by China’s government. 
Where the “basic industries enterprises” accounted for around one third of all 
Chinese centrally owned enterprises, the SASAC had the right to appoint the 
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chairman and CEO for these enterprises. With regard to the “other industries 
enterprises”, the CSRC maintained strong influence over the appointment of certain 
senior executives of these enterprises, although the Chinese government had reduced 
state ownership shares in such enterprises in recent years.  
 
Apart from centrally owned enterprises, several other enterprises in certain key 
industries had also been formed from substantial Chinese SOEs, and some of these 
enterprises might have been recognised as vitally important contributors to the 
economy by the Chinese government. With almost all centrally owned enterprises 
and the said vitally important enterprises deemed as the engine of the Mainland’s 
national economy, there is very little likelihood that the Chinese government will 
loosen its hold on these enterprises in the foreseeable future, regardless of whether 
such enterprises have been listed on foreign stock exchanges or not.  
 
It should be noted that most overseas listed Chinese companies that transformed 
from former SOEs bear strong resemblance in their ownership structures, as they all 
have a dominant shareholder which is a Chinese state-owned parent company in 
most instances. The state-owned parent companies generally own more than 50 per 
cent of the overseas listed company’s outstanding shares, and this allows the parent 
companies outright control of the overseas listed company’s operations, especially 
the election of its board of directors and other senior executives. Some scholars 
argued that this state dominance model seen in China’s SOEs ownership structure 
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would not be easily displaced by a different model, and that the history of the 
Chinese SOEs’ reform substantiated that the path-dependence theory proposed by 
Bebchuk and Roe could be applied to China’s SOEs.390  
 
Mr K reported that the state-owned parent companies of these offshore listed 
Chinese companies are still largely seen as traditional SOEs by China’s government 
and these parent companies are generally regulated by the SASAC and CSRC, who 
serve as the voice of China’s government. Besides, these said state-owned parent 
companies were also under the supervision of various corresponding ministries, 
exemplified by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and the 
Ministry of Transport.  
 
The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State 
Council (SASAC) is a special institution directly affiliated with the State Council. 
The SASAC shoulders the responsibility for managing China’s state-owned 
enterprises, including appointing top executives and approving any acquisitions or 
mergers. The SASAC also supervises the sales of state-owned shares or assets, as 
well as formulating regulations related to state-owned enterprises. Significantly, the 
SASAC has been authorised to dispatch supervisory panels to SOEs on behalf of the 
state council so as to oversee the management of the SOEs.
391
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Mr K said that a kind of special regulatory privilege enjoyed by the SASAC is to 
evaluate the performances of almost all the top executives of China’s centrally 
owned enterprises and SOEs. As mentioned previously, centrally owned enterprises 
and some other large SOEs are the parent companies or dominant shareholders of a 
large number of overseas listed Chinese companies. Thus, the said overseas listed 
Chinese companies are subject to the de facto control of the SASAC in this special 
regulatory environment. Besides, it must be mentioned that the SASAC is directly 
under the control and supervision of the State Council of China, though the State 
Council has given the SASAC greater autonomy over the regulation of China’s 
overseas listed companies in recent years.  
 
Mr K also advised that the SASAC has never disclosed which kind of norms had 
been adopted for evaluating the performances of SOEs’ executives, but that the 
SASAC holds absolute discretion to decide whether or not to remove the president, 
CEO and other top executives of almost all of China’s SOEs. Besides, the SASAC 
could also take disciplinary actions against the senior executives of China’s SOEs, 
provided that those executives had been involved in some form of misconduct, and 
such misconduct was not sufficiently serious that it undermined the trust that the 
SASAC had in these executives. Mr K gave the example of XIONG Weiping, who 
was the president of the Aluminium Corporation of China Limited (CHALCO) as a 
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top executive and viewed favourably by the SASAC. As the performance and talents 
of XIONG had been fully appreciated by some elevated officials of SASAC, the 
commission was even considering whether there was any possibility to appoint 
XIONG as the presidents for two centrally owned enterprises simultaneously.  
 
Generally, the CSRC and SASAC are the main regulatory bodies in China’s current 
regulatory framework for overseas listed Mainland companies. Technically, the 
administrative measures taken by China’s government and the power of the major 
SOEs’ top executives’ appointment or removal by the CSRC and SASAC are vital 
elements in this regulatory environment. Apart from China’s laws and regulations, 
overseas listed Chinese companies are also subject to the listing rules of the foreign 
stock exchanges that they are listed on. These listing rules of foreign stock 
exchanges will be reviewed in next section.  
 
IV. THE LISTING RULES OF OVERSEAS STOCK EXCHANGES 
Hundreds of large and medium-sized Chinese SOEs and collectively owned 
enterprises have been listed on the Hong Kong, London, New York and other foreign 
stock exchanges. Furthermore, almost all of China’s companies have tended to 
consider a well-regarded market as the listing venue, since prominent stock markets 
can provide better trading infrastructure and sounder regulatory frameworks.  
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All major foreign stock exchanges have issued detailed listing rules, which generally 
contain listing standards for domestic and foreign companies, listing fees and 
continued listing standards. Therefore, every prospective Chinese company must 
satisfy the minimum listing requirements of the foreign stock exchanges before they 
are qualified for listing. Besides, Chinese companies that have been listed on 
overseas stock exchanges have had to meet the continued listing criteria of these 
stock exchanges, otherwise the appropriateness of their continued listing would be 
scrutinised by the stock exchanges.  
 
With the latter case study chapters of this research analysing six Chinese companies 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
(HKEx), we will try to briefly examine the listing rules of the NYSE and HKEx in 
this section. 
 
The NYSE provides two sets of listing standards, which are the U.S. standards and 
Non-U.S. standards. A prospective Chinese company would generally have to fulfil 
the distribution and financial criteria of the Non-U.S. listing standards that were 
applicable to them.
392
 There is no doubt that China’s companies also have to sign 
the Listed Securities Fee Agreement with the NYSE, by which Chinese companies 
are requested to pay the listing fees and annual fees.
393
 Furthermore, Chinese 
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companies must ensure that they will not fall below any of the quantitative and 
qualitative continued listing criteria adopted by the NYSE,
394
 or they risk being 
suspended or even delisted by the exchange.  
 
An increasing number of disputes have broken out between international auditors 
and Chinese companies listed on the NYSE and HKEx,
395
 and the accuracy of 
financial reporting presented by Chinese companies has been challenged by some 
foreign investors. Technically, the NYSE has implemented stringent Listed Company 
Compliance for listed companies, which consists of Financial Compliance and 
Corporate Compliance. Financial Compliance generally reviews the health of the 
Chinese companies’ finances, which might be based on certain kinds of criteria 
including earnings, cash flow, trading volume, market value and share price, etc. 
Moreover, the NYSE requires listed Chinese companies to fully comply with the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Where Chinese listed companies 
are unable to meet any of these requirements, suspension or delisting from the NYSE 
is a possible result. In some cases, the NYSE might agree to give non-compliant 
Chinese companies a temporary respite, which would enable non-compliant 
companies to take remedial action so as to return to compliance. However, the 
remedial plans proposed by the non-compliant companies must come to fulfilment 
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within the time allotted.  
 
By contrast, Corporate Compliance of the NYSE sets out very high standards of 
corporate governance practices for Chinese listed companies, which generally 
examine the accountability and transparency of these companies. With the corporate 
governance listing standards of the NYSE having been amended on several 
occasions in recent years, the issues of composition of corporate board, configuration 
of audit committee, director independence, the accuracy and balance of disclosure 
and the protection of minority shareholders have been the main focus of attention. In 
addition, a number of new rules were enacted by the SEC following the 
announcement of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
396
 the main aim of which was to 
direct the American securities exchanges to ensure that all issuers were in 
compliance with the requirements relating to the disclosure and independence of the 
audit committee mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
397
 In fact, such 
ground rules for audit committees had already been laid down by the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934,
398
 and therefore the new rules proposed by the SEC could be 
deemed as the detailed implementation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 
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the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. While all listed issuers were requested to meet the 
new exacting standards regarding audit committees by 2004, China’s private issuers 
were given additional time to comply.  
 
With regard to the HKEx, which was also one of the preferred listing venues for 
most Mainland companies, this exchange had also issued strict pre and post-listing 
requirements. As the HKEx’s main board listing rules were applicable to these large 
Chinese companies, the listing requirements of the HKEx’s Growth Enterprise 
Market (GEM) were moderated for small and medium-sized enterprises. The basic 
listing requirements for equities of the HKEx’s main board had some chief 
considerations, which generally included the financial circumstances and operating 
history and management of the new applicant, the minimum market capitalisation 
and the offering mechanism.
399
 Furthermore, the HKEx has also set out additional 
modifications and exceptions to the basic listing requirements of the main board for 
some special companies and industries, such as spin-off listing and secondary listing. 
From mid-2008, Chinese companies could also apply to list on the HKEx in 
depositary receipt (HDR) form if they could fulfil the requirements of the HKEx’s 
listing rules, but these companies must also be in compliance with China’s 
regulatory regime.
400
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As is often the case with other foreign stock exchanges, the HKEx requested the new 
Mainland applicants to pay an initial listing fee for their issue of equity securities, 
and this initial listing fee was proportional to the value of the equity securities to be 
listed. Technically, new Mainland applicants needed a suitable sponsor for their 
listing proposal, specifically a company or financial institution accredited by the 
Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission.
401
 The sponsor would be in 
complete charge of all matters relating to the listing application. It seems that the 
HKEx and the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) attached great importance 
to the role played by the sponsors in the listing application, and this was largely due 
to the fact that substantial numbers of companies listed on the HKEx had their 
primary operations outside the jurisdiction of Hong Kong.
402
  
 
After the Mainland companies were listed on the HKEx, they still had to meet the 
post-listing requirements issued by the HKEx. The continuing obligations of issuers 
generally covered the following areas: disclosure of price-sensitive and financial 
information, trading and settlement arrangements and relevant information regarding 
the senior management and directors.
403
 Significantly, the HKEx prescribed that 
issuers should appoint an independent post-listing adviser, which was also known as 
a compliance adviser. Further, the HKEx had compelled listed Mainland companies 
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to adopt high corporate governance standards, as well as establish an effective 
system for internal control. The HKEx emphasised the importance of appointing 
certain independent non-executive directors by the issuers, and the Mainland 
companies were also requested to establish an audit committee, the majority of 
whose members should be independent non-executive directors.
404
 As some issues 
might not have been defined clearly in the listing rules, HKEx also published 
frequently asked questions (FAQs) to help issuers understand the Listing Rules. 
These FAQs encompassed important amendments relating to corporate governance 
and listing criteria, as well as the model code for the directors of listed companies.
405
  
 
Seemingly, both the NYSE and HKEx had established sound regulatory frameworks 
for issuers, and all the Chinese companies that had been listed on these two stock 
exchanges would operate under such disciplined regulatory frameworks. Further, 
offshore listed Chinese companies were also subject to the supervision of the 
overseas securities regulators of whose jurisdiction they were under, in addition to 
the requirements imposed by the Chinese government. With overseas listed Chinese 
companies under such more stringent regulations in comparison with domestic 
companies, their corporate governance would arguably have been improved to a 
certain degree.  
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It is important to highlight that foreign listing could take several different forms, 
while some types of foreign listing such as issuing depositary receipts on foreign 
stock exchanges might be a simpler proposition in comparison with other types. 
Depositary receipts generally refer to a negotiable certificate that represents the 
outstanding shares of a foreign company; however, they are traded on local stock 
exchanges.
406
 When foreign custodial banks and local depositary banks act as 
intermediaries between the listed company and depositary receipt holders, the 
dividends will be paid to investors in their local currency.  
 
Those depositary receipts traded on the U.S. financial markets have been referred to 
as American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), with these ADRs actually representing the 
underlying securities of foreign companies, which are American Depositary Shares 
(ADSs). Technically, the ADR structure encompasses different classes of ADR 
programmes, which contain Level 1 unlisted (Over-the-Counter) ADRs, Level 2 
listed ADRs, Level 3 public offering ADRs, privately placed ADRs and offshore 
ADRs.
407
 The creation of ADRs made it possible for foreign companies to have 
their equities traded on large U.S. capital markets, such as the NYSE, by a less 
onerous listing regime than full listing, as various depositary receipt programmes 
offer a far greater degree of flexibility echoing the way that the regulatory reporting 
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and accounting requirements of different ADR programmes vary enormously.
408
  
 
The prevailing view seems to be that the owners of ADRs have to bear increased risk 
in contrast with normal shareholders that hold stock directly, since ADRs actually 
contain certain distinct risks such as currency risk, political risk and inflationary 
risk.
409
 Nevertheless, the issuing company of Level II ADRs and Level III ADRs 
still has to abide by the listing rules of the prospective stock exchange, together with 
the continued reporting requirements as defined by the SEC. Significantly, the Level 
III ADRs involve U.S. public offering, and thus must strictly adhere to both the 
SEC’s registration and disclosure requirements as well as the U.S.’s GAAP.410  
 
V. BACK-DOOR LISTING, SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLE (SPV) AND VARIABLE 
INTEREST ENTITY (VIE) 
Most of China’s major SOEs and large private enterprises probably prefer to list their 
shares overseas by a normal and direct manner, but the direct overseas listing is very 
costly, since it involves many legal and accounting issues.
411
 Hence, some Chinese 
companies began to consider whether there was any more convenient indirect route 
to list on foreign stock markets, such as back-door listing or by setting up a Special 
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Purpose Vehicle (SPV).  
 
The back-door overseas listing history of Chinese companies can be traced back to 
1984, when the Bank of China Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company 
Limited jointly invested HK$ 180,000,000 to acquire an approximate 35 per cent 
shareholding of the Conic Investment Company, which was a company on the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx). Latterly, an increasing number of China’s big SOEs, 
such as Capital Steel Group, China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, 
and China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Corporation, tried to indirectly list 
on the HKEx through reverse mergers. In fact, the overseas operations of Chinese 
enterprises were more foreign direct investment than back-door listing in this period, 
and these overseas operations were largely motivated by the political interests of the 
Chinese government.
412
 Essentially, overseas listing had not become a real trend 
among China’s SOEs throughout the 1980s.  
 
From 1992, China’s enterprises began to list on American stock markets by 
back-door listing, and the Brilliance Auto Group
413
 was the first in China to list on 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) via an offshore Special Purpose Vehicle 
established in a tax heaven,
414
 where this SPV held Brilliance Auto Group’s assets in 
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China.
415
 It seems that transferring the ownership of the domestic company to the 
offshore SPV is the key factor in the SPV listing of Chinese companies, and this kind 
of SPV is established by the founders of the domestic company in most cases. At this 
point, foreign Venture Capital (VC) is ready to invest in the offshore SPV to 
increases the SPV’s capital, which will finally enable the SPV to list on foreign stock 
markets.
416
 SPV overseas listing soon aroused the attention of the CSRC, which 
issued a circular on February 4, 1994 stipulating that all Chinese enterprises should 
apply for approval from the CSRC before their SPV listing.
417
  
 
In fact, China’s authority had overlooked SPV listing for some time, since this 
method of overseas listing had been adopted by only a few private companies during 
the 1990s. However, the listing of the Beijing Yuxing Group on the Growth 
Enterprise Market (GEM) of the HKEx finally fell under the CSRC’s notice in 1999. 
Although the CSRC eventually approved the overseas listing of Yuxing under the 
authority of the State Council, the Chinese government decided to take steps to 
scrutinise in greater detail the administration of SPV listing.  
 
In mid-2000, the CSRC issued the important Circular 72, through which the CSRC 
requested that any companies that intended to issue shares or list on foreign stock 
exchanges should submit prior draft legal opinion to the CSRC for review. If the 
                                                             
415
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draft legal opinion was satisfactory, the CSRC would issue a “No-comment Letter” 
for the company.
418
 Circular 72 clearly illustrated that this Circular was mainly 
aimed at those private companies that attempted to list on foreign stock markets 
through an SPV structure, while SPV listings involving state-owned assets were also 
subject to Circular 72. Additionally, Article 1 of Circular 72 also prescribed that the 
overseas listing matters of China’s companies should still be dealt with in 
accordance with the 1997 Red-chip Guidelines, if these matters fell within the scope 
of the Guidelines. Unfortunately, the Chinese government soon found that the CSRC 
appeared to be a most unlikely candidate for scrutinising all the Chinese companies 
that were attempting to list abroad, since this gatekeeper role should be jointly 
conducted by intermediaries, sponsors and underwriters. Thus, the State Council 
nullified Circular 72 only three years later,
419
 and the CSRC also officially 
announced that the “No-comment Letter” no longer existed.420  
 
The abolition of the “No-comment Letter” meant the overseas listing of an offshore 
SPV that held assets in China was not subject to the CSRC’s approval, provided such 
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assets were not state-owned assets. Meanwhile, China’s authority introduced another 
new measure to control SPV listings. In late 2003, the Chinese government issued 
the Interim Provisions for Foreign Investors to Merge Domestic Enterprises, by 
which China’s authorities requested that the value of the acquired Chinese 
companies involved in a cross-border merger should be determined by an 
independent valuator.
421
 Furthermore, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
(SAFE) issued Circular 11 in 2005, which stipulated that PRC citizens should file 
applications for foreign exchange registration with their local SAFE before directly 
or indirectly establishing, or gaining control of, an offshore SPV.
422
 As the 2005 
SAFE Circular 11 was not entirely satisfactory, it was soon replaced by the 2005 
SAFE Circular 29, by which SAFE forwarded stricter requirements regarding 
foreign exchange registration and relevant information disclosure in connection with 
the offshore investment.
423
 In late 2005, the Chinese government finally 
promulgated the long awaited SAFE Circular 75, which officially stipulated the 
ground rules for the use of offshore SPVs in relation to the overseas listing and 
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investment of PRC companies.
424
 The 2005 SAFE Circular 75 eventually confirmed 
the legality of these offshore SPVs employed by PRC companies for overseas listing, 
while actually creating more hurdles for the SPV listings of Mainland companies at 
the same time.  
 
In 2007, SAFE further issued Circular 106, by which it was requested that a foreign 
exchange registration for round-trip investment must be supplemented by three years’ 
financial statements from the domestic company. This meant that the domestic target 
company should have an operating history of three years at least.
425
 In mid-2011, 
SAFE promulgated another important circular, Circular 19, which provided guidance 
to further clarify the 2005 SAFE Circular 75 and 2007 SAFE Circular 106. The 2011 
SAFE Circular 19 eliminated the three years’ operational requirement of the 
domestic target company, and it simplified operational procedures for the 2005 
SAFE Circular 75, which would facilitate the SPV listing of PRC companies to a 
certain degree.
426
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In contrast with SPV listing, listing on foreign stock exchanges by the Variable 
Interest Entity (VIE) structure has become widespread among Chinese companies in 
recent years. As mentioned in the former sections, very few Chinese companies 
under private ownership had enough economic strength to be qualified for listing on 
major foreign stock markets until the mid-1990s. In the late 1990s, some Chinese 
Internet companies started trying to list on American stock exchanges through the 
VIE structure.
427
 The concept of “VIE” is very similar to that of “SPV”, and it has 
been used by the United States Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to 
refer to an entity in which the investor “holds a controlling interest that is not based 
on the majority of voting rights”.428 A main difference between the VIE and SPV is 
that an enterprise should consolidate the assets and liabilities of the VIE into its 
financial statements, when this enterprise is the primary beneficiary of such VIE.
429
  
 
Technically, listing on foreign stock markets through the VIE structure is a comprise 
solution for Chinese companies, since foreign direct investment in some sectors such 
as value-added telecommunication services is subject to the investment restrictions 
of the Chinese government.
430
 Sina Corporation was the first Chinese company to 
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pioneer the VIE structure for listing on U.S. stock markets.  
 
Generally, the overseas VIE listing of Sina Corporation can be divided into several 
steps, which include:
431
 
1. Sina’s assets related to value-added telecom services were diverted into a new 
domestic Beijing Information Services Company, the shares of which were held by 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chief Operating Officer (COO) of Sina, who 
were both Chinese citizens. Significantly, this said new domestic company held all 
necessary telecom licenses to operate in the value-added telecom services sector. 
2. Then, the CEO and COO of Sina jointly created a new domestic Sina Interactive 
Advertising Agency, which had charge of all the advertisements business of Sina. 
3. The Beijing Information Services Company and Sina Interactive Advertising 
Agency became the real Operating Company of Sina.  
4. Sina established an offshore company in the Cayman Islands known as the 
Controlling Company. 
5. The Controlling Company of Sina reached a series of contractual arrangements 
with Sina’s Operating Company so as to obtain the substantial (or de facto) control 
of the Operating Company. These contractual arrangements were termed as “VIE 
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arrangements”. 
6. The profits of Sina’s Operating Company were returned back to its Controlling 
Company, and the operation results of the Operating Company were also 
consolidated into the financial statements of the Controlling Company. 
7. The Controlling Company of Sina finally listed on the NASDAQ.  
 
After the successful VIE listing of Sina, this kind of VIE listing model created by 
Sina was gradually duplicated by more and more Chinese companies. Some 
commentators even argued that approximately half of the Chinese companies listed 
in the U.S. were using this kind of VIE structure by 2011.
432
 It was gradually 
accepted by the Chinese government that these kinds of complex VIE structures used 
by Chinese companies listed overseas might hold hidden risks, since it allowed 
foreign investors to control China’s domestic companies even though they did not 
actually have any ownership in such companies. 
 
On August 8, 2006, six PRC regulatory agencies including the CSRC announced the 
new Circular 10 on cross-border mergers and acquisitions,
433
 and the Ministry of 
Commerce further issued Circular 6 in 2009, so as to perfect the 2006 Circular 10.
434
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These regulations, among other functions, had certain provisions that required 
offshore SPVs, formed for the purpose of acquiring PRC domestic companies and 
controlled by PRC individuals, to obtain the approval of the CSRC prior to listing 
their securities on an overseas stock exchange. Apart from the 2006 Circular 10, the 
SAFE 2007 Circular 106
435
 and SAFE 2011 Circular 19
436
 also played an important 
role in regulating the VIE overseas listing of Chinese companies.  
 
There was rising concern that these Chinese companies listed on foreign stock 
markets by VIE structures might contain hidden legal risks, since a Chinese 
company might renege on its promises to the foreign partners, breaching the terms of 
the VIE contractual arrangements at very low cost.
437
 Besides, some foreign 
investors repeatedly questioned whether China’s government would enact any 
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regulation to prohibit VIE overseas listing in the future, or revoke the operating 
licenses of these domestic operating companies.  
 
VI. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the legal framework of offshore listing for Mainland companies was 
reviewed. The special regulatory environment for overseas listed companies in China 
is highly likely to shape the characteristics of the corporate governance of Chinese 
companies. The case studies of six representative samples of Chinese companies will 
be undertaken in the next two chapters, in which the findings of the empirical 
research will also be represented. 
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CHAPTER 6. MAINLAND CHINESE CORPORATIONS LISTED ON THE 
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE (NYSE): THE CASE STUDIES  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) had its origins in 
the Button Agreement, which was signed by 24 stockbrokers and merchants in 1792 
in New York City.
438
 In 1817, New York brokers drafted a constitution and formed 
the New York Stock & Exchange Board (NYS&EB) as a formal organisation. In 
1863, the official title of the NYSE finally changed from The New York Stock & 
Exchange Board to the New York Stock Exchange.
439
  
 
In fact, the NYSE was initially incorporated as a not-for-profit corporation in 1971. 
However, the merger between the NYSE and Archipelago Holdings, Inc. had 
transformed the NYSE Group, Inc. into a for-profit, publicly owned company on 
March 7, 2006.
440
 This merger was the largest ever consolidation among securities 
exchanges, as of 2006. However, this record was soon surpassed by the combination 
of the NYSE Group, Inc. and Euronext N.V. which occurred on April 4, 2007, and 
out of which the NYSE Euronext holding company was formed.
441
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The NYSE Euronext was established as the world’s largest publicly traded exchange, 
as it created the first ever transatlantic global marketplace group.
442
 The equities and 
derivatives exchanges of the NYSE Euronext spread across Europe and the United 
States, trading bonds, cash equities, futures, options, and fixed-income products.
443
 
The merger of the NYSE Group and Euronext had enormous significance for the 
global financial markets. On the one hand the NYSE Euronext provided world-class 
companies an opportunity to raise capital globally, but on the other, the NYSE 
Euronext also accomplished a public listing of shares on the exchange itself. In 
addition, the new organisational structure of exchanges caused by the combination of 
cross-country exchanges created some issues for the national regulatory authorities, 
as they had no jurisdiction over those exchanges located in other countries.
444
  
 
It seems that the globalisation trend of stock exchanges resumed with even greater 
intensity after the merger of the NYSE Group and Euronext, as the NYSE Euronext 
further completed the acquisition of the American Stock Exchange (Amex) in 
October 2008.
445
 Amex was one of the oldest stock exchanges in the United States 
and its history stretched back to 1790. In its pioneering days, Amex came to be 
known as an organisation for “curbstone brokers”, since these brokers were 
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generally doing business in the street.
446
 Due to the sustained efforts of these 
street-based brokers, the New York Curb Market was incorporated as a mutual 
organisation with formal listing standards in 1911. In 1953, the New York Curb 
Market was finally renamed the American Stock Exchange.
447
 The acquisition of 
Amex catapulted the NYSE Euronext into the third-largest U.S. options 
marketplace
448
 and further boosted its cash equities, closed-end funds, exchange 
traded funds (ETFs) and structured products.
449
 As a large proportion of bonds and 
stocks trading on the Amex were issued by small and micro-cap companies, Amex 
was soon integrated with the Alternext European small-cap exchange after the 
merger. Since then, Amex has been rebranded as the NYSE Amex Equities.
450
  
 
Seemingly, the combination of major stock exchanges could indeed bring substantial 
benefits for both parties in terms of long-term value, as the NYSE Euronext had 
further submitted a proposal for a merger transaction with Deutsche Börse in early 
2011.
451
 The shareholders of the NYSE Euronext had approved this proposed 
merger at a special shareholders meeting held on July 07, 2011 in New York.
452
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Deutsche Boerse, the operator of the Frankfurt stock exchange, would vote on the 
proposal at a later time. In addition, it would take time for American and European 
regulators to review this merger. With the success of this proposed merger 
transaction not beyond the realms of possibility, it might have created the world’s 
largest stock exchange by virtue of its revenues and profits.
453
  
 
The NYSE Euronext had always been a prime listing venue for most Chinese 
companies, and this was largely due to its solid reputation, high liquidity and 
stringent regulations. The Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Company Limited, 
which launched its IPO on the NYSE on July 26, 1993, was the first company 
originating in Mainland China to be listed on the NYSE.
454
 Subsequently, an 
increasing number of Chinese companies endeavoured to list on the NYSE in order 
to raise funds and expand their shareholder base. By May 2009, the Chinese 
companies that had listed on the NYSE Euronext totalled 70, while their average 
daily trading volumes had risen to 981,421,804.
455
 In addition, six Chinese 
closed-end funds had also been publicly traded on the NYSE Euronext.  
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I. THE CHINA MOBILE LIMITED COMPANY (CHINA MOBILE) 
a) Overview  
The China Mobile Limited Company (hereinafter referred to as “China Mobile”)456 
was one of the largest global mobile telecommunication companies and the 
company’s total number of mobile phone subscribers had reached approximately 570 
million, as of 2010. China Mobile primarily provided a range of countrywide mobile 
voice and multimedia value-added services in Mainland China which covered 31 
provinces, autonomous regions and directly administered municipalities, as well as 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China. 
Boasting a quality nationwide telecommunications network together with the world’s 
largest mobile customer base, China Mobile had been generally deemed as one of 
the most valuable state-owned telecommunication enterprises in the world.  
 
By 2010, China Mobile still dominated the overall domestic mobile services market 
of Mainland China with a respectable 70 per cent market share. Although China 
Mobile began to offer third-generation (3G) telecommunication services employing 
the advanced TD-SCDMA
457
 standard from early 2009, around 97 per cent of its 
mobile customers still used its 2G services based on mature GSM
458
 technology, as 
                                                             
456
 The stock symbol of China Mobile limited company on the NYSE is CHL, and on the HKEx is 0941.  
457
 Time Division Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access (TD-SCDMA) or UTRA / UMTS-TDD 1.28 Mcps Low 
Chip Rate (LCR), is an air interface found in UMTS mobile telecommunications networks in China as an 
alternative to W-CDMA.  
458
 GSM refers to Global System for Mobile Communications, the world’s most popular standard for mobile 
telephony systems.  
  
 
231 
of 2010.
459
 Besides, the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 
had awarded China Mobile the essential license for the full deployment of the 
nationwide TD-SCDMA network in 2009.
460
  
 
China Mobile was actually incorporated in Hong Kong on September 3, 1997, 
launching its Initial Public Offering (IPO) on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
on October 22, 1997, with the issue type American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). 
Simultaneously, it also listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (HKEx) on 
October 23, 1997. In early 1998, China Mobile was admitted as a constituent stock 
of the Hang Seng Index in Hong Kong. In 2009, China Mobile was again recognised 
on the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes (DJSI). Recently, the company’s credit 
rating was A+/Outlook Stable by Standard and Poor’s, and A1/Outlook Positive by 
Moody’s.  
 
b) Corporate Structure and Ownership Structure 
As of April 30, 2010, the substantial shareholder of China Mobile was China Mobile 
(Hong Kong) Group Limited, which indirectly held approximately 74.21 per cent of 
all outstanding shares of China Mobile through a wholly-owned subsidiary, China 
Mobile Hong Kong (BVI) Limited, where public investors owned the remaining 
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25.79 per cent of the ordinary shares.
461
 Furthermore, all of the equity interests of 
China Mobile (Hong Kong) Group Limited were owned by China Mobile 
Communications Corporation (hereinafter referred to as “CMCC”), which was a 
state-owned company tightly controlled by the central government of Mainland 
China.
462
 Significantly, no other investors held more than 5 per cent of the ordinary 
shares of China Mobile, with the statistics of Table 6.1 offering a clear illustration of 
the majority shareholders and their underlying shares in China Mobile.  
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Table 6.1 Majority Shareholders and Underlying Shares of China Mobile Limited Company 2000-2010 
(all the interests in issued shares of China Mobile amounting to 5% or more of the ordinary shares in issue) 
Year Name of Company 
Ordinary Shares Held 
Percentage of Total Shareholding 
Directly Indirectly 
2000 
China Mobile Communications Corporation (CMCC)  14,062,602,396 75.58% 
China Mobile (Hong Kong) Group Limited 
(CMHK Group) 
 14,062,602,396 75.58% 
China Mobile Hong Kong (BVI) Limited (CMHK BVI) 14,062,602,396  75.58% 
2001 
CMCC  14,062,602,396 75.58% 
 CMHK Group  14,062,602,396 75.58% 
CMHK BVI 14,062,602,396  75.58% 
2002 
CMCC  14,890,116,842 75.69% 
 CMHK Group  14,890,116,842 75.69% 
CMHK BVI 14,890,116,842  75.69% 
2003 
CMCC  14,890,116,842 75.69% 
 CMHK Group  14,890,116,842 75.69% 
CMHK BVI 14,890,116,842  75.69% 
2004 
CMCC  14,890,116,842 75.58% 
 CMHK Group  14,890,116,842 75.58% 
CMHK BVI 14,890,116,842  75.58% 
2005 
CMCC  14,890,116,842 75.07% 
 CMHK Group  14,890,116,842 75.07% 
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CMHK BVI 14,890,116,842  75.07% 
2006 
CMCC  14,890,116,842 74.57% 
 CMHK Group  14,890,116,842 74.57% 
CMHK BVI 14,890,116,842  74.57% 
2007 
CMCC  14,890,116,842 74.33% 
 CMHK Group  14,890,116,842 74.33% 
CMHK BVI 14,890,116,842  74.33% 
2008 
CMCC  14,890,116,842 74.25% 
 CMHK Group  14,890,116,842 74.25% 
CMHK BVI 14,890,116,842  74.25% 
2009 
CMCC  14,890,116,842 74.22% 
 CMHK Group  14,890,116,842 74.22% 
CMHK BVI 14,890,116,842  74.22% 
2010 
CMCC  14,890,116,842 74.21% 
 CMHK Group  14,890,116,842 74.21% 
CMHK BVI 14,890,116,842  74.21% 
Source: Adapted from China Mobile Limited Company 2000-2010 Annual Reports463  
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In the interim period before 2000, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) 
indirectly held approximately 75 per cent of equity interest in China Mobile via 
several subsidiaries including China Telecom Hong Kong Group Limited, The 
Directorate General of Telecommunications and Telpo Communications Group 
Limited.
464
 After 2000, the share ownership structure of China Mobile reflected that 
China Mobile Communications Corporation (CMCC) steadily owned an aggregate 
of about 75 per cent of all issued and outstanding share capital through two 
subsidiaries: CMHK Group and CMHK BVI. Table 6.1 clearly shows that the 
general share ownership structure of China Mobile remained almost unchanged 
between 2000 and 2010, with CMCC the blockholder for this entire period. 
According to the Memorandum and Articles of Association of China Mobile, CMCC 
did not have different voting rights when compared with other shareholders in the 
same class.
465
 Nevertheless, China Mobile was actually dominated by CMCC since 
all other public shareholders only held a small percentage of shares.  
 
As CMCC was also an SOE, the state owner actually never relaxed its firm hold on 
China Mobile. It seems that the recent split share reforms, which were aimed at 
improving the undeveloped ownership structure of major Chinese SOEs, had no 
substantial influence on China Mobile. The government had shown no signs of 
changing the ownership structure of China Mobile, since that might have resulted in 
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a change of control. Generally, the Chinese government had a strong tendency 
towards exerting tight control over key SOEs such as China Mobile, since this would 
suit the government-controlled financial system.  
 
As stated in Proposition 2, it seems that the corporate governance patterns of China 
Mobile generally reflect a typical insider-based control system model since there 
were no other shareholders that held more than 5 per cent of the total equity interests, 
apart from CMCC. It is arguable that China Mobile would not have major corporate 
governance problems arising from the separation of ownership and management, 
since the ownership structure of China Mobile was highly concentrated. 
Notwithstanding, the majority shareholder control mechanism could also give rise to 
other corporate governance problems. Since CMCC had enduring interests in China 
Mobile, it tended to hold positions on the board of directors or exert undue influence 
upon the appointment of other senior managerial posts. As the relationships between 
the management and CMCC were close and stable, it would be very difficult to 
prevent CMCC and the management from infringing the interests of minority 
shareholders.  
 
In the current social and political climate of Mainland China, the Party’s 
determination would virtually play a decisive role when it came to the nomination of 
the top management personnel of major SOEs. To a great extent, SOEs had been 
employed as a major instrument in Mainland China that could cater for the central 
  
 
237 
government’s intention of maintaining social stability. With China’s economy largely 
controlled by the government, Chinese SOEs dominated most industries on the 
Mainland from heavy and light industries to routine consumer products. The 
dominance of SOEs in the food supply industry and other public essential services 
such as transportation, telecommunication and energy supply had broad implications 
for the lives of most Chinese people. Furthermore, the SOEs still enjoyed a 
significant share of the tax contributions to the government. In addition, SOEs 
remained the largest employers in Mainland China.
466
  
 
As mentioned in Proposition 3, it could be argued that political factors determined 
the nature of corporate governance in China’s listed companies, especially for large 
Chinese SOEs such as China Mobile. Several academics have advanced theories to 
explain the political preconditions of corporate governance. It was stated that the 
social democracies of certain political environments actually pressed managers to 
stabilise employment, or managed to avoid work forces being downsized even when 
the firm’s production capabilities could not align with the markets.467 This kind of 
theory should help to explain why the management of large SOEs in China could not 
always pursue the goals of the maximisation of shareholders’ profits. The 
circumstances of corporate governance in Mainland China were quite similar to 
those of continental social democratic countries in some respects, as the means of 
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incentive compensation and transparent accounting were all fairly weak. Moreover, 
the market for corporate control had also been undervalued to a great extent in China. 
When the ownership concentration brought about expensive agency costs in public 
firms in Europe, China’s major SOEs generally bore much higher managerial agency 
costs than their counterparts in other countries. Technically, the greater discretion of 
senior management in Chinese SOEs was another factor that made these steep 
agency costs more unreasonable.  
 
As China Mobile is one of the biggest SOEs in China, its corporate structure is large 
and complicated. The governance structure of China Mobile has been complied in 
Table 6.2 below.  
 
  
 
239 
Table 6.2 Corporate Structure of China Mobile Limited Company 
 
Source: Adapted from China Mobile Limited Company’s website, available at: 
http://www.chinamobileltd.com/en/about/overview.php, accessed December 15, 2012.  
Communist Party 
Committee 
Shareholders' 
General Meeting 
Provincial 
Subsidiaries (100% 
equity interests) 
Beijing Mobile 
Shanghai Mobile 
Tianjin Mobile 
Hebei Mobile 
Shandong Mobile 
Qinghai Mobile 
Xinjiang Mobile 
Two Partially Owned 
Subsidiaries (Aspire 
and Fujian FUNO) 
Board of Directors 
Audit Committee 
Remuneration 
Committee 
Nomination 
Committee 
Presidents 
Functional 
Departments 
Research & 
Development 
Department 
Legal Affairs 
Department 
Human Resources 
Department 
Supervision 
Department 
Wholly Owned 
Subsidiaries 
China Mobile Group 
Design Institute Co., 
Ltd. 
China Mobile 
Communication Co., 
Ltd. 
China Mobile 
(Shenzhen) Limited 
Aspire Technologies 
(Shenzhen) Limited 
China Mobile 
International Limited 
Supervisory Board 
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According to the structure illustrated in Table 6.2, it seems that China Mobile has a 
well-developed governance structure. When the board of directors is appointed at the 
shareholders’ general meeting, the board then designates the president of China 
Mobile. Establishing board sub-committees has become a matter of routine in almost 
all of China’s large SOEs as required by the CSRC, and China Mobile has an audit 
and remuneration committee, as well as a nomination committee. Furthermore, a 
supervisory board has also been set up in compliance with the 2006 Company Law 
of China.
468
 As China Mobile provides telecommunication services nationwide, it 
has a few dozen fully owned provincial subsidiaries, while several investment 
holding companies have been correspondingly established in the British Virgin 
Islands so as to facilitate management.
469
  
 
Apart from these provincial subsidiaries, China Mobile has also held 100 per cent 
equity interests via investment holding companies in a number of other subsidiaries 
including China Mobile Group Design Institute Co., Ltd., China Mobile 
Communication Co., Ltd., China Mobile (Shenzhen) Limited, Aspire Technologies 
(Shenzhen) Limited, Aspire Information Network (Shenzhen) Limited, Aspire 
Information Technologies (Beijing) Limited, Advanced Roaming & Clearing House 
Limited, China Mobile Hong Kong Company Limited (CMHK) and China Mobile 
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International Limited. These subsidiaries were responsible for the provision of 
various telecommunication services such as network design, roaming clearance, 
platform development and mobile data solutions. Moreover, China Mobile 
respectively owned a 66.41 per cent and 51 per cent shareholding in Aspire Holdings 
Limited and Fujian FUNO Mobile Communication Technology Company Limited, 
respectively. With the former of these two companies an investment holding 
company incorporated in the Cayman Islands, the latter provided network 
technology support for clients.  
 
Nevertheless, the CMCC had the de facto right to appoint most members to the 
board of directors since it owned approximately 75 per cent of the total shares in 
China Mobile. As the central government had CMCC under its influence, China 
Mobile was still a typical Chinese SOE dominated by a state shareholder, and while 
the Communist Party Committee could not be termed as a formal organ of listed 
companies, it actually plays a decisive role in most important events in the vast 
majority of China’s SOEs. The existence of the Party Committee facilitated the 
Party’s participation in China Mobile matters, but it also detrimentally affected the 
productiveness of the governance structure of China Mobile.  
 
With the telecommunications industry in China dominated by three state-run 
companies,
 470
 China Mobile was the largest mobile phone operator with a market 
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share of 69.3 per cent in Mainland China.
471
 In fact, China’s government had the 
inclination to keep its tenacious hold on the mobile telecommunications network by 
investing in China Mobile and the subsidiaries of China Mobile. As the 
telecommunications sector had generally been perceived as a key area that was 
closely related to the national economy and social well-being,
472
 there was no sign 
that the dominant shareholding of government in China Mobile would be 
considerably diminished in the foreseeable future.  
 
c) Board Composition and Supervisory Board Composition 
Since the CMCC was the dominant shareholder in China Mobile, the government 
had the de facto rights to appoint most members to the board of directors of China 
Mobile. On occasion, the Party Committee might also seek to influence corporate 
management by nominating their preferred board candidates.  
 
The board of directors of China Mobile consisted of twelve members by 2010, and 
all directors were subject to re-election at the annual general shareholders’ meetings 
at least once every three years.
473
 Outwardly, the board structure of China Mobile 
fulfilled the requirements of Article 109 of China’s new Company Law, as the 
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number of directors was not excessive. Three independent non-executive directors 
had been recruited into the board as required by the 2006 Company Law of China,
474
 
but this did not really attain the one-third standards set by the Guidelines for 
Independent Directors.
475
 In broad terms, the executive directors were mainly 
selected internally from within China Mobile and its subsidiaries. The candidates for 
executive director were expected to have previous management experience and 
technical expertise in the telecommunications industry, whereas the non-executive 
directors were required to have individual independence as well as considerable 
experience or expertise in business management.
476
 As a general rule, the 
nomination committee assumed the responsibility to identify and nominate member 
candidates for the board.  
 
The composition of the board of China Mobile indicated that WANG Jianzhou, the 
chairman of the board of directors, was actually in charge of the overall management 
of the entire China Mobile group. It is noteworthy that Wang was also sitting as the 
chairman of the CMCC, the ultimate controlling shareholder of China Mobile. 
Furthermore, all other executive directors held senior management positions in 
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China Mobile including vice president, chief executive office and chief financial 
officer. Interestingly, the composition of the three board sub-committees was 
identical, as these committees were all comprised of the three independent 
non-executive directors. As has been mentioned in earlier chapters, stewardship 
theory was focused on the socio-psychological factors of corporate governance, with 
the assumption that the directors’ behaviour was largely aligned with the 
shareholders’ interests. Seemingly, the governance structures of most large Chinese 
companies, especially those giant SOEs such as China Mobile, owed much to 
stewardship theory. With the theory offering more discretion for directors and 
executives to allow for the facilitation of their organisational functions, the 
empowering governance mechanisms arguably assisted China’s companies in 
attaining improved performance. In fact, these politically appointed directors of large 
Chinese SOEs were treated as government officials to some extent, and the Chinese 
government placed them under obligation to be faithful stewards of the state.
477
  
 
As the appointment of a supervisory board was mandatory in the 2006 Company 
Law of China, there seems no conceivable reason for China Mobile to be the 
exception. Unfortunately, there was no reference to the composition or role of the 
supervisory board in the annual reports from China Mobile.  
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It seems that China Mobile had a well-designed governance structure under 
superficial review; however, it was unable to withstand close scrutiny. When the 
dominant state blockholders themselves had appointed preferable directors, the 
interests of the minority shareholders could not be truly represented on the board. 
Significantly, almost all executive directors had previous working experience in 
governmental agencies of Mainland China.
478
 By reviewing their professional 
histories, it seems that all three independent directors had served in various positions 
with Hong Kong’s government bodies or well-regarded financial institutions. It was 
arguable that these independent directors could take a positive role in the corporate 
governance of China Mobile, since they did not lack essential management 
experience and professional expertise. Notwithstanding, the effectiveness of 
independent directors is rather questionable given the current legal and political 
circumstances of China. With shareholder derivative litigation having been tightly 
restricted in Mainland China, there was no real market for corporate control either. It 
was argued by some commentators that the mechanism of independent directors 
would not truly present difficulties for a dominant state shareholder to exercise 
control over the listed companies, as large shareholding was the only known working 
approach to monitor management.
479
 As argued in Proposition 5, traditional Chinese 
corporate governance ideas would probably remain strong in China Mobile.  
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d) Related Party Transactions 
Related party transactions were a common occurrence in most of China’s large listed 
SOEs, as these enterprises and their subsidiaries generally operated as a 
conglomerate. Related party transactions have been termed as a kind of severe 
problem in the corporate governance of China’s listed companies, since they are 
unfair to minority shareholders in the majority of cases.
480
 Technically, the related 
party transactions enabled the dominant shareholders to expropriate the interests of 
minority shareholders, or even jeopardise the interests of the company. By connected 
deals, companies could tunnel or support profits via selling assets to related parties at 
an unreasonable price. This also allows the company to misreport their accounting 
numbers so as to mislead the public investors, such as occurred in the infamous 
collapse of Enron.  
 
It was disclosed in the annual reports that China Mobile and each of its subsidiaries 
had entered into various related party transactions, and that the terms of these 
connected deals were generally based on an arm’s length basis.481 The related party 
transactions of China Mobile covered most common telecommunication services, 
such as international roaming arrangements, inter-provincial transmission line 
leasing and platform development, etc. In July 2004, China Mobile acquired several 
telecommunications assets from the CMCC in order to decrease the amount of 
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related party transactions, and the related agreements between China Mobile and the 
CMCC were consolidated into two agreements in late 2004 so as to further 
streamline the management of the connected transactions.
482
  
 
It seems that China Mobile had made a number of detailed disclosures of related 
party transactions, as required by the listing rules of foreign stock exchanges. 
However, the appropriateness of these connected deals still deserves further 
examination or even revisiting. It was questionable whether the interests of minority 
shareholders had been well protected in these connected transactions, as the 
ownership structure of China Mobile was a typical majority block shareholding and 
therefore the board of directors could not be considered as independent. It was 
particularly worrying that WANG Jianzhou, the chairman of the board of China 
Mobile, also acted as chairman of the CMCC, which was the substantial shareholder 
of China Mobile. This situation had been classified as one of the typical 
non-independent relationships in the independence criteria of the OECD.
483
  
 
Article 217 S.4 of China’s Company Law indicated that the related-party relationship 
generally referred to the relationship between the company’s controlling 
shareholders, de facto controllers, directors, supervisors, executives and the 
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enterprises they controlled either directly or indirectly. In addition, related-party 
relationship also referred to other relationships that might result in the transfer of 
resources or obligations. Nevertheless, the parastatal entities such as SOEs and 
Government-owned Corporations (GOCs), which were owned by a government 
holding agency, would not be recognised as representing a related-party relationship 
since they were all controlled by the state.
484
 With the absence of any provisions 
with respect to related-party relationships in China’s old Company Law, it seems that 
the new law had compensated for this oversight. However, Mr K (Interviewee No.11) 
considered the disclosure of related-party transactions to be of dubious benefit to 
most minority shareholders, since the majority of giant China’s companies – 
especially those of strategic value – were all parastatal. Thus, such companies were 
exempt from the stipulations of Article 217.  
 
With the State controller electing most executive directors, it also played a dominant 
role in the nomination of independent directors. Significantly, the State shareholder 
could exert sufficient influence over the incentive structures of independent directors, 
such as remuneration policy. Whether independent directors could really represent 
the interests of minority shareholders in the process of approving related party 
transactions was open to doubt, since the loyalties of independent directors were 
highly questionable.  
                                                             
484
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e) Stakeholders and Corporate Governance  
According to the relevant documents of China Mobile, sustainability strategy was 
adopted in their development so as to create sustainable value, and due attention had 
been paid to the interests of the stakeholder.
485
 Customers, shareholders and 
investors, employees, regulatory authorities, value chain partners, industry peers and 
the public had all been termed as stakeholders by China Mobile. Technically, the 
annual reports of China Mobile made no reference to the issue of stakeholders. 
However, China Mobile issued annual sustainability reports from 2005, so as to give 
a full account of their performance of sustainable development as well as social 
responsibility. Seemingly, China Mobile was performing well in terms of protecting 
the interests of stakeholders, since it was recognised on the Dow Jones Sustainability 
Indexes for three consecutive years from 2008 to 2010. Furthermore, China Mobile 
had also been admitted to the Hang Seng Corporate Sustainability Index Series in 
mid-2010.
486
  
 
Employees had been traditionally considered as one of the most important 
stakeholders, who could even have a significant influence on the capital structure 
decisions of a company.
487
 It was stated that China Mobile valued employees’ 
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interests as one of their key social responsibilities, and that it used its best 
endeavours to promote the careers of employees. Moreover, two-tier employee 
representative committee meeting systems at the provincial and municipal levels had 
been established so as to give employees the opportunity to participate in corporate 
decision-making.
488
 However, it was highly questionable whether the employee 
representative committee could play a material role in the corporate governance of 
China Mobile, since the employee representatives were actually appointed by senior 
management in most instances in Chinese SOEs.  
 
By evaluating the reports, it could be seen that sizeable input of resources into 
employee welfare from China Mobile. The company had made considerable 
investment to strengthen workplace health and safety management, and these 
measures would likely make a contribution towards reducing industrial accidents. 
Moreover, employees of China Mobile could also obtain benefits and insurance 
coverage. It was said that special aid funds had been established in more than 
two-thirds of China Mobile’s provincial subsidiaries in order to provide support to 
those employees in difficulty.
489
 In terms of the career development of employees, 
China Mobile devised a training evaluation system so as to provide employees with 
extensive training courses.  
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In fact, the maturity of employee welfare facilities in China Mobile was predictable, 
since China Mobile was still a government-dominated SOE that virtually operated in 
the traditional sense. To a certain extent, most of China’s large SOEs actually bore 
heavier pension burdens and wider obligations of social welfare when compared 
with their foreign counterparts,
490
 since a modern social security system had not yet 
been developed in Mainland China. While the coverage of the public pension system 
in China was at the time still quite low, its investment return rates were also 
unattractive.
491
 In such a circumstance, the desirable social welfare provided by 
large Chinese SOEs could be termed as a main attraction to most candidates. Hence, 
it was only natural for China’s large SOEs to further strengthen this advantage in 
order to recruit more quality employees.  
 
Significantly, China Mobile no longer directly paid pensions or other post-retirement 
benefits to its retirees after the SOE reform. The subsidiaries of China Mobile in 
Mainland China were required to contribute to defined contribution retirement plans 
that were managed by local municipal governments. This kind of contribution from 
China Mobile was set at fixed rates of the employees’ salary costs. Furthermore, 
some Mainland subsidiaries of China Mobile even made contributions to retirement 
plans operated by insurance companies, as a supplement to the mandatory 
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governmental retirement plans.
492
 In addition, China Mobile and its subsidiaries in 
Hong Kong had engaged in the Mandatory Provident Fund Scheme in accordance 
with the Hong Kong Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Ordinance,
493
 which was 
a retirement plan organised by independent trustees. All those employed by China 
Mobile under the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong Employment Ordinance were 
covered by this retirement scheme.
494
  
 
In general, China Mobile had made due allowance for the interests and welfare of 
employees, ranging from health care to employee assistance programs and special 
aid funds. The establishment of contribution retirement schemes for SOEs on the 
Mainland could also relieve China Mobile of some of the responsibilities of social 
security, which should have been assumed by the government. In Hong Kong, China 
Mobile also provided well-managed welfare packages to employees in compliance 
with the relevant Hong Kong law, and this could be partly attributable to the 
soundness of the social welfare system as well as the fairness of judiciary in Hong 
Kong.  
 
Aside from giving due consideration to the interests of employees, China Mobile 
also paid attention to the expectations of other stakeholders. China Mobile developed 
internal mechanisms, such as Issue Analysis and Dialogue Management, to improve 
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communication and engagement with stakeholders. Furthermore, China Mobile 
constantly developed new technologies so as to improve network quality and 
promote customer satisfaction. In 2004, China Mobile launched the Village 
Connected Project, under which all administrative villages in Mainland China were 
covered. The mobile network of China Mobile had been expanded to include most 
rural areas in Mainland China by the end of 2010.
495
 In addition, China Mobile 
devised the Green Action Plan, the emphasis of which was energy conservation and 
emissions reduction. The implementation of this plan indicated that China Mobile 
had put special efforts into minimising its impact on the environment. Significantly, 
China Mobile established a general corporate strategy towards the information 
society, by which the informatisation of healthcare, education and daily lives in 
Mainland China would be largely promoted. In terms of charities, China Mobile 
founded the China Mobile Charity Foundation in 2009. In 2010, this Foundation 
donated a total of RMB 20.2 million to support education and disadvantaged 
groups.
496
  
 
In light of the description of the China Mobile Sustainability Reports, it is arguable 
that China Mobile gave a fair account of itself in promoting the interests of 
stakeholders. Indeed, China Mobile had made some attempts to strike a balance 
between itself and its stakeholders, with the intention of fulfilling its corporate social 
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responsibilities. In a conventional sense, China’s large SOEs would generally offer 
very generous benefits to their employees and retirees.
497
 However, the majority of 
China’s SOEs tended to pay little regard to the interests of other stakeholders in 
making corporate decisions. Therefore, the Sustainability Reports from China 
Mobile were a favourable sign which indicated that the valued role of other 
stakeholders had been gradually brought within the corporate governance of China 
Mobile.  
 
It seems that China Mobile showed signs of improvement in corporate governance in 
terms of giving due consideration to the interests of stakeholders. However, there is 
no certainty whether there was any causal relationship between overseas listing and 
this improvement, as the “Section 303A Corporate Governance Listing Standards” 
and the “FAQs Regarding 303A - Corporate Governance Standards” released by the 
NYSE made no specific reference to the interests of stakeholders.
498
 In actual fact, 
most of China’s listed companies attempted to give a superficial impression that they 
had made every endeavour to take account of the interests of all stakeholders, 
respecting the fact that more scholars and practitioners had advocated stakeholder 
value in recent years.
499
 Somehow this trend could be termed as a solid movement 
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in corporate governance for Chinese companies, since it was generally believed that 
a company could not obtain value maximisation if it ignored the interests of its 
stakeholders.
500
  
 
Mr J (Interviewee No.10) was somewhat cynical about whether the provisions of the 
new Company Law – in regard to corporate social responsibility – would really 
bring tangible benefits to stakeholders. He proposed that protection of the interests 
of stakeholders, or even social communities, was definitely not one of the main 
concerns of Chinese companies at this stage. The fact remains that the vast majority 
of Chinese companies would not overextend themselves through taking account of 
corporate social responsibility issues, as it was widely considered that this could 
negatively impact company performance.  
 
China Mobile made detailed accounts of its corporate governance practices in the 
relevant sections of its annual reports. As a company listed both on the HKEx and 
NYSE, some corporate governance principles and polices of China Mobile did not 
completely conform with the Section 303A corporate governance listing standards 
established by the NYSE Listed Company Manual, which were supposed to be 
followed by U.S. companies. These differences were also elaborated in the annual 
reports of China Mobile.
501
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In 2010, a major change in the corporate governance of China Mobile was that LI 
Yue had taken over the role of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) vacated by WANG 
Jianzhou, and that Wang would remain as the chairman of China Mobile.
502
 This 
practice was a significant departure from the traditional governance principles of 
China’s large SOEs. In the conventional sense, the same individual, who was 
politically appointed by senior government officials, would perform the roles of both 
chairman and CEO in major Chinese SOEs. To a great extent, this governance 
improvement of China Mobile was made in response to the Code on Corporate 
Governance Practices of the HKEx, as the responsibilities between the chairman and 
CEO were required to be clearly divided under the provisions of this Code.
503
  
 
It was argued by some commentators that separating the roles of chairman and CEO 
could reinforce the effectiveness of the corporate board to a certain degree, when the 
formative context of each company must be taken into account.
504
 However, several 
other scholars suggested that the costs of separating the titles of chairman and CEO 
actually outweighed its advantages for most large companies.
505
 Moreover, it 
warrants mention that statistics showed the same person occupied the roles of 
chairman of the board and CEO in around 75 per cent of the Standard & Poor’s 500 
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companies in the U.S.
506
 By comparison, the principle that the leadership of the 
board should be split with the executive roles for the company’s management had 
been applied by the vast majority of U.K. companies,
507
 since the UK Combined 
Code 2008 plainly stated that the same individual should not exercise the roles of 
chairman and CEO.
508
 Although more American companies have moved towards 
the separation of chairman and CEO positions in recent years,
509
 the listing 
standards of the NYSE did not set forth any provision on this issue.
510
  
 
Unfortunately, the question of whether the separation of chairman and CEO would 
bring any improvement in corporate governance for China Mobile could still be 
doubted, as WANG still served as the chairman of the parent company of China 
Mobile.
511
 As a general rule the Central Organization Department of Communist 
Party preserved the virtual control over personnel decisions of the parent companies 
of these major Chinese SOEs such as China Mobile, since such state companies with 
multi-billion dollar market capitalisation had a high position in China’s economy. 
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Hence, WANG could have a greater say over the CEO in the crucial management 
issues of China Mobile, such as senior executive appointments, as he was actually 
backed by the Party. Ultimately, the chairman of China Mobile probably had 
unrestrained powers of decision-making.  
 
According to the records of the board meetings and board committees’ meetings of 
China Mobile, it seems that most directors and independent directors performed their 
duties conscientiously, notwithstanding that some directors had been absent on a 
number of occasions.
512
 With all the directors of China Mobile having disclosed 
their interests in the annual report, the regulation laid down in the Hong Kong Main 
Board Listing Rules governing the directors’ securities transactions had been also 
adopted by China Mobile.
513
 There was good reason to believe that a number of 
preventive measures had been taken by China Mobile in order to avoid any conflicts 
of interests.  
 
In the summer of 2002, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act was enacted by the U.S. congress in 
the wake of a number of major corporate and accounting scandals.
514
 Not only did 
these scandals devastate the share prices of the affected companies, including Enron, 
Tyco International and WorldCom, they also undermined the public’s confidence in 
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the American securities markets. The enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act was 
widely seen as an attempt to restore investor confidence by establishing enhanced 
corporate accountability standards for listed companies.  
 
Section 406 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act introduced a code of ethics for listed 
companies, by which senior financial officers and principal accounting officers were 
required to adhere to a high standard of business ethics when performing their 
management duties. Accordingly, this requirement in respect of the ethics code had 
been incorporated into the corporate governance standards of the NYSE Listed 
Company Manual.
515
 The said code of ethics was adopted by China Mobile in 2004, 
and had been filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
516
 In 
fact, China Mobile was not required to adopt such a similar ethics code under the 
applicable law or listing rules of Hong Kong. It was hoped such a code would 
contribute to the prevention of wrongdoings of senior executives for China Mobile.  
 
Under the provisions of Section 404 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, the annual reports 
provided by each listed company must include an internal control report, and an 
assessment of the effectiveness of the company’s internal control structure should be 
contained in this report.
517
 In accordance with the said requirement of Section 404, 
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the internal audit department of China Mobile carried out internal audit tests on the 
internal control structure, as well as the internal control procedures of China 
Mobile.
518
 These internal audit tests not only facilitated the issuance of the internal 
control report for China Mobile, but also lent further assurances to the accuracy of 
the information over the financial reporting of China Mobile.  
 
In addition, the registered accounting firm KPMG had been employed as the external 
auditors by China Mobile. Apart from providing audit services for the interim and 
annual consolidated financial statements for China Mobile, KPMG also audited and 
attested to the internal control assessment made by the management of China Mobile 
according to the regulation of Section 404 (b) of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. In addition, 
KPMG rendered other non-audit services such as tax services and Sarbanes–Oxley 
Act advisory services to China Mobile, which were subject to the pre-approval of the 
Audit Committee. In light of the well-established reputation of KPMG, their 
engagement as external auditors would arguably bring extra quality assurance to the 
financial reporting of China Mobile, despite the considerable service fees.
519
  
 
For listed public companies, their internal control system played an important role in 
safeguarding the assets and resources of the company, as well as helping ensure the 
reliability of financial reporting and compliance with applicable laws. The internal 
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control system had been identified as a key element of corporate governance by the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO),
520
 
where Section 404 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act expressly introduced rules for 
improving internal control in American public companies. Similarly, the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) of the U.K. also issued the Turnbull guidance in order to 
set out best practice on internal control for U.K. listed companies.
521
  
 
In accordance with Section 404 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, the board of directors of 
China Mobile assumed responsibility for establishing an internal control system as 
well as regularly reviewing the effectiveness of the internal control. Like many of 
their American counterparts, China Mobile adopted the model internal control 
framework issued by COSO, which was named the “Internal Control - Integrated 
Framework”. The internal control system of China Mobile would make a valuable 
contribution towards facilitating business management and operations, as well as 
deterring misstatement and fraud in financial reporting. In addition, a comprehensive 
risk management framework had also been established with the aim of reducing the 
negative effect of risks, and this risk framework mainly focused on the high risk 
areas of business. The employment of the management information system was 
another characteristic of the internal control system of China Mobile, by which the 
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 See Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), Internal Control - 
Integrated Framework, available at: http://coso.org/IC-IntegratedFramework-summary.htm, accessed August 1, 
2011; this framework has been widely used in the United States.  
521
 Financial Reporting Council (FRC), The Turnbull Guidance on Internal Control (October 2005), available at: 
http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/internalcontrol.cfm, accessed August 1, 2011; the Turnbull Guidance has been 
identified by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a suitable framework for complying with the 
U.S. requirements to report on internal controls over financial reporting.  
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accountability of China Mobile’s internal controls would be reinforced to a certain 
degree.
522
  
 
When the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) had been adopted in 
the financial reporting of China Mobile according to the regulations of the NYSE, 
the board of directors of China Mobile still executed an annual review of the 
information disclosure controls. In broad terms, it was safe to assume that the 
internal controls of China Mobile were effective, while the disclosure procedures of 
financial information were reasonable.  
 
As China Mobile had been defined as a foreign private issuer under the relevant 
American securities law,
523
 China Mobile was not required to fully comply with the 
corporate governance practices issued by the NYSE. Instead, China Mobile could 
follow the governance practices of its home country, China. In fact, China Mobile 
adopted some corporate governance practices of Hong Kong, since it was also listed 
on the HKEx.  
 
Pursuant to the rules of Section 303A.11 of the NYSE Listed Company Manual, 
listed foreign private issuers had to take responsibility to disclose the significant 
differences between their corporate governance practices and those followed by 
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 See China Mobile, China Mobile Limited Company Annual Report 2010, p. 45, Corporate Governance Report 
section, available at: http://www.chinamobileltd.com/ir.php?menu=3, accessed August 5, 2011.  
523
 See United States of America, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, enacted as of June 6, 1934, 
codified at 15 United States Code § 78a et seq., §240.3b-4: Definition of “foreign government”, “foreign issuer” 
and “foreign private issuer”, available at: http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/secrulesregs.htm, accessed August 5, 
2011.  
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American domestic companies under the NYSE listing standards.
524
 Accordingly, 
China Mobile presented a full description of these differences in governance 
practices in its annual reports.  
 
As of 2010, China Mobile had twelve directors in total, of which three members 
could be defined as independent directors according to the director independence 
standards of the Hong Kong Listing Rules. However, American domestic listed 
companies were actually required to have a majority of independent directors 
according to Section 303A.01 of the NYSE Listed Company Manual. Besides, the 
independence standards for directors established by the Hong Kong Listing Rules 
were slightly different from those stipulated by the NYSE Listed Company Manual. 
As a general rule, the presence of independent directors on the board could help to 
enhance the quality of board oversight, protecting the interests of shareholders, or 
even maximising social welfare.
525
 Nevertheless, other empirical research 
demonstrated that the relationship between independent directors and the corporate 
performance of China’s companies was not strong, especially under the current 
unformed institutional environment of Mainland China.
526
 When taking these 
environmental and practical considerations into account, it seems that the 
composition of the board of China Mobile was tenable, since more independent 
                                                             
524
 See New York Stock Exchange, NYSE Listed Company Manual - Section 303A.00 Corporate Governance 
Standards (approved November 25, 2009), 303A.11 Foreign Private Issuer Disclosure, available at: 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/, accessed August 6, 2011.  
525
 Gordon, Jeffrey N., “The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder 
Value and Stock Market Prices”, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 59, Issue 6, 2007, p. 1465.  
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 Clarke, Donald C., “The Independent Director In Chinese Corporate Governance”, Delaware Journal of 
Corporate Law, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2006, p. 217.  
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directors would not necessarily produce greater independence for the board of China 
Mobile, nor improve the corporate governance or financial performance of China 
Mobile.  
 
By Section 303A.07 of the NYSE Listed Company Manual, the role and 
responsibilities of the audit committee in a listed company had been considered as 
highly demanding. Hence, it would be desirable if the number of audit committees 
on which the audit committee members of a listed company served were strictly 
under control, as this could ensure their time commitment attendant to audit 
committee membership.
527
 Unfortunately, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange made no 
stringent provision in respect of such simultaneous service of audit committee 
members. Technically, China Mobile did not make any disclosure in its annual 
reports of whether the members of its audit committee served on the audit 
committees of several public companies simultaneously.  
 
The audit committee of China Mobile was comprised of three members: Dr. LO Ka 
Shui, Mr Frank WONG Kwong Shing and Dr. Moses CHENG Mo Chi. In actual fact, 
these three members, who were all independent non-executive directors, 
simultaneously sat on a number of committees in several listed companies. Dr. LO, 
the chairman of the audit committee, served on the audit committee of four other 
                                                             
527
 Section 303A.07 of NYSE Listed Company Manual provides that if an audit committee member 
simultaneously serves on the audit committees of more than three public companies, the board must 
determine that such simultaneous service would not impair the ability of such a member to effectively serve on 
the listed company’s audit committee, and must disclose such determination.  
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public companies in 2010;
528
 Mr WONG served as a member of the audit committee 
in the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited;
529
 And Dr. CHENG held a 
position on the audit committees of other seven public companies as of 2011.
530
  
 
In summary, two out of the three audit committee members of China Mobile served 
on the audit committees of more than three public companies. Only Wong sat on the 
audit committee of one other company, which met the requirements for simultaneous 
service set out by the NYSE Listed Company Manual. According to the annual 
reports of China Mobile, it seems that these three audit committee members could 
give their due attention to the work of the audit committee in China Mobile, as all of 
them had attended the four audit committee meetings that were held in 2010.
531
 
Nevertheless, such onerous simultaneous service would arguably impair the ability 
of these members to effectively perform their duties on the audit committee of China 
Mobile to a certain degree.  
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 Dr. LO Ka Shui is chairman of the audit committee of Shanghai Industrial Holdings Limited; a member of the 
audit committee of The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited; a member of the audit 
committee of Phoenix Satellite Television Holdings Limited; and a member of the audit committee of TOM 
Online Inc.; see Bloomberg Businessweek, Great Eagle Holdings Ltd, Executive Profile - LO Ka Shui, available at: 
http://investing.businessweek.com/businessweek/research/stocks/people/person.asp?personId=8096143&tick
er=41:HK&previousCapId=368157&previousTitle=CHINA%20MOBILE%20LTD, accessed August 10, 2011.  
529
 See Bloomberg Businessweek, Bank ICBC Indonesia, Executive Profile - WONG Kwong Shing, available at: 
http://investing.businessweek.com/businessweek/research/stocks/private/person.asp?personId=52806441&pri
vcapId=29290957&previousCapId=368157&previousTitle=CHINA%20MOBILE%20LTD, accessed August 11, 
2011.  
530
 Dr. Moses CHENG Mo Chi is a member of the audit committee in Liu Chong Hing Investment Ltd.; a member 
of the audit committee in Kader Holdings Co. Ltd.; a member of the audit committee in Guangdong Investment 
Ltd.; a member of the audit committee in Tian An China Investments Co. Ltd.; a member of the audit committee 
in China Resources Enterprise Ltd.; a member of the audit committee in Towngas China Company Limited; and a 
member of the audit committee in ARA Asset Management Limited; See Bloomberg Businessweek, Kader 
Holdings Co. Ltd., Executive Profile - CHENG Mo Chi, available at: 
http://investing.businessweek.com/businessweek/research/stocks/people/person.asp?personId=7673053&tick
er=180:HK&previousCapId=368157&previousTitle=CHINA%20MOBILE%20LTD, accessed August 11, 2011.  
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 See China Mobile, China Mobile Limited Company Annual Report 2010, p. 40, Corporate Governance Report 
section, available at: http://www.chinamobileltd.com/ir.php?menu=3, accessed August 13, 2011.  
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As stated above, there were real grounds to believe that China Mobile had 
endeavoured to conform to the applicable U.S. and Hong Kong laws, as well as the 
listing rules of these foreign stock exchanges. Indeed, some aspects of China 
Mobile’s corporate governance had been correspondingly improved by the process 
of foreign listing. These facts substantiate the statement of Proposition 4 to some 
degree. Unfortunately, China’s government still played a dominant role in the 
corporate governance structure of China Mobile. As China Mobile was a major SOE 
in the telecommunication industry of Mainland China, there was a slim chance the 
government might relinquish its influence over China Mobile. As Proposition 3 
asserted, relevant political factors largely determined the nature of corporate 
governance in China Mobile. Furthermore, the likelihood was that traditional 
Chinese corporate governance notions would remain quite strong in China Mobile, 
which could lend support to the argument of Proposition 5.  
 
II. THE PETROCHINA COMPANY LIMITED (PETROCHINA) 
a) Overview  
PetroChina Company Limited (hereinafter referred to as “PetroChina”)532 was an oil 
and gas producer and purveyor in Mainland China, headquartered in Beijing. 
Technically, it was the listed arm of the state-owned China National Petroleum 
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as “CNPC”). As the largest oil producer in China, 
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 The stock symbol of PetroChina Company Limited on the NYSE is PTR, on the HKEx is 0857, and on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) is 601857.  
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PetroChina was also the most valuable company by market capitalisation in the 
world as of 2010.
533
 PetroChina, along with its subsidiaries, were engaged in a 
range of petroleum related products and services covering the exploration, 
development, production and marketing of crude oil and natural gas. In recent years, 
PetroChina further expanded the business by branching out into the fields of 
petrochemical product refining, derivative petrochemical product development and 
the building of transmission pipelines.  
 
PetroChina was originally established as a joint stock company in Mainland China 
under the Special Provisions of the State Council Concerning the Floatation and 
Listing Abroad of Stocks by Limited Stock Companies
534
 on November 5, 1999, as 
part of the restructuring programme of the CNPC.
535
 Most assets of the CNPC, 
together with its liabilities related to crude oil, natural gas and derivative chemicals 
businesses had been injected into PetroChina during the restructuring. As PetroChina, 
together with the China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), near 
dominated the wholesale and retail business of oil and gas products in Mainland 
China, PetroChina had made healthy profits every year since its inception.
536
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 See Xie, Jingwei, “FT: PetroChina World’s Most Valuable Company”, China Daily, May 31, 2010, available at: 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-05/31/content_9912238.htm, accessed January 10, 2011.  
534
 People’s Republic of China, Special Provisions of the State Council Concerning the Floatation and Listing 
Abroad of Stocks by Limited Stock Companies (1994 Order No.160 of the State Council of the People’s Republic 
of China), adopted at the 22
nd
 executive meeting of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China on, and 
effective as of August 4, 1994, available at: http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=707, 
accessed April 26, 2012.  
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 See PetroChina Company Limited, Company Profile, available at: 
http://www.petrochina.com.cn/Ptr/About_PetroChina/Company_Profile/, accessed January 10, 2011.  
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 See Wikinvest, PetroChina’s Annual Income Statement, available at: 
http://www.wikinvest.com/stock/PetroChina_Company_%28PTR%29/Data, accessed January 10, 2011.  
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PetroChina launched its IPO on the NYSE on April 6, 2000, as American Depositary 
Shares (ADSs). At the same time, it was listed on the HKEx as H shares on April 7, 
2000. Several years later, PetroChina announced its plans to issue stocks on the SSE. 
After its flotation on the Shanghai stock market on November 5, 2007, PetroChina 
became the world’s first company to reach one trillion dollar market capitalisation,537 
while on December 10, 2007, the Hang Seng Index Services Company admitted 
PetroChina as a Hang Seng Index Constituent Stock.  
 
b) Corporate Structure and Ownership Structure 
The Ministry of Petroleum Industry of China, the predecessor of the CNPC, was 
founded in July 1955 to undertake the exploration of petroleum and gas resources in 
China. On September 17, 1988, the CNPC was established on the basis of the 
Ministry of Petroleum Industry, as a state-owned petroleum company endowed with 
certain government administrative responsibilities. In the mid-1990s, the State 
Council of China launched the restructuring of the CNPC, in order to match the 
ongoing economic and enterprise reforms in Mainland China.
538
 The CNPC was 
reorganised into an integrated company group with businesses covering the upstream 
and downstream operations of petroleum and gas. In 1998, the CNPC pooled its best 
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 Watts, Jonathan and Wearden, Graeme, “PetroChina Makes Its Debut as World’s First Trillion-Dollar Firm”, 
The Guardian, November 6, 2007, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2007/nov/06/china, 
accessed January 10, 2011.  
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 See PetroChina Company Limited (PetroChina), PetroChina Company Limited Annual Report 2010, p. 14, 
Changes in Share Capital and Information on Shareholders (5), available at: 
http://www.petrochina.com.cn/Ptr/Investor_Relations/Periodic_Reports/Annual_Report/, accessed September 
8, 2011.  
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performing assets and injected them into a newly established company, which was 
PetroChina. To a great extent, the establishment practice of PetroChina was an 
accepted procedure for most transformed Chinese SOEs, as this could facilitate their 
listing on foreign stock exchanges, as well as domestic listings.  
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Table 6.3 Subsidiaries of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 
CNPC Subsidiaries of CNPC 
Holding Companies 
PetroChina Company Limited 
CNPC Finance Company Limited 
China Huaming International Investment Corporation 
CNPC Assets Management Company Limited 
Jilin Fuel Ethanol Company Limited 
Specialised Companies 
CNPC Technical Service Company 
CNPC Engineering & Construction Company 
CNPC Manufacturing Company 
Joint Stock Companies 
PetroChina Hutchison Information Technology Co., Ltd. 
Guotai Jun’an Securities Co., Ltd. 
Guotai Jun’an Investment Management Co., Ltd. 
The Eighth Construction Company of CNPC, Ltd. 
BOC International (China) Limited 
China Yangtze Power Co., Ltd. 
Enterprises and Public Institutions 
Oil and Gas Field Enterprises Daqing Petroleum Administration, etc. (10 companies) 
Refining and Chemicals Companies Daqing Petroleum and Petrochemical Complex, etc. (10 companies) 
Technical Service Companies CNPC Xibu Drilling Engineering Company Limited, etc. (7 companies) 
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Engineering and Construction Companies China Oil and Gas Pipeline Company Limited, etc. (5 companies) 
Equipment Manufacturing Companies CNPC Technology & Development Company Limited, etc. (5 companies) 
Overseas Companies China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Corporation, etc. (7 companies) 
Research Institutions CNPC Economics & Technology Research Institute, etc. (8 companies) 
Other Companies CNPC Engineering Consulting Company Limited (CNPC Advisory Center), etc. (6 companies) 
Source: Adapted from China National Petroleum Corporation Annual Reports - CNPC Subsidiaries section539 
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 China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China National Petroleum Corporation Annual Reports, available at: http://www.cnpc.com.cn/en/aboutcnpc/, accessed September 27, 2011.  
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As illustrated in Table 6.3, PetroChina Company Limited was one of five holding 
companies of the CNPC. It is noteworthy that only two of these companies operated 
in the petroleum industry, while other three were actually investment companies. 
These subsidiaries aside, the CNPC held substantial equity interests in several dozen 
subsidiaries, wholly owned or partially owned. Apart from three specialised 
engineering and technical service subsidiaries, the CNPC was also the parent 
company of 58 enterprises and public institutions. The vast majority of these 
enterprises were engaged in the petroleum and petrochemical industries, and their 
businesses ranged from oil equipment manufacture, oil field administration and oil 
refinement to exploration technology research and development.  
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Table 6.4 Majority Shareholders and Shareholdings of PetroChina Company Limited 2000-2010 
(all the interests in issued shares of PetroChina amounting to 1% or more of the shares in issue) 
Year Name of Shareholders Nature of Shares Number of Shares Held Percentage of Total Shareholding Increase / Decrease of Shares 
2000 
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) State-owned Shares 158,241,758,000 90.00% / 
BP Investments China Limited* H Shares 3,516,484,000 2.00% / 
Franklin Resources, Inc. H Shares 2,470,114,000 1.40% / 
Templeton International, Inc.** H Shares 2,460,528,000 1.39% / 
Templeton Global Advisors, Ltd. H Shares 2,116,744,000 1.20% / 
2001 
CNPC State-owned Shares 158,241,758,000 90.00% / 
BP Investments China Limited* H Shares 3,516,484,000 2.00% / 
Franklin Resources, Inc. H Shares 2,098,818,212 1.19% -371,295,788 
Templeton International, Inc.** H Shares 2,043,244,993 1.16% -417,283,007 
2002 
CNPC State-owned Shares 158,241,758,000 90.00% / 
BP Investments China Limited* H Shares 3,516,484,000 2.00% / 
2003 
CNPC State-owned Shares 158,241,758,000 90.00% / 
BP Amoco Plc. H Shares 3,516,484,000 2.00% / 
Warren E. Buffett H Shares 2,347,761,000 1.335% / 
2004 
CNPC State-owned Shares 158,241,758,000 90.00% / 
Credit Suisse Group H Shares 2,774,536,979 1.578% / 
Warren E. Buffett H Shares 2,347,761,000 1.335% / 
2005 
CNPC State-owned Shares 157,922,077,818 88.21% -319,680,182 
Warren E. Buffett H Shares 2,347,761,000 1.311% / 
2006 CNPC State-owned Shares 157,922,077,818 88.21% / 
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J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. H Shares 2,595,035,030 1.449% / 
Warren E. Buffett H Shares 2,347,761,000 1.311% / 
2007 
CNPC State-owned Shares 157,922,077,818 86.29% / 
HKSCC Nominees Limited*** H Shares 20,937,754,152 11.44% / 
2008 
CNPC State-owned Shares 158,164,597,259 86.42%**** +242,519,441 
HKSCC Nominees Limited*** H Shares 20,869,519,699 11.40% -68,234,453 
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. H Shares 2,329,725,346 1.27% / 
2009 
CNPC State-owned Shares 157,764,597,259 86.20%**** -400,000,000 
HKSCC Nominees Limited*** H Shares 20,819,411,829 11.38% -50,107,870 
2010 
CNPC State-owned Shares 157,764,597,259 86.20%**** / 
HKSCC Nominees Limited*** H Shares 20,801,208,420 11.37% -18,203,409 
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. H Shares 1,996,347,016 1.09% / 
Source: Adapted from PetroChina Company Limited 2000-2010 Annual Reports540  
* Note: BP Global Investments Limited has the same holdings through BP Investments China Limited. BP Amoco Plc. also has the same holdings through BP Global Investments Limited and BP 
Investments China Limited.  
** Includes holdings of shares through Templeton Global Advisors, Ltd.  
*** HKSCC Nominees Limited is a subsidiary of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and its principal business is to act as nominee on behalf of shareholders.  
**** The number of shares excludes the H shares indirectly held by CNPC through Fairy King Investments Limited, an overseas wholly-owned subsidiary of CNPC; these H shares were held in the name of 
HKSCC Nominees Limited.  
 
                                                             
540
 See PetroChina, PetroChina Company Limited Annual Reports 2000-2010, available at: http://www.petrochina.com.cn/Ptr/Investor_Relations/Periodic_Reports/Annual_Report/, accessed September 11, 
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The major shareholders of PetroChina and their respective shareholdings from 2000 
to 2010 are illustrated in Table 6.4. As PetroChina is a typical Chinese company that 
evolved from a traditional state-owned enterprise, it has still been inevitably placed 
under the firm grip of China’s central government. The CNPC, a state-authorised 
investment company,
541
 as well as a state-owned enterprise directly controlled by 
the central government, had always been the dominant shareholder of PetroChina 
throughout this ten year period, during which it actually held a large block holding of 
the equity interest of PetroChina.  
 
Table 6.4 also shows that some foreign companies and individuals such as BP 
Investments, China Limited and Warren E. Buffett became major shareholders in 
PetroChina between 2000 and 2006, although they were not expected to materially 
affect the control of PetroChina since their holding in PetroChina never exceeded 2 
per cent. Besides, HKSCC Nominees Limited, a wholly-owned member of the 
HKEx group, held approximately 11 per cent of the shares of PetroChina from 2007 
to 2010. However, HKSCC Nominees Limited merely acted as nominee on behalf of 
shareholders;
542
 thus, CNPC’s position as the dominant shareholder of PetroChina 
was still secure.  
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 Over 70 per cent of the shares on the HKEx in quantity terms have been deposited into HKEx’s Central 
Clearing and Settlement System (CCASS), and all the shares held in CCASS are registered in the name of HKSCC 
Nominees Limited; see Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Frequently Asked Questions, Chapter 4 Investment 
Information, available at: http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/global/faq/listed%20company.htm, accessed October 
23, 2012.  
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Table 6.5 Major Institutional Investors of PetroChina Company Limited 2005-2010 
Year Name of Institutional Investors 
Origin of the 
Institutional 
Investors 
Nature of 
Shares 
Number of Shares 
Held 
Percentage of 
Total 
Shareholding 
Increase / 
Decrease of 
Shares 
2005 
Warren E. Buffett Foreign H Shares 2,347,761,000 1.311% / 
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Foreign H Shares 1,698,459,199 0.948% / 
2006 
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Foreign H Shares 2,595,035,030 1.449% +896,575,831 
Warren E. Buffett Foreign H Shares 2,347,761,000 1.311% / 
Templeton Asset Management Limited Foreign H Shares 1,054,208,903 0.589% / 
2007 
HKSCC Nominees Limited* Foreign H Shares 20,937,754,152 11.44% / 
UBS AG Foreign H Shares 1,503,922,021 0.83% / 
China Life Insurance (Group) Company - Traditional - Ordinary Insurance Product Domestic A Shares 56,797,000 0.031% / 
China Life Insurance Company Limited - Dividends - Personal Dividends - 005L - FH002 Shanghai Domestic A Shares 30,238,570 0.016% / 
China Life Insurance Company Limited - Traditional - Ordinary Insurance Product - 005L - CT001 Shanghai Domestic A Shares 25,069,000 0.014% / 
China Life Insurance Company Limited - Dividends - Group Dividends - 005L - FH001 Shanghai Domestic A Shares 25,069,000 0.014% / 
Ping An Life Insurance Company of China, Ltd. - Traditional - Ordinary Insurance Products Domestic A Shares 25,069,000 0.014% / 
New China Life Insurance Company Limited - Dividends - Group Dividends - 018L FH001 Shanghai Domestic A Shares 25,069,000 0.014% / 
Ping An Life Insurance Company of China, Ltd. - Proprietary Funds Domestic A Shares 25,069,000 0.014% / 
Ping An Life Insurance Company of China, Ltd. - Dividends - Personal Insurance Dividends Domestic A Shares 25,069,000 0.014% / 
2008 
HKSCC Nominees Limited* Foreign H Shares 20,869,519,699 11.40%** -68,234,453 
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Foreign H Shares 2,329,725,346 1.27% / 
Bank of Communications - Yi Fang Da 50 Index Securities Investment Fund Domestic A Shares 53,233,434 0.029% +53,233,434 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China - Shanghai 50 Index ETF Securities Investment Fund Domestic A Shares 47,178,809 0.026% +42,415,163 
Bank of China - Shanghai and Shenzhen 300 Index Jiashi Securities Investment Fund Domestic A Shares 24,846,098 0.014% +10,810,672 
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China Life Insurance Company Limited - Dividends - Personal Dividends - 005L - FH002 Shanghai Domestic A Shares 23,519,614 0.013% -6,718,956 
China Construction Bank - CIFM China Advantage Securities Investment Fund Domestic A Shares 20,943,434 0.011% +20,943,434 
China Life Insurance Company Limited - Traditional - Ordinary Insurance Product - 005L - CT001 Shanghai Domestic A Shares 18,771,597 0.010% -6,297,403 
UBS AG Foreign A Shares 18,032,575 0.010% +17,041,546 
China Life Insurance (Group) Company - Traditional - Ordinary Insurance Product Domestic A Shares 17,926,950 0.010% -38,870,050 
2009 
HKSCC Nominees Limited* Foreign H Shares 20,819,411,829 11.38%** -50,107,870 
National Council for Social Security Fund of the PRC (NSSF) Domestic A Shares 400,000,000 0.219% +400,000,000 
China Life Insurance Company Limited - Dividends - Personal Dividends - 005L - FH002 Shanghai Domestic A Shares 69,494,300 0.038% +45,974,686 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China - China Universal SCI Index Fund Domestic A Shares 60,604,060 0.033% +60,604,060 
China Construction Bank - Changsheng Tongqing Detachable Transaction Securities Investment Fund Domestic A Shares 46,078,103 0.025% +46,078,103 
Guangxi Investment Group Limited Domestic A Shares 39,329,509 0.021% +39,329,509 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China - Shanghai 50 Index ETF Securities Investment Fund Domestic A Shares 37,755,932 0.021% -9,422,877 
China Construction Bank - CIFM China Advantage Securities Investment Fund Domestic A Shares 27,924,148 0.015% +6,980,714 
Bank of Communications - Yi Fang Da 50 Index Securities Investment Fund Domestic A Shares 25,115,047 0.014% -28,118,387 
2010 
HKSCC Nominees Limited* Foreign H Shares 20,801,208,420 11.37%** -18,203,409 
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Foreign H Shares 1,996,347,016 1.09% / 
Aberdeen Asset Management Plc. and its associates (together the “Aberdeen Group”) on behalf of accounts 
managed by the Aberdeen Group 
Foreign H Shares 1,266,618,163 0.69% / 
Templeton Asset Management Ltd. Foreign H Shares 1,061,205,077 0.58% / 
NSSF Domestic A Shares 400,000,000 0.219% / 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China - China Universal SCI Index Fund Domestic A Shares 57,326,103 0.031% -3,277,957 
China Life Insurance Company Limited - Dividends - Personal Dividends - 005L - FH002 Shanghai Domestic A Shares 55,047,859 0.030% -14,446,441 
China Construction Bank - Changsheng Tongqing Detachable Transaction Securities Investment Fund Domestic A Shares 45,719,759 0.025% -358,344 
Guangxi Investment Group Limited Domestic A Shares 39,560,045 0.022% +230,536 
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Industrial and Commercial Bank of China - Shanghai 50 Index ETF Securities Investment Fund Domestic A Shares 35,312,598 0.019% -2,443,334 
China Merchants Securities - Client Account of Collateral Securities for Margin Trading Domestic A Shares 35,114,494 0.019% +35,114,494 
Bank of Communications - Yi Fang Da 50 Index Securities Investment Fund Domestic A Shares 32,482,052 0.018% +7,367,005 
Source: Adapted from PetroChina Company Limited 2005-2010 Annual Reports543  
* HKSCC Nominees Limited is a subsidiary of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and its principal business is to act as nominee on behalf of shareholders. 
** Some H shares were indirectly held by CNPC through Fairy King Investments Limited, an overseas wholly-owned subsidiary of CNPC; these H shares were held in the name of HKSCC Nominees 
Limited.  
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 See PetroChina, PetroChina Company Limited Annual Reports 2005-2010, available at: http://www.petrochina.com.cn/Ptr/Investor_Relations/Periodic_Reports/Annual_Report/, accessed September 13, 
2011.  
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Table 6.5 shows the major institutional investors of PetroChina between 2005 and 
2010. Warren E. Buffett and J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. were the major institutional 
investors of PetroChina in 2005 and 2006, and they had an interest in about 1.4 per 
cent of the H shares of PetroChina. From 2007 to 2010, no institutional investors 
held more than 1.3 per cent of PetroChina’s H shares.544 After the flotation of 
PetroChina on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) in 2007, some domestic life 
assurance companies, such as the subsidiaries of China Life Company and Ping An 
Company became the major institutional investors of PetroChina’s A shares. 
However, the ownership percentage of these domestic institutional investors was not 
in excess of 0.2 per cent. It seems that institutional investors of PetroChina would 
not have substantial influence in PetroChina’s management since their voting rights 
in the company were almost negligible. Presumably, they would not actively engage 
in the corporate governance of PetroChina.  
 
                                                             
544
 This does not include HKSCC Nominees Limited; the role of HKSCC Nominees Limited has been explained in 
former footnote.  
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Table 6.6 Shareholders and Underlying Shares with Selling Restrictions of PetroChina Company Limited 2007-2010 
Year Name of Shareholders 
Number of Shares with 
Selling Restrictions at the 
Beginning of the Year 
Number of Shares 
with Selling 
Restrictions Expired 
in the Year 
Change in Number of 
Shares with Selling 
Restrictions in the 
Year 
Number of Shares 
with Selling 
Restrictions at the 
End of the Year 
Reasons for 
Selling 
Restrictions 
Expiry Date of Selling 
Restrictions 
2007 
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 157,922,077,818 0 / 157,922,077,818 (1) November 5, 2010 
Shares placed off-line 0 0 +1,000,000,000 1,000,000,000 (2) February 5, 2008 
2008 
CNPC 157,922,077,818 0 / 157,922,077,818 / November 5, 2010 
Shares placed off-line 1,000,000,000 1,000,000,000 -1,000,000,000 0 / February 5, 2008 
2009 
CNPC 157,922,077,818 0 -400,000,000 157,522,077,818 / November 5, 2010 
National Council for Social Security Fund of the PRC 
(NSSF) 
0 0 +400,000,000 400,000,000 (3) November 5, 2013 
2010 
CNPC 157,522,077,818 157,522,077,818 -157,522,077,818 0 / 
The selling restrictions 
expired and trading 
commenced on November 
8, 2010 
NSSF 400,000,000 0 / 400,000,000 / November 5, 2013 
Source: Adapted from PetroChina Company Limited 2007-2010 Annual Reports545  
                                                             
545
 See PetroChina, PetroChina Company Limited Annual Reports 2007-2010, Changes in Share Capital and Information on Shareholders section, available at: 
http://www.petrochina.com.cn/Ptr/Investor_Relations/Periodic_Reports/Annual_Report/, accessed September 17, 2011.  
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(1) In October 2007, PetroChina offered its RMB denominated ordinary shares (A shares) to the public for the first time. At that time, CNPC undertook that for a period of 36 months, commencing from the 
date of listing of the A shares of PetroChina on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, it would not transfer or entrust others with the management of the A shares which it held, or allow such shares to be repurchased 
by PetroChina. However, certain shares held by CNPC, which could be subsequently listed on overseas stock exchanges after obtaining necessary approvals in the PRC, were not subject to the restriction of 
the 36-month lock-up period.  
(2) In October 2007, PetroChina offered its RMB denominated ordinary shares (A shares) to the public for the first time. Shares that had been placed with target placees off-line were subject to a lock-up 
period of three months from the date of listing of the shares on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.  
(3) Pursuant to Clause 13 of the Implementing Measures for the Transfer of Some State-owned Shares from the Domestic Securities Market to the National Social Security Fund,546 CNPC transferred part of 
its holding of the state-owned shares in PetroChina to the NSSF. The NSSF extended the lock-up period by three years, in addition to assuming the original state-owned shareholders’ statutory obligations 
and voluntary commitments on lock-up periods.  
 
                                                             
546
 See People’s Republic of China, The Implementing Measures for the Transfer of Some State-owned Shares from the Domestic Securities Market to the National Social Security Fund (2009 Order No. 94 of 
the Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China), jointly issued by Ministry of Finance, State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission 
and National Council for Social Security Fund of the People’s Republic of China on, and effective as of June 19, 2009, available at: http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=7902, accessed 
September 16, 2011.  
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According to Table 6.6, the CNPC held 157,922,077,818 A shares with selling 
restrictions in 2007, and these A shares were subject to a 36 month lock-up period 
which expired in November 2010. Furthermore, the CNPC placed 1,000,000,000 A 
shares with target off-line placees, but the lock-up period of these shares was only 
three months. In 2009, the CNPC transferred 400,000,000 A shares to the National 
Council for Social Security Fund of the PRC (NSSF), where the NSSF undertook 
that the lock-up period of these A shares would be extended by three years, meaning 
that their trading would commence in early November of 2013.  
 
Mr H (Interviewee No.8), who had a long record of service in the petrochemical 
industry, said that split share structure reform actually would not substantially affect 
the ownership structure of PetroChina in the foreseeable future, since PetroChina 
had been considered as one of the most strategically important petrochemical 
enterprises by China’s central government. Although the selling restrictions of these 
PetroChina’s A shares held by the CNPC expired in late 2010, Mr H did not believe 
that the CNPC was intending to sell any of these shares. Besides, Mr H added that 
these business propositions associated with the ownership structure of PetroChina, 
such as selling or transferring the PetroChina’s A shares held by the CNPC, were 
definitely subject to approval by the SASAC, since these business propositions 
might seriously undermine the Mainland government’s control over PetroChina.  
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c) Board Composition and Supervisory Board Composition 
The composition of the board in PetroChina could be termed as a representative 
sample of major Chinese State-owned resources companies, since all chairmen, 
vice-chairmen, executive directors and non-executive directors were appointed by 
the Chinese government in its capacity as dominant shareholder. In 2011, the board 
of directors of PetroChina consisted of fourteen members, and the term of their 
appointment was from May 2008 to May 2011. In addition, five of the fourteen 
members were independent directors. The board composition of PetroChina 
conformed to the regulations of Article 109 of China’s Company Law, as the 
directors numbered between five and nineteen.  
 
PetroChina had also established a Supervisory Committee, which had nine members. 
Two of these members were independent supervisors, while the other three 
supervisors were appointed by the employees’ representatives. It should be noted 
that CHEN Ming, who was the chairman of the supervisory committee of 
PetroChina, used to hold several senior management positions in the CNPC. 
According to Article 118 of China’s Company Law, the supervisory board of a 
joint-stock company should have at least three members, where the proportion of 
employee representatives ought to account for no less than one-third of the 
supervisory membership. The proportion of PetroChina’s employee representatives 
on its supervisory board did not fail to achieve the required standard.  
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Mr H (Interviewee No.8) reported that the chairman of PetroChina was actually 
appointed by the Organization Department of the Communist Party of China Central 
Committee, as the main role of a chairman of a major Chinese state-owned resources 
company was to protect China’s strategic state-owned assets. Significantly, the 
integrity of the chairman was the single most important factor when the Organization 
Department of the Communist Party tried to find the right candidate for the job, 
which meant that the chairman of this kind of Chinese strategically important 
company should have the implicit trust of the Communist Party. By contrast, the 
Chinese government would generally appoint a professor-level individual who had 
more than twenty years’ experience in the petrochemical industry to be the CEO or 
vice chairman of large state-owned petrochemical companies such as PetroChina, 
since these professional people would have the skills to take the state-owned 
enterprises forward.  
 
Seemingly, the Chinese government tended towards tradition rather than innovation 
when appointing the chairman of these strategically valuable enterprises, and the role 
played by Confucian values was thus irreplaceable in this regard. The appointment 
of chairmen and CEOs for these large Chinese companies reflected the Confucian 
ethics that China’s political elite had adopted, which also highlights that the 
corporate governance of China’s companies was largely reliant on relationships and 
paternalistic leadership.
547
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 Miles, Lilian and Goo, S. H., “Corporate Governance in Asian Countries: Has Confucianism Anything to 
Offer?”, Business and Society Review, Vol. 118, Issue 1, 2013, p. 27.  
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Mr H also indicated that there would generally be no minority representative on the 
board of large resources companies like PetroChina. Besides, the Communist Party 
had the leading role in shaping the composition of the supervisory board of 
PetroChina and other similar companies, where those supervisors appointed by the 
employees’ representatives would not ultimately represent the employees’ interests 
either.  
 
d) Stakeholders and Corporate Governance  
PetroChina Company did not mention whether the protection of stakeholders’ 
interests was integrated into company policy in its annual reports. Mr L (Interviewee 
No.12), a senior manager of a large Chinese petrochemical SOE, reported that 
PetroChina and comparable Chinese SOEs generally treated employees as the most 
important stakeholders, and thus would provide desirable benefits packages to their 
employees. Furthermore, PetroChina would not really consider the interests of other 
stakeholders when making its corporate decisions. The logic behind this kind of 
corporate governance pattern is that PetroChina and similar Chinese SOEs thought 
that their success was crucial to the economic prosperity of China. With each 
member of China’s society holding a stake in the future of the country, PetroChina’s 
success would advantage almost everyone in China.  
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PetroChina Company stated in its annual reports that PetroChina was able to comply 
with the regulatory rules of the jurisdictions in which it was listed, and that the 
company had also tried to improve its internal control system. Additionally, 
PetroChina provided corporate governance reports in its annual reports,
548
 which 
stated that it had strictly adhered to its own corporate governance code. In the said 
corporate governance reports, PetroChina explained the operations of its board of 
directors and special board committees in more detail. These facts could reflect 
Proposition 4, as the overseas listing improved some aspects of PetroChina’s 
corporate governance.  
 
As asserted by Mr H (Interviewee No.8), PetroChina was still to a great extent a 
traditional Chinese SOE, and the policy of the Communist Party comprehensively 
determined the nature of corporate governance in PetroChina. With the Chinese 
government showing no indication of a willingness to give up its dominant 
shareholder status of PetroChina in the future, PetroChina’s corporate governance 
will continue to reflect insider control system patterns. This evidence can support 
both Propositions 2 and 3.  
 
                                                             
548
 See PetroChina, PetroChina Company Limited Annual Reports 2010, Corporate Governance section, available 
at: http://www.petrochina.com.cn/Ptr/Investor_Relations/Periodic_Reports/Annual_Report/, accessed 
September 17, 2011. 
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III. THE CHINA NATIONAL OFFSHORE OIL CORPORATION LIMITED (CNOOC 
LIMITED) 
a) Overview  
The China National Offshore Oil Corporation (hereinafter referred to as “CNOOC 
Group”) was one of the three major National Oil Companies (NOC) in China, the 
other two being the CNPC (parent of PetroChina), and China Petrochemical 
Corporation (parent of Sinopec). The China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
Limited (hereinafter referred to as “CNOOC Limited”) was incorporated in Hong 
Kong on August 20, 1999 as an investment holding subsidiary of CNOOC Group, 
and it was listed on both the NYSE and HKEx in early 2001.
549
 In addition, 
CNOOC Limited was admitted as a constituent stock of the Hang Seng Index in July 
2001. 
 
While onshore upstream projects in China were largely engaged by PetroChina, 
CNOOC Group focused on the exploitation, exploration and development and sales 
of crude oil and natural gas, together with other petroleum products offshore.
550
 
CNOOC Limited had four major production areas in offshore China: Bohai Bay, 
Western South China Sea, Eastern South China Sea and East China Sea.
551
 Besides, 
CNOOC Limited has made continuing efforts in the exploitation of overseas 
                                                             
549
 The stock symbol of CNOOC limited company on the NYSE is CEO, and on the HKEx is 0883; CNOOC Limited 
concluded its IPO on the NYSE in Feb 27, 2001, with its issue type as ADS.  
550
 See China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC Group), Company Review, available at: 
http://en.cnooc.com.cn/data/html/english/channel_110.html, accessed January 18, 2011.  
551
 See China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC Group), Company Profile, available at: 
http://www.cnoocltd.com/encnoocltd/aboutus/default.shtml, accessed January 18, 2011.  
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resources in recent years, taking positive steps in mergers and acquisitions. In 2002, 
CNOOC Limited became the largest offshore oil producer in Indonesia after 
purchasing nine subsidiaries from the Spanish oil company, Repsol, which operated 
in five oil and gas fields.
552
 In 2006, CNOOC Limited made another deal valued at 
US$ 2.27 billion to buy a 45 per cent stake in a substantial offshore oil field from the 
South African Petroleum Company in Nigeria.
553
 A mere four years later, CNOOC 
Limited signed a further contract with Britain’s BG Group to purchase upstream 
assets valued approximately US$ 60 billion, by which CNOOC Limited would buy 
3.6 million tonnes per annum (Mtpa) of liquified natural gas (LNG) from the British 
firm’s Queensland project located on Australia’s east coast.554  
 
By 2010, CNOOC Limited owned net proved reserves of around 2.66 billion Barrel 
of Oil Equivalents (BOE), while its average daily net production was 623,896 BOE. 
Moreover, CNOOC Limited had over 4,000 employees, with its total asset worth 
approximately US$ 36,805,370,000.
555
  
 
                                                             
552
 See McMillan, Alex Frew, “CNOOC Buys Indonesian Oil Fields”, CNN, January 21, 2002, available at: 
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/BUSINESS/asia/01/21/ind.cnooc/index.html, accessed January 18, 2011.  
553
 See Goodman, Peter S., “CNOOC Buys Oil Interest In Nigeria”, The Washington Post, January 10, 2006, 
available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/09/AR2006010901779.html, 
accessed January 19, 2011.  
554
 See The Sydney Morning Herald, “Australia’s Biggest-ever Gas Deal Inked”, The Sydney Morning Herald, 
March 24, 2010, available at: 
http://www.smh.com.au/business/australias-biggestever-gas-deal-inked-20100324-qvd3.html, accessed 
January 19, 2011. 
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 See China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC Group), Company Profile, available at: 
http://www.cnoocltd.com/encnoocltd/aboutus/default.shtml, accessed January 19, 2011.  
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b) Corporate Structure and Ownership Structure 
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Table 6.7 Major Shareholders and Shareholdings of China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) Limited 2000-2011 
Year 
Total Number of Outstanding 
Shares of CNOOC Limited 
Number of Outstanding 
American Depositary Shares 
(ADS) 
Percentage of All 
Outstanding Shares 
(Underlying Ownership of 
ADS) 
Number of ADS 
Record Holders 
Controlling 
Shareholders 
Number of Shares 
Owned by Controlling 
Shareholder 
Percentage of Total 
Shareholding (Shares 
held by Controlling 
Shareholders) 
2000 8,214,165,655 23,979,943 5.8% 1505 CNOOC Group(1) 5,800,000,000 70.61%(2) 
2001 8,214,165,655 ?* ? ? CNOOC Group 5,800,000,000 70.61% 
2002 8,214,165,655 ?* ? ? CNOOC Group 5,800,000,000 70.61% 
2003 41,061,951,275(3) 11,385,465 9.44% 12 CNOOC Group 29,000,000,000 70.625%(4) 
2004 41,054,675,375 7,463,545 1.8% 17 CNOOC Group 29,000,000,000 70.64%(5) 
2005 41,054,675,375 8,661,634 2.0% 24 CNOOC Group 28,772,727,273 66.41%(6) 
2006 43,328,552,648 13,913,503 3.2% 22 CNOOC Group 28,772,727,273 66.41% 
2007 44,302,616,976 11,651,950 2.61% 28 CNOOC Group 28,772,727,273 64.41%(7) 
2008 44,669,199,984 12,440,689 2.8% 29 CNOOC Group 28,772,727,273 64.41% 
2009 44,669,199,984 10,781,476 2.4% 38 CNOOC Group 28,772,727,273 64.41% 
2010 44,669,199,984 12,945,022 2.9% 42 CNOOC Group 28,772,727,273 64.41% 
2011 44,646,305,984 13,346,202 3.0% 45 CNOOC Group** 28,772,727,273 64.45%(8) 
Source: Adapted from China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) Limited 2000-2010 Annual Reports and CNOOC Limited Annual Reports On Form 20-F 2000-2011556 
                                                             
556
 China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) Limited, CNOOC Limited Annual Reports 1999-2011, available at: http://www.cnoocltd.com/encnoocltd/tzzgx/dqbd/nianbao/default.shtml, accessed 
October 25, 2012; and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) Limited, CNOOC Limited Annual Reports On Form 20-F 2000-2011, available at: 
http://www.cnoocltd.com/encnoocltd/tzzgx/dqbd/f20f/default.shtml, accessed October 25, 2012.  
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* CNOOC Limited did not disclose these figures in its annual reports and Forms 20-F 
** There was no other shareholder who held more than 5% of CNOOC Limited’s shares from 2000 to 2011 
(1) CNOOC Group indirectly owned the shares of CNOOC Limited through two wholly-owned offshore subsidiaries: Overseas Oil & Gas Corporation, Ltd. (Bermuda) and CNOOC (BVI) Limited (British 
Virgin Islands). 
(2) Other shares were held by public shareholders, corporate investors and strategic investors. 
(3) On March 17, 2004, the shareholders of CNOOC Limited approved a five-for-one stock split of CNOOC Limited’s shares; the stock split was effected by dividing the shares of HK$0.10 each into the 
shares of HK$0.02 each. Then the number of shares owned by CNOOC Group changed from 5,800,000,000 to 29,000,000,000. 
(4) In May 2004, CNOOC Limited repurchased a total of 8,877,000 shares on the open market based on the general mandate approved by the shareholders on May 29, 2003, and these repurchased shares 
were cancelled. Then, CNOOC Group’s interest in CNOOC Limited increased from 70.61% to 70.625% due to the decrease of total issued and outstanding shares. 
(5) In 2004, CNOOC Limited repurchased a total of 18,453,000 shares on the open market based on the general mandate approved by the shareholders on June 14, 2004, and these repurchased shares were 
cancelled. Then, CNOOC Group’s interest in CNOOC Limited increased from 70.625% to 70.64% due to the decrease to total issued and outstanding shares. 
(6) As of June 6, 2006, CNOOC Group’s interest in CNOOC Limited was reduced from 70.64% to 66.41% as a result of placing 2,500,000,000 existing shares to independent investors and subscribing 
2,272,727,273 new shares by CNOOC (BVI) Limited.  
(7) CNOOC Group’s share ownership decreased from 66.41% to 64.41% as of May 30, 2008 due to an increase in CNOOC Limited’s total outstanding shares as a result of the conversion of bonds and the 
exercise of options. 
(8) In 2011, CNOOC Limited repurchased some shares in the open market and these repurchased shares were cancelled. Then, CNOOC Group’s interest in CNOOC Limited increased from 64.41% to 64.45% 
due to the decrease to total issued and outstanding shares.  
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As mentioned earlier, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) Limited is 
a major state-owned petrochemical enterprise. As illustrated in Table 6.7, CNOOC 
Group, which was also a state-owned company, was the dominant shareholder of 
CNOOC Limited. CNOOC Group held about 91.5% of CNOOC Limited’s shares 
prior to CNOOC Limited’s IPO; then CNOOC Group sold some shares after the IPO 
and kept a 70.61% holding in CNOOC Limited in 2000. From 2000 to 2004, 
CNOOC Group’s interest in CNOOC Limited increased slightly since CNOOC 
repurchased some shares on the open market, and then cancelled these shares. From 
2004 to 2011, CNOOC Group’s existing percentage holding in CNOOC Limited had 
dipped from 70.6% to 64.4%, the major cause of which was that CNOOC Group had 
placed some existing shares to independent investors and subscribed some new 
shares to CNOOC (BVI) Limited. However, CNOOC Group still retained its 
position as controlling shareholder.  
 
Table 6.7 clearly revealed that CNOOC Group was able to exercise all the rights of a 
controlling shareholder, including electing the directors of CNOOC Limited and 
approving the general mandate for repurchasing the shares of CNOOC Limited on 
the open market (and then cancelling these shares). Besides, CNOOC Group could 
also place the shares of CNOOC Limited to independent investors and strategic 
investors. Significantly, there was no other shareholder who held more than 5% 
shares of CNOOC Limited, apart from CNOOC Group.  
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It should also be noted that the underlying ownership of outstanding American 
Depositary Shares (ADS) actually accounted for only a small fraction of the total 
ownership of CNOOC Limited from 2000 to 2011. With the underlying ownership of 
ADS making up of about 5.8% of all outstanding shares after the IPO of CNOOC 
Limited in 2000, this figure rose to 9.4% in 2003.
557
 Nevertheless, this figure then 
dropped suddenly in the following years, and generally stayed below 3%. Another 
issue deserving attention is that the number of ADS record holders was 1,505 after 
the IPO of CNOOC Limited, but this number declined sharply to only several dozen 
within 2 years. It seems that only foreign strategic investors and foreign corporate 
investors would like to hold the shares of CNOOC Limited for a long term.  
 
c) Board Composition and Supervisory Board Composition 
CNOOC Limited provided detailed information about the composition of its board 
of directors and supervisory board in its annual reports and Forms 20-F. The board of 
CNOOC Limited had ten members by 2011, which included two executive directors, 
four non-executive directors and four independent non-executive directors. 
Furthermore, CNOOC Limited had also established three board sub-committees 
including an audit committee, remuneration committee and nomination committee. It 
should be noted that WANG Yilin, the chairman of CNOOC Limited’s board, also 
served as the chairman of CNOOC Group. Technically, some of CNOOC Limited’s 
                                                             
557
 CNOOC Limited did not disclose the number of outstanding ADS and the ADS’s underlying ownership of 
2001 and 2002 in its annual reports, but there was presumably no great variation in these figures, since the 
total number of all CNOOC Limited’s outstanding shares had not changed in such two years.  
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corporate governance practices did not follow the corporate governance standards 
applicable to U.S. domestic companies listed on the NYSE, and CNOOC Limited 
disclosed these significant differences in its Forms 20-F.
558
  
 
The composition of CNOOC Limited’s board revealed once again that the majority 
shareholder status enabled CNOOC Group to appoint almost all directors. Moreover, 
Mr M (Interviewee No.13), who served as a senior manager in a large Chinese 
petrochemical SOE, said in his written responses to the empirical questionnaire that 
he did not think these independent non-executive directors would play a substantial 
part in the corporate governance practice of a large Chinese petrochemical SOE such 
as CNOOC Limited, although such independent non-executive directors normally 
had a vast store of financial and legal knowledge, as well as greater experience of 
industry. In crude terms, the board of CNOOC Limited generally could take an 
important corporate decision without considering the views of the independent 
non-executive directors. Nevertheless, Mr M felt sure that the independent 
non-executive directors would definitely give objective opinions in the board 
meetings freely, since they would have to accept responsibility if they failed to do so, 
especially if there were any costly incorrect decisions.  
 
As the chairman of CNOOC Group, which was the controlling shareholder of 
CNOOC Limited, simultaneously doubled as the chairman of CNOOC Limited, it 
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 China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) Limited, CNOOC Limited Annual Reports On Form 20-F 
2000-2011, Item 6 Directors, Senior Management and Employees: C Board Practice, available at: 
http://www.cnoocltd.com/encnoocltd/tzzgx/dqbd/f20f/default.shtml, accessed October 28, 2012.  
  
 
295 
could be argued that the corporate structure of CNOOC Limited still followed the 
example of a traditional Chinese SOE. With CNOOC Group appointing almost all 
board members of CNOOC Limited, it is highly disputable whether the interests of 
minority shareholders and other stakeholders could be represented. CNOOC 
Limited’s corporate governance patterns still reflected insider control system patterns, 
and this fact can prove Proposition 2. 
 
Notwithstanding directors and senior managers being prohibited from siting on the 
supervisory board by Article 118 of China’s Company Law, large Chinese SOEs 
such as CNOOC Limited were entitled to designate senior officials from the 
company’s internal Chinese Communist party committee as supervisors. Mr E 
(Interviewee No.5), who had represented numerous large Chinese companies, argued 
there was no reason to suppose that these senior officials of a company’s internal 
Chinese Communist party committee played only a negligible role in the supervisory 
board. In addition, Mr E held that these senior party committee officials had a 
general responsibility for the monitoring of the supervisory board, and that all other 
supervisors were under their supervision. He believed that the existence of the 
internal party committee introduced an element of ambiguity into the board structure 
of Chinese companies, especially for those giant Chinese SOEs. As the political 
stability of strategically important Chinese SOEs was always of primary national 
importance, the senior officials of the internal party committee could use their own 
discretion to launch disciplinary inspections against almost any director or 
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supervisor as they saw appropriate. This practice could be deemed as a reflection of 
the typical Confucian-style business ethics that the Chinese government pursued, 
and also suggests that the board structure of China’s companies was still largely 
grounded in the political hierarchy.  
 
d) Related Party Transactions and Corporate Governance  
The related party transactions of CNOOC Limited were disclosed in the annual 
reports and Forms 20-F. CNOOC Limited entered into a considerable number of 
continuing connected transactions with CNOOC Group and its subsidiaries, which 
generally involved provision of exploration and support services. Seemingly, these 
related party transactions were conducted on a commercial basis. The disclosure of 
these related party transactions at least could suggest that CNOOC Limited had 
observed the disclosure requirements set out in the listing rules of the NYSE. 
Overseas listing probably could not remedy all the inherent problems of corporate 
governance in Chinese SOEs, but it would improve some aspects of their corporate 
governance. This point has been stated in Proposition 4.  
  
 
297 
CHAPTER 7. MAINLAND CHINESE CORPORATIONS LISTED ON THE 
HONG KONG STOCK EXCHANGE (HKEX): THE CASE STUDIES  
The Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) grew out of the Association of 
Stockbrokers, which was the first formal stock market of Hong Kong established in 
1891. Another Hong Kong Stockbrokers’ Association was incorporated in 1921. 
These two exchanges were consolidated for greater efficiency in 1947, and this 
consolidation formed the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. After the Second World War, 
Hong Kong gradually established other three stock exchanges: the Far East 
Exchange, Kam Ngan Stock Exchange and Kowloon Stock Exchange. These four 
stock exchanges were fused into the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong in 1980s, which 
was the only unified stock market in Hong Kong. 
 
When the Hong Kong government raised several proposals to reform the stock and 
futures markets in late 1990s, the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (SEHK), 
Hong Kong Futures Exchange Limited (HKFE) and Hong Kong Securities Clearing 
Company Limited (HKSCC) contracted a merger in 1999, which created a new 
single holding company: the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx). 
Then, the HKEx listed itself on the SEHK in June 2000.
559
 
 
With the HKEx an already leading and formidable stock market in the Asia-Pacific 
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 See Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx), About HKEx, Corporate Information: History of HKEx and its Markets, 
available at: http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/exchange/corpinfo/history/history.htm, accessed October 31, 2012.  
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region, its rigorous market regulation, sound risk management system as well as its 
geographical proximity to Mainland China made the HKEx a very popular overseas 
listing venue for Chinese companies.  
 
This chapter will try to study three representative Mainland companies listed on the 
HKEx. Hopefully, the case studies of this chapter will provide some corroborative 
evidence for the propositions stated in Chapter 1.  
 
I. THE CHINA PETROLEUM & CHEMICAL CORPORATION LIMITED (SINOPEC 
LIMITED) 
a) Overview  
The China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as 
“Sinopec Limited”) was a China-based energy and chemical joint stock company 
established on February 25, 2000. Sinopec Limited was also the majority-owned 
listing arm of China Petrochemical Corporation (hereinafter referred to as “Sinopec 
Group”), which was incorporated by China’s central government in 1998 based on 
the former China Petrochemical Corporation. As Sinopec Group was one of the 
major petroleum SOEs in China, Sinopec Limited rationally obtained its upstream 
oil asset base from its state-controlled parent company.  
 
Sinopec Limited mainly engaged in oil and gas operations in China, and its business 
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covered exploitation of crude oil and natural gas, pipeline transportation of crude oil 
and crude oil refinement, together with petrochemical production. As of 2010, 
Sinopec Limited operated sixteen oil and gas production bureaus, and the Shengli 
oilfield bureau located in northern Shandong province accounted for around 60 per 
cent of total production in 2009.
560
 In 2009, Sinopec produced about 962 thousand 
barrels of oil equivalent (BOE) per day, of which around 85 per cent was crude oil. 
By the end of 2009, Sinopec’s proved reserves of crude oil and natural gas were 
approximately 3,943 million BOE.
561
 In 2010, Sinopec Limited ranked first again in 
the Top 500 Enterprises of China ranking.
562
 In 2009, Sinopec was ranked 9
th
 by the 
Fortune Global 500, when it was actually the first Chinese company that had 
featured in the top ten. In 2010, it improved its Fortune Global 500 ranking from 9
th
 
to 7
th
, with annual revenues of US$ 187,518 million, and profits of US$ 5,756 
million.
563
  
 
Sinopec Limited was listed on the main board of the HKEx as H shares on October 
19, 2000, whilst also simultaneously floating in New York and London.
564
 In June 
                                                             
560
 See China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Limited (Sinopec Limited), U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Filings FORM 20-F (Annual Report), April 30, 2010, Item 4: Information on the Company, 
available at: http://secfilings.nyse.com/files.php?symbol=SNP&fg=24, accessed January 30, 2011.  
561
 See China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Limited (Sinopec Limited), U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Filings FORM 20-F (Annual Report), April 30, 2010, Item 4: Information on the Company, 
Section B Business Overview, available at: http://secfilings.nyse.com/files.php?symbol=SNP&fg=24, accessed 
January 30, 2011.  
562
 See Xinhua News Agency, “Sinopec Leads ‘Top 500 Enterprises of China’”, Economic Observer, September 06, 
2010, available at: http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/homepage/haedlinescanner/2010/09/06/180026.shtml, 
accessed January 30, 2011.  
563
 See CNNMoney, Fortune Global 500 Full List, available at: 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2010/full_list/, accessed January 30, 2011.  
564
 The stock symbol of Sinopec Limited on the HKEx is 0386, and on the NYSE and London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
is SNP.  
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2001, Sinopec completed its listing on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE).
565
 
Sinopec’s total number of shares was 86.7 billion by the end of 2009, of which 75.84 
per cent were held by Sinopec Group, 19.35 per cent of shares were listed overseas 
and 4.81 per cent were domestic public shares.
566
  
 
b) Corporate Structure and Ownership Structure 
 
                                                             
565
 The stock symbol of Sinopec Limited on the SSE is 600028.  
566
 See China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Limited (Sinopec Limited), Our Company section, available at: 
http://english.sinopec.com/about_sinopec/our_company/20100328/8532.shtml, accessed January 30, 2011.  
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Table 7.1 The Share Capital of China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Limited (Sinopec Limited) 2000-2011 
Year Nature of Shares Prior to Changes After changes Percentage of share capital 
2000 
State-owned domestic shares 67,121,951,000 67,121,951,000 80% 
H shares 16,780,488,000 16,780,488,000 20% 
Total number 83,902,439,000 83,902,439,000 100% 
2001 
State-owned shares 67,121,951,000 67,121,951,000 77.4% 
A shares(1) 2,800,000,000 2,800,000,000 3.2% 
H shares 16,780,488,000 16,780,488,000 19.3% 
Total number 86,702,439,000 86,702,439,000 100%* 
2002 
Shares not listed 
State-owned shares 47,742,561,000 47,742,561,000 55% 
A shares not in circulation(2) 570,000,000 0 0% 
Others(3) 19,379,390,000 19,379,390,000 22.3% 
Total number of shares not in circulation 67,691,951,000 67,121,951,000 77.4% 
Shares listed 
A shares 2,230,000,000 2,800,000,000 3.2% 
H shares 16,780,488,000 16,780,488,000 19.3% 
Total number of outstanding shares 19,010,488,000 19,580,488,000 22.5% 
Total number of shares 86,702,439,000 86,702,439,000 100% 
2003 
Shares not listed 
State-owned shares 47,742,561,000 47,742,561,000 55% 
Others 19,379,390,000 19,379,390,000 22.3% 
Total number of shares not in circulation 67,121,951,000 67,121,951,000 77.4% 
Shares listed 
A shares 2,800,000,000 2,800,000,000 3.2% 
H shares 16,780,488,000 16,780,488,000 19.3% 
Total number of outstanding shares 19,580,488,000 19,580,488,000 22.5% 
Total number of shares 86,702,439,000 86,702,439,000 100% 
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2004 
Shares not listed 
State-owned shares 47,742,561,000 58,885,561,000 67.9% 
Others 19,379,390,000 8,236,390,000 9.4% 
Total number of shares not in circulation 67,121,951,000 67,121,950,000 77.4% 
Shares listed 
A shares 2,800,000,000 2,800,000,000 3.2% 
H shares 16,780,488,000 16,780,488,000 19.3% 
Total number of outstanding shares 19,580,488,000 19,580,488,000 22.5% 
Total number of shares 86,702,439,000 86,702,439,000 100% 
2005 
Shares not listed 
State-owned shares 58,885,561,000 61,757,325,000 71.2% 
Others 8,236,390,000 5,364,626,000 6.2% 
Total number of shares not in circulation 67,121,951,000 67,121,951,000 77.4% 
Shares listed 
A shares 2,800,000,000 2,800,000,000 3.2% 
H shares 16,780,488,000 16,780,488,000 19.3% 
Total number of outstanding shares 19,580,488,000 19,580,488,000 22.5% 
Total number of shares 86,702,439,000 86,702,439,000 100% 
2006 
Shares not listed 
State-owned shares 66,535,191,000 65,758,044,000 75.84% 
Legal person shares 586,760,000 579,907,000 0.67% 
Total number of shares not in circulation 67,121,951,000 66,337,951,000 76.51% 
Shares listed 
A shares 2,800,000,000 3,584,000,000(4) 4.13% 
H shares 16,780,488,000 16,780,488,000 19.35% 
Total number of outstanding shares 19,580,488,000 20,364,488,000 23.49% 
Total number of shares 86,702,439,000 86,702,439,000 100% 
2007 
Shares not listed 
State-owned shares 66,758,044,000 61,422,922,000 70.84% 
Legal person shares 579,907,000 0 0% 
Total number of shares not in circulation 66,337,951,000 61,422,922,000 70.84% 
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Shares listed 
A shares 3,584,000,000 8,499,029,000 9.8% 
H shares 16,780,488,000 16,780,488,000 19.35% 
Total number of outstanding shares 20,346,488,000 25,279,517,000 29.15% 
Total number of shares 86,702,439,000 86,702,439,000 100% 
2008 
Shares not listed State-owned shares 61,422,922,000 57,087,800,000 65.84% 
Total number of shares not in circulation 61,422,922,000 57,087,800,000 65.84% 
Shares listed 
A shares 8,499,029,000 12,834,151,000 14.8% 
H shares 16,780,488,000 16,780,488,000 19.35% 
Total number of outstanding shares 25,279,517,000 29,614,639,000 34.16% 
Total number of shares 86,702,439,000 86,702,439,000 100% 
2009 
Shares not listed State-owned shares 57,087,800,000 0 0% 
Total number of shares not in circulation 57,087,800,000 0 0% 
Shares listed 
A shares 12,834,151,000 69,921,951,000 80.65% 
H shares 16,780,488,000 16,780,488,000 19.35% 
Total number of outstanding shares 29,614,639,000 86,702,439,000 100% 
Total number of shares 86,702,439,000 86,702,439,000 100% 
2010 
Shares listed 
A shares 69,921,951,000 69,922,040,000 80.65% 
H shares 16,780,488,000 16,780,488,000 19.35% 
Total number of shares 86,702,439,000 86,702,528,000(5) 100% 
2011 
Shares listed 
A shares 69,922,040,000 69,922,074,000 80.65% 
H shares 16,780,488,000 16,780,488,000 19.35% 
Total number of shares 86,702,528,000 86,702,562,000 100% 
Source: Adapted from China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Limited (Sinopec Limited) 2000-2011 Annual Reports567 
                                                             
567
 China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Limited (Sinopec Limited), Sinopec Limited Annual Reports 2000-2011, available at: http://english.sinopec.com/investor_center/reports/, accessed October 30, 
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* Percentage of individual items may not add up to total figure due to rounding 
(1) Sinopec Limited issued 2.8 million A shares in the PRC market on July 16, 2001 with an issue price of RMB 4.22. 
(2) 0.57 billion A shares listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) April 8, 2002 were held by strategic investors with a lock-up period of eight months. 
(3) “Others” under the “Shares not listed” refers to the balance of shares which were transferred from China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec Group) to domestic asset management corporations in 2000.  
(4) Sinopec Limited implemented A-share reform on non-tradable shares in October 2006. 
(5) Sinopec Limited’s A shares increased by 88,774 between February 25, 2010 and March 3, 2010 as a result of partial exercise of the warrants embedded in its RMB 30 billion Bond with Warrants.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
2012.  
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As illustrated in Table 7.1, state-owned shares accounted for 80% of Sinopec 
Limited’s all share in 2000, while the remaining 20% were H shares. Sinopec 
Limited issued 2.8 million A shares in the PRC market in July 2001, which 
accounted for 3.2% of its all shares. The lock-up period of these A shares held by 
strategic investors was only eight months, thus all A shares were in circulation after 
2003. The percentage of Sinopec Limited’s non-circulating shares, which included 
state-owned shares and shares held by domestic asset management companies had 
been consistently maintained at 77.4% from 2001 to 2005. This figure declined 
progressively after 2006, and dropped to 65.84% in 2008. Sinopec Limited 
accomplished the Spilt Share Structure Reform in 2009, when all its shares had been 
converted into outstanding shares. By 2011, Sinopec Limited issued 86,702,528,000 
shares in total, of which 80.65% were A shares and the remaining 19.35% H shares.  
 
It seems that the Spilt Share Structure Reform had produced a certain effect, since 
there were no non-circulating shares for Sinopec Limited, such as state-owned shares 
or legal person shares any longer. But some interviewees suggested that this was 
little more than a formality, as Sinopec Limited would not sell off its shares unless it 
had obtained such instructions from higher authorities.  
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Table 7.2 The Shareholdings of Principal Shareholders of China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Limited (Sinopec Limited) 2000-2011 
Year Name of Shareholders Number of Shares Held Nature of Shares Held Type of Shares Held Total Shareholdings 
2000 
China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec Group) 47,742,610,000 State-owned shares Non-tradable 56.9% 
HKSCC (Nominees) Limited 8,812,830,000 H shares Tradable 10.50% 
China Development Bank 8,775,570,000 State-owned shares Non-tradable 10.46% 
China Cinda Asset Management Corporation 8,720,650,00 State-owned shares Non-tradable 10.39% 
2001 
Sinopec Group 47,743,000,000 State-owned shares Non-tradable 55.06% 
China Development Bank 8,776,000,000 State-owned shares Non-tradable 10.12% 
China Cinda Asset Management Corporation 8,721,000,000 State-owned shares Non-tradable 10.05% 
2002 
Sinopec Group 47,742,561,000 State-owned shares Non-tradable 55.06% 
HKSCC (Nominees) Limited 8,948,143,000 H shares Tradable 10.32% 
China Development Bank 8,775,570,000 State-owned shares Non-tradable 10.12% 
China Cinda Asset Management Corporation 8,720,650,000 State-owned shares Non-tradable 10.06% 
ExxonMobil Far East Holdings Ltd. 3,168,529,000 H shares Tradable 3.65% 
Shell Eastern (PTE) Ltd. 1,966,422,000 H shares Tradable 2.27% 
BP Oil Espana S.A. 1,829,229,000 H shares Tradable 2.11% 
China Orient Asset Management Corporation 1,296,410,000 State-owned shares Non-tradable 1.50% 
Guo Tai Jun An Corporation 586,760,000 State-owned shares Non-tradable 0.68% 
TOPGOAL Company 339,065,000 H shares Tradable 0.39% 
2003 
Sinopec Group 47,742,561,000 State-owned shares Non-tradable 55.06% 
HKSCC (Nominees) Limited 11,639,618,000 H shares Tradable 13.42% 
China Development Bank 8,775,570,000 State-owned shares Non-tradable 10.12% 
China Cinda Asset Management Corporation 8,720,650,000 State-owned shares Non-tradable 10.06% 
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ExxonMobil Far East Holdings Ltd. 3,168,529,000 H shares Tradable 3.65% 
BP Oil Espana S.A. 1,829,229,000 H shares Tradable 2.11% 
China Orient Asset Management Corporation 1,296,410,000 State-owned shares Non-tradable 1.50% 
Guo Tai Jun An Corporation 597,188,000 
State-owned shares and A 
shares(1) 
Non-tradable / Tradable 0.69% 
Social Security Fund Portfolio 107 72,100,000 A shares Tradable 0.08% 
Xinghe Securities Investment Fund 61,948,000 A shares Tradable 0.07% 
2004 
Sinopec Group 58,885,561,000 State-owned shares Non-tradable 67.92% 
HKSCC (Nominees) Limited 16,678,790,000 H shares Tradable 19.24% 
China Cinda Asset Management Corporation 3,720,650,000 State-owned shares Non-tradable 4.29% 
China Development Bank 2,632,570,000 State-owned shares Non-tradable 3.04% 
China Orient Asset Management Corporation 1,296,410,000 State-owned shares Non-tradable 1.50% 
Guo Tai Jun An Corporation 586,760,000 Legal person shares Non-tradable 0.68% 
EFUND 50 Securities Investment Fund 73,109,000 A shares Tradable 0.08% 
Xinghe Securities Investment Fund 64,387,000 A shares Tradable 0.07% 
Qingdao Port Authority 60,000,000 A shares Tradable 0.07% 
Harvest Service Sector Fund 59,749,000 A shares Tradable 0.07% 
2005 
Sinopec Group 61,757,325,000 State-owned shares Non-tradable 71.2% 
HKSCC (Nominees) Limited 16,679,304,000 H shares Tradable 19.2% 
China Cinda Asset Management Corporation 2,848,886,000 State-owned shares Non-tradable 3.3% 
China Orient Asset Management Corporation 1,296,410,000 State-owned shares Non-tradable 1.5% 
China Development Bank 632,570,000 State-owned shares Non-tradable 0.7% 
Guo Tai Jun An Corporation 605,041,000 
Legal person shares and A 
shares(2) 
Non-tradable / Tradable 0.7% 
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Fortis Haitong Growth Investment Fund 89,668,000 A shares Tradable 0.1% 
EFUND 50 Securities Investment Fund 70,984,000 A shares Tradable 0.1% 
Shanghai Securities 50ETF Investment Fund 67,016,000 A shares Tradable 0.1% 
Qingdao Port (Group) Co Ltd. 60,000,000 A shares Tradable 0.1% 
2006 
Sinopec Group 65,758,044,000 State-owned shares Non-tradable 75.84% 
HKSCC (Nominees) Limited 16,685,675,000 H shares Tradable 19.24% 
Guo Tai Jun An Corporation 579,964,000 
Legal person shares and A 
shares 
Non-tradable / Tradable 0.67% 
Southern Supreme Growth Stock Investment Fund 134,174,000 A shares Tradable 0.15% 
China Life Insurance Company Limited - Dividend - Individual 
Dividend - 005L - FH002 Shanghai 
127,369,000 A shares Tradable 0.15% 
Guangfa Strategic Selected Mixed Equity Investment Fund 93,836,000 A shares Tradable 0.11% 
EFUND Stable Growth Securities Investment Fund 89,796,000 A shares Tradable 0.10% 
EFUND Value Selected Stock Securities Investment Fund 81,580,000 A shares Tradable 0.09% 
China Life Insurance (Group) Company - Traditional - Ordinary 
Insurance Product 
78,913,000 A shares Tradable 0.09% 
Harvest Theme Selected Mixed Securities Investment Fund 68,676,000 A shares Tradable 0.08% 
2007 
Sinopec Group 65,758,044,000 State-owned shares Non-tradable 75.84% 
HKSCC (Nominees) Limited 16,699,595,000 H shares Tradable 19.26% 
Guo Tai Jun An Securities Co. Ltd. 579,906,000 Legal person shares Non-tradable 0.67% 
E Fund 50 Index Equity Investment Fund 130,790,000 A shares Tradable 0.15% 
Shanghai Stock Exchange Tradable Open-end Index Securities 
Investment Fund 
84,725,000 A shares Tradable 0.10% 
Harvest Shanghai & Shenzhen 300 Index Securities Investment Fund 75,918,000 A shares Tradable 0.09% 
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Bosera Thematic Sector Equity Securities Investment Fund 70,229,000 A shares Tradable 0.08% 
Bank of Communication Schroders Blue Chip Securities Investment 
Fund 
50,257,000 A shares Tradable 0.06% 
China Post Core Growth Securities Investment Fund 44,000,000 A shares Tradable 0.05% 
China Life Insurance Company Limited - Dividend - Individual 
Dividend - 005L - FH002 Shanghai 
37,000,000 A shares Tradable 0.04% 
2008 
Sinopec Group 65,758,044,000 State-owned shares Non-tradable 75.84% 
HKSCC (Nominees) Limited 16,687,682,000 H shares Tradable 19.25% 
Guo Tai Jun An Securities Co. Ltd. 377,906,000 A shares Tradable 0.44% 
Rongtong New Blue Chip Securities Investment Fund 76,462,000 A shares Tradable 0.09% 
Bosera Thematic Sector Equity Securities Investment Fund 75,000,000 A shares Tradable 0.09% 
Shanghai Stock Exchange Tradable Open-end Index Securities 
Investment Fund 
58,346,000 A shares Tradable 0.07% 
Everbright Baodexin Quantative Core Securities Investment Fund 51,056,000 A shares Tradable 0.06% 
China Social Security Fund 102 Portfolio 50,617,000 A shares Tradable 0.06% 
E Fund 50 Index Securities Investment Fund 50,334,000 A shares Tradable 0.06% 
Shanghai Investment & Morgan China Premium Securities 
Investment Fund 
49,827,000 A shares Tradable 0.06% 
2009 
Sinopec Group 65,758,044,000 State-owned shares Non-tradable 75.84% 
HKSCC (Nominees) Limited 16,675,277,000 H shares Tradable 19.23% 
China Life Insurance Corporation - Dividend - Individual Dividend - 
005L - FH002 Shanghai 
2,567,820,000 A shares Tradable 0.30% 
Guo Tai Jun An Securities Co. Ltd. 2,544,840,000 A shares Tradable 0.29% 
Bosera Thematic Sector Securities Investment Fund 750,000,000 A shares Tradable 0.09% 
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Changsheng Tongqing Separately-traded Stock Fund 600,270,000 A shares Tradable 0.07% 
Shanghai Investment & Morgan China Premium Securities 
Investment Fund 
440,000,000 A shares Tradable 0.05% 
Shanghai Stock Exchange Tradable Open-ended Index 50 Fund 395,540,000 A shares Tradable 0.05% 
Fortune SGAM Selected Sectors Fund 360,900,000 A shares Tradable 0.04% 
China AMC GARP Fund 354,610,000 A shares Tradable 0.04% 
2010 
Sinopec Group 65,758,044,000 A shares Tradable 75.84% 
HKSCC (Nominees) Limited 16,658,226,000 H shares Tradable 19.21% 
Guo Tai Jun An Securities Co. Ltd. 256,081,000 A shares Tradable 0.30% 
China Life Insurance Company Limited - Dividend - Individual 
Dividend - 005L - FH002 Shanghai 
140,750,000 A shares Tradable 0.16% 
Postfund Core Growth Equity Investment Fund 62,871,000 A shares Tradable 0.07% 
Postfund Core Selected Equity Investment Fund 55,854,000 A shares Tradable 0.06% 
Shanghai Stock Exchange Tradable Open-ended Index 50 Fund 38,625,000 A shares Tradable 0.04% 
E-Fund 50 Index Equity Investment Fund 35,344,000 A shares Tradable 0.04% 
Changsheng Tongqing Detachable Trading Equity Investment Fund 33,899,000 A shares Tradable 0.04% 
PICC Life Insurance Company Limited - Dividend - Individual 
Dividend 
32,747,000 A shares Tradable 0.04% 
2011 
Sinopec Group 65,758,044,000 A shares Tradable 75.84% 
HKSCC (Nominees) Limited 16,671,989,000 H shares Tradable 19.23% 
Guo Tai Jun An Securities Co. Ltd. 256,751,000 A shares Tradable 0.30% 
China Life Insurance Company Limited - Bonus - Personal Bonus - 
005L - FH002 Shanghai 
170,958,000 A shares Tradable 0.20% 
PICC Life Insurance Company Limited - Bonus - Personal Insurance 143,124,000 A shares Tradable 0.17% 
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Bonus 
Hua An Hongli Stock Securities Investment Fund 73,700,000 A shares Tradable 0.09% 
Harvest Theme New Dynamic Equity Securities Investment Fund 42,040,000 A shares Tradable 0.05% 
Shanghai Stock Exchange Traded Open-ended Index 50 Fund 41,943,000 A shares Tradable 0.05% 
Social Security Fund 101 Portfolio 33,707,000 A shares Tradable 0.04% 
Taikang Life Insurance Co. Ltd. - Bonus - Personal Bonus - 019L - 
FH002 Shanghai 
30,500,000 A shares Tradable 0.04% 
Source: Adapted from China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Limited (Sinopec Limited) 2000-2011 Annual Reports568 
(1) These shares included 586.76 million State-owned shares and 10.428 million A shares. 
(2) These shares included 586.76 million Legal Person shares and 18.281 million A shares.  
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 China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Limited (Sinopec Limited), Sinopec Limited Annual Reports 2000-2011, available at: http://english.sinopec.com/investor_center/reports/, accessed October 30, 
2012.  
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Table 7.2 shows that China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec Group) held 
47,742,610,000 state-owned shares of Sinopec Limited in 2000, which accounted for 
56.9% of all Sinopec Limited’s shares. Apart from HKSCC (Nominees) Limited, 
which kept 10.5% of Sinopec Limited’s shares (H shares), China Development Bank 
and China Cinda Asset Management Corporation respectively held about 10% of 
Sinopec Limited’s state-owned shares. In 2002 and 2003, several foreign investors, 
such as ExxonMobil and Shell, began to invest in the H shares of Sinopec Limited, 
but Sinopec Group still retained its controlling shareholder position since it still held 
over 55% of Sinopec Limited’s shares. The percentage of shares held by Sinopec 
Group began to rise after 2004, climbing to 75.84% in 2006. Then, this figure 
remained unchanged between 2007 and 2011. Significantly, there was no shareholder 
holding 10% or more of Sinopec Limited’s shares after 2004, except HKSCC 
(Nominees) Limited.  
 
Sinopec Limited implemented A-share reform in late 2006, by which the 
shareholders of non-tradable shares paid a total of 784,000,000 shares to the 
shareholders of tradable A shares as compensation.
569
 Besides, the former 
non-tradable shares were divided into three parts, and the lock-up periods of these 
three parts expired in 2007, 2008 and 2009, respectively.  
 
Technically, no other shareholder held more than 0.30% of the issued shares of 
                                                             
569
 China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Limited (Sinopec Limited), Sinopec Limited Annual Reports 2006, p. 
38, available at: http://english.sinopec.com/investor_center/reports/, accessed October 31, 2012.  
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Sinopec Limited apart from Sinopec Group and HKSCC (Nominees) Limited in 
2011. When Sinopec Group was an SOE, directly controlled by the SASAC, Sinopec 
Limited’s ownership structure still followed the typical Chinese SOEs’ model. It 
would be very difficult for other shareholders to challenge Sinopec Group’s control 
over Sinopec Limited, since their shareholdings were totally insignificant.  
 
c) Board Composition and Corporate Governance 
Sinopec Limited’s board of directors consisted of fifteen male members in 2011, 
which included a chairman, vice chairman, president, senior vice president, directors 
and independent non-executive directors. None of these members held shares of 
Sinopec Limited as of 2011, except the 10,000 A shares of Sinopec Limited held by 
vice president LING Yiqun.
570
 Besides, Sinopec Limited had established several 
special committees under the board, such as an audit committee and compensation 
committee. The supervisory board of Sinopec Limited had nine members, including 
two independent supervisors and four employee’s representative supervisors. The 
composition of Sinopec Limited’s board of directors and supervisory board fulfilled 
all the criteria stipulated by China’s Company Law.  
 
Apart from Sinopec Group and HKSCC (Nominees) Limited, no other shareholders 
held more than 0.3% of Sinopec Limited’s shares in 2011. With HKSCC (Nominees) 
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 China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Limited (Sinopec Limited), Sinopec Limited Annual Reports 2011, p. 
43, available at: http://english.sinopec.com/investor_center/reports/, accessed November 1, 2012. 
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Limited being a subsidiary of the HKEx group, all shares held in the HKEx’s Central 
Clearing and Settlement System (CCASS) were registered in the name of HKSCC 
(Nominees) Limited. This indicated that Sinopec Group virtually could appoint 
almost all members of the board and supervisory board, as its shareholding was 
75.84% in 2011.  
 
Sinopec Limited argued in the annual reports that it continued to explore every 
avenue to improve its corporate governance. It was stated that Sinopec Limited had 
conducted self-inspection to prevent insider dealing. Moreover, it took various 
measures to improve the internal control system, as well as enhancing information 
disclosure. Most importantly, Sinopec Limited had complied with the Code on 
Corporate Governance Practices set out in Appendix 14 to the Hong Kong Listing 
Rules. Superficially, Sinopec Limited provided detailed corporate governance 
reports in its annual reports.  
 
Mr E (Interviewee No.5), a British partner lawyer of an international law firm, had 
considerable experience in the corporate and financing field in Mainland China. Mr 
E had advised broad range of Mainland clients, including some large Chinese SOEs, 
on law matters in relation to energy and resource transactions. He thought that the 
listing on a prominent foreign stock exchange such as the HKEx might improve 
some aspects of the Mainland companies’ corporate governance, as the listing rules 
of the HKEx set out stringent mandatory standards for Mainland companies, 
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including strict principles on the remuneration of top executives and the requirement 
to comply with the Code on Corporate Governance Practices of HKEx, as well as the 
higher requirements of transparency in information disclosure.  
 
However, Mr E did not anticipate that the overseas listing would completely 
transform the corporate governance of Chinese companies, especially for those giant 
Chinese SOEs. He argued that the Chinese government always adopted top-down 
management structures for large Mainland resource companies such as Sinopec 
Limited, which meant that the government slanted towards directly appointing most 
senior executives of these companies. Moreover, Mr E suggested that the 
Communist Party’s Committee in Chinese SOEs could play a more vital role than 
the board of directors in some cases, and that the board should refer important 
strategic issues to the Communist Party’s Committee. Mr E’s arguments could lend 
weight to Propositions 4 and 5, as traditional Chinese corporate governance ideas 
will be very likely to remain strong in foreign listed Mainland companies, while 
some aspects of their corporate governance will be improved.  
 
As has been analysed in earlier chapters, agency theory argued that the board chair 
and CEO positions should be divided so as to reinforce the independence of the 
board, as the objective evaluation of the CEO’s work was one of the major 
responsibilities of the board.
571
 Basically, the governance practice of CEO duality 
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 Peng, Mike W.; Zhang, Shujun and Li, Xinchun, “CEO Duality and Firm Performance during China’s 
Institutional Transitions”, Management and Organization Review, Vol. 3, Issue 2, 2007, p. 207.  
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has been steadily abolished in large Chinese companies. However, Mr K 
(Interviewee No.11) argued whether partitioning the positions of board chair and 
CEO would materially affect the corporate governance of China’s large SOEs. The 
fact of the matter was that the board chairs of these large Chinese SOEs were all 
politically appointed by China’s authorities, and thus they naturally had political 
superiority over the CEOs. In essence, the board chair served as the deputy of the 
State within the company.  
 
II. THE PING AN INSURANCE (GROUP) COMPANY OF CHINA LIMITED (PING AN) 
a) Overview  
The Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China Limited (hereinafter referred to 
as “Ping An”) was established in 1988 in Shenzhen. As Ping An was the first 
insurance company that adopted a shareholding structure in China, it together with 
its subsidiaries mainly engaged in insurance services, banking and investment 
businesses. Ping An was listed on the main board of the HKEx as H shares on June 
24, 2004 (under the stock code of 2318), and was soon selected as an index stock of 
the Hang Seng China Enterprises Index (HSCEI), replacing Anhui Expressway.
572
 In 
mid-2007, Ping An was selected as a Hang Seng Index Constituent Stock by the 
Hang Seng Index Services Company.
573
 On March 1, 2007, Ping An floated on the 
                                                             
572
 See Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China Limited (Ping An), Ping An News, “Ping An is Included in 
the Hang Seng China Enterprises Index (HSCEI)”, August 16, 2004, available at: 
http://about.pingan.com/pinganxinwen/46585.shtml, accessed January 31, 2011.  
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 See Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China Limited (Ping An), Ping An News, “Ping An Insurance 
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Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) under the stock code of 601318.
574
  
 
Initially, Ping An company focused on casualty insurance business only; however, in 
the mid-1990s it adopted a diversifying strategy and gradually transformed into an 
integrated financial services conglomerate engaged in asset management, banking, 
investment and marketing service businesses. Recently, Ping An company has 
provided services for more than 51 million retail customers and two million 
corporate clients through its numerous subsidiaries.
575
 By the end of 2009, the 
rapidly growing marketing network of Ping An was comprised of 417,000 life 
insurance sales agents, over 83,000 full-time employees, and more than 3,800 branch 
offices.
576
 Ping An Group’s major insurance arm, Ping An Life Insurance Company 
of China, Ltd., was the second largest life insurer in China by insurance income, 
while Ping An Property & Casualty Insurance Company of China, Ltd. was the 
second largest property and casualty insurer in China.
577
 From 2008 to 2010, Ping 
An group secured first position among China’s Non-State-Owned Enterprises in the 
Global 500 list of Fortune Magazine.
578
 In 2009, Ping An group ranked second 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Becomes Constituent Stock of Hang Seng Index”, May 11, 2007, available at: 
http://about.pingan.com/pinganxinwen/46558.shtml, accessed January 31, 2011.  
574
 See Ping An of China Securities (Hong Kong) Company Limited, Company Description, available at: 
http://stock.pingan.com.hk/CompanyDescription.aspx?Language=Eng, accessed January 31, 2011.  
575
 The major subsidiaries of Ping An (Group) Company are Ping An Life Insurance Company of China, Ltd.; Ping 
An Property & Casualty Insurance Company of China, Ltd.; Ping An Annuity Insurance Company of China, Ltd.; 
Ping An Health Insurance Company of China, Ltd.; Ping An Bank Co., Ltd.; China Ping An Trust & Investment Co., 
Ltd.; Ping An Securities Co., Ltd.; Ping An of China Securities (Hong Kong) Co., Ltd; Ping An Asset Management 
Co., Ltd.; Ping An of China Asset Management (Hong Kong) Co., Ltd.; and Ping An Futures Co. Ltd.  
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 See Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China Limited (Ping An), Introduction section, available at: 
http://about.pingan.com/en/index.shtml, accessed January 31, 2011.  
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among insurers in the world in the British Financial Times Global 500 enterprises 
list.  
 
Ping An was the first Chinese insurer to have introduced foreign investors into its 
shareholding structure, as it had obtained investment from Morgan Stanley and 
Goldman Sachs as early as 1994. In 2002, HSBC Group took a large equity interest 
in Ping An through a wholly-owned subsidiary, and HSBC Group completed further 
acquisitions in 2005, bringing its aggregate holding in Ping An to 19.90 per cent.
579
  
 
b) Corporate Structure and Ownership Structure 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Included in Fortune's Global Top 500 List”, July 12, 2010, available at: 
http://about.pingan.com/pinganxinwen/60741.shtml#, accessed January 31, 2011.  
579
 See HSBC Holdings Plc., HSBC Newsroom, August 31, 2005, available at: 
http://www.hsbc.com/1/2/newsroom/news/2005/hsbc-completes-acquisition-of-9point91-per-cent-of-ping-an, 
accessed January 31, 2011.  
  
 
319 
Table 7.3 The Share Capital of Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China Limited 2004-2011 
Year Nature of Shares Number of Shares Percentage of Share Capital 
2004 H shares 6,195,053,334 100% 
2005 H shares 6,195,053,334 100% 
2006 H shares 6,195,053,334 100% 
2007 
A shares 4,786,409,636(1) 65.17% 
H shares 2,558,643,698 34.83% 
Total 7,345,053,334 100% 
2008 
A shares 4,786,409,636 65.17% 
H shares 2,558,643,698 34.83% 
Total 7,345,053,334 100% 
2009 
A shares 4,786,409,636 65.17% 
H shares 2,558,643,698 34.83% 
Total 7,345,053,334 100% 
2010 
A shares 4,786,409,636 62.62% 
H shares 2,857,732,456(2) 37.38% 
Total 7,644,142,092 100% 
2011 
A shares 4,786,409,636 60.46% 
H shares 3,129,732,456(3) 39.54% 
Total 7,916,142,092 100% 
Source: Adapted from Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China Limited 2004-2011 Annual Reports580 
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(1) Ping An issued 1.15 billion ordinary A shares with par value of RMB 1.00 at the offer price of RMB 33.80 per A share in February 2007.  
(2) Ping An issued additional 299,088,758 H shares on May 6, 2010. 
(3) Ping An issued additional 272,000,000 H shares on June 17, 2011. 
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Ping An issued 1,261,720,000 ordinary H shares on June 24, 2004 through an Initial 
Public Offering (IPO) on the HKEx. In early 2007, Ping An further issued 1.15 
billion ordinary A shares, and these A shares were listed on the SSE in March 2007. 
Table 7.3 shows that the proportion of Ping An’s A shares to H shares was 65.17% to 
34.83% in 2007, and this ratio remained unchanged in the following two years.  
 
In 2010, Ping An entered a share purchase agreement with Newbridge Capital, and 
Ping An made non-public directed issuance of new H shares to Newbridge Capital. 
In 2011, the CSRC approved another agreement of Ping An to make non-public 
directed issuance of an additional 272,000,000 H shares to Jinjun Limited. After 
these two non-public issuances, Ping An’s H shares accounted for 39.54% of the 
total share capital as of 2011.  
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Table 7.4 The Substantial Shareholders of Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China Limited 2004-2011 
(all the interests in issued shares of Ping An amounting to 5% or more of the shares in issue) 
Year Name of Substantial Shareholders Capacity Number of Shares Percentage of Total Shares 
2004 
HSBC Insurance Holdings Limited (1) Beneficial owner 618,886,334 9.99% 
HSBC Holdings PLC Interest of controlled corporations 618,886,334 9.99% 
Shenzhen Investment Holdings Co., Ltd. (2) Beneficial owner 543,181,445 8.77% 
China Ping An Trust & Investment Co., Ltd. Labor Union Interest of controlled corporations 479,117,788 7.73% 
Ping An Securities Company Ltd. Labor Union Interest of controlled corporations 479,117,788 7.73% 
Shenzhen Jingao Industrial Development Co., Ltd.  Interest of controlled corporations / Beneficial owner 479,117,788 7.73% 
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Interest of controlled corporations 410,382,182 6.62% 
Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Ltd. Labor Union Interest of controlled corporations 389,592,366 6.29% 
Shenzhen New Horse Investment Development Co., Ltd. Beneficial owner 389,592,366 6.29% 
Yuan Trust Investment Company Ltd. Beneficial owner 380,000,000 6.13% 
Morgan Stanley Interest of controlled corporations 360,817,888 5.83% 
Capital China Group Limited Beneficial owner 332,526,844 5.37% 
GS Advisors, L.L.C Interest of controlled corporations 310,901,538 5.02% 
2005 
HSBC Holdings PLC Interest of controlled corporations 1,233,870,388 19.92% 
HSBC Insurance Holdings Limited Beneficial owner 618,886,334 9.99% 
The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (3) Beneficial owner 614,099,279 9.91% 
Shenzhen Investment Holdings Co., Ltd. Beneficial owner 543,181,445 8.77% 
Shenzhen Jingao Industrial Development Co., Ltd. Interest of controlled corporations / Beneficial owner 479,117,788 7.73% 
Ping An Securities Company, Ltd. Labor Union Interest of controlled corporations 479,117,788 7.73% 
China Ping An Trust & Investment Co., Ltd. Labor Union Interest of controlled corporations 479,117,788 7.73% 
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Shenzhen New Horse Investment Development Co., Ltd. Beneficial owner 389,592,366 6.29% 
Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Ltd. Labor Union Interest of controlled corporations 389,592,366 6.29% 
Yuan Trust Investment Company Ltd. Beneficial owner 380,000,000 6.13% 
Capital China Group Company Limited Beneficial owner 332,526,844 5.37% 
2006 
HSBC Holdings PLC Interest of controlled corporations 1,233,870,388 19.92% 
HSBC Insurance Holdings Limited Beneficial owner 618,886,334 9.99% 
The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited Beneficial owner 614,099,279 9.91% 
Shenzhen Investment Holdings Co., Ltd. Beneficial owner 543,181,445 8.77% 
Shenzhen Jingao Industrial Development Co., Ltd. Interest of controlled corporations / Beneficial owner 479,117,788 7.73% 
Ping An Securities Company, Ltd. Labor Union Interest of controlled corporations 479,117,788 7.73% 
China Ping An Trust & Investment Co., Ltd. Labor Union Interest of controlled corporations 479,117,788 7.73% 
Shenzhen New Horse Investment Development Co., Ltd. Beneficial owner 389,592,366 6.29% 
Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Ltd. Labor Union Interest of controlled corporations 389,592,366 6.29% 
Yuan Trust Investment Company Ltd. Beneficial owner 380,000,000 6.13% 
2007 
HSBC Holdings PLC Interest of controlled corporations 1,233,870,388 16.80% 
HSBC Insurance Holdings Limited Beneficial owner 618,886,334 8.43% 
The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited Beneficial owner 614,099,279 8.36% 
Shenzhen Investment Holdings Co., Ltd. Beneficial owner 543,181,445 7.40% 
Shenzhen New Horse Investment Development Co., Ltd. Beneficial owner 389,592,366 5.30% 
Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Ltd. Labor Union Interest of controlled corporations 389,592,366 5.30% 
Yuan Trust Investment Company Ltd. Beneficial owner 380,000,000 5.17% 
2008 
HSBC Holdings PLC Interest of controlled corporations 1,233,870,388 16.80% 
HSBC Insurance Holdings Limited Beneficial owner 618,886,334 8.43% 
The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited Beneficial owner 614,099,279 8.36% 
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Shenzhen Investment Holdings Co., Ltd. Beneficial owner 546,672,967 7.44% 
Shenzhen New Horse Investment Development Co., Ltd. Beneficial owner 389,592,366 5.30% 
Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Ltd. Labor Union Interest of controlled corporations 389,592,366 5.30% 
Yuan Trust Investment Company Ltd. Beneficial owner 380,000,000 5.17% 
2009 
HSBC Holdings PLC Interest of controlled corporations 1,233,870,388 16.80% 
HSBC Insurance Holdings Limited Beneficial owner 618,886,334 8.43% 
The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited Beneficial owner 614,099,279 8.36% 
Shenzhen Investment Holdings Co., Ltd. Beneficial owner 481,359,551 6.55% 
Shenzhen New Horse Investment Development Co., Ltd. Beneficial owner 389,592,366 5.30% 
Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Ltd. Labor Union Interest of controlled corporations 389,592,366 5.30% 
Yuan Trust Investment Company Ltd. Beneficial owner 380,000,000 5.17% 
2010 
HSBC Holdings PLC Interest of controlled corporations 1,240,069,099 16.22% 
HSBC Insurance Holdings Limited Beneficial owner 618,886,334 8.10% 
The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited Beneficial owner 613,929,279 8.03% 
Shenzhen Investment Holdings Co., Ltd. Beneficial owner 481,359,551 6.30% 
2011 
HSBC Holdings PLC Interest of controlled corporations 1,233,926,425 15.59% 
HSBC Insurance Holdings Limited Beneficial owner 618,886,334 7.82% 
The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited Beneficial owner 613,929,279 7.76% 
Shenzhen Investment Holdings Co., Ltd. Beneficial owner 481,359,551 6.08% 
Source: Adapted from Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China Limited 2004-2011 Annual Reports581 
(1) HSBC Insurance Holdings Limited is a wholly-owned subsidiary of HSBC Holdings PLC. 
(2) Shenzhen Investment Holdings Co., Ltd. is a state-owned company directly controlled by Shenzhen State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Bureau. 
(3) The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited is a wholly-owned subsidiary of HSBC Holdings PLC.  
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According to Table 7.4, the shareholding structure of Ping An was relatively 
scattered when compared with that of large Chinese SOEs, and there was no 
controlling shareholder. The largest shareholder of Ping An was HSBC Holdings 
PLC, which was a foreign company established in 1866. HSBC Holdings PLC 
indirectly held 1,233,926,425 H shares of Ping An thorough two wholly-owned 
subsidiaries, HSBC Insurance Holdings Limited and The Hong Kong and Shanghai 
Banking Corporation Limited. Besides, the third largest shareholder of Ping An was 
Shenzhen Investment Holdings Co., Ltd., which was a Chinese SOE controlled by 
Shenzhen State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Bureau. Apart from 
these two major shareholders, some other domestic and foreign investment 
companies such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley had intermittently invested 
in Ping An, but they had only held a small percentage of shares in Ping An. 
Technically, the shareholding of these investment companies accounted for less than 
5% of Ping An’s total shareholding after 2010.  
 
Superficially, Table 7.4 displayed that Ping An had a dispersed ownership structure, 
which was quite similar to the western outsider-based model. However, it might be 
not easy to arrive at the truth from these official statistics. It was generally believed 
that the next of kin of some of China’ paramount political leaders played a vital role 
in forwarding the overseas listing of Ping An.
582
 Ping An was initially a small 
casualty insurance company, and MA Mingzhe, a former official of Shenzhen 
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government, successfully transformed it into a giant state-owned financial services 
company in the mid-1990s. It was unthinkable that MA could accomplish such a 
difficult plan without the powerful backing of the state bureaucracy, as Ping An was 
facing stiff competition in its infancy. Significantly, it was theoretically impossible 
for Ping An to file an overseas listing application under the rules of the SASAC and 
CSRC at that time, since the shareholding of foreign investors accounted for more 
than 50% of Ping An’s share capital in early 2004 (before Ping An was listed on the 
HKEx). The U.S.-based New York Times recently published an investigation on the 
wealth of a senior Chinese government figure’s family, by which it was alleged that 
the elderly mother of this Chinese chief magistrate held a stake valued at US$ 120 
million in Ping An as of 2007.
583
 Although there was only fragmentary firm 
evidence to support the case that political determinants played a leading role in the 
overseas listing of Ping An, the political influence of the Chinese government over 
Ping An’s operation was not to be taken lightly.  
 
c) Board Composition and Corporate Governance 
The board of Ping An had four executive directors, seven non-executive directors 
and seven independent non-executive directors. Ping An had also established four 
board sub-committees: the Strategy and Investment Committee, Audit and Risk 
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Management Committee, Remuneration Committee and Nomination Committee. 
Besides, Ping An also had a supervisory board, which consisted of a chairman, two 
independent supervisors and three supervisors representing the employees. It should 
be noted that the chairman of the supervisory board was an independent supervisor. 
The biographies of Ping An’s board members and supervisory board members were 
available in its latest annual report.  
 
Ping An advised that all its independent non-executive directors met the 
independence guidelines set by the HKEx,
584
 and that no independent non-executive 
directors had any interest in the business of Ping An or its subsidiaries. Moreover, 
Ping An refused to allow the independent non-executive directors to take any 
administrative positions in the company.  
 
While there was no dominant shareholder in Ping An, it was far from clear which 
kind of role the Party and the government played in electing the board members and 
supervisory board members of Ping An. However, the biographies showed that some 
key board members had worked in public office. MA Mingzhe, who was the 
chairman of Ping An’s board, had spent much of his career in the Shenzhen 
Municipal Government. Additionally, he was a member of the 11
th
 National 
Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. SUN Jianyi, 
the Executive Vice President of Ping An, was a former senior official of the People’s 
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Bank of China. Furthermore, FAN Mingchun, a non-executive director of Ping An, 
was actually the secretary of the Party Committee of Shenzhen Investment Holdings 
Co., Ltd., which was an SOE controlled by the Shenzhen Municipal Government 
(also the second largest shareholder of Ping An). GUO Limin, who served as the 
Chief of Economics and Information Committee of the Shenzhen Municipal 
Government, doubled as the non-executive director of Ping An. It should be noted 
that GUO was also the former chief of the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of Shenzhen Municipality. Furthermore, other three 
independent non-executive directors had also worked for the Chinese government. 
Apart from these board members who had governmental background, HSBC 
Holdings PLC had appointed some members of the board.  
 
The supervisory board of Ping An had six members, and three of these were 
independent. Among those members of the supervisory board, two members used to 
hold senior positions in public office. Three other supervisors were named employee 
representatives, but all these three supervisors representing the employees were 
holding senior management positions or Party secretary positions in Ping An or Ping 
An’s subsidiaries. It seems that the composition of Ping An’s supervisory board was 
still quite similar to that of traditional Chinese SOEs, and whether the employees’ 
interests could be represented in the supervisory board is open to question.  
 
As has been mentioned in earlier chapters, the two-tier board system had been 
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widely adopted in continental countries, where the management board and 
supervisory board attended to their own duties respectively. When the supervisory 
board was expected to assume the responsibilities for promoting stakeholders’ 
interests, it held de jure and de facto supervisory power to monitor the management 
board, as well as for recruiting and dismissing the chairman, CEO and other 
executives. The two-tier board system had been adopted by Chinese companies such 
as Ping An, but the supervisory board in Chinese companies did not have the actual 
discretion to select directors or formulate compensation schemes. On the contrary, 
the chairman and CEO often had a strong voice in the nomination or even 
appointment of supervisors and independent directors in Chinese companies. Mr K 
(Interviewee No.11) held that the supervisory board played only a nominal role in 
most Chinese companies, and that Ping An was no exception.  
 
Ping An had established its corporate governance structure in accordance with the 
PRC Company Law and the Code on Corporate Governance Practices of the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange. Besides, Ping An adopted an internal control system that met 
international standards, and this internal control system could help to prevent 
systemic risk for Ping An. Ping An also paid special attention to investor relations, 
and global teleconferences and mobile conferences were organised regularly so as to 
maintain frequent communication with investors. In 2011, Ping An was granted the 
“2011 Board of Directors Award” by the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the “Award 
for Corporate Governance Excellence of 2011 Hong Kong Corporate Governance 
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Excellence Awards (Main Board-Hang Seng Index Constituents)”, co-organised by 
the Chamber of Hong Kong Listed Companies and the Centre for Corporate 
Governance & Financial Policy of Hong Kong Baptist University.
585
 These awards 
reflected that the corporate governance of Ping An stood up to international 
standards, and had been gaining credence among foreign investors.  
 
It is safe to assume that Ping An has established an appropriate corporate governance 
structure, while the stringent listing rules and stricter scrutiny of the HKEx has 
further improved its governance practices. As mentioned earlier, it is doubtful 
whether the Chinese government tried to exercise an undue influence upon the 
election of Ping An’s board members and supervisors, although the state-owned 
Shenzhen Investment Holdings Co., Ltd. controlled by the Shenzhen municipal 
government held only 6% of the shares in Ping An as of 2011. Nevertheless, their 
biographies revealed that a considerable number of the key board members in Ping 
An had close ties with the Chinese government, while some members were even still 
holding high public office. Although the influence of the Chinese government over 
Ping An’s management and operation cannot be ignored, HSBC Holdings PLC is 
still the largest shareholder of Ping An. Thus, HSBC Holdings PLC has easily 
appointed certain important members of Ping An’s board. The comparatively 
dispersed ownership structure of Ping An would likely benefit minority and 
individual shareholders, since the tunnelling behaviour of the major shareholders and 
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 Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China Limited, Ping An Annual Reports 2011, p. 111, available at: 
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331 
managers could largely be suppressed. These facts can reflect Proposition 4, which 
argues that foreign listing will improve some aspects of the corporate governance of 
Chinese companies.  
 
III. THE TSINGTAO BREWERY COMPANY LIMITED (TSINGTAO BREWERY) 
a) Overview  
The Tsingtao Brewery Company Limited (hereinafter referred to as “Tsingtao 
Brewery”) 586  was China’s largest brewery, as well as beer exporter. It was 
established by a group of German and English businessmen on August 15, 1903 as 
the Germania Brewery, with an initial capital of 400,000 Mexican silver dollars 
divided into 4,000 shares priced at US$ 100 each.
587
 It was owned until 1916 by The 
Anglo-German Brewery Co., Ltd., which was based in Hong Kong, since Germany 
had obtained a 99-year lease of the Shandong province in 1898 and administered the 
Kiaochow peninsula as a colony.
588
 However, the Japanese soon occupied Qingdao 
City and seized Tsingtao Brewery. When World War II ended, China’s central 
government took control of Tsingtao Brewery. Shortly after China’s civil war ended 
in 1949, the Communist regime resolved to have Tsingtao Brewery nationalised, and 
it then became a state-owned business.  
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Tsingtao Brewery began its privatisation and reorganisation process from the early 
1990s by merging with a number of other breweries in Qingdao city. On July 15, 
1993, Tsingtao Brewery issued 317.6 million H shares at HK$ 2.80 per share on the 
HKEx and raised HK$114 million in total; thus, it became the first of the nine 
Chinese State-Owned Enterprises listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.
589
 
Anheuser-Busch InBev, the American brewer of Budweiser beer, purchased around 5 
per cent equity of Tsingtao in the IPO and eventually lifted its holding to 27 per cent 
in 2005.
590
 In 2009, Anheuser-Busch InBev sold its 19.9 per cent stake of Tsingtao 
to Asahi Breweries of Japan for US$ 667 million to help reduce its debts.
591
 Shortly 
after, Anheuser-Busch InBev transferred its remaining 7 per cent stake to CHEN 
Fashu, a shareholder of the gold mining company ZiJin Mining of China, for 
US$ 235 million.
592
 Asahi Beer was the second largest shareholder of Tsingtao 
Brewery at this time, holding a 26.99 per cent stake in contrast to the 30.89 per cent 
held by Tsingtao Brewery Group, the parent company of Tsingtao Brewery.
593
  
 
Tsingtao Brewery has developed an aggressive marketing strategy in recent years 
and made some acquisitions in Mainland China and Hong Kong. It successively 
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purchased equities of Carlsberg Hong Kong, Asia Shuang He Sheng Five Star Beer 
Co., Ltd., Three Ring Asia Pacific Beer Co., Ltd., and New Laoshan Brewery in the 
early 2000s.
594
 After the consolidation, Tsingtao Brewery gradually increased its 
production quantities so as to raise its share of the domestic market as well as the 
international market. Now Tsingtao Brewery was one of the largest comprehensive 
trans-regional enterprises in China.  
 
b) Corporate Structure and Ownership Structure 
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Table 7.5 The Substantial Shareholders of Tsingtao Brewery Company Limited 2002-2011 
Year Name of Substantial Shareholders Class of Shares Nature of Shareholding Number of Shares 
Percentage of 
Total Shares 
2002 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the People’s Government of Qingdao A shares State-owned shares 399,820,000 39.98% 
HKSCC Nominees Limited* H shares Outstanding shares 291,212,380 29.1% 
Anheuser-Busch Companies Inc. H shares Outstanding shares 45,000,000 4.5% 
Bank of China, Shandong Province Branch A shares Legal person shares 29,250,000 2.93% 
Construction Bank of China, Qingdao Branch A shares Legal person shares 19,080,000 1.91% 
Qingdao Huaqing Financial Services Company Limited A shares Legal person shares 5,000,000 0.5% 
Taihe Fund A shares Outstanding shares 4,334,174 0.43% 
Fenghe Fund A shares Outstanding shares 3,685,420 0.37% 
E Fund Stable Growth Fund A shares Outstanding shares 3,552,808 0.36% 
Han Sheng Fund A shares Outstanding shares 3,442,384 0.34% 
2003 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the People’s Government of Qingdao(1) A shares State-owned shares 399,820,000 37.72% 
HKSCC Nominees Limited H shares Outstanding shares 293,981,380 27.73% 
Anheuser-Busch Companies Inc.(2) H shares Outstanding shares 105,000,000 9.91% 
Bank of China, Shandong Province Branch A shares Legal person shares 29,250,000 2.76% 
Construction Bank of China, Qingdao Branch A shares Legal person shares 19,080,000 1.8% 
E Fund Stable Growth Fund A shares Outstanding shares 6,437,028 0.61% 
Rongtong New Blue Chip Fund A shares Outstanding shares 5,025,025 0.47% 
Qingdao Huaqing Financial Service Company Limited A shares Legal person shares 5,000,000 0.47% 
Tongqian Fund A shares Outstanding shares 4,976,131 0.47% 
Han Sheng Fund A shares Outstanding shares 3,708,475 0.35% 
2004 State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the People’s Government of Qingdao(3) A shares State-owned shares 399,820,000 37.72% 
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HKSCC Nominees Limited H shares Outstanding shares 294,466,380 27.78% 
Anheuser-Busch Jade Hong Kong Holding Co., Ltd.(4) H shares Outstanding shares 105,000,000 9.91% 
China Orient Asset Management Corporation A shares Legal person shares 29,250,000 2.76% 
Construction Bank of China, Qingdao Branch A shares Legal person shares 19,080,000 1.8% 
E Fund Stable Growth Fund A shares Outstanding shares 9,626,514 0.91% 
Fortis Haitong Returns Growth Fund A shares Outstanding shares 6,769,007 0.64% 
INVESCO Great Wall Neixu Fund A shares Outstanding shares 6,039,137 0.57% 
Qingdao Huaqing Financial Service Company Limited A shares Legal person shares 5,000,000 0.47% 
Rongtong New Blue Chip Fund A shares Outstanding shares 4,890,900 0.46% 
2005 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the People’s Government of Qingdao A shares State-owned shares 399,820,000 30.6% 
HKSCC Nominees Limited H shares Outstanding shares 294,713,373 22.5% 
Anheuser-Busch Jade Hong Kong Holding Co., Ltd. H shares Outstanding shares 261,643,836 20% 
Law Debenture Trust (Asia) Limited(5) H shares Outstanding shares 91,575,342 7.0% 
China Orient Asset Management Corporation A shares Legal person shares 29,250,000 2.2% 
China Construction Bank, Qingdao Branch A shares Legal person shares 19,080,000 1.5% 
National Social Security Fund 108 A shares Outstanding shares 9,128,578 0.7% 
Tianyuan Securities Investment Fund A shares Outstanding shares 8,953,602 0.7% 
Bank Of Communications Schroder Core Equity Fund A shares Outstanding shares 8,912,255 0.7% 
National Social Security Fund 102 A shares Outstanding shares 6,990,197 0.5% 
2006 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the People’s Government of Qingdao(6) A shares 
Outstanding shares in 
lock-up period(7) 
399,820,000 30.56% 
HKSCC Nominees Limited H shares Outstanding shares 295,265,373 22.57% 
Anheuser-Busch Jade Hong Kong Holding Co., Ltd. H shares Outstanding shares 261,643,836 20.0% 
Law Debenture Trust (Asia) Limited H shares Outstanding shares 91,575,342 7.0% 
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China Construction Bank, Qingdao Branch A shares 
Outstanding shares in 
lock-up period 
17,574,505 1.34% 
National Social Security Fund 108 A shares Outstanding shares 17,194,184 1.31% 
Merrill Lynch International Shenyin & Wanguo - HSBC - Merrill Lynch International A shares Outstanding shares 13,865,587 1.06% 
National Social Security Fund 103 A shares Outstanding shares 13,011,017 0.99% 
National Social Security Fund 102 A shares Outstanding shares 12,041,297 0.92% 
CPF Jingcui Growth Equity Securities Investment Fund A shares Outstanding shares 9,052,602 0.69% 
2007 
Tsingtao Brewery Group Company Limited(8) A shares 
Outstanding shares in 
lock-up period 
399,820,000 30.56% 
HKSCC Nominees Limited H shares Outstanding shares 298,256,072 22.80% 
Anheuser-Busch Jade Hong Kong Holding Co., Ltd. H shares Outstanding shares 261,643,836 20.0% 
Law Debenture Trust (Asia) Limited H shares Outstanding shares 91,575,342 7.0% 
China Jianyin Investment Company Ltd. A shares 
Outstanding shares in 
lock-up period 
17,574,505 1.35% 
National Social Security Fund 108 A shares Outstanding shares 15,000,000 1.15% 
National Social Security Fund 102 A shares Outstanding shares 10,749,300 0.82% 
Boshi Thematic Sector Equity Securities Investment Fund A shares Outstanding shares 9,000,000 0.69% 
Dacheng Blue Chip Steady Securities Investment Fund A shares Outstanding shares 8,194,667 0.63% 
National Social Security Fund 106 A shares Outstanding shares 7,000,000 0.54% 
2008 
Tsingtao Brewery Group Company Limited A shares 
Outstanding shares in 
lock-up period 
404,092,250(9) 30.89% 
HKSCC Nominees Limited H shares Outstanding shares 297,118,072 22.71% 
Anheuser-Busch Jade Hong Kong Holding Co., Ltd.(10) H shares Outstanding shares 261,643,836 20.0% 
Law Debenture Trust (Asia) Limited H shares Outstanding shares 91,575,342 7.0% 
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China Jianyin Investment Company Ltd. A shares 
Outstanding shares in 
lock-up period 
17,574,505 1.35% 
National Social Security Fund 108 A shares Outstanding shares 13,000,000 0.99% 
Industrial Trend Investment Mixed Securities Investment Fund A shares Outstanding shares 12,285,524 0.94% 
National Social Security Fund 102 A shares Outstanding shares 10,000,000 0.76% 
Industrial Global Vision Stock Securities Investment Fund A shares Outstanding shares 9,767,624 0.75% 
Dacheng Blue Chip Steady Securities Investment Fund A shares Outstanding shares 8,107,570 0.62% 
2009 
Tsingtao Brewery Group Company Limited A shares 
Outstanding shares in 
lock-up period 
411,400,050(11) 30.45% 
HKSCC Nominees Limited H shares Outstanding shares 285,868,342 21.16% 
Asahi Breweries, Ltd.(12) H shares Outstanding shares 266,721,836 19.74% 
ICBC (Asia) Nominee Limited H shares Outstanding shares 91,641,342 6.78% 
Dacheng Blue Chip Steady Securities Investment Fund A shares Outstanding shares 18,013,310 1.33% 
China Jianyin Investment Company Ltd. A shares 
Outstanding shares in 
lock-up period 
17,574,505 1.30% 
National Social Security Fund 108 A shares Outstanding shares 11,465,900 0.85% 
National Social Security Fund 102 A shares Outstanding shares 10,000,000 0.74% 
Industrial Trend Investment Mixed Securities Investment Fund A shares Outstanding shares 9,747,800 0.72% 
Yinhua Core Value Selected Stock Securities Investment Fund A shares Outstanding shares 8,411,747 0.62% 
2010 
Tsingtao Brewery Group Company Limited A shares  
Outstanding A shares in 
lock-up period 
411,400,050 30.45% 
HKSCC Nominees Limited H shares Outstanding shares 373,649,484 27.66% 
Asahi Breweries, Ltd. H shares Outstanding shares 270,127,836 19.99% 
China Jianyin Investment Company Ltd. A shares Outstanding shares in 17,574,505 1.30% 
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lock-up period 
Industrial Bank Co., Ltd. - Industrial Trend Investment Mixed Securities Investment Fund A shares Outstanding shares 11,518,606 0.85% 
National Social Security Fund 108 A shares Outstanding shares 11,465,900 0.85% 
Bank of Communications - Bosera Emerging Growth Stock Securities Investment Fund A shares Outstanding shares 9,999,387 0.74% 
National Social Security Fund 102 A shares Outstanding shares 8,500,000 0.63% 
ICBC - Nuo’an Value Growth Stock Securities Investment Fund A shares Outstanding shares 8,000,000 0.59% 
Bank of Communications - Hua’an Strategy Selection Stock Securities Investment Fund A shares Outstanding shares 7,597,428 0.56% 
2011 
Tsingtao Brewery Group Company Limited 
A shares and H 
shares 
Outstanding shares 411,400,050 30.45% 
HKSCC Nominees Limited H shares Outstanding shares 373,747,484 27.66% 
Asahi Group Holdings Ltd.(13) H shares Outstanding shares 270,127,836 19.99% 
China Jianyin Investment Company Ltd. A shares Outstanding shares 17,574,505 1.30% 
China Life Insurance Co., Ltd. - Dividends - Personal dividends - 005L - FH002Hu A shares Outstanding shares 14,348,359 1.06% 
Taikang Life Insurance Co., Ltd. - Dividends - Personal dividends - 019L - FH002Hu A shares Outstanding shares 9,700,000 0.72% 
National Social Security Fund 108 A shares Outstanding shares 9,400,000 0.70% 
ICBC - E-Fund Value Growth Mixed Securities Investment Fund A shares Outstanding shares 7,206,331 0.53% 
Industrial Bank Co., Ltd. - Xingquan Trend Investment Mixed Securities Investment Fund A shares Outstanding shares 7,025,222 0.52% 
Morgan Stanley & Co. International PLC. - Morgan Stanley China A-share Fund A shares Outstanding shares 6,648,039 0.49% 
Source: Adapted from Tsingtao Brewery Company Limited 2002-2011 Annual Reports595 
* The number of Tsingtao Brewery’s H shares held by HKSCC Nominees Limited excludes those H shares owned by the wholly-owned subsidiary of SASAC of Qingdao or Tsingtao Brewery Group Company 
Limited.  
(1) State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the People’s Government of Qingdao (SASAC of Qingdao) and Anheuser-Busch became concerted parties after Anheuser-Busch was 
introduced into Tsingtao Brewery as a strategic investor. 
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(2) Tsingtao Brewery and SASAC of Qingdao signed a Strategic Investment Agreement with U.S. brewery Anheuser-Busch on October 21st, 2002, and issued an aggregate of HK$ 1,416,195,342 
mandatorily convertible bonds to Anheuser-Busch; these bonds would be converted to H shares.  
(3) The strategic investment agreement between SASAC of Qingdao and Anheuser-Busch constitutes a Section 317 agreement under the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Ordinance.596 Thus, SASAC of 
Qingdao is deemed to have interests in the H shares held by Anheuser-Busch, while Anheuser-Busch is deemed to have interests in the A shares held by SASAC of Qingdao.  
(4) Anheuser-Busch Jade Hong Kong Holding Co., Ltd. is a fully-owned subsidiary of Anheuser-Busch Companies Inc.  
(5) Law Debenture Trust (Asia) Limited held H shares of Tsingtao Brewery under entrusted voting, and it undertook such voting rights under the written instruction of SASAC of Qingdao. 
(6) The Split Share Structure Reform proposal of Tsingtao Brewery was approved by the Shareholder’s Meeting on October 16, 2006, by which the shareholders of non-tradable shares would pay 0.178777 
share and RMB 0.24 for each tradable A share. When the Split Share Structure Reform of Tsingtao Brewery was finished by December 22, 2006, the total shares held by the shareholders of non-tradable 
shares decreased from 453,150,000 shares to 417,394,505 shares. 
(7) After the Split Share Structure Reform, the shares held by SASAC of Qingdao were subject to a lock-up period.  
(8) SASAC of Qingdao unconditionally transferred 399,820,000 A shares to its wholly-owned subsidiary Tsingtao Brewery Group Company Limited in April 2007. The transfer of these A shares had been 
approved by SASAC of China.  
(9) Tsingtao Brewery Group Company Limited instructed Tsingtao Brewery to increase 3,260,250 A shares by the secondary market of the Shanghai Stock Exchange, as well as 1,012,000 H shares through a 
Hong Kong-based wholly-owned subsidiary.  
(10) Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc. merged with InBev SA in November 2008 and was renamed as “Anheuser-Busch InBev SA”, which obtained all the H shares of Tsingtao Brewery previously held by 
Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc.  
(11) Upon the approval of the 2007 first Extraordinary Shareholder’s Meeting and CSRC, Tsingtao Brewery issued 6-year-long convertible bonds valued at RMB 1.5 billion in April 2008, and 105 million 
warrants were issued to the subscribers of these bonds. After these warrants were successfully exercised, Tsingtao Brewery issued 42,763,617 A shares in 2008.  
(12) Anheuser-Busch InBev S.A sold the Tsingtao shares it held to Asahi Breweries in early 2009. Then Anheuser-Busch Jade Hong Kong Holding Co., Ltd, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Anheuser-Busch 
InBev S.A, entered into an agreement with CHEN Fashu in May 2009, by which CHEN obtained about 7% holding in Tsingtao Brewery.  
(13) Asahi Breweries, Ltd. was restructured into Asahi Group Holdings Ltd. in July 2011.  
 
                                                             
596
 Hong Kong, Hong Kong CAP 571 Securities and Futures Ordinance, available at: http://www.hklii.hk/eng/hk/legis/ord/571/, accessed November 13, 2012.  
  
 
340 
Generally, Tsingtao Brewery can be deemed as a Chinese SOE, and Table 7.5 shows 
that the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the 
People’s Government of Qingdao (SASAC of Qingdao) was the largest shareholder 
of Tsingtao Brewery in 2002, with a shareholding of almost 40%. As mentioned 
earlier, the HKSCC was only a nominee company established by the HKEx, and it 
only provided nominee services such as voting and distribution of dividends for 
investors. Thus, Anheuser-Busch Companies Inc. (Anheuser-Busch) was the second 
largest shareholder of Tsingtao Brewery in 2002, when it held 4.5% of Tsingtao 
Brewery’s shares. Besides, three Chinese state-owned companies owned legal person 
shares of Tsingtao Brewery in 2002, when the total shareholding of these three 
companies accounted for about 5.3% of all Tsingtao Brewery’s shares. In 2002, 
several other Chinese investment companies also held a small fraction of Tsingtao 
Brewery’s A shares.  
 
From 2003 to 2005, the shareholding of SASAC of Qingdao decreased to about 30%, 
while the shareholding of these Chinese state-owned companies that held the legal 
person shares of Tsingtao Brewery remained almost unchanged. However, 
Anheuser-Busch gradually increased its shareholding to 20% by converting the 
convertible bonds of Tsingtao Brewery that it held into H shares. In 2006, all the 
shares of Tsingtao Brewery were converted into outstanding shares after the 
implementation of the Split Share Structure Reform, but those A shares held by 
SASAC of Qingdao were subject to a lock-up period. The SASAC of Qingdao 
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transferred all Tsingtao Brewery’s shares that it held to a wholly-owned subsidiary in 
2007, which was Tsingtao Brewery Group Company Limited (Tsingtao Group 
Company). The shareholding of Tsingtao Group Company in Tsingtao Brewery did 
not substantially change in the following four years, remaining at around 30.5%. It 
should be noted that Law Debenture Trust (Asia) Limited became a major 
shareholder of Tsingtao Brewery with a shareholding of 7% from 2005 to 2008, but 
this company actually held H shares of Tsingtao Brewery under entrusted voting, and 
it undertook such voting rights under the instruction of SASAC of Qingdao.  
 
Asahi Breweries, Ltd. replaced Anheuser-Busch as the second largest shareholder of 
Tsingtao Brewery in early 2009, and Asahi still held over 270 million Tsingtao 
Brewery H shares as of 2011, which accounted for about 20% of the total 
shareholding. In addition, it rates mention that a Chinese individual investor named 
CHEN Fashu purchased some Tsingtao Brewery H shares from a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Anheuser-Busch in mid-2009. CHEN owned about 7% of Tsingtao 
Brewery’s total shares as of 2011, and these shares were registered under HKSCC 
Nominees Limited.
597
  
 
Seemingly, Tsingtao Brewery has been transferred into an overseas listed company 
with many foreign shareholders and foreign strategic investors. However, this 
argument does not withstand close scrutiny. The shareholding of SASAC of Qingdao 
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far outweighed that of the other shareholders from 2002 to 2004. After 2005, the 
shareholding of the State declined considerably, but never fell below 30%, which 
still exceeded that of the second largest shareholder by 10% in every year. In this 
regard, the Chinese government has never loosened its hold on Tsingtao Brewery. 
Although there was a foreign strategic investor (Anheuser-Busch) in the ownership 
structure of Tsingtao Brewery from 2002 to 2008, the voting interest of 
Anheuser-Busch was significantly less than that of SASAC of Qingdao, since Law 
Debenture Trust (Asia) Limited undertook the voting right in Tsingtao Brewery 
under the written instruction of SASAC of Qingdao. Essentially, Tsingtao Brewery is 
still a Chinese SOE, as the Chinese State retains the final voice over its operation 
and management. Furthermore, as there is no immediate prospect that China’s 
government will relax its grip on Tsingtao Brewery, traditional Chinese corporate 
governance ideas will probably remain strong in Tsingtao Brewery. This can be 
reflected in the argument of Proposition 5.  
 
c) Board Composition and Supervisory Board Composition 
The composition of the Tsingtao Brewery’s board and supervisory board was 
disclosed in the annual reports of Tsingtao Brewery. The board of Tsingtao Brewery 
comprised of eleven directors, including a chairman, vice chairman, three executive 
directors, two non-executive directors and four independent non-executive directors. 
The chairman, vice chairman and three executive directors were nominated by 
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SASAC of Qingdao, while the two non-executive directors were nominated 
respectively by Asahi Breweries and CHEN Fashu. Then, the board nominated the 
other four independent non-executive directors. The appointment of directors once 
again established that the State still played a dominant role in the operation of 
Tsingtao Brewery, since the Chinese government appointed almost all key members 
of the board. The second and third largest shareholder, Asahi Brewery and CHEN, 
were only able to designate two non-executive directors. Besides, these board 
members appointed by the Chinese government would play a leading role in 
appointing independent non-executive directors, since such independent 
non-executive directors were collectively nominated by the board of Tsingtao 
Brewery. Tsingtao Brewery had also established three board sub-committees, 
including an audit and finance committee, strategy and investment committee and 
corporate governance and remuneration committee.  
 
The supervisory board of Tsingtao Brewery had seven members, consisting of a 
chairman, a supervisor as the shareholder representative, two independent 
supervisors and three supervisors as staff representatives. The supervisor as the 
shareholder representative was nominated by Asahi Brewery. The main task of the 
supervisory board in Tsingtao Brewery was to guard the interests of the company 
and its employees, as well as monitor the functions of the board. It should be noted 
that the chairman of the supervisory board used to serve as the deputy commissioner 
of Qingdao Finance Bureau. Furthermore, two independent supervisors had also 
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once held high public office. The three supervisors chosen as staff representative 
were at the time holding senior management positions in Tsingtao Brewery. It seems 
that the State appointed all the supervisors, except the one nominated by Asahi 
Brewery as the shareholder representative. It is doubtful whether the supervisory 
board could play its functional role in the operation of Tsingtao Brewery, since its 
composition was largely following the inclinations of the Chinese government.  
 
d) Related Party Transactions and Corporate Governance 
Related party transactions were disclosed in the annual reports of Tsingtao Brewery. 
Tsingtao Brewery entered into some agreements with related parties, and these 
related parties were subsidiaries of Tsingtao Brewery and subsidiaries of Asahi 
Brewery. The substance of such related party transaction mainly covered beer 
products sales and distribution. There were no clear indications that the corporate 
governance of Tsingtao Brewery suffered ill effects from these related party 
transactions, and all related party transactions were conducted on normal commercial 
terms, and these terms were no better than those Tsingtao Brewery would provide to 
any independent third party. As related party transactions are a very common issue in 
most overseas listed Chinese SOEs, the existence of a major foreign shareholder 
probably can produce certain effect in remedying the problem caused by related 
party transactions, since the foreign shareholder has the motive to guard its own 
interests against infringement.  
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Article 125 of China’s Company Law provided that the directors of listed companies 
had no right to vote or involve themselves in board meetings when the board of 
directors were attempting to adopt a resolution on matters concerning those 
enterprises that such directors had a related-party relationship with. In addition, the 
said resolution had to be passed by more than half of those directors without any 
related-party relationship with the concerned enterprises. The provisions of Article 
125 should arguably help to tackle the problem of related-party transactions. 
However, Mr K (Interviewee No.11) proposed that certain senior directors of listed 
Chinese companies, particularly the chairmen, generally held higher political office 
over other directors. Mr K would not rule out the possibility that such senior 
directors might exercise undue influence upon other unconnected directors over the 
resolutions with respect to related-party transactions, even when they were unable to 
exercise their own voting rights independently. When the chairman and vice 
chairman of Tsingtao Brewery were all nominated by SASAC of Qingdao, they were 
most likely to have held the political ascendancy over the other directors. It was 
doubtful whether they would have exercised undue influence upon other directors 
over the related-party transactions.  
 
  
 
346 
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION 
Mainland China has developed rapidly from an underdeveloped country into a 
fledgling nation that has strengthened and become increasing more influential over 
the last three decades, while some commentators have even argued that China could 
become the primary driver of the global economy within only a few decades.
598
 
Nevertheless, the state-driven method and administrative approaches adopted by the 
Chinese government to manage its economy have been roundly criticised by western 
scholars.
599
 Further, the impact of its unstable political environment gradually 
impeding the prospects of China’s rise is not to be underestimated, while the 
widely-accepted modern values that western developed countries have placed such 
high value on, such as democracy, due process and the rule of law, have been treated 
by Chinese governments with indifference. Moreover, it has not been unheard of for 
the Chinese government to restrict the civil liberties of ordinary Chinese citizens. 
Significantly, Mr K (Interviewee No. 11) argued that the greatest economic challenge 
that currently occupies the minds of China’s leaders and their protégés is that the 
country’s remarkable economic growth will not tangibly improve the welfare of 
most working-class Chinese.  
 
With the intention of developing a market economy, most major Chinese 
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state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been transformed into modern joint-stock 
companies since the 1980s, while some leading Chinese SOEs began to consider the 
possibilities of floating on foreign stock exchanges in as early as 1990. The Chinese 
government even launched a high-profile Split Share Structure Reform after 2002, 
through which all the non-tradable State-owned Shares and Legal Person Shares of 
those Chinese companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) would be converted into tradable shares. 
However, whether this reform will have a markedly positive effect on the corporate 
governance practices of listed Chinese companies remains to be seen.  
 
This PhD research has resulted in a detailed theoretical and empirical investigation 
into the corporate governance practices of Chinese companies that have been listed 
on foreign stock exchanges for certain periods; this has allowed us to scrutinise the 
influence that foreign listing has exerted on the corporate governance of these 
companies. Some experts offered powerful reflections, such as Mr K (Interviewee 
No. 11), a participant with significant experience in the corporate governance of 
major Chinese companies, who provided valuable criticisms and remarks in his 
empirical interviews. While several major propositions regarding the corporate 
governance of overseas listed Chinese companies were presented in the first chapter 
of this thesis, these experts’ comments will help to scrutinise and reflect upon these 
propositions.  
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As stated in Chapter 2, although some companies under private ownership have 
emerged as competitive players in recent years, the major SOEs still occupy an 
almost unassailable position in China’s stock markets. The ownership structures of 
these Chinese SOEs are often highly concentrated, in which the government has 
never relinquished its status as the dominant shareholder. On the whole, illiquidity is 
intrinsic to the character of China’s stock market, as the ownership of China’s major 
companies is not actively traded. Technically, the market for corporate control is 
uncompetitive in China, and the impact of external corporate control on the 
governance of China’s companies is insignificant. The major Chinese SOEs’ disdain 
for minority investors has been expressed by their casual disregard for the empirical 
research conducted through this PhD study. Such a disagreeable experience resulting 
from empirical research provides evidence that the transparency of China’s stock 
market and major companies is still in its infancy, while improved protection for the 
minority investors continues to require attention. These facts imply that China’s 
stock markets embody several distinguishing characteristics that are quite distinct 
from the market-oriented Anglo-American corporate governance model, and which 
largely reflect an insider control system [Proposition 1].  
 
The corporate governance of China is becoming increasingly complex, as the 
government strives to benefit from the hindsight of other nations. In the case of 
single-tier boards of the Anglo-American model, independent directors have been 
introduced into the corporate governance structure as a monitoring mechanism to 
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tackle agency problems such as higher agency costs and agency risks, since the 
typically diffused Anglo-American shareholding structures tend to give the senior 
management substantial control rights over the company. As a major feature of the 
Anglo-American model, the independent directors system was adopted in China as 
early as 2001; however, it seems that such independent directors only play a passive 
role in the corporate governance of Chinese companies, and therefore their 
independence may also be brought into question.  
 
The two-tier board is a key characteristic that can differentiate the German-Japanese 
insider-based model from the UK-US model, and the supervisory board plays a 
significant monitoring role in this system as it has been granted a role in the 
appointment of the management board. This major feature of the insider control 
system has been adopted by China. In addition, the employee representatives, who 
play an active role in the German model of the insider control system, have also been 
introduced into China. Unfortunately, the supervisory board’s discretion is somewhat 
limited in the corporate governance of Chinese companies, and almost all members 
of the supervisory board are selected by the management. The selection of employee 
representatives closely echoes that of the supervisory board in China, as it is highly 
improbable that the management would appoint any employee representative who 
would effectively challenge them.  
 
Excluding the supervisory board and employee representatives, banks and financial 
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institutions also function as an external monitoring mechanism in the 
German-Japanese corporate governance model. With China’s securities markets still 
underdeveloped, major Chinese companies lean heavily on debt financing from 
banks under certain conditions, and as the Chinese banking sector is dominated by 
the four State-Owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs), the external monitoring by 
banks may also be a contributing factor in shaping the corporate governance 
structures of major Chinese companies. 
 
Strictly speaking, corporate governance in China cannot be categorised as either an 
Anglo-American market-oriented model or a German-Japanese insider-based model, 
since it attempts to improve its original governance practices by transplanting 
advantageous features from both corporate governance models. However, features 
indigenous to Chinese corporate governance, such as concentrated ownership, weak 
public disclosure, poor protection for minority shareholders, and passive market for 
corporate control, together with the banks’ considerable contribution to the corporate 
financing of major Chinese companies, will serve to illustrate that China’s corporate 
governance can reflect insider control system patterns [Proposition 2].  
 
On the whole, the Mainland government still exercises firm control over the major 
Chinese SOEs, especially for those SOEs that have been defined as “strategically 
important”, and even when such companies have been listed on foreign stock 
exchanges [Proposition 5]. Technically, the Chinese government has tried since 2000 
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to introduce some modern corporate governance concepts, such as the independent 
director and the model code of corporate governance, into the governance practices 
of major Chinese SOEs. Moreover, overseas listed Chinese companies have also 
begun to commit to higher standards of corporate governance after foreign listing, 
through the phased introduction of the applicable code provisions of the corporate 
governance code issued by the respective foreign stock exchanges. For those 
Chinese companies that listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), they have 
been required to disclose the material differences between their corporate 
governance standards and the NYSE corporate governance rules applicable to US 
companies listed on the NYSE by the listing rules of the Exchange (Section 
303A-11). The stricter regulation and improved corporate governance standards of 
the foreign jurisdictions in which Chinese companies list would arguably support 
such companies to improve their corporate governance, regardless of being SOEs or 
under private ownership [Proposition 4].  
 
Nevertheless, there is no immediate prospect of the Chinese government loosening 
its grip on the major Chinese SOEs, since it still maintains its dominant shareholder 
status, especially in those large centrally-owned companies. Significantly, the 
Chinese government has de facto plenary powers to appoint the chairmen, executive 
directors, senior managers and certain supervisors in the majority of China’s large 
SOEs. As most overseas listed Chinese SOEs have a state-owned parent company as 
their controlling shareholder, the vital role played by the Communist Party’s 
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committee in the operation of these companies cannot be ignored. Furthermore, with 
most Chinese SOEs having now concluded their Spilt Share Structure Reforms, the 
results of this reform appear to be negligible, as the Chinese government shows no 
sign of decreasing its shareholding in these SOEs, or relaxing the overwhelming 
influence that it has in dictating the direction of these companies [Proposition 3].  
 
Therefore, traditional Chinese corporate governance approaches are likely to prevail 
in foreign listed Mainland companies. Furthermore, the current single-party socialist 
political system of China, alongside the slow pace of social and economic reforms, 
will in the longer term serve to ensure that political factors will continue to 
determine the nature of corporate governance in China’s overseas listed companies.  
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APPENDIX: FULL LIST OF CHINESE OVERSEAS LISTED COMPANIES 
I. CHINESE COMPANIES LISTED ON NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE (NYSE) 
(rated according to their market capitalisation) 
English Name of Company Ticker Symbol Listed Stock Exchange Market Capitalisation (descending US$)* Listing Date 
China Mobile Limited (China Mobile) CHL NYSE $4,817,311,590 22 Oct 1997 (IPO) (ADR) 
PetroChina Company Limited PTR NYSE $1,627,920,000 06 Apr 2000 (IPO) (ADR) 
New Oriental Education & Technology Group Inc. (New Oriental) EDU NYSE $1,268,276,800 07 Sep 2006 (IPO) 
Mindray Medical International Limited MR NYSE $1,175,235,880 26 Sep 2006 (IPO) (ADR) 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) Limited CEO NYSE $1,070,926,260 27 Feb 2001 (IPO) (ADR) 
China Life Insurance Company LFC NYSE $1,062,736,030 17 Dec 2003 (IPO) (ADR) 
Suntech Power Holdings Co., Ltd. (Suntech) STP NYSE $769,881,600 14 Dec 2005 (IPO) (ADR) 
Giant Interactive Group Inc. GA NYSE $741,124,670 01 Nov 2007 (IPO) 
China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) SNP NYSE $725,462,100 18 Oct 2000 (IPO) (ADR) 
LDK Solar Co., Ltd. LDK NYSE $564,536,850 01 Jun 2007 (IPO) (ADR) 
Huaneng Power International, Inc. HNP NYSE $511,838,780 06 Oct 1994 (IPO) (ADR) 
China Unicom Limited CHU NYSE $466,087,750 21 Jun 2000 (IPO) (ADR) 
American Oriental Bioengineering, Inc. AOB NYSE $446,019,300 18 Dec 2006 
Longtop Financial Technologies Limited LFT NYSE $436,778,480 24 Oct 2007 (IPO) (ADR) 
World Art Net MLWAN Euronext Paris - Marche Libre $380,951,228 17 Jan 2008 
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Aluminum Corporation of China Limited (Chalco) ACH NYSE $314,607,930 11 Dec 2001 (ADR) 
American Dairy, Inc. ADY NYSE ARCA $266,485,440 18 Apr 2005 
E-House (China) Holdings Limited EJ NYSE $264,845,100 08 Aug 2007 (IPO) (ADR) 
WuXi PharmaTech (Cayman) Inc. WX NYSE $256,471,890 09 Aug 2007 (IPO) (ADR) 
China Security & Surveillance Technology, Inc. CSR NYSE $247,552,200 29 Oct 2007 
Yingli Green Energy Holding Company YGE NYSE $230,331,660 08 Jun 2007 (IPO) (ADR) 
China Telecom Corporation Limited CHA NYSE $222,731,670 14 Nov 2002 (IPO) (ADR) 
Huacheng Real Estate ALHUA ALTERNEXT PARIS $218,852,183 08 Apr 2008 
Trina Solar Limited (Trina) TSL NYSE $194,192,400 19 Dec 2006 (IPO) 
Qiao Xing Mobile Communication Co., Ltd. QXM NYSE $142,750,156 03 May 2007 (IPO) 
China Nepstar Chain Drugstore Ltd. NPD NYSE $124,646,060 09 Nov 2007 (IPO) 
Simcere Pharmaceutical Group SCR NYSE $115,517,150 20 Apr 2007 (IPO) (ADR) 
General Steel Holdings, Inc. GSI NYSE $112,361,190 08 Aug 2008 
WSP Holdings Limited WH NYSE $109,069,450 06 Dec 2007 (IPO) (ADR) 
China Digital TV Holding Co., Ltd. STV NYSE $102,806,720 05 Oct 2007 (IPO) (ADR) 
ReneSola Ltd. SOL NYSE $100,225,730 29 Jan 2008 (IPO) (ADR) 
China Corn Oil ALCCO ALTERNEXT PARIS $97,855,401 25 Mar 2008 
Gushan Environmental Energy Limited GU NYSE $91,547,700 19 Dec 2007 (IPO) (ADR) 
Yanzhou Coal Mining Company Limited YZC NYSE $89,743,780 31 Mar 1998 (IPO) (ADR) 
Guangshen Railway Company Limited GSH NYSE $80,861,280 13 May 1996 (IPO) (ADR) 
VanceInfo Technologies, Inc. VIT NYSE $76,162,640 12 Dec 2007 (IPO) (ADR) 
China Photovoltaic Group (CNPV) ALCNP ALTERNEXT PARIS $70,381,259 14 Aug 2008 
Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Company Limited SHI NYSE $64,685,000 26 Jul 1993 (IPO) (ADR) 
Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) SMI NYSE $62,859,000 17 Mar 2004 (IPO) 
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China Super Power Saving Holdings Ltd. MLCSP Euronext Paris - Marche Libre $59,213,253 25 Feb 2008 
Noah Education Holdings, Ltd. NED NYSE $54,339,840 19 Oct 2007 (IPO) (ADR) 
Xinyuan Real Estate Co., Ltd. XIN NYSE $46,966,490 12 Dec 2007 (IPO) 
China Forest Industry Holdings Limited MLCFI Euronext Paris - Marche Libre $43,201,989 07 Oct 2008 
Sinovac Biotech Ltd. SVA NYSE Alternext U.S. $37,084,630 26 Nov 2004 
China Southern Airlines Company Limited ZNH NYSE $34,906,410 30 Jul 1997 (IPO) (ADR) 
Agria Corporation GRO NYSE $31,686,300 07 Nov 2007 (IPO) (ADR) 
Tongjitang Chinese Medicines Company TCM NYSE $26,286,700 16 Mar 2007 (IPO) 
Acorn International, Inc. ATV NYSE $25,796,160 03 May 2007 (IPO) (ADR) 
China Mass Media International Advertising Corp. CMM NYSE ARCA $15,507,950 04 Aug 2008 (IPO) 
China Eastern Airlines Corporation Limited CEA NYSE $11,992,560 04 Feb 1997 (IPO) (ADR) 
Easson Telecom Limited MLEAS Euronext Paris - Marche Libre $3,273,177 25 Mar 2008 
Lionax MLION Euronext Paris - Marche Libre $1,394,801 22 Aug 2007 
Vestasia Limted MLVES Euronext Paris - Marche Libre $282,907 20 Dec 07 
China Distance Education Holdings Ltd. DL NYSE ARCA / 30 Jul 2008 (IPO) 
China Netcom Group Corporation (Hong Kong) Ltd. (CNC) CN Delisted / 17 Nov 2004 
Source: data collected from the official website of New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ in October 2008, see New York Stock Exchange Euronext, Listings Directory, available at: 
http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/lc_all_overview.html, accessed October 27, 2008; and NASDAQ Stock Exchange, Company List (Exchange: NASDAQ - All NASDAQ Securities / Region: Asia - China), 
available at: http://www.nasdaq.com/screening/companies-by-industry.aspx?industry=ALL&exchange=NASDAQ&region=Asia&country=China, accessed October 27, 2008.  
* The market capitalisation of these Chinese companies listed in this table was considerably smaller than the official figures issued by the Chinese government, since the NYSE and NASDAQ probably 
adjusted for this by calculating on a free float basis, i.e., the market capitalisation that the NYSE and NASDAQ used is the value of the publicly tradable part of the Chinese company.  
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II. CHINESE COMPANIES LISTED ON HONG KONG STOCK EXCHANGE (HKEX) 
(rated according to their market capitalisation) 
English Name of Company Ticker Symbol Listed Stock Exchange Listing Date 
Market Capitalisation 
(descending HK$) 
Type 
China Mobile Co., Ltd. 00941 HKEX Main Board 23 Oct 1997 $1,359,476,863,733 Red Chip Companies 
China Construction Bank Corporation 00939 HKEX Main Board 27 Oct 2005 $831,349,610,800 H Share Companies 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd. 01398 HKEX Main Board 27 Oct 2006 $294,020,016,945 H Share Companies 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) Ltd. 00883 HKEX Main Board 28 Feb 2001 $281,415,959,899 Red Chip Companies 
Bank of China Ltd. 03988 HKEX Main Board 01 Jun 2006 $168,004,755,304 H Share Companies 
China Life Insurance Co., Ltd. 02628 HKEX Main Board 18 Dec 2003 $151,427,911,250 H Share Companies 
China Unicom (Hong Kong) Ltd. 00762 HKEX Main Board 22 Jun 2000 $150,314,471,395 Red Chip Companies 
PetroChina Co., Ltd. 00857 HKEX Main Board 07 Apr 2000 $120,263,730,000 H Share Companies 
Bank of Communications Co., Ltd. 03328 HKEX Main Board 23 Jun 2005 $101,944,949,161 H Share Companies 
Bank of China Hong Kong (Holdings) Ltd. 02388 HKEX Main Board 25 Jul 2002 $90,714,454,682 Red Chip Companies 
China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Limited 00386 HKEX Main Board 19 Oct 2000 $84,405,854,640 H Share Companies 
Ping An Insurance (Group) Co. of China Ltd. 02318 HKEX Main Board 24 Jun 2004 $81,876,598,336 H Share Companies 
China Overseas Land & Investment Ltd. 00688 HKEX Main Board 20 Aug 1992 $66,567,247,103 Red Chip Companies 
China Resources Power Holdings Co., Ltd. 00836 HKEX Main Board 12 Nov 2003 $60,227,954,874 Red Chip Companies 
China Shenhua Energy Co., Ltd. 01088 HKEX Main Board 15 Jun 2005 $47,580,155,000 H Share Companies 
China Merchants Holdings (International) Co., Ltd. 00144 HKEX Main Board 15 Jul 1992 $43,415,021,826 Red Chip Companies 
China Telecom Corporation Ltd. 00728 HKEX Main Board 15 Nov 2002 $37,746,555,200 H Share Companies 
China Resources Enterprise Ltd. 00291 HKEX Main Board 12 Nov 2003 $35,828,146,800 Red Chip Companies 
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China Resources Land Ltd. 01109 HKEX Main Board 08 Nov 1996 $35,828,137,877 Red Chip Companies 
Beijing Enterprises Holdings Ltd. 00392 HKEX Main Board 29 May 1997 $34,118,910,000 Red Chip Companies 
China Merchants Bank Co., Ltd. 03968 HKEX Main Board 22 Sep 2006 $30,613,000,000 H Share Companies 
Sinofert Holdings Ltd. 00297 HKEX Main Board 30 Sep 1996 $29,637,907,806 Red Chip Companies 
China CITIC Bank Corporation Ltd. 00998 HKEX Main Board 27 Apr 2007 $28,524,145,706 H Share Companies 
CITIC International Financial Holdings Ltd. 00183 HKEX Main Board 17 Jul 1980 $28,219,947,288 Red Chip Companies 
China Insurance International Holdings Co., Ltd. 00966 HKEX Main Board 29 Jun 2000 $25,301,873,938 Red Chip Companies 
China Communications Construction Co., Ltd. 01800 HKEX Main Board 15 Dec 2006 $23,377,200,000 H Share Companies 
Lenovo Group Ltd. 00992 HKEX Main Board 14 Feb 1994 $20,909,209,272 Red Chip Companies 
China Railway Construction Corporation Ltd. 01186 HKEX Main Board 13 Mar 2008 $19,475,656,480 H Share Companies 
China Railway Group Ltd. 00390 HKEX Main Board 07 Dec 2007 $18,512,516,000 H Share Companies 
China Coal Energy Co., Ltd. 01898 HKEX Main Board 19 Dec 2006 $18,397,850,240 H Share Companies 
Guangdong Investment Ltd. 00270 HKEX Main Board 06 Oct 2009 $14,171,192,563 Red Chip Companies 
Denway Motors Ltd. 00203 HKEX Main Board 22 Feb 1993 $14,059,966,259 Red Chip Companies 
CITIC Pacific Ltd. 00267 HKEX Main Board 26 Feb 1986 $13,290,483,910 Red Chip Companies 
Shanghai Industrial Holdings Ltd. 00363 HKEX Main Board 30 May 1996 $12,916,320,000 Red Chip Companies 
COSCO Pacific Ltd. 01199 HKEX Main Board 19 Dec 1994 $12,347,661,139 Red Chip Companies 
Huaneng Power International Inc. 00902 HKEX Main Board 21 Jan 1998 $11,518,640,848 H Share Companies 
Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd. 02600 HKEX Main Board 12 Dec 2001 $11,240,303,009 H Share Companies 
China Everbright Ltd. 00165 HKEX Main Board 26 Feb 1973 $11,001,955,497 Red Chip Companies 
CNPC (Hong Kong) Ltd. 00135 HKEX Main Board 13 Mar 1973 $10,793,321,413 Red Chip Companies 
Anhui Conch Cement Co., Ltd. 00914 HKEX Main Board 21 Oct 1997 $10,331,820,000 H Share Companies 
China COSCO Holdings Co., Ltd. 01919 HKEX Main Board 30 Jun 2005 $10,296,594,000 H Share Companies 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Asia) Ltd. 00349 HKEX Main Board 14 Mar 1973 $10,159,959,040 Red Chip Companies 
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China Agri-Industries Holdings Ltd. 00606 HKEX Main Board 21 Mar 2007 $9,703,547,161 Red Chip Companies 
China Shipping Development Co., Ltd. 01138 HKEX Main Board 11 Nov 1994 $9,434,880,000 H Share Companies 
Datang International Power Generation Co., Ltd. 00991 HKEX Main Board 21 Mar 1997 $9,416,524,322 H Share Companies 
Yanzhou Coal Mining Co., Ltd. 01171 HKEX Main Board 01 Apr 1998 $9,302,400,000 H Share Companies 
Zijin Mining Group Co., Ltd. 02899 HKEX Main Board 23 Dec 2003 $9,212,512,000 H Share Companies 
Air China Ltd. 00753 HKEX Main Board 15 Dec 2004 $9,119,764,563 H Share Companies 
Sino-Ocean Land Holdings Ltd. 03377 HKEX Main Board 28 Sep 2007 $8,943,974,000 Red Chip Companies 
Tsingtao Brewery Co., Ltd. 00168 HKEX Main Board 15 Jul 1993 $8,869,636,670 H Share Companies 
Beijing Capital International Airport Co., Ltd. 00694 HKEX Main Board 01 Feb 2000 $7,893,328,800 H Share Companies 
China Communications Services Corporation Ltd. 00552 HKEX Main Board 08 Dec 2006 $7,891,686,792 H Share Companies 
BYD Co., Ltd. 01211 HKEX Main Board 31 Jul 2002 $7,385,300,000 H Share Companies 
Franshion Properties (China) Ltd. 00817 HKEX Main Board 17 Aug 2007 $7,127,132,800 Red Chip Companies 
PICC Property and Casualty Co., Ltd. 02328 HKEX Main Board 06 Nov 2003 $7,119,318,800 H Share Companies 
Sinotruk (Hong Kong) Ltd. 03808 HKEX Main Board 28 Nov 2007 $7,075,868,890 Red Chip Companies 
Shanghai Electric Group Co., Ltd. 02727 HKEX Main Board 28 Apr 2005 $6,689,052,000 H Share Companies 
Jiangsu Expressway Co., Ltd. 00177 HKEX Main Board 27 Jun 1997 $6,452,160,000 H Share Companies 
China Oilfield Services Ltd. 02883 HKEX Main Board 20 Nov 2002 $6,338,938,760 H Share Companies 
Sinotrans Shipping Ltd. 00368 HKEX Main Board 23 Nov 2007 $6,227,676,000 Red Chip Companies 
China Travel International Investment Hong Kong Ltd. 00308 HKEX Main Board 11 Nov 1992 $6,094,030,412 Red Chip Companies 
Dongfeng Motor Group Co., Ltd. 00489 HKEX Main Board 07 Dec 2005 $5,997,037,200 H Share Companies 
China Foods Ltd. 00506 HKEX Main Board 07 Oct 1988 $5,582,766,712 Red Chip Companies 
China South Locomotive & Rolling Stock Corporation Ltd. 01766 HKEX Main Board 21 Aug 2008 $5,545,760,000 H Share Companies 
Zhejiang Expressway Co., Ltd. 00576 HKEX Main Board 15 May 1997 $5,133,199,110 H Share Companies 
China BlueChemical Ltd. 03983 HKEX Main Board 29 Sep 2006 $5,082,770,000 H Share Companies 
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Jiangxi Copper Co., Ltd. 00358 HKEX Main Board 12 Jun 1997 $5,050,434,480 H Share Companies 
China Power International Development Ltd. 02380 HKEX Main Board 15 Oct 2004 $5,047,855,190 Red Chip Companies 
Angang Steel Co., Ltd. 00347 HKEX Main Board 24 Jul 1997 $4,972,964,000 H Share Companies 
Shougang Concord International Enterprises Co., Ltd. 00697 HKEX Main Board 30 Apr 1991 $4,456,937,713 Red Chip Companies 
Guangshen Railway Co., Ltd. 00525 HKEX Main Board 14 May 1996 $4,179,396,000 H Share Companies 
Guangzhou Investment Co., Ltd. 00123 HKEX Main Board 15 Dec 1992 $3,991,034,832 Red Chip Companies 
China National Building Material Co., Ltd. 03323 HKEX Main Board 23 Mar 2006 $3,906,020,200 H Share Companies 
ZTE Corporation 00763 HKEX Main Board 09 Dec 2004 $3,811,594,752 H Share Companies 
Guangzhou R&F Properties Co. Ltd., 02777 HKEX Main Board 14 Jul 2005 $3,604,167,320 H Share Companies 
Shenzhen International Holdings Ltd. 00152 HKEX Main Board 25 Sep 1972 $3,594,578,679 Red Chip Companies 
CITIC Resources Holdings Ltd. 01205 HKEX Main Board 08 Sep 1997 $3,446,543,212 Red Chip Companies 
Asia Satellite Telecommunications Holdings Ltd. 01135 HKEX Main Board 19 Jun 1996 $3,364,281,300 Red Chip Companies 
GZI Transport Ltd. 01052 HKEX Main Board 30 Jan 1997 $3,346,324,590 Red Chip Companies 
Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Co., Ltd. 00338 HKEX Main Board 26 Jul 1993 $3,331,900,000 H Share Companies 
China Shipping Container Lines Co., Ltd. 02866 HKEX Main Board 16 Jun 2004 $3,225,860,000 H Share Companies 
Shandong Weigao Group Medical Polymer Co., Ltd. 08199 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 27 Feb 2004 $3,196,080,000 H Share Companies 
Wumart Stores Inc. 08277 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 21 Nov 2003 $3,090,064,800 H Share Companies 
China Molybdenum Co., Ltd. 03993 HKEX Main Board 26 Apr 2007 $3,068,105,040 H Share Companies 
Sinotrans Ltd. 00598 HKEX Main Board 13 Feb 2003 $3,002,842,080 H Share Companies 
Poly (Hong Kong) Investments Ltd. 00119 HKEX Main Board 30 Aug 1973 $2,866,570,569 Red Chip Companies 
Harbin Power Equipment Co., Ltd. 01133 HKEX Main Board 16 Dec 1994 $2,769,841,100 H Share Companies 
China National Materials Co., Ltd. 01893 HKEX Main Board 20 Dec 2007 $2,747,389,551 H Share Companies 
Tianjin Port Development Holdings Ltd. 03382 HKEX Main Board 24 May 2006 $2,680,650,000 Red Chip Companies 
Shenzhen Investment Ltd. 00604 HKEX Main Board 07 Mar1997 $2,506,370,170 Red Chip Companies 
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Dongfang Electric Corporation Ltd. 01072 HKEX Main Board 06 Jun 1994 $2,502,400,000 H Share Companies 
Maanshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. 00323 HKEX Main Board 03 Nov 1993 $2,408,772,700 H Share Companies 
Dah Chong Hong Holdings Ltd. 01828 HKEX Main Board 17 Oct 2007 $2,391,117,890 Red Chip Companies 
China Pharmaceutical Group Ltd. 01093 HKEX Main Board 21 Jun 1994 $2,307,186,992 Red Chip Companies 
Digital China Holdings Ltd. 00861 HKEX Main Board 01 Jun 2001 $2,271,241,771 Red Chip Companies 
Tianjin Development Holdings Ltd. 00882 HKEX Main Board 10 Dec 1997 $2,252,361,964 Red Chip Companies 
Weichai Power Co., Ltd. 02338 HKEX Main Board 11 Mar 2004 $2,251,700,000 H Share Companies 
China Southern Airlines Co., Ltd. 01055 HKEX Main Board 31 Jul 1997 $2,043,069,720 H Share Companies 
China Everbright International Ltd. 00257 HKEX Main Board 02 Oct 1990 $2,041,304,005 Red Chip Companies 
China State Construction International Holdings Ltd. 03311 HKEX Main Board 08 Jul 2005 $2,023,644,122 Red Chip Companies 
Huadian Power International Corporation Ltd. 01071 HKEX Main Board 30 Jun 1999 $2,017,749,480 H Share Companies 
COSCO International Holdings Ltd. 00517 HKEX Main Board 11 Feb 1992 $1,998,460,743 Red Chip Companies 
Shenzhen Expressway Co., Ltd. 00548 HKEX Main Board 12 Mar 1997 $1,936,025,000 H Share Companies 
Beijing Enterprises Water Group Ltd. 00371 HKEX Main Board 19 Apr 1993 $1,875,957,218 Red Chip Companies 
Zhuzhou CSR Times Electric Co., Ltd. 03898 HKEX Main Board 20 Dec 2006 $1,865,483,356 H Share Companies 
Lianhua Supermarket Holdings Co., Ltd. 00980 HKEX Main Board 27 Jun 2003 $1,863,000,000 H Share Companies 
Dalian Port (PDA) Co., Ltd. 02880 HKEX Main Board 28 Apr 2006 $1,827,672,000 H Share Companies 
Inspur International Ltd. 00596 HKEX Main Board 29 Apr 2004 $1,633,444,645 Red Chip Companies 
Minmetals Resources Ltd. 01208 HKEX Main Board 15 Dec 1994 $1,538,778,599 Red Chip Companies 
Ming An (Holdings) Co. Ltd., The 01389 HKEX Main Board 22 Dec 2006 $1,511,319,680 Red Chip Companies 
China Eastern Airlines Corporation Ltd. 00670 HKEX Main Board 05 Feb 1997 $1,472,933,000 H Share Companies 
Anhui Expressway Co., Ltd. 00995 HKEX Main Board 13 Nov 1996 $1,429,729,000 H Share Companies 
CITIC 1616 Holdings Ltd. 01883 HKEX Main Board 03 Apr 2007 $1,423,966,524 Red Chip Companies 
Shenyin Wanguo (HK) Ltd. 00218 HKEX Main Board 18 Dec 1996 $1,247,283,946 Red Chip Companies 
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Dynasty Fine Wines Group Ltd. 00828 HKEX Main Board 26 Jan 2005 $1,232,550,000 Red Chip Companies 
Zhaojin Mining Industry Co., Ltd. 01818 HKEX Main Board 08 Dec 2006 $1,206,597,480 H Share Companies 
Brilliance China Automotive Holdings Ltd. 01114 HKEX Main Board 22 Oct 1999 $1,174,325,088 Red Chip Companies 
Xinjiang Xinxin Mining Industry Co., Ltd. 03833 HKEX Main Board 12 Oct 2007 $1,146,090,000 H Share Companies 
TravelSky Technology Ltd. 00696 HKEX Main Board 07 Feb 2001 $1,131,508,560 H Share Companies 
Hunan Nonferrous Metals Corporation Ltd. 02626 HKEX Main Board 31 Mar 2006 $1,110,255,040 H Share Companies 
Sichuan Expressway Co., Ltd. 00107 HKEX Main Board 07 Oct 1997 $1,056,477,600 H Share Companies 
Shanghai Forte Land Co., Ltd. 02337 HKEX Main Board 06 Feb 2004 $949,984,310 H Share Companies 
Shanghai Jin Jiang Int'l Hotels (Group) Co., Ltd. 02006 HKEX Main Board 15 Dec 2006 $946,220,000 H Share Companies 
China Chengtong Development Group Ltd. 00217 HKEX Main Board 18 Dec 1996 $937,616,950 Red Chip Companies 
Great Wall Motor Co., Ltd. 02333 HKEX Main Board 15 Dec 2003 $933,994,720 H Share Companies 
Silver Grant International Industries Ltd. 00171 HKEX Main Board 16 Nov 2009 $928,561,902 Red Chip Companies 
TCL Multimedia Technology Holdings Ltd. 01070 HKEX Main Board 26 Nov 1999 $899,507,342 Red Chip Companies 
AviChina Industry & Technology Co., Ltd. 02357 HKEX Main Board 30 Oct 2003 $873,496,260 H Share Companies 
Guangzhou Shipyard International Co., Ltd. 00317 HKEX Main Board 06 Aug 1993 $832,635,420 H Share Companies 
Shandong Chenming Paper Holdings Ltd. 01812 HKEX Main Board 18 Jun 2008 $806,016,200 H Share Companies 
Qingling Motors Co., Ltd. 01122 HKEX Main Board 17 Aug 1994 $805,123,712 H Share Companies 
Sinopec Kantons Holdings Ltd. 00934 HKEX Main Board 25 Jun 1999 $777,622,500 Red Chip Companies 
China Aerospace International Holdings Ltd. 00031 HKEX Main Board 25 Aug 1981 $771,271,165 Red Chip Companies 
Kingway Brewery Holdings Ltd. 00124 HKEX Main Board 08 Aug 1997 $761,633,898 Red Chip Companies 
Sinopec Yizheng Chemical Fibre Co., Ltd. 01033 HKEX Main Board 29 Mar 1994 $742,000,000 H Share Companies 
China Energine International (Holdings) Ltd. 01185 HKEX Main Board 11 Aug 1997 $724,799,134 Red Chip Companies 
Beijing Capital Land Ltd. 02868 HKEX Main Board 19 Jun 2003 $714,529,200 H Share Companies 
Xiamen International Port Co., Ltd. 03378 HKEX Main Board 19 Dec 2005 $651,222,000 H Share Companies 
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Weiqiao Textile Co., Ltd. 02698 HKEX Main Board 24 Sep 2003 $645,245,640 H Share Companies 
Chu Kong Shipping Development Co., Ltd. 00560 HKEX Main Board 23 May 1997 $621,000,000 Red Chip Companies 
Shandong Molong Petroleum Machinery Co., Ltd. 00568 HKEX Main Board 07 Feb 2007 $601,897,040 H Share Companies 
Beijing Development (Hong Kong) Ltd. 00154 HKEX Main Board 06 Jan 2003 $582,487,278 Red Chip Companies 
Min Xin Holdings Ltd. 00222 HKEX Main Board 28 Jun 1982 $574,285,820 Red Chip Companies 
China Resources Logic Ltd. 01193 HKEX Main Board 07 Nov 1994 $574,253,184 Red Chip Companies 
Sichuan Xinhua Winshare Chainstore Co., Ltd. 00811 HKEX Main Board 30 May 2007 $561,260,117 H Share Companies 
Chongqing Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. 01053 HKEX Main Board 17 Oct 1997 $543,508,472 H Share Companies 
CATIC International Holdings Ltd. 00232 HKEX Main Board 12 Dec 1991 $540,739,239 Red Chip Companies 
TCL Communication Technology Holdings Ltd. 02618 HKEX Main Board 27 Sep 2004 $536,287,403 Red Chip Companies 
Shougang Concord Technology Holdings Ltd. 00521 HKEX Main Board 23 Dec 1988 $535,225,370 Red Chip Companies 
Beijing North Star Co., Ltd. 00588 HKEX Main Board 14 May 1997 $530,265,000 H Share Companies 
Guangnan (Holdings) Ltd. 01203 HKEX Main Board 09 Dec 1994 $525,249,905 Red Chip Companies 
Shougang Concord Century Holdings Ltd. 00103 HKEX Main Board 09 Apr 1992 $495,429,837 Red Chip Companies 
Yantai North Andre Juice Co Ltd. 08259 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 22 Apr 2003 $492,849,280 H Share Companies 
Shanghai Prime Machinery Co., Ltd. 02345 HKEX Main Board 27 Apr 2006 $486,214,400 H Share Companies 
Stone Group Holdings Ltd. 00409 HKEX Main Board 16 Aug 1993 $482,516,412 Red Chip Companies 
CATIC Shenzhen Holdings Ltd. 00161 HKEX Main Board 29 Sep 1997 $478,607,998 H Share Companies 
Hainan Meilan International Airport Co., Ltd. 00357 HKEX Main Board 18 Nov 2002 $471,979,040 H Share Companies 
Yunnan Enterprises Holdings Ltd. 00455 HKEX Main Board 30 Mar 1992 $467,529,540 Red Chip Companies 
China Glass Holdings Ltd. 03300 HKEX Main Board 23 Jun 2005 $449,280,000 Red Chip Companies 
CITIC 21CN Co., Ltd. 00241 HKEX Main Board 06 Jul 1972 $446,144,356 Red Chip Companies 
Chongqing Machinery & Electric Co., Ltd. 02722 HKEX Main Board 13 Jun 2008 $429,073,113 H Share Companies 
Minmetals Land Ltd. 00230 HKEX Main Board 20 Dec 1991 $423,256,078 Red Chip Companies 
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Tong Ren Tang Technologies Co., Ltd. 08069 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 31 Oct 2000 $420,009,200 H Share Companies 
Rivera (Holdings) Ltd. 00281 HKEX Main Board 23 Jan 1973 $417,367,442 Red Chip Companies 
Guangzhou Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. 00874 HKEX Main Board 30 Oct 1997 $400,218,000 H Share Companies 
Shandong Luoxin Pharmacy Stock Co., Ltd. 08058 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 09 Dec 2005 $398,235,200 H Share Companies 
China Resources Microelectronics Ltd. 00597 HKEX Main Board 13 Aug 2004 $392,586,988 Red Chip Companies 
Zhejiang Glass Co., Ltd. 00739 HKEX Main Board 10 Dec 2001 $381,149,010 H Share Companies 
First Tractor Co., Ltd. 00038 HKEX Main Board 23 Jun 1997 $369,830,800 H Share Companies 
Shenzhen Dongjiang Environmental Co., Ltd. 08230 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 29 Jan 2003 $343,347,000 H Share Companies 
Lingbao Gold Co., Ltd. 03330 HKEX Main Board 12 Jan 2006 $341,865,100 H Share Companies 
Jiuzhou Development Co., Ltd. 00908 HKEX Main Board 26 May 1998 $335,580,000 Red Chip Companies 
Beijing Jingkelong Co., Ltd. 00814 HKEX Main Board 26 Feb 2008 $327,888,000 H Share Companies 
China Electronics Corporation Holdings Co., Ltd. 00085 HKEX Main Board 25 Jul 1997 $319,650,200 Red Chip Companies 
China Information Technology Development Ltd. 08178 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 11 Dec 2001 $318,250,412 Red Chip Companies 
Baoye Group Co., Ltd. 02355 HKEX Main Board 30 Jun 2003 $312,221,952 H Share Companies 
EVOC Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd. 08285 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 10 Oct 2003 $283,683,840 H Share Companies 
Shougang Concord Grand (Group) Ltd. 00730 HKEX Main Board 08 Aug 1991 $275,182,800 Red Chip Companies 
Zhengzhou Gas Co., Ltd. 03928 HKEX Main Board 29 Jun 2007 $264,316,800 H Share Companies 
APT Satellite Holdings Ltd. 01045 HKEX Main Board 18 Dec 1996 $256,224,300 Red Chip Companies 
Tianjin Capital Environmental Protection Co., Ltd. 01065 HKEX Main Board 17 May 1994 $255,000,000 H Share Companies 
Tianjin Tianlian Public Utilities Co., Ltd. 08290 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 09 Jan 2004 $247,529,700 H Share Companies 
Nanjing Sample Technology Co., Ltd. 08287 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 09 Jun 2004 $244,800,000 H Share Companies 
Wing Shan International Ltd. 00570 HKEX Main Board 07 Apr 1993 $236,827,660 Red Chip Companies 
Anhui Tianda Oil Pipe Co., Ltd. 00839 HKEX Main Board 24 Dec 2007 $228,733,050 H Share Companies 
Shenji Group Kunming Machine Tool Co., Ltd. 00300 HKEX Main Board 07 Dec 1993 $225,431,700 H Share Companies 
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Great Wall Technology Co., Ltd. 00074 HKEX Main Board 05 Aug 1999 $208,781,120 H Share Companies 
Shanghai Tonva Petrochemical Co., Ltd. 08251 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 13 Jul 2005 $189,318,850 H Share Companies 
Guangdong Nan Yue Logistics Co., Ltd. 03399 HKEX Main Board 26 Oct 2005 $186,300,000 H Share Companies 
Overseas Chinese Town (Asia) Holdings Ltd. 03366 HKEX Main Board 02 Nov 2005 $168,699,300 Red Chip Companies 
Shenzhen Neptunus Interlong Bio-Technique Co., Ltd. 08329 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 12 Sep 2005 $165,669,000 H Share Companies 
Changmao Biochemical Engineering Co., Ltd. 08208 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 28 Jun 2002 $165,330,000 H Share Companies 
Nanjing Panda Electronic Co., Ltd. 00553 HKEX Main Board 02 May 1996 $147,620,000 H Share Companies 
Advanced Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation Ltd. 03355 HKEX Main Board 07 Apr 2006 $144,810,684 H Share Companies 
Founder Holdings Ltd. 00418 HKEX Main Board 21 Dec 1995 $141,287,487 Red Chip Companies 
Yue Da Mining Holdings Ltd. 00629 HKEX Main Board 29 Nov 2001 $131,855,580 Red Chip Companies 
Sanmenxia Tianyuan Aluminum Co., Ltd. 08253 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 13 Jul 2004 $126,007,200 H Share Companies 
Shandong Xinhua Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. 00719 HKEX Main Board 31 Dec 1996 $123,000,000 H Share Companies 
IRICO Group Electronics Co., Ltd. 00438 HKEX Main Board 20 Dec 2004 $121,323,500 H Share Companies 
Global Digital Creations Holdings Ltd. 08271 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 04 Aug 2003 $115,276,853 Red Chip Companies 
Guangdong Tannery Ltd. 01058 HKEX Main Board 16 Dec 1996 $112,875,840 Red Chip Companies 
Capinfo Co., Ltd. 08157 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 21 Dec 2001 $106,106,226 H Share Companies 
Jingwei Textile Machinery Co., Ltd. 00350 HKEX Main Board 02 Feb 1996 $104,864,000 H Share Companies 
Beijing Media Corporation Ltd. 01000 HKEX Main Board 22 Dec 2004 $103,213,880 H Share Companies 
Fujian Holdings Ltd. 00181 HKEX Main Board 22 Feb 1973 $101,228,200 Red Chip Companies 
EC-Founder (Holdings) Co., Ltd. 00618 HKEX Main Board 07 Oct 1991 $94,015,273 Red Chip Companies 
Northeast Electric Development Co., Ltd. 00042 HKEX Main Board 06 Jul 1995 $86,413,250 H Share Companies 
Tianjin Binhai Teda Logistics (Group) Corporation Ltd. 08348 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 30 Apr 2008 $83,506,720 H Share Companies 
Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics Co., Ltd. 08102 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 04 Aug 2000 $81,180,550 H Share Companies 
AKM Industrial Co., Ltd. 08298 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 18 Aug 2004 $81,000,000 Red Chip Companies 
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Xinjiang Tianye Water Saving Irrigation System Co., Ltd. 00840 HKEX Main Board 24 Jan 2008 $80,960,000 H Share Companies 
Zhejiang Shibao Co., Ltd. 08331 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 16 May 2006 $76,308,320 H Share Companies 
Powerleader Science & Technology Group Ltd. 08236 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 12 Dec 2002 $75,937,500 H Share Companies 
Beijing Beida Jade Bird Universal Sci-Tech Co., Ltd. 08095 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 27 Jul 2000 $72,235,200 H Share Companies 
Chengdu PUTIAN Telecommunications Cable Co., Ltd. 01202 HKEX Main Board 13 Dec 1994 $68,800,000 H Share Companies 
Launch Tech Co., Ltd. 08196 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 07 Oct 2002 $68,400,000 H Share Companies 
Changan Minsheng APLL Logistics Co., Ltd. 08217 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 23 Feb 2006 $63,250,000 H Share Companies 
Biosino Bio-Technology and Science Incorporation 08247 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 27 Feb 2006 $60,060,000 H Share Companies 
Shanxi Changcheng Microlight Equipment Co., Ltd. 08286 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 18 May 2004 $55,000,000 H Share Companies 
Beiren Printing Machinery Holdings Ltd. 00187 HKEX Main Board 06 Aug 1993 $49,000,000 H Share Companies 
Shanghai Fudan-Zhangjiang Bio-Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. 08231 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 13 Aug 2002 $47,520,000 H Share Companies 
Jiangsu Nandasoft Co., Ltd. 08045 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 24 Apr 2001 $40,950,000 H Share Companies 
Dahe Media Co., Ltd. 08243 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 13 Nov 2003 $40,500,000 H Share Companies 
Zhejiang Yonglong Enterprises Co., Ltd. 08211 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 08 Nov 2002 $36,613,500 H Share Companies 
Tianjin TEDA Biomedical Engineering Co., Ltd. 08189 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 18 Jun 2002 $34,755,000 H Share Companies 
Jilin Qifeng Chemical Fiber Co., Ltd. 00549 HKEX Main Board 21 Jun 2006 $34,563,375 H Share Companies 
Jilin Province Huinan Changlong Bio-pharmacy Co., Ltd. 08049 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 24 May 2001 $34,500,000 H Share Companies 
Shanghai Jiaoda Withub Information Industrial Co., Ltd. 08205 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 31 Jul 2002 $30,360,000 H Share Companies 
Shenzhen Mingwah Aohan High Technology Corp., Ltd. 08301 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 07 Jul 2004 $23,023,000 H Share Companies 
CCID Consulting Co., Ltd. 08235 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 12 Dec 2002 $20,064,000 H Share Companies 
Shaanxi Northwest New Technology Industry Co., Ltd. 08258 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 03 Jul 2003 $19,550,000 H Share Companies 
Xi'an Haitian Antenna Technologies Co., Ltd. 08227 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 05 Nov 2003 $14,558,824 H Share Companies 
Zhejiang Prospect Co., Ltd. 08273 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 18 Feb 2004 $10,350,000 H Share Companies 
Zheda Lande Scitech Ltd. 08106 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 03 May 2002 $9,530,625 H Share Companies 
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Northeast Tiger Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. 08197 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 28 Feb 2002 $8,901,000 H Share Companies 
Ningbo Yidong Electronic Co., Ltd. 08249 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 14 Nov 2003 $5,200,000 H Share Companies 
Luoyang Glass Co., Ltd. 01108 HKEX Main Board 08 Jul 1994 Suspended over 1 year H Share Companies 
Hisense Kelon Electrical Holdings Co., Ltd. 00921 HKEX Main Board 23 Jul 1996 Suspended over 1 year H Share Companies 
Shenyang Public Utility Holdings Co., Ltd. 00747 HKEX Main Board 16 Dec 1999 Suspended over 1 year H Share Companies 
Mudan Automobile Shares Co., Ltd. 08188 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 18 Dec 2001 Suspended over 1 year H Share Companies 
Shanghai Qingpu Fire-Fighting Equipment Co., Ltd. 08115 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 30 Jun 2004 Suspended over 1 year H Share Companies 
China Data Broadcasting Holdings Ltd. 08016 HKEX Growth Enterprise Market 24 Jan 2000 Suspended over 1 year Red Chip Companies 
Source: data collected from the official website of Hong Kong Stock Exchange in October 2008, see Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Statistics & Research, Securities Market Statistics: China Dimension, 
available at: http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/stat/smstat/chidimen/chidimen.htm, accessed October 27, 2008.  
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III. CHINESE COMPANIES LISTED ON NASDAQ STOCK EXCHANGE 
(rated according to their market capitalisation) 
English Name of Company Ticker Symbol Listed Stock Exchange 
Market Capitalisation 
(descending US$)* 
Listing Date 
Baidu.com, Inc. BIDU NASDAQ Global Select Market $3,897,516,960  05 Aug 2005 
Netease.com Inc. NTES NASDAQ Global Select Market $2,309,309,600  30 Jun 2000 
Shanda Interactive Entertainment Ltd. SNDA NASDAQ Global Select Market $1,816,300,000  12 May 2004 
Sohu.com Inc. SOHU NASDAQ Global Select Market $1,716,800,800  12 Jul 2000 
SINA Corporation SINA NASDAQ Global Select Market $1,454,189,150  13 Apr 2000 
Ctrip.com International Ltd. CTRP NASDAQ Global Select Market $1,343,457,240  09 Dec 2003 
Focus Media Holding FMCN NASDAQ Global Market $1,008,812,790  13 Jul 2005 
Perfect World Co., Ltd. PWRD NASDAQ Global Market $771,780,380  26 Jul 2007 
AsiaInfo Holdings Inc. ASIA NASDAQ Global Market $566,370,930  03 Mar 2000 
JA Solar Holdings, Co., Ltd. JASO NASDAQ Global Market $557,225,160  07 Feb 2007 
China Medical Technologies Inc. CMED NASDAQ Global Select Market $513,059,040  10 Aug 2005 
VisionChina Media Inc. VISN NASDAQ Global Market $387,070,420  06 Dec 2007 
AirMedia Group Inc. AMCN NASDAQ Global Market $366,921,500  07 Nov 2007 
Home Inns & Hotels Management Inc. HMIN  NASDAQ Global Market $350,110,390  26 Oct 2006 
CNinsure Inc. CISG NASDAQ Global Market $339,922,750  31 Oct 2007 
The9 Limited NCTY  NASDAQ Global Market $322,716,300  15 Dec 2004 
Himax Technologies, Inc. HIMX NASDAQ Global Select Market $244,359,680  31 Mar 2006 
Solarfun Power Holdings Co., Ltd. SOLF NASDAQ Global Market $238,083,720  20 Dec 2006 
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China Natural Resources Inc. CHNR NASDAQ Capital Market $212,553,000  07Aug 1995 
UTStarcom Inc. UTSI NASDAQ Global Select Market $194,348,000  02 Mar 2000 
51job Inc. JOBS NASDAQ Global Select Market $192,733,200  24 Sep 2004 
China Finance Online Co., Ltd. JRJC NASDAQ Global Market $156,291,120  15 Oct 2004 
China Sunergy Co., Ltd. CSUN NASDAQ Global Market $138,442,500  17 May 2007 
Jinpan International Ltd. JST NASDAQ Global Select Market $130,300,500  09 Sep 2008 
China BAK Battery Inc. CBAK NASDAQ Global Market $129,189,760  31 May 2006 
3SBio Inc. SSRX NASDAQ Global Market $127,948,390  07 Feb 2007 
Actions Semiconductor Co., Ltd. ACTS NASDAQ Global Market $123,840,000  30 Nov 2005 
Kongzhong Corp. KONG NASDAQ Global Market $119,545,440  09 Jul 2004 
Cogo Group Inc. COGO  NASDAQ Global Select Market $114,593,940  31 Jan 2005 
Silicon Motion Technology Corporation SIMO NASDAQ Global Select Market $93,674,760  30 Jun 2005 
CDC Corp. CHINA NASDAQ Global Market $89,939,640  13 Jul 1999 
O2Micro International Limited OIIM NASDAQ Global Select Market $89,621,950  28 Nov 2005 
China TransInfo Technology Corp. CTFO NASDAQ Capital Market $85,419,950  14 May 2007 
eLong Inc. LONG NASDAQ Global Market $78,682,800  28 Oct 2004 
China Automotive Systems Inc. CAAS  NASDAQ Capital Market $73,933,420  24 Aug 2004 
Qiao Xing Universal Telephone Inc. XING NASDAQ Global Market $67,159,330  19 Feb 1999 
Vimicro International Corp. VIMC NASDAQ Global Market $61,663,000  15 Nov 2005 
Xinhua Finance Media Limited XFML NASDAQ Global Market $41,732,740  09 Mar 2007 
Ninetowns Internet Technology Group Company Limited NINE NASDAQ Global Market $40,087,040  03 Dec 2004 
China Techfaith Wireless Communication Technology Ltd. CNTF NASDAQ Global Market $39,421,200  05 May 2005 
SORL Auto Parts Inc. SORL NASDAQ Global Market $38,385,900  18 Apr 2005 
Linktone Ltd. LTON NASDAQ Global Market $37,012,113.60  04 Mar 2004 
  
 
369 
Hurray! Holding Co., Ltd. HRAY NASDAQ Global Market $34,998,180  04 Feb 2005 
Spreadtrum Communications Inc. SPRD NASDAQ Global Market $33,221,560  27 Jun 2007 
China Technology Development Group Corp. CTDC NASDAQ Capital Market $22,694,240  13 Dec 1996 
China Grentech Corp., Ltd. GRRF NASDAQ Global Market $20,387,290  30 Mar 2006 
Fuwei Films (Holdings) Co., Ltd. FFHL NASDAQ Global Market $11,756,700  19 Dec 2006 
Telestone Technologies Corporation TSTC NASDAQ Global Market $10,925,250  17 May 2005 
e-Future Information Technology Inc. EFUT NASDAQ Capital Market $10,509,660  31 Oct 2006 
Source: data collected from the official website of NASDAQ Stock Exchange in October 2008, see NASDAQ Stock Exchange, Company List (Exchange: NASDAQ - All NASDAQ Securities / Region: Asia - 
China), available at: http://www.nasdaq.com/screening/companies-by-industry.aspx?industry=ALL&exchange=NASDAQ&region=Asia&country=China, accessed October 27, 2008.  
* The market capitalisation of the Chinese companies showed in this table was considerably smaller than the official figures issued by the Chinese government, since NASDAQ probably adjusted for these 
by calculating on a free float basis, i.e., the market capitalisation that NASDAQ used is the value of the publicly tradable part of the Chinese company. 
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IV. CHINESE COMPANIES LISTED ON LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE (LSE) 
(rated according to their market capitalisation) 
English Name of Company 
Ticker 
Symbol 
Market 
Capitalisation 
(descending UK£) 
Sub Sector Listed Stock Exchange Listing Date 
Country of 
Incorporation 
China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation SNP £8,825,954,184 Integrated Oil & Gas LSE International Main Market 18 Oct 2000 China 
Datang International Power Generation DAT £1,076,805,358 Electricity LSE International Main Market 20 Mar 1997 China 
Air China AIRC £764,181,714 Airlines LSE International Main Market 15 Dec 2004 China 
Zhejiang Expressway Company ZHEH £538,060,026 Transportation Services LSE International Main Market 05 May 2000 China 
Green Dragon Gas Ltd. GDG £460,270,000 Coal LSE Alternative Investment Market (AIM) 17 Aug 2006 Cayman Islands 
ARC Capital Holdings Ltd. ARCH £264,610,000 Equity Investment Instruments LSE AIM 26 Jun 2006 Cayman Islands 
ReneSola Ltd. SOLA £264,580,000 Electrical Components & Equipment LSE AIM 08 Aug 2006 British Virgin Islands 
Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund Ltd. PAX £247,520,000 Equity Investment Instruments LSE AIM 21 Sep 2006 Cayman Islands 
Pacific Alliance China Land Ltd. PACL £135,900,000 Real Estate Holding & Development LSE AIM 22 Nov 2007 Cayman Islands 
Zhejiang Southeast Electric Power Company ZSED £120,144,422 Electricity LSE International Main Market 23 Sep 1997 China 
China Central Properties Ltd. CCPL £107,560,000 Real Estate Holding & Development LSE AIM 13 Jun 2007 U.K. 
Asian Citrus Holdings ACHL £103,730,000 Farming & Fishing LSE AIM 03 Aug 2005 Bermuda 
RCG Holdings Ltd. RCG £101,320,000 Electronic Equipment LSE AIM 02 Jul 2004 Bermuda 
China Real Estate Opportunities Ltd. CREO £85,730,000 Real Estate Holding & Development LSE AIM 11 Jul 2007 U.K. 
Macau Property Opportunities Fund Ltd. MPO £76,650,000 Real Estate Holding & Development LSE AIM 05 Jun 2006 U.K. 
Asian Growth Properties AGP £75,340,000 Real Estate Holding & Development LSE AIM 05 Oct 2006 British Virgin Islands 
Cosmedia Group Holdings Ltd. CGHL £65,130,000 Media Agencies LSE AIM 28 Dec 2006 Cayman Islands 
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China Medical System Holdings Ltd. CMSH £55,040,000 Pharmaceuticals LSE AIM 26 Jun 2007 Cayman Islands 
Griffin Mining GFM £50,330,000 General Mining LSE AIM 30 Jun 1997 Bermuda 
Vision Opportunity China Fund Ltd. VOC £49,780,000 Equity Investment Instruments LSE AIM 28 Nov 2007 U.K. 
Hutchison China Meditech Ltd. HCM £39,180,000 Pharmaceuticals LSE AIM 19 May 2006 Cayman Islands 
West China Cement Ltd. WCC £38,470,000 Building Materials & Fixtures LSE AIM 04 Dec 2006 U.K. 
Jetion Solar Holdings Ltd. JHL £37,850,000 Electrical Components & Equipment LSE AIM 06 Jul 2007 British Virgin Islands 
Natsun Holdings Ltd. NTS £35,420,000 Clothing & Accessories LSE AIM 24 Dec 2007 Hong Kong 
Origo Resources Partners Ltd. ORP £31,740,000 Equity Investment Instruments LSE AIM 14 Dec 2007 U.K. 
Speymill Macau Property Co., Plc. MCAU £29,520,000 Real Estate Holding & Development LSE AIM 17 Nov 2006 U.K. 
Prosperity Minerals Holdings Ltd. PMHL £29,160,000 Building Materials & Fixtures LSE AIM 24 May 2006 U.K. 
Origo Sino-India Plc. OSI £25,050,000 Specialty Finance LSE AIM 21 Dec 2006 U.K. 
ET-China.com International Holdings Ltd. ETC £23,730,000 Travel & Tourism LSE AIM 03 Aug 2007 U.K. 
China Shoto CHNS £22,080,000 Electrical Components & Equipment LSE AIM 06 Dec 2005 U.K. 
Bluestar Secutech Inc. BSST £21,480,000 Electronic Equipment LSE AIM 18 Jun 2007 British Virgin Islands 
China Goldmines Plc. CGM £17,210,000 Gold Mining LSE AIM 07 Feb 2006 U.K. 
Haike Chemical Group Ltd. HAIK £17,070,000 Exploration & Production LSE AIM 14 Feb 2007 Cayman Islands 
China Food Company Plc. CFC £16,270,000 Farming & Fishing LSE AIM 10 Dec 2007 U.K. 
Yangtze China Investment Ltd. YCI £14,770,000 Equity Investment Instruments LSE AIM 14 May 2008 Cayman Islands 
Sorbic International Plc. SORB £12,700,000 Food Products LSE AIM 30 Sep 2008 U.K. 
Geong International Ltd. GNG £12,140,000 Software LSE AIM 23 Jun 2006 U.K. 
FoaMasters International Ltd. FOAM £10,440,000 Commodity Chemicals LSE AIM 05 Dec 2007 U.K. 
London Asia Chinese Private Equity LCP £10,180,000 Equity Investment Instruments LSE AIM 15 Mar 2006 U.K. 
GMO Ltd. GMO £9,690,000 Mobile Telecommunications LSE AIM 06 Sep 2006 U.K. 
Leyshon Resources Ltd. LRL £9,160,000 Gold Mining LSE AIM 26 Oct 2005 Australia 
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Sinosoft Technology Plc. SFT £8,280,000 Software LSE AIM 06 Mar 2006 U.K. 
Walcom Group Ltd. WALG £7,570,000 Food Products LSE AIM 21 Dec 2006 British Virgin Islands 
Taihua Plc. TAIH £7,550,000 Biotechnology LSE AIM 14 Dec 2006 U.K. 
Pixel Interactive Media Ltd. PIXL £7,510,000 Media Agencies LSE AIM 10 Jul 2006 U.K. 
China Eastsea Business Software CESG £6,480,000 Software LSE AIM 24 Jan 2008 U.K. 
Asia Distribution Solutions Ltd. ADSL £6,390,000 Soft Drinks LSE AIM 07 Nov 2007 Cayman Islands 
Arko Holdings Plc. AKO £5,440,000 Electricity LSE AIM 13 May 2002 U.K. 
EBT Mobile China EBT £5,000,000 Specialty Retailers LSE AIM 08 Sep 2005 U.K. 
Upstream Marketing and Communications Inc. UPS £3,780,000 Media Agencies LSE AIM 16 Oct 2006 Cayman Islands 
China Biodiesel International Holdings 
Company Ltd. 
CBI £2,950,000 Specialty Chemicals LSE AIM 30 Jun 2006 British Virgin Islands 
Central China Goldfields GGG £2,910,000 Gold Mining LSE AIM 30 Mar 2005 U.K. 
Bodisen Biotech, Inc. BODI £2,840,000 Specialty Chemicals LSE AIM 06 Feb 2006 U.S.A. 
Univision Engineering Ltd. UVEL £2,780,000 Electronic Equipment LSE AIM 16 Dec 2005 Hong Kong 
China Western Investments Plc. CHWI £2,730,000 Real Estate Holding & Development LSE AIM 15 Jun 2004 U.K. 
ZTC Telecommunications Plc. ZTC £2,720,000 Telecommunications Equipment LSE AIM 21 Mar 2007 U.K. 
SovGEM Ltd. SOV £2,510,000 Specialty Finance LSE AIM 23 Nov 2004 U.K. 
NetDimensions (Holdings) Ltd. NETD £1,800,000 Software LSE AIM 02 May 2007 Cayman Islands 
Sweet China Plc. SWC £1,330,000 Specialty Finance LSE AIM 31 Mar 2005 U.K. 
China Wonder CWO £1,080,000 Industrial Machinery LSE AIM 01 Oct 2004 U.K. 
LED International Holdings Ltd. LED £780,000 Electronic Equipment LSE AIM 23 Oct 2006 Hong Kong 
PAQ International Holdings Ltd. PAQ £720,000 Industrial Suppliers LSE AIM 25 Feb 2008 Cayman Islands 
Universal Coal Plc. UCL 0.00 General Mining LSE AIM 01 Jul 2005 U.K. 
Jarlway Holdings Plc. JWY 0.00 Commercial Vehicles & Trucks LSE AIM 18 Jul 2005 U.K. 
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CEC Unet Plc. CECU 0.00 Specialty Finance LSE AIM 06 Jul 2006 Republic of Ireland 
Tinci Holdings Ltd. TNCI 0.00 Industrial Machinery LSE AIM 31 Jul 2006 Hong Kong 
Canton Property Investment Ltd. CPIL 0.00 Real Estate Holding & Development LSE AIM 16 Aug 2007 British Virgin Islands 
Source: data collected from the official website of London Stock Exchange in October 2008, see London Stock Exchange, Statistics, Historic: Company Files, available at: 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/statistics/historic/company-files/company-files.htm, accessed October 27, 2008. 
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